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Abstract
The Glittery Fog of Civilization: Great Britain, Germany, and International Politics, 1854 - 1902
For the last twenty years, the rhetoric of civilization has clawed its way back into international 
discourse,  and into books and articles written by political scientists and scholars of international 
relations. Most of these emphasize the close connection between the concept of civilization and 
colonialism, suggesting that the main purpose of civilizational language in international relations 
has always been an imperial one. In this thesis, I argue that such interpretations are mistaken, and 
use British and German debates to retrace the complex political development of a concept at once 
popular and indeterminate, which Bismarck referred to as being covered by a 'glittery fog'. I argue 
that political civilizational language first started to be advanced by European liberals, who were not 
advocating  colonialism,  but  instead  opposing dynastic  and non-national  politics  within  Europe. 
Following these debates, the rhetoric of civilization was first officially employed in the Crimean 
War, and from then on remained an important fixture primarily of inner-European politics. The wars 
of the 1860s that followed in its wake were, I argue, as much wars about the correct definition of 
civilization, as they were about nationalism. It was only in the 1870s that the concept of civilization 
started to acquire the global profile and sometimes imperial connotation so often associated with it 
and the nineteenth century in general. But the bloom of this civilizational language was a short one. 
From the 1880s onwards, the appeal of civilization started to decline as the critique of modernity 
and  its  negative  effects,  first  voiced  by  socialists  and  radicals,  started  to  reach  mainstream 
liberalism. With the end of the nineteenth century, I argue, the classic language of civilization also 
came to an end. Larger sections of the European public started to question the ulterior motives 
behind civilizational language and the main conflicts of the turn of the century, the Boer war and the 
Boxer rebellion, also produced new discourses of civilizational plurality, through which appeals to 
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Interpreting the Return of Civilization
In 1993, Samuel Huntington burst the collective bubble of enthusiasm created by the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union with the grim assertion that what the world would now come to see was not the 
'End of History', but a 'Clash of Civilizations'.2 The word had a distant ring to it. Although some had 
written about civilizations during the Cold War, most would have agreed with Anthony Pagden, 
who just a few years earlier asserted: 'We do not, on the whole, speak of civilizations, except in the 
past tense'.3 Yet, Huntington's article was so successful that it, as he himself proudly noted in the 
book bearing the same title: 'stirred up more discussion in three years than any other article they 
[Foreign Affairs] had published since the 1940s.'4 Proponents and opponents of Huntington's thesis 
clashed in an academic debate of unparalleled proportions, whose echo reverberated in the higher 
echelons of power.5 Following a proposal from former Iranian president Muhammed Khatami in 
1 All mentions of 'civilization' and similarly charged words like 'savages' and 'barbarians' should be understood as 
being in inverted commas. All the translations that follow, unless otherwise specified, are my own, and I have  
taken the liberty to refer to various countries by the names used in the decades analysed, even though they were 
sometimes not the official name of the country itself. So, when commentators in the United Kingdom of Great  
Britain and Ireland,  which was most frequently referred to as England,  talked about Turkey or the Turkish  
Empire,  a state officially known as  the Ottoman Empire,  I  have used these designations interchangeably.  It  
should be assumed that these words refer, respectively, to congruent political entities. The exception to this rule 
is the word 'Germany', that, although frequently used by commentators in the mid-nineteenth century, did not 
actually refer to a clearly designated unit. I have generally referred to 'the German-speaking lands' or have used 
similar words to describe a linguistically (widely) homogeneous region in Central Europe, and have reserved the 
word Germany for the territories inside the borders of the German Empire from 1871. The spelling of the word  
civilization itself has, as for most engaged in its study, been an ongoing concern for me. I have settled with  
spelling civilization with a z, except when quoting from original material.
2 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22–49; Francis 
Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).
3 Anthony Pagden, “The ‘Defence of Civilization’ in Eighteenth-Century Social Theory,” History of the Human 
Sciences 1, no. 1 (1988): 33; Fernand Braudel, Grammaire des Civilisations (Paris: Arthaud, 1987); Philip 
Bagby, Culture and History: Prolegomena to the Comparative Study of Civilizations (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1958); William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); Victor Fritz Lenzen et al., Civilization (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1959); Arnold Toynbee, Civilization on Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948); Carroll 
Quigley, The Evolution of Civilizations: An Introduction to Historical Analysis (New York: MacMillan, 1961); 
Stanford M. Lyman, Civilization: Contents, Discontents, and Malcontents and Other Essays (Fayetteville, AR: 
University of Arkansas Press, n.d.); Roger W. Wescott, “The Enumeration of Civilizations,” History and Theory 
9, no. 1 (1970): 59–85; “International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations,” 
http://wmich.edu/iscsc/Journal.html, (n.d.), accessed December 25, 2014.
4 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2007), 13.
5 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “‘Civilization’ on Trial,” Millennium, no. 28 (1999): 141–53; Bruce M. Russett, John 
R. Oneal, and Michaelene Cox, “Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence,” 
Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 5 (2000): 583–608; Lene Hansen, “Past as Preface: Civilizational Politics and 
the `Third’ Balkan War,” Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 3 (2000): 345–62; Giacomo Chiozza, “Is There a 
Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International Conflict Involvement, 1946–97,” Journal of 
Peace Research 39 (2002): 711–34; Robert Cox, “Thinking about Civilizations,” Review of International Studies 
26 (2000): 217–34; James F. Hoge, The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2010).
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1998, the UN decided to name 2001 'Year of Dialogue among Civilizations'.6 The following years, 
Khatami's  intention to  counter  the  threat  of  Huntington's  best-seller  becoming a 'self-fulfilling-
prophecy'  proved  to  be  an  enduring  concern.  In  2005,  the  Turkish  President  Erdogan  and  the 
Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero started another initiative for a 'UN Alliance for Civilizations'.7 The 
project  was  formalized  a  year  later,  and  it  is  safe  to  say  that  political  concerns  expressed  in 
civilizational  terms,  both  amicably  and  antagonistically,  have  since  remained  a  fixture  of 
conceptualizations of the international sphere; a fact only recently proven by Putin's assertion that 
Crimea  had  'invaluable  civilizational  […]  meaning  for  Russia',  a  status  apparently  implicitly 
justifying its annexation.8
The academic debates that followed Huntington's publications in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
were not limited to the theses and arguments of his books. They were also concerned with the 
concept of civilization as an analytical tool. In departments of international relations, politics and 
sociology, civilization became a new buzzword to be analysed in journals, conferences, congresses, 
and edited volumes.9 This interdisciplinarity was a natural phenomenon, as Johan P. Arnason noted: 
'the problematic of civilizations is not reducible to particular ideological choices, nor can the more 
scholarly discussion be confined to a particular discipline.'10 All  seemed to agree that the word 
civilization was particularly well suited to describe a fundamentally new international situation. 
Although many criticized Huntington's essentialist categories, it seemed obvious to most that a new 
vocabulary was needed to describe a new world. The concept of civilization would be at the heart of 
these  endeavours,  and  sustain  the  work  of  several  disciplines  trying  to  adapt  their  theoretical 
apparatus. As the introduction to a themed issue of  International Sociology triumphantly noted in 
6 “UN Documents,” http://www.un-documents.net/a55r23.htm, (n.d.), accessed July 29, 2014; M. S. Michael and 
Fabio Petito, eds., Civilizational Dialogue and World Order: The Other Politics of Cultures, Religions, and 
Civilizations in International Relations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
7 “United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC),” United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC), 
accessed July 29, 2014, http://www.unaoc.org/.
8 Gregorio Bettiza, “Civilizational Analysis in International Relations: Mapping the Field and Advancing a 
‘Civilizational Politics’ Line of Research,” International Studies Review 16, no. 1 (2014): 1–28; Andrew 
Linklater, “Civilizations and International Society,” http://www.e-ir.info/2013/05/03/civilizations-and-
international-society/, E-International Relations, (n.d.), accessed March 30, 2015; Johan Eriksson and Ludvig 
Norman, “Political Utilisation of Scholarly Ideas: The ‘Clash of Civilisations’ vs. ‘Soft Power’ in US Foreign 
Policy,” Review of International Studies 37, no. 01 (2011): 417–36; “Putin Says Crimea Sacred, Attacks U.S., 
EU Over Ukraine,” http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2014-12-03/ukraine-may-hold-new-talks-with-
rebels-as-eu-nato-press-russia, Bloomberg Politics, (n.d.), accessed February 10, 2015.
9 Stephen K. Sanderson, ed., Civilizations and World Systems: Studying World-Historical Change (Lanham: 
Rowman Altamira, 1995); Mehdi Mozzafari, ed., Globalization and Civilizations (London: Routledge, 2002); 
Jóhann Páll Árnason, Civilizations in Dispute: Historical Questions and Theoretical Traditions (Leiden: Brill, 
2003); Martin Hall and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, eds., Civilizational Identity: The Production and 
Reproduction of “Civilizations” in International Relations (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007); Peter J. 
Katzenstein, ed., Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009).
10 Johann P. Arnason, “Introduction,” Thesis Eleven 62, no. 1 (2000): iii – v.
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September 2001: 'To develop the conceptual and methodological framework to do justice to this 
emergent global reality is the challenge for the sociology of civilization.'11
A little more than a week later, 'this emergent global reality' revealed a cruel twist, and the word 
civilization a long-forgotten second face. As the dust slowly settled on the World Trade Center, the 
United States were 'waging a war to save civilization itself'.12 Albeit reluctantly, other world leaders 
soon followed this rhetoric and the singular of civilization joined the plural as a tool to analyse and 
conduct international politics.13 US President Bush offered a characteristic, and inimitably nuanced, 
description of the situation, as he rallied a 'coalition of the willing' to engage in a 'crusade' to fight  
'civilization's fight'.14 In a bizarre reversal of a scenario played out just a few years before, Bush 
threw the  ball  of  civilization back to  academia.  Whereas  Huntington's  controversial  theses  had 
forced politicians to react, the US commander-in-chief's use of the word civilization had a similarly 
stimulating  effect  on  the  academic  community.  Throughout  the  next  months,  the  president's 
speeches  and their  reference  to  civilization  were dissected  in  numerous  articles,  all  seeking to 
situate  the new political  rhetoric  of civilization and to understand its  role in a  changing world 
order.15
These first responses were shaped by a post-colonial outlook and the suspicion that the rhetoric of 
civilization marked a return of imperialism. In academic fields marred by a colonial legacy the 
concept of civilization did not enjoy the best of reputations. Given their central involvement in the 
science of empire, anthropologists had insisted since the 1970s that the use of civilization in their 
discipline had sustained conquest and repression, yet other academic fields had equally been blamed 
11 Edward A. Tiryakian, “The Civilization of Modernity and the Modernity of Civilizations,” International 
Sociology 16, no. 3 (2001): 290.
12 “Bush: ‘We Wage a War to Save Civilization Itself,’” 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/11/08/rec.bush.speech/index.html, (n.d.), accessed July 29, 2014.
13 “Italy’s Premier Calls Western Civilization Superior to Islamic World,” 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/27/world/italy-s-premier-calls-western-civilization-superior-to-islamic-
world.html, (n.d.), accessed July 30, 2014; Lee Harris, Civilization and Its Enemies: The Next Stage of History 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004); “Kerry: Paris Gunmen ‘Opposed to a Civilized World,’” 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/01/07/john-kerry-charlie-hebdo-attackers-opposed-to-a-civilized-
world, U.S. News, (n.d.), accessed February 20, 2015.
14 “Transcript of President Bush’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Thursday Night, September 20, 2001,” 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/, (n.d.), accessed July 30, 2014.
15 Maureen Montgomery, “Savage Civility: September 11 and the Rhetoric of ‘Civilization,’” Australasian Journal  
of American Studies 21, no. 2 (2002): 56–65; Brett Bowden, “Reinventing Imperialism in the Wake of September 
11,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 1, no. 2 (2002): 28–46; Henry A. Giroux, “Democracy and the Politics 
of Terrorism: Community, Fear, and the Suppression of Dissent,” Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies 2, 
no. 3 (2002): 334–42; Douglas Kellner, “9/11, Spectacles of Terror, and Media Manipulation,” Critical 
Discourse Studies 1, no. 1 (2004): 41–64; David Palumbo-Liu, “Civilization and Dissent,” Amerasia Journal 27, 
no. 3 (2001): 125–38; David Palumbo-Liu, “Multiculturalism Now: Civilization, National Identity, and 
Difference Before and After September 11th,” Boundary 2 29, no. 2 (2002): 87–108; David P. Fidler, “The 
Return of the Standard of Civilization,” Chicago Journal of International Law 2 (2001): 137.
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for similar offences.16 As the sociologist Jonathan Fletcher had explained to his readers in 1997: 
'The concept of civilization has been used [...] as an ideological, evaluative weapon employed by 
generations  of  historians  in  the  service  of  Western  colonialist  aspirations  [...]'.17 Said's  ground-
breaking Orientalism inspired many to think of Western domination as a military-artistic complex 
sustained  by  academics  and  their  arguments  from  civilization.  With  the  wars  in  Iraq  and 
Afghanistan  these  concerns  returned  to  the  centre  of  attention  and  Said  himself  described  the 
interventions as 'the latest mission civilizatrice (sic)' defended by a 'chorus of willing intellectuals'.18
To many of those who continued to probe the concept of civilization in the aftermath of these 
events, its tandem appearance with imperialism was no coincidence. As the exploration of the term 
itself intensified in the early 2000s, a popular argument developed that effortlessly linked previous 
historical uses of civilization with the present.19 The concept of civilization, most argued, had been 
formed during the Enlightenment, but it expressed an ever-present desire of the 'West', in one way 
or another, to dominate the rest of the world.20 The universal narratives provided by Enlightenment 
philosophers  and  their  predecessors  justified  and  sustained  European  imperialism  (and  its 
reincarnations in the US), and formed an integral part of what had become known as the 'rhetoric 
(or language) of empire'.21 The word civilization, according to some throughout centuries, never 
16 Stanley Diamond, In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilization (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1974), 1; Thomas C. Patterson, Inventing Western Civilization (New York: Cornerstone Books, 
1997).
17 Jonathan Fletcher, Violence and Civilization: An Introduction to the Work of Norbert Elias (London: John Wiley 
& Sons, 1997), 6–7.
18 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 2003), xxi.
19 Mark B. Salter, Barbarians and Civilization in International Relations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); 
Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2005); Brett Bowden, “Civilization and Savagery in the Crucible of War,” Global 
Change, Peace & Security: 19, no. 1 (2007): 3–16; Christopher Hobson, “‘Democracy as Civilisation,’” Global 
Society 22, no. 1 (2008): 75–95; Boris Kapustin, “Some Political Meanings of ‘Civilization,’” Diogenes 56, no. 
2–3 (2009): 151–69; Mark Neocleous, “The Police of Civilization: The War on Terror as Civilizing Offensive,” 
International Political Sociology 5, no. 2 (2011): 144–59; Aziz Al-Azmeh, “Civilization as a Political 
Disposition,” Economy and Society 41, no. 4 (2012): 501–12; Helen M. Kinsella, “Discourses of Difference: 
Civilians, Combatants, and Compliance with the Laws of War,” Review of International Studies 31, no. 
Supplement S1 (2005): 163–85; Roland Paris, “International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilatrice,’” 
Review of International Studies 28, no. 04 (2002): 637–56; Alexandra Gheciu, Securing Civilization? The EU, 
NATO and the OSCE in the Post 9/11 World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Armel Brice 
Adanhounme, “Corporate Social Responsibility in Postcolonial Africa: Another Civilizing Mission?,” Journal of  
Change Management 11, no. 1 (2011): 91–110; Jan Zielonka, “Europe’s New Civilizing Missions: The EU’s 
Normative Power Discourse,” Journal of Political Ideologies 18, no. 1 (2013): 35–55.
20 The 'West' is almost as slippery a concept as civilization, for a brief introduction see Riccardo Bavaj, “‘The 
West’: A Conceptual Exploration,” EGO | Europäische Geschichte Online, accessed July 30, 2014, http://ieg-
ego.eu/_theme/temporary_manifest_hack.html; Alastair Bonnett, The Idea of the West: Politics, Culture and 
History (Palgrave USA, 2004). Riccardo Bavaj, “‘The West’: A Conceptual Exploration,” http://ieg-
ego.eu/_theme/temporary_manifest_hack.html, EGO | Europäische Geschichte Online, (n.d.), accessed July 30, 
2014; Alastair Bonnett, The Idea of the West: Politics, Culture and History (Palgrave USA, 2004).
21 Bruce Buchan, “Enlightened Histories: Civilization, War and the Scottish Enlightenment,” The European 
Legacy: Toward New Paradigms 10, no. 2 (2005): 177–92; Bruce Buchan, “The Empire of Political Thought: 
Civilization, Savagery and Perceptions of Indigenous Government,” History of the Human Sciences 18, no. 2 
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fulfilled another function than to dominate, to enslave and to suppress. The discourse of progress 
and  civilization,  wherever  it  appeared,  did  not  just  smack  of  imperialism  –  it  was.22 In  the 
international sphere, civilization could serve as a litmus test for empire, as it was always indicative 
of sinister politics.
Questions and Arguments
At first glance, this interpretation of civilization as an exclusively imperial tool is a powerful and 
succinct explanation of its history and use in the international sphere, but we should be wary of 
reducing this concept to a particular meaning or area of politics. Throughout the nineteenth century, 
the rhetoric of civilization combined an indeterminate nature with enormous emotional appeal in 
virtually all aspects of European debates; a fact often lamented by its critics. As the idiosyncratic 
British politician, David Urquhart, put it in 1855: '“Civilisation” is, in fine, a monster without brain 
or heart, or noble organ, but with a life of mere limb, such as belong to the order of polypi destitute  
of cerebral function'.23 Yet, this lack of independent cerebral function seemed to have only increased 
its  political  power,  and  as  I  will  demonstrate  the  word  civilization  served  as  the  cover  for  a 
bewildering variety of political  aims.  Seeking to  sum up its  simultaneously attractive and hazy 
nature  for  Western  Europeans,  Bismarck described the  rhetoric  of  civilization  as  covered  by a 
'glittery fog'.24 This phenomenon, I argue, spread over and enveloped most political debates during 
the nineteenth century. While imperialism was perhaps the first structure to be revealed after it had 
lifted and has therefore become associated with it, we should think of the whole nineteenth century 
as covered by the 'glittery fog' of civilization.
In the following chapters, I will trace and explore a multitude of international uses of the concept of 
civilization, seeking to answer three essential questions implicitly raised but not explicitly treated in 
recent literature on the topic. When and why did civilization first become used as justification in 
international politics? How did it become and remain so successful? And when did it start to be seen 
(2005): 1–22; David Spurr, The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and 
Imperial Administration (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1993); Robert H. MacDonald, The Language of 
Empire: Myths and Metaphors of Popular Imperialism, 1880-1918 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1994); Alastair Pennycook, English and the Discourses of Colonialism (London and New York: Routledge, 
2002).
22 For the most explicit formulation of this argument see Brett Bowden, The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution 
of an Imperial Idea (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and 
the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
23 David Urquhart, Familiar Words, as Affecting the Conduct of England in 1855 (London: Trübner & Company, 
1855), 182.
24 Otto v. Bismarck, Gedanken und Erinnerungen, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Verlag der J.G.Cotta’schen Buchhandlung, 
1898), 102.
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as associated with imperialism, as it is predominantly today? The argument that I want to propose is  
that civilization did not originally become an essential concept of international politics because of 
its  imperial  connotations,  but  because  the  word  took  on  a  central  role  in  the  rhetoric  that 
accompanied the major political shifts in nineteenth-century Europe. In the hundred years in which 
the continent shifted from the Vienna to the Paris system, as Weitz has described it, civilization was 
the major rhetorical tool driving political change, including a turn to empire amongst many other 
developments.25 Civilization should therefore not be seen as an essentially imperial concept but an 
incidental one.
As I will argue, the rise of civilization as a political term was closely connected to liberal politics,  
but while liberalism was the driving force behind most early nineteenth-century debates, we should 
not think of the concept of civilization as a tool exclusively tied to one ideology. Liberal rhetoric of 
civilization found a conservative echo in most political discussions in which those claiming to speak 
for the future of civilization opposed those who sought to protect it from revolutionary influences.  
The progress  of  civilization  was  the  rallying  cry in  demands  for  the  downfall  of  the  dynastic 
empires  in  Europe,  while  the  opponents  of  such  politics  claimed  that  the  Holy  Alliance  was 
protecting civilization from the 'barbarism of the educated West'.26 As the century advanced, the 
politics  of  liberalism started  to  prevail,  and  civilization  as  a  key-word  of  the  1830  and  1848 
revolutions  became the  main  justification  of  the  Crimean War,  thereby bringing an  end to  the 
conservative European order.27 With the downfall of the Vienna system a new era in international 
politics began, whereby liberal ideas of a national and civilized state came to replace the divine 
right of kings and Christianity as the standard model of European politics.
Liberal nationalism soon turned to empire and the concept of civilization started to lend its name to 
the 'civilizing mission'.  With the Great Game in Asia and the Scramble for Africa,  the aims of 
civilization quickly covered the whole globe and the standard of civilization became a tool to judge 
and rank non-European states and regions. With European wars and conquests all over the world 
continuously justified with civilizational  rhetoric,  socialists  and others  critical  of  empire turned 
against the concept of civilization as a tool of international politics. As they started to claim at the  
25 Eric D. Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of 
Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions,” The American Historical Review 113, no. 5 
(2008): 1313–43.
26 Friedrich Julius Stahl, “Der Orientalische Krieg. (Sitzung Der Ersten Kammer Am 25. April 1854),” in Siebzehn 
Parlamentarische Reden Und Drei Vortraege von Stahl. Nach Letztwilliger Bewilligung Geordnet Und 
Herausgegeben (Berlin: Verlag von Wilhelm Hertz, 1862), 200–218.
27 See chapter 2.
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end of the nineteenth-century, civilization was a 'masked word' of imperialism and could therefore 
not be trusted in  political  discourse.28 While civilization as an international  tool  was weakened 
through this criticism, it continued to be politically effective. As the first global catastrophe of the 
twentieth century, the Great War for Civilization, ripped Europe apart, the rhetoric of civilization 
found another inner-European target. The political concept of civilization continued to endure in 
diluted and debated form in the mandates system of the League of Nations, only to be finally swept 
away by the Second World War.29
While the history of the political  uses of civilization stretches into the middle of the twentieth 
century, the scope of this thesis is limited to answering the three questions outlined above and is 
therefore focused on the nineteenth-century. In seeking to trace the political history of civilization, it 
can rely on a long historiographical tradition exploring various aspects of civilization since the early 
twentieth century. But as I will argue in the next section, dedicated to this literature on civilization, 
the disputed character of the concept itself and its turbulent history have also had a major impact on 
its academic examination. The historical study of the concept of civilization has been an exercise 
almost as political as the use of the concept itself. Indeed, as I show in a quick overview of nearly a  
hundred years of historiography, the academic interest in civilization was often closely related to its 
political use. In light of this historiography, the latest interpretations of civilization as an imperial 
concept, triggered by the suspicion of the return of imperial politics, appear to be following a long 
tradition stretching back almost a century.
Historiography
Serious historical investigation into the problem of civilization originated in the inter-war period 
when, as Fernandez-Armesto casually explained: 'Civilizationology could be said almost to have 
constituted an academic discipline in itself'.30 In the aftermath of a catastrophic war fought in its 
name, the future of civilization was everyone's concern. The history of Germany's prophet of doom, 
Oswald  Spengler,  and  the  public  debates  that  followed  the  publication  of  his  book  are  well 
documented and known,  but  the debate about  civilization affected  other  European countries  as 
well.31 In France, Paul Valéry was describing 'la crise de l'esprit' gripping Europe in the aftermath of 
28 J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: J. Nisbet, 1902), 219.
29 For the most treatment of these questions, see Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the 
Crisis of Empire (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2015).
30 Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, Civilizations: Culture, Ambition, and the Transformation of Nature (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2001), 18; Adam Kuper, Culture: The Anthropologists’ Account (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 23–46.
31 Adam Paulsen, “Reconstruction or Decline? The Concept of Europe and Its Political Implications in the Works 
of Ersnt Troeltsch and Oswald Spengler,” in European Self-Reflection Between Politics and Religion: The Crisis 
of Europe in the 20th Century, ed. Lars K. Bruun, Karl Christian Lammers, and Gert Sørensen (Basingstoke: 
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the war, Spain's Ortega Y Gasset predicted the devastating effects of the rise of the masses, and 
Britain slid into a 'morbid age of civilizational crisis', as Overy has recently called it.32 In times of 
social and economic depression, T.S. Eliot and W.H. Auden were contemplating how their poetry 
could help to save civilization, and a young Arnold Toynbee started to think about the larger life-
cycles of civilization in a comparative perspective to understand current events.33
These concerns for civilization as a phenomenon inspired others to investigate the history of its 
political use in different arenas. The Fabian Leonard Woolf dedicated several works to questions of 
the League of Nations and how the mandates system and its notorious 22nd article, 'the sacred trust 
of civilization', were just an updated version of previous imperialism.34 The current international 
language of civilization, he argued in 1920, was a cover-up: 'The League, as it exists to-day, and its 
mandates system are both shams, and article 22 is simply being used to obscure the fact that France 
and Britain are obtaining large accession of territory for economic exploitation in Africa and Asia'.35 
His close friend, the art critic Clive Bell, meanwhile, explored the historical use of civilization from 
an inner-European angle, an examination triggered by a European catastrophe. In an essay simply 
entitled Civilisation, and dedicated to Woolf's wife, Virginia, he explained that his curiosity in the 
history of the word civilization was piqued by the question of how it had transformed from an 
'abstraction' to holding 'the highest place amongst British war aims' in the latest European conflict.36
Similar questions were asked in Germany, if not about Britain but France. The assertion that 'la 
France marche toujours à la tête de la civilisation' had long been an often ironic dictum in Germany, 
but with the First World War the association of France with the rhetoric of civilization had deepened 
dramatically.37 In the years leading up to and during the war, Germans had been bombarded with 
official and unofficial propaganda, explaining how this conflict had to be framed as an opposition 
between  French  Zivilisation  and German  Kultur.38 To those  who were  now urging for  Franco-
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 58–79; Joanne Miyang Cho, “The German Debate over Civilization: Troeltsch’s 
Europeanism and Jaspers’s Cosmopolitanism,” History of European Ideas 25, no. 6 (1999): 305–19.
32 Paul Valéry, “La crise de l’esprit,” in Europes: De l’Antiquité au XXe siècle: Anthologie critique et commentée, 
ed. Yves Hersant and Fabienne Durand-Bogaert (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2000), 405–14; José Ortega y Gasset, 
The Revolt of the Masses (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993); Richard Overy, The Morbid Age: Britain and the 
Crisis of Civilisation, 1919 - 1939 (London: Penguin, 2009).
33 Lucy McDiarmid, Saving Civilization: Yeats, Eliot, and Auden Between the Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984); Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, 21.
34 Leonard Woolf, Imperialism and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1928); Anna Snaith, 
“Leonard and Virginia Woolf: Writing against Empire,” The Journal of Commonwealth Literature, 2014.
35 Leonard Woolf, Economic Imperialism (London: Swarthmore Press, 1920), 105.
36 Clive Bell, Civilization. An Essay (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1928), 3.
37 See the entry in Georg Büchmann, Geflügelte Worte: Der Citatenschatz des deutschen Volks, 11th ed. (Berlin: 
Haude & Spener’sche Buchhandlung, 1879).
38 Eckart Koester, “‘Kultur’ versus ‘Zivilisation’: Thomas Mann’s Kriegspublizistik Als Weltanschaulich-
12
German reconciliation in books, and in the various reviews and journals founded exclusively for 
this  purpose  in  the  Locarno  era,  civilisation  and  Kultur  were  not  just  philosophical  ideas,  but 
expressions of national character in need of further exploration. As the Alsatian-born, francophile, 
literary scholar Ernst Robert  Curtius explained in the first  volume of the  Deutsch-Französische 
Rundschau, anyone studying the history of France should know:
Wer  sich  damit  abgibt,  der  sollte  –  als  heuristisches  Prinzip  gleichsam  –  immer  die 
Voraussetzung machen: In Frankreich ist alles anders als  bei uns.  […] Eine französische 
Kulturkunde muesste bei dem Wort ‘Kultur‘ anfangen und sich fragen ob man den deutschen 
Begriff ohne weiteres auf Frankreich uebertragen kann. Und man kann es natuerlich nicht! 
Man steht sofort vor der Antithese: Kultur, und Zivilisation.39
Curtius' advice to explore the history of the word civilization along national lines was heeded across 
the border, where in 1929 the notables of French sociological and historical research met at the 
Centre International de Synthèse in Paris to discuss both the past as well as the present of the 
concept of civilization in a star-studded conference.40 While Marcel Mauss's presentation focused 
on the anthropological use of the concept of civilization more broadly and others commented on the 
new research program Alfred Weber and Karl Mannheim had started at Heidelberg, the historical 
part  of  the  colloquium  was  clearly split  between  German  and  French  understandings  of 
civilization.41 Lucien Febvre explored the history of  the evolution of  civilisation,  presumably a 
peculiarly French word, whereas Emile Tonnelat dedicated his time to the exploration of German 
Kultur.42 In a time of European reconciliation, presumed national differences paradoxically did not 
evaporate but were indeed emphasized.
Ästhetische Standortsuche,” in Kultur Und Krieg : Die Rolle Der Intellektuellen, Künstler Und Schriftsteller Im 
Ersten Weltkrieg, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, vol. 34, Schriften Des Historischen Kollegs: Kolloquien (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 1996), 249–58; Nils Bruhn, Vom Kulturkritiker zum “Kulturkrieger”: Paul Natorps Weg in den 
“Krieg der Geister” (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2007); Peter Hoeres, Krieg der Philosophen: die 
deutsche und britische Philosophie im Ersten Weltkrieg (Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schoehning, 2004).
39 Ernst Robert Curtius, “Frankreichkunde,” Deutsch-Französische Rundschau 1 (1928): 28. 'Whoever undertakes 
this study should start with the assumption – as a heuristic principle – that in France everything is different from 
here. A study of French culture would have to start with the word 'culture' and ask whether the German concept 
could easily be applied to France. It cannot, of course! One is immediately confronted with the anti-thesis of 
culture and civilization.'
40 Lucien Febvre et al., Civilisation. Le mot et l’idée (Paris: La Renaissance du livre, 1930); Kuper, Culture, 23–46.
41 Marcel Mauss, “Les Civilisations. Éléments et formes,” in Civilisation. Le mot et l’idée, ed. Lucien Febvre et al. 
(Paris: La Renaissance du livre, 1930), 82–104; Henri Berr, “Avant-propos,” in Civilisation. Le mot et l’idée, ed. 
Lucien Febvre et al. (Paris: La Renaissance du livre, 1930), 8; Colin Loader, Alfred Weber and the Crisis of 
Culture, 1890-1933 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
42 Lucien Febvre, “Civilisation: l’évolution d’un mot et d’un groupe d’idées,” in Civilisation. Le mot et l’idee, ed. 
Lucien Febvre et al. (Paris: La Renaissance du livre, 1930), 10–59; Emile Tonnelat, “Kultur. Histoire du mot, 
évolution du sens,” in Civilisation. Le mot et l’idée, ed. Lucien Febvre et al. (Paris: La Renaissance du livre, 
1930), 64–81.
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In Bonn, where Curtius became professor the same year, the study of the word civilization was 
naturally also considered a French affair.  Obsessed by the role of civilization in French culture, 
Curtius fielded two doctoral students to for the first time trace the history of the French use of 
civilization in its entirety. Joachim Moras explored the historical path of the word civilization from 
its origins in 1756 to its use in Guizot's works of the late 1820s, focusing on the philosophical 
debates  of  the  Enlightenment  and  its  aftermath.43 Moras'  New-Zealand-born  colleague  Reuben 
Ansome Lochore continued the task, and took the examination of French uses of civilization up to 
the 1870s.44 The watershed of 1830, the young doctoral students had introduced, was not accidental, 
as Moras and Lochore agreed that the character of the word civilization changed dramatically in the 
early decades of the nineteenth century. As Moras put it: 
Der  Zivilisationsbegriff  war  in  seiner  substanzlosen  Allgemeinheit  einer  unbegrenzten 
Funktionalisierung  ausgeliefert;  er  kam auf  den  Markt;  jeder  konnte  ihm nun  den  Sinn 
geben, der ihm beliebte, und jeder musste ihn umso mehr auf seine Seite zu bringen suchen, 
je höher er im Kurs der öffentlichen Meinung stieg.45
Slowly, throughout the nineteenth century, the enlightened philosophers and intellectuals originally 
concerned with the term civilization would have had to witness its adoption into general political  
discourse.46 Civilization, Moras and Lochore claimed, became a term every political party sought to 
identify with. Like other words, such as freedom or liberty, whose popularity rose as the nineteenth 
century  advanced,  civilization  was  filled  with  various  meanings,  and  employed  in  changing 
contexts. Through the noise of politicization, or as Moras preferred to call it, 'vulgarisation', more 
academic  discussions  became ever  less  audible.47 Although  few have  since  directly  referred  to 
Moras and Lochore's work, the 1830 line of separation they introduced is in many ways still active, 
as most of the research examining civilization's purely philosophical meanings is not concerned 
with anyone after Guizot.48
43 Joachim Moras, Ursprung und Entwicklung des Begriffs der Zivilisation in Frankreich (1756-1830) (Hamburg: 
Seminar für romanische Sprachen und Kultur, 1930).
44 R.A. Lochore, History of the Idea of Civilization in France (1830-1870) (Bonn: Roehrscheid, 1935); Freya Klier, 
Gelobtes Neuseeland: Fluchten bis ans Ende der Welt (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 2012).
45 Moras, Zivilisation, 85.The concept of civilization was, in its substance-less generality, subjected to unlimited 
functionalization. It became part of the (political) market. Everyone could give it their preferred meaning, and all 
had to seek to have it on their side the higher it rose in public appreciation. 
46 Ibid., 75–87.
47 Ibid., 85.
48 Bertrand Binoche, ed., Les équivoques de la civilisation (Seyssel: Editions Champ Vallon, 2005); Émile 
Benveniste, “Civilisation. Contribution à l’histoire du mot,” in Problèmes de linguistique générale, vol. 1 (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1966), 336–45; Pagden, “The Defence of Civilization”; Raymonde Monnier, “The Concept of 
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The rise of Nazism and the Second World War once again pushed civilization to the centre of 
international discussions. Already in 1934, a mock trial of Hitler in Madison Square Garden had 
found  him  guilty  of  having  committed  'crimes  against  civilization',  but  such  rhetoric  would 
naturally intensify over the following years.49 During the war, civilization featured more frequently 
in the pages of the international law journal, AJIL, than ever before; usage that culminated in the 
Nuremberg trials.50 Here, as Justice Robert Jackson argued in his closing statements, civilization 
itself was the 'real complaining party',  as the wrongs committed in previous years had 'been so 
calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, 
because it cannot survive their being repeated'.51 These legal uses of civilization tied in with a larger 
discussion of how Germans could be reintegrated into a civilized international society, a topic that 
has received more attention in recent US historiography, in which both the short-term rhetoric as 
well as the long-term processes of 're-civilization' have been explored.52
This reconciliation of former enemies was partly the result of the final disintegration of both war-
time alliances and the concept of civilization as a tool structuring international society. For different 
reasons the atomic bomb, the threat of communism, and decolonization convinced many in the 
aftermath of the war that the concept of civilization as an ordering principle of international affairs 
was a phenomenon of the past. The international lawyer,  Georg Schwarzenberger, wrote of 'the 
double-challenge' of totalitarian systems and nuclear war in whose shadow he attempted to trace 
'the ominous character of a movement which has first led to a coalescence of international law and 
civilisation, but, on a global level appears now to point towards the evanescence of the standard of 
Civilisation from Enlightenment to Revolution: An Ambiguous Transfer,” Contributions to the History of 
Concepts 4, no. 1 (2008): 106–36; Hugh L. Gilderson, “From the State of Nature to the Empire of Reason: 
Civilization in Buffon, Mirabeau, and Raynal,” Comparative Civilizations Review 34 (1996): 27–44; Pim den 
Boer, “Towards a Comparative History of Concepts: Civilisation and Beschaving,” Contributions to the History 
of Concepts 3 (2007): 207–33; Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, The American Spirit. A Study of the Idea of 
Civilization in the United States (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1941), 62–97; Jean Starobinski, “The 
Word Civilization,” in Blessings in Disguise; Or, the Morality of Evil (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), 1–35.
49 Louis Anthes, “Publicly Deliberative Drama: The 1934 Mock Trial of Adolf Hitler for ‘Crimes against 
Civilization,’” The American Journal of Legal History 42, no. 4 (1998): 391–410; Mark Mazower, “An 
International Civilization? Empire, Internationalism and the Crisis of the Mid-Twentieth Century,” International 
Affairs 82, no. 3 (2006): 553–66.
50 Christiane Wilke, “Reconsecrating the Temple of Justice: Invocations of Civilization and Humanity in the 
Nuremberg Justice Case,” Canadian Journal of Law and Society 24, no. 2 (2009): 187.
51 “Avalon Project : Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression - Chapter 5,” http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/chap_05.asp, The 
Avalon Project, (n.d.), accessed November 16, 2015.
52 Konrad H. Jarausch, “German Civility? Retying Social Bonds after Barbarism,” European Review of History: 
Revue Europeenne D’histoire 18, no. 3 (2011): 373–86; Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 
1945-1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy: German 
Reconstruction And the Invention of the West (University of Michigan Press, 2006).
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civilisation from international law.'53 This lack of trust in previous European rhetoric of civilization 
drove the process of decolonization. As Mazower has argued, the downfall of civilization used as a 
hierarchical principle of international relations paralleled an adoption of the language of human 
rights  as  a  thoroughly  universal  framework.54 With  the  abolition  of  a  system  of  European 
domination the word civilization also disappeared from view.
The declining importance of civilization as an international principle opened it up to more thorough 
historical exploration and enabled new perspectives on its use.  The Polish scholar of international 
law, Alexandrowicz, argued that similar systems to the standard of civilization had existed in other 
areas of the globe before, and that academic attention should not be focused on the meaning of 
civilization, but instead on these systems of order.55 The same year, Notker Gloker explored what he 
understood to be the the end of the French fascination for the concept of civilization. As Gloker 
claimed,  with  the  catastrophes  of  previous  decades  and  a  general  decline  of  national  ideas  in 
Europe,  the  French  association  with  civilization  had  evaporated.56 While  the  French  links  to 
civilization were weakened in the literature, new studies of German uses of civilization reconnected 
France's eastern neighbour with the rhetoric of civilization. Pflaum, like Gloker a doctoral student, 
started to question whether the ideas of the inter-war period of a German opposition to civilization 
were  based  on  historical  evidence  and  found  that  at  least  until  the  1880s  Germans  had  not 
distinguished between Zivilisation and Kultur.57 Although he could not quite explain how and why 
this shift had happened, his work has since formed the basis of most studies concerned with the 
distinction between Zivilisation and Kultur. Most importantly, Fisch has relied on Pflaum's findings 
for his article on Zivilisation  and Kultur  in the  Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe,  but this research of 
the 1960s also sustains more recent work on the development of German Kulturpropaganda,  like 
Besslich's Wege in den Kulturkrieg.58
53 Georg Schwarzenberger, “The Standard of Civilisation in International Law,” Current Legal Problems 8, no. 1 
(1955): 234.
54 Mark Mazower, “The End of Civilization and the Rise of Human Rights,” in Human Rights in the Twentieth 
Century, ed. Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
55 C. H. Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies:(16th, 17th and 
18th Centuries) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967).
56 Notker Gloker, “Die Entwicklung von Civilisation und Cultur in Frankreich seit 1930,” in Europäische 
Schlüsselwörter. Wortvergleichende und wortgeschichtliche Studien., vol. III. Kultur und Zivilisation (Munich: 
Max Hueber Verlag, 1967), 31–97; Notker Gloker, “Civilisation” und “culture” in Frankreich seit 1930: Ein 
Beitrag zur Entwicklungsgeschichte beider Begriffe (Tübingen: Verlag Elly Huth, 1967).
57 Michael Pflaum, “Geschichte Des Wortes Zivilisation” (PhD, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, 1961).
58 Jörg Fisch, “Zivilisation, Kultur,” Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen 
Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992); Barbara Besslich, Wege in den “Kulturkrieg”: 
Zivilisationskritik in Deutschland 1890-1914 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2000); Georg 
Bollenbeck, Bildung und Kultur, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt: Insel Verlag, 1994); Stefan Breuer, “Späte Barbaren. Kultur 
und Zivilisation im kaiserlichen Deutschland,” in Politik-Verfassung-Gesellschaft: Traditionslinien und 
Entwicklungsperspektiven. Otwing Massing zum 60. Geburtstag (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
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In the 1980s,  historians  investigating the history of the word civilization were joined by those 
working in international relations. From the early 1980s onwards, members of the so-called English 
school have started to examine the workings of the nineteenth-century standard of civilization.59 It 
was specifically the publication of Gong's The Standard of Civilization in International Society in 
1984 that provided new insights into both the workings of the international society, as well as the 
use of civilization.60 Much has since then been written about the standard of civilization in the 
nineteenth  century,  as  well  as  on  its  predecessors  and  alleged  successors  in  the  twentieth  and 
twenty-first  century.61 Most intriguingly for those interested in the concept of civilization itself, 
international relations scholars have since then focused on the adoption of civilizational language 
and other tools of the international sphere around the turn of the century.62 Specifically the case of 
Japan  and  China,  their  varying  adoption  of  the  European  ideas  of  civilization,  and  of  the 
international order, have been traced in minute historical detail by scholars like Shogo Suzuki.63 
This trend of international relations scholarship shows no sign of abating any time soon, as many 
have now turned to other countries, like Russia, and leading journals in international relations, such 
1995), 35–50.
59 Barry Buzan, “The ‘Standard of Civilisation’ as an English School Concept,” Millennium - Journal of 
International Studies 42, no. 3 (2014): 576–94.
60 Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1984).
61 Mehdi Mozzafari, “The Transformationalist Perspective and the Rise of a Global Standard of Civilization,” 
International Relations of the Asia Pacific 1, no. 2 (2001): 247–64; Brett Bowden, “In the Name of Progress and 
Peace: The ‘Standard of Civilization’ and the Universalizing Project,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29, 
no. 1 (2004): 43–68; Fidler, “Return of the Standard of Civilization”; Brett Bowden and Leonard Seabrooke, 
Global Standards of Market Civilization (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006); Ann Towns, “The Status of Women as a 
Standard of ‘Civilization,’” European Journal of International Relations 15, no. 4 (2009): 681–706; Edward 
Keene, International Political Thought: An Historical Introduction (Oxford: Polity, 2005), 160–193; Brett 
Bowden, “The Colonial Origins of International Law. European Expansion and the Classical Standard of 
Civilization,” Journal of the History of International Law7 7, no. 1 (2005): 1–23; Buzan, “The ‘Standard of 
Civilisation’ as an English School Concept”; Edward Keene, “The Standard of ‘Civilisation’, the Expansion 
Thesis and the 19th-Century International Social Space,” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 42, no. 3 
(2014): 651–73; S. Yamauchi, “Civilization and International Law in Japan during the Meiji Era (1868-1912),” 
Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics 24 (1996): 17–25; Yannis A. Stivachtis, “Civilization and International 
Society: The Case of European Union Expansion,” Contemporary Politics 14, no. 1 (2008): 71–89.
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Discourse, 1847-1911 (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2007); Turan Kayaoglu, Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and 
Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); 
Tong Lam, “Policing the Imperial Nation: Sovereignty, International Law, and the Civilizing Mission in Late 
Qing China,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 52, no. 04 (2010): 881–908; Junnan Lai, “Sovereignty 
and ‘Civilization’ International Law and East Asia in the Nineteenth Century,” Modern China 40, no. 3 (2014): 
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Nineteenth-Century China and Japan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Alexander Bukh, Japan’s 
National Identity and Foreign Policy: Russia as Japan’s “Other” (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010).
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as Millennium, have published issues exclusively concerned with the standard of civilization and its 
history.64
This frenzied interest in the standard of civilization and the meaning of the word itself have also 
affected the discipline of international law. While references to civilization in today's legal practice 
are few and far between, its implication in the international affairs of the late nineteenth century, 
which Schwarzenberger explored, has been a concern of the historians of international law ever 
since.  Around  the  time  of  the  millennium and  the  founding  of  the  Journal  of  the  History  of  
International Law, these concerns markedly intensified as the study of the history of international 
law itself received an enormous boost.65 Books and articles have been written not only about the 
historical  use  of  the  term 'civilized  state',  but  also  about  the  generation  of  lawyers  that  were 
involved  in  the  formalization  of  the  vocabulary  of  civilization.66 While  some  have  focused 
specifically  on  the  development  of  the  terminology  of  civilized  warfare,  others  have  been 
examining this movement more broadly.67 Most important amongst these works is Koskenniemi's 
magisterial The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, which traces the lives and doctrines of the founders of 
the  Institut de Droit International  and their successors, and which inspired a host of other works 
dedicated to the question of the relationship between civilization and international law.68
Historians, meanwhile, not to be outdone, have produced a staggering amount of literature on the 
ideological use of civilization in the era of high imperialism in recent years. Not only has the idea of 
the civilizing mission been analysed in countless publications, but historians of imperialism have 
done their best to trace the existence of this mission in practically all European states.69 But, just as 
64 Dimitrios Stroikos, “Introduction: Rethinking the Standard(s) of Civilisation(s) in International Relations,” 
Millennium - Journal of International Studies 42, no. 3 (2014): 546–56.
65 For some examples see E. Myles, “‘Humanity’, ‘Civilization’ and ‘the International Community’ in the Late 
Imperial Russian Mirror - Three Ideas ‘Topical for Our Days,’” Journal of the History of International Law 4 
(2002): 310–34; Douglas Howland, “Japan’s Civilized War: International Law as Diplomacy in the Sino-
Japanese War (1894-1895),” Journal of the History of International Law 9, no. 2 (2007): 179–201; Brett 
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Civilization,” Journal of the History of International Law7 7, no. 1 (2005): 1–23.
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(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012).
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Crimes, 1872–1918,” European Review of History: Revue Europeenne D’histoire 14, no. 2 (2007): 215–34; 
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War Studies 4, no. 1 (2013): 97–110; Kinsella, “Discourses of Difference”; Geoffrey Wallace, “Regulating 
Conflict: Historical Legacies and State Commitment to the Laws of War,” Foreign Policy Analysis 8, no. 2 
(2012): 151–72; the locus classicus remains Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare. The Modern History of the 
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the scholars of international relations, with whose work theirs often overlaps, they have with time 
become more interested in the use of civilization in non-European countries. The various instances 
of what Osterhammel has referred to as 'self-civilization' have been examined more closely, and 
even attempts to mimic and to adapt European civilizing missions have come under close scrutiny.70 
Again,  Japan and China  have  attracted the most  attention,  but  we also now know more  about 
Ottoman attempts to justify their empire through a civilizing mission, or the Korean politics of 
'internal civilization'.71
Methodology
While the historiography on civilization is rich and varied, most of it has been dedicated to the 
exploration of very specific areas of its use and not on a larger picture of its political development, 
which this thesis seeks to trace. Some have approached civilization as a French expression, others 
have dedicated their studies to its specific use in international law or how it featured in debates of 
the Enlightenment, but with few exceptions, the manifold connections between these uses and their 
change over time have been insufficiently analysed. Yet, in order to understand how the discourse of 
civilization developed on a larger scale and affected European politics as a whole, our attention 
needs to be focused on multiple arenas. Approaches to trace such conceptual development over time 
have been pioneered by the German tradition of Begriffsgeschichte on which this thesis relies, but 
also seeks to develop further.
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The original intention of the scholars of Begriffsgeschichte was to add a layer of intellectual history 
to the booming discipline of Sozialgeschichte and to argue that concepts just like social structures 
were  developing  over  long  time-spans.  The  project  quickly  became  synonymous  with  a  large 
dictionary entitled Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (GG), whose originators postulated that the most 
important shifts in German vocabulary had happened during the so-called Sattelzeit.  It was during 
this time, which they defined as lasting from 1750 to 1850, that many German words underwent a 
process of Politisierung, Demokratisierung, Verzeitlichung and increased their Ideologisierbarkeit.72 
In other  words,  they acquired the character  of modern,  contested,  political  vocabulary,  that  the 
theorists  of  Begriffsgeschichte  imagined to  be not  just  a German but  a European phenomenon. 
Investigating a series of such concepts through centuries, a process the makers of the  GG called 
'macro-diachronic  analysis',  they  hoped  would  demonstrate  the  validity  of  their  theory,  and 
simultaneously make it possible to trace what they were most interested in: conceptual change.73
Over several years of the dictionaries existence, certain problems started to show. Although some 
articles in the enormous work, like Jörg Fisch's contribution on  Zivilisation/Kultur,  attempted to 
integrate  other  languages  and  time-periods,  the  project  itself  was  not  internationalized,  and 
remained fixed within a particular historical vision.74 This framework, to which Koselleck, its main 
architect, would later refer as a 'theoretische Zwangsjacke', became more difficult to sustain as the 
project advanced.75 Given the immense variety of terms covered in the dictionary, its contributors 
were struggling to write their articles in a broadly comparable style, and the ideas of the Sattelzeit  
were  harder  to  prove  than  its  theorists  had  originally  imagined.  Especially  the  universalizing 
ambition of proving that this process had also happened around the same time in other European 
countries proved futile, as similar dictionaries in other languages quickly made clear that Sattelzeit  
(at least in the way that the makers of the GG imagined) was not a universal phenomenon.76
As the  program of  conceptual  study became applied  internationally,  investigations  beyond  the 
strictly national became possible.77 Several Dutch studies into the parallel  history of Dutch and 
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European  concepts  were  undertaken  and  Jörn  Leonard  even  tried  to  compare  the  concept  of 
liberalism in four European countries.78 Most of these studies pioneered new ways into conceptual 
analysis, yet they remained classical in one respect. The nature of conceptual change was grasped 
through  a  large  socio-historiographical  apparatus,  itself  the  heritage  of  the  (originally)  close 
relationship of Begriffs,- and Sozialgeschichte.79 From such a socio-historical perspective, concepts 
changed  in  long processes  of  historical  change,  in  which  the  acts  of  individual  speakers  were 
submerged in a sea of 'general development'. Whether these time-periods were called Sattelzeit  or 
Moderne,  it  seemed  as  if  the  various  individual  utterances  studied  were  not  connected  to  the 
individual speaker/writer originally responsible, but instead to the time-period itself. In other words, 
in order to establish a historically changing sphere of communication, the individual speech-acts 
became representations of larger historical processes.
A critique of not considering speech acts as individual utterances was the starting point for the most 
poignant criticism of  Begriffsgeschichte,  which came from theorists not directly involved in it. It 
was predominantly members of the so-called Cambridge School, Pocock and Skinner, who argued 
that  the  project  of  Begriffsgeschichte had  been  misconceived  from the  beginning.80 Especially 
Pocock, who met Koselleck on several occasions, criticized the methodology of Begriffsgeschichte 
as in many ways a-historical. Taking concepts out of the political debates that they formed a part of, 
and then integrating them into a larger narrative of social history de-contextualized these words, 
Pocock argued, and thereby obscured the political intention behind their use.81 Pocock and Skinner 
advocated a contextualist approach, which as Skinner had paradigmatically outlined in his famous 
'Meaning  and  Understanding  in  the  History  of  Ideas'  situated  particular  utterances  in  specific 
political  debates.82 Concepts,  Pocock and Skinner  asserted,  only had  meaning  in  these  debates 
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themselves, and could not be generalized onto a higher level.
This  critique of the large project  of  Begriffsgeschichte  is  a  powerful  one,  but  an insistence on 
contextualism should not discourage us from undertaking larger studies. As Koselleck has put it in 
answer to such criticism, it is important to remain 'sensibel fuer solche Problemstellungen', but this 
does  not  necessarily  mean  that  one  has  to  give  up  trying  to  understand  larger  conceptual 
developments.83 As long as the main problem Skinner and Pocock identified in Begriffsgeschichte,  
that utterances could and were taken out of context to fit a larger narrative, can be sidestepped, 
nothing  speaks  against  histories  of  concepts  and  their  development.  As  Skinner  himself  has 
admitted 'as long as this danger can be avoided, then I see every reason to welcome the attempt to 
write histories of concepts – or rather, as I strongly prefer to put it, to write histories of the uses of  
concepts in argument.'84
To write such a history of 'the use of concepts in argument' means to find a compromise between the 
strict contextualist approach of Skinner and the long-term focus of the original Begriffsgeschichte, 
to balance an insistence on the individual value of speech acts with an analysis of their development 
on a larger scale. The only sensible approach appears to be to focus on a number of debates spread 
evenly over a certain time-period, and to draw them together for analysis.  It is clear that any of 
these smaller cases that make up a narrative of the longue durée could be treated in more detail. But 
what is lost in depth is gained in breath. While a more detailed study of a particular debate might be 
able to describe it with more nuance, it would be less capable of understanding its relationship and 
dependence on other, similar debates.
The debates that I have chosen, and will discuss in more detail in the last section of this chapter, are  
Europe-wide discussions about political or military conflicts in which the word civilization was 
invoked.  Some of  them are  covered  in  more  depth,  whereas  others  serve  as  auxiliary tools  to 
explore the specific meanings of civilization in connected conflicts. I am aware that the multitude of 
discussions covered chronologically might leave an impression of superficial treatment, as several 
books could be written about each one of them. But I want to stress what the aim of this thesis is, 
namely to explore the development of the political rhetoric of civilization in the nineteenth century. 
The main improvement on a classical  Begriffsgeschichte  approach is that the word civilization is 
53.
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only treated in its political  variety,  and directly integrated into the debates in which it  is used. 
Without having to rely on a large a-priori model of historical development, the various instances of 
civilizational  language  can  be  treated  as  individual  acts  and  their  uses  fused  into  a  more 
genealogical story. But this raises the question in which framework these debates are to be analysed, 
a topic I deal with in the next section.
Case Selection and Sources
Traditionally, French debates have been seen as the most historically fruitful acre of understanding 
ideas of civilization and even civilization itself, as France has been used both to exemplify the rise 
of civilization as well as the use of the word. When Guizot addressed his students in 1828 on the 
subject of civilization, he argued that its historical development could be traced in several ways. 
One could focus on the rise of civilization in its entirety jumping from one country to another and 
examining events in a multitude of contexts, or one could focus on one country, one that would 
exemplify the rise of civilization in its entirety.85 Guizot chose the second option and used France as 
an example of civilization. This close association of France and civilization has, as I have shown, 
later inspired several studies on the use of the concept of civilization, and although the association 
of France and civilization has weakened in recent decades, it  is still  described as an essentially 
French concept. As Alice Conklin has argued in a recent book on the French civilising mission: 
'Civilization is a particularly French concept; the French invented the term in the eighteenth century 
and have celebrated the achievements of their own ever since.'86 
The  questions  of  method  and  case  selection  Guizot  discussed  with  his  students  in  the  early 
nineteenth century have continued to plague historians, but they no longer share his robust trust in a  
study focusing on a single nation or state. Historians of the nineteenth century helped to constitute 
the nation-state through their writings, but their profession's enthusiasm for such enterprises has 
since  waned.87 While  the  method  of  comparative  history  was  pioneered  in  the  early  twentieth 
century to go beyond a single nation-state perspective, if one were to sum up the major trend in 
history writing over recent decades, it is a collection of attempts to move beyond the European 
nation-state altogether.88  While a first wave of discussions of globalization in the 1990s led to new 
developments in the fields of global or world history, the previously self-evident character of the 
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European nation-states has also come under close scrutiny.89 Their past has been described as a long 
history of a multitude of transfers in which the idea of certain clearly identifiably national aspects 
has all but evaporated.90 Especially in Franco-German traditions of history-writing a number of new 
approaches  seeking  to  go  beyond  previous  comparative  studies  have  been  advanced  in  recent 
decades.91
The idea of transfers and connections going beyond the previously known has not stopped with 
bordering countries, but has by now taken on global dimensions in which not only the history of 
former colonies and colonizers has become entangled, but a renewed focus has been put on imperial 
and transnational elites.92 Historians of imperialism have described the intellectual arena created by 
empires as the origin of modern international thought, and exciting new works have been written on 
imperial and national elites mixed in these new spaces created by empire.93 These elites also acted 
as carriers of ideas, and a new field of global concept history tracing the dissemination of concepts 
along these lines has been the home of a growing number of historians.94 But the spread of global 
networks has not exclusively been the purview of imperial historians. Indeed, it has opened a space 
for an examination of transnational networks, which have featured in multiple studies on various 
communities.95
This  larger  transnational  shift  of  the  historical  profession  is  a  fascinating  and  enriching 
historiographical development, but the question is whether this new perspective is best applied to a 
study seeking to explore the rise of civilization as a concept of international politics. The word 
civilization was never the exclusive domain of particular international networks, although some like 
the Institut de Droit International exercised a major influence over its development.96 There could 
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be many studies on the use of civilization in these circles as well as on the multitude of transfers of 
civilizational ideology and vocabulary, but they would be limited in scope and it is doubtful whether 
the rise and continued importance of civilization would be explicable through them. Yet, neither 
does it seem feasible to go back to a study focused on just one state or to explore the history of  
civilization  through a  classical  comparison,  as  this  general  phenomenon  cannot  be  grasped  by 
focusing purely on clearly defined units.
In order  to  solve this  problem, I  have chosen to write  what  Miller  has called a  'cross-national 
history'  and has defined as 'the pursuit  of a historical story across several national experiences 
without  the  impulse  to  make  comparative  evaluations'.97 Such  an  approach  may  develop 
comparative  attributes,  but  it  is  not  originally  set  out  to  compare  or  to  specifically  trace 
entanglements. In contrast, it is meant to trace a general development through the use of sources and 
material  from several  national  settings.  At  first  glance,  such a  methodology would seem to sit 
uneasy with a contextualist approach to intellectual history, as it could potentially be focused on too 
many different contexts to allow for proper historical engagement. In order to minimize the risk of 
chasing a multitude of stories in incomparable contexts, I have kept the number of countries whose 
debates I will trace at two. It is however important to stress that I do not understand these cases as  
hermetically sealed containers. Rather, I use them to reflect general aspects of European debates in 
an increasingly international era. In the late nineteenth century, most larger debates have to be seen 
as common European ones.  Newspapers were sharing information,  new books on controversial 
topics  were  quickly  translated,  and  parliamentarians  in  various  European  countries  referred  to 
debates in other national legislatures. While I have attempted to situate debates in specific countries, 
the transnational nature of these discussions has sometimes made it necessary to refer to literature 
or events outside of their national borders.
With  many  civilizational  studies  already  existing  on  France,  I  will  focus  on  its  European 
neighbours, Germany and Britain, whose debates not only helped to spread the word civilization 
and influence its developments, as I will explore in the next section, but which as centres of debate 
also reveal different aspects of the political use of civilization. As I will demonstrate, the major 
social  and ideological  developments to  which the word civilization was connected affected the 
frameworks of British and German debates in often very different ways. While the rise of liberalism 
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and civilization as a political ideology ultimately moved the former enemies Britain and France 
closer  together,  Prussia  (on  which  this  study  will  focus  before  German  unification)  was  torn 
between a predominantly conservative elite and an often liberal populace advocating rather different 
international policies. The question of nationalism, intimately connected to these debates never saw 
the territorial integrity of Great Britain seriously in doubt, whereas the German question continued 
to dominate European politics for decades. A similar situation can be observed in the years in which 
European politics turned to imperialism. Whereas Britain was the leading global imperial power, 
Germany had not acquired a single overseas possession before 1884, a fact naturally reflected in 
these often civilizational debates. While the political make-up of Germany and Britain can naturally 
not reflect all major international developments, they form two very heterogeneous frameworks in 
which to examine the various uses of civilization, and are therefore ideal for a study of its larger 
development.
In order to trace the various civilizational debates in these countries, I have relied on a large number 
of  published  sources.  As the  original  scholars  of  Begriffsgeschichte,  I  have  started  out  by not 
actively excluding any source mentioning the term civilization, but in contrast to them, I have taken 
great care to connect each mention of civilization to a specific public debate. In this thesis, I have 
used parliamentary protocols, pamphlets, books, essays, articles in newspapers and journals, treaties 
in international law, and papal encyclicals. I have also used private letters between members of the 
British  government  and  Portuguese,  German,  and  French  diplomatic  documents  in  order  to 
highlight aspects of publicly debated treaties. Yet, for the most part, I have focused my attention on 
published documents, in order to trace the larger picture of the rhetoric of civilization. When using 
books  or  others  sources,  whose  content  was  debated  in  British  and  German  discussions  but 
originated in other countries, I have attempted to use it in the versions translated into German or 
English.
Conflicts and Outline
As I will argue in the first chapter, which serves as a historical introduction, while the language of  
civilization was undoubtedly born in France, it not only relied on Ancient Greek and Roman tropes, 
but spread through the intervention of British and German philosophers. It might have been the 
Marquis de Mirabeau who first used the term civilization in 1756, however the philosophers who 
perfected the study of the levels of development it was soon associated with were Scottish, and the 
idea of civilization itself was probed as far away as Königsberg. The French Revolution, in whose 
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wake, I argue, the term civilization took on a pronounced political meaning, was certainly justified 
in  France  with  reference  to  civilization,  but  in  the  international  debate  that  followed,  it  was 
chastised through the same vocabulary. Edmund Burke demonstrated civilization's contested nature 
when he argued that 'our civilization, and all the good things which are connected with manners and 
with civilization' were not connected to the idea of progress and the 'barbarous metaphysics' of the 
revolution, but to the 'spirit of religion'. It was, as I will show, a distinction between two definitions 
of civilization that would influence European thinking for almost a hundred years.  In the early 
decades  of  the  nineteenth  century,  a  time-period  Moras  has  rightly  identified  as  a  period  of 
vulgarization, French liberals, like Constant and Guizot, can most clearly be identified with the 
language of civilization. Yet their thought and ideas about it only spread through the intervention of 
men like John Stuart Mill and German nationalists, who adopted the language of civilization as their 
own. 
It was through its association with nationalism, I argue in chapters two and three, now focused on 
entirely on German and British debates, that the concept of civilization reached truly international 
prominence.  A discourse  that  associated  the  claims  of  nationalism  with  the  idea  of  modern 
civilization, and identified Russia as the opponent of both, had grown in Europe in the aftermath of 
the 1830 and 1848 revolutions, which Russia had helped to suppress. When the Tsar, after a series 
of diplomatic misunderstandings, attacked the Ottoman Empire, which had previously given shelter 
to the refugees of 1848, British and French politicians could count on the support of those who had 
harboured positive feelings towards the revolutions to support them in their intervention against the 
Russian Empire. It was clear that Napoleon III should justify French intervention on the side of 
Turkey as being in support of civilization, but as I show tracing British debates surrounding the war, 
the concept of civilization also took centre-stage in the arguments of those who wanted to see the 
United Kingdom at war with Russia. The irony that (what I argue was) the first official war for 
civilization fought by Western powers, was undertaken in defence of the Ottoman Empire should 
not be lost on those who continue to argue that all expressions of civilization fit neatly into an 
orientalist paradigm. 
In the German-speaking countries, the rhetoric of civilization surrounding the war was also heavily 
discussed in debates that continued almost seamlessly during the 1860s, and that are the subject of 
the third chapter. During the 1860s, the high-point of the Western European wars of nationalism, 
civilization  became  even  more  closely  associated  with  national  claims.  In  the  discussions 
surrounding the Second Italian War of Independence and the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, which I 
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examine  in  detail,  the  ideas  of  modern  civilization  associated  with  nationalism and  liberalism 
collided with the ideas of those, like the Catholic Church, who sought to defend the old order with 
similar  vocabulary.  The  Vatican  itself  not  only  published  a  journal  dedicated  to  Catholic 
Civilization, but also expressly denounced the calls for a reconciliation of the Pope with modern 
civilization  and  liberalism  in  the  Syllabus  of  Errors  of  1864,  an  event  that,  as  I  will  show, 
reverberated throughout Europe, specifically in Britain and Germany.
As the problematic of Western European nationalism started to subside in the early 1870s, a period I 
analyse  in  the  fourth  chapter,  German  and  British  politicians  started  to  apply  the  ideas  of 
civilization  further  afield.  The  1870s  can  be  seen  as  a  shift  of  European  civilizational 
preoccupations from internal and European-wide discussions, related to the Catholic Church and 
nationalism, to truly global debates. Whereas the early years of the decade were still dominated by 
discussions about how the freshly proclaimed infallibility of the Pope was related to civilization, the 
latter years saw civilization applied further afield. It is no coincidence, as I show tracing several 
discussions about international politics from 1875 to 1878, that the language of civilization was 
suddenly simultaneously used to  argue for  British intervention  against  the Ottoman Empire,  to 
justify the Russian war effort in the same conflict, and in calls for the geographical exploration of 
the Congo. These debates also prove that the language of civilization was, by the late 1870s, no 
more purely French, but international. 
Its truly international character quickly showed at the Berlin Conference of 1885, in which the 
spread of civilization, argued for on an international basis since the 1870s, was formally inscribed 
into international law. Exploring the debates surrounding the Conference, but also the conference 
protocols themselves, a task to which the fifth chapter is dedicated, I argue that we should read the 
obvious success of civilizational language against the criticism of civilization which became more 
pronounced around the same time. Especially in German debates, but as I show also in Britain, 
liberal ideas of the continuous rise of civilization were heavily criticized. While such criticism had 
previously come from the likes of the Catholic Church, it had spread further afield, and changed in 
character.  The  'original'  critique  of  modern  civilization  had  been  based  on  an  opposition  to 
nationalism,  its  newer variety opposed increasing industrialization,  the character  of  the modern 
economy, and the inability of the state to solve larger social issues.
Similar debates continued in the 1890s, and chapter six focuses on two European-wide discussions, 
which  were  concerned  not  with  spreading,  but  with  preserving  civilization.  In  the  climate 
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dominating the last decade of the century, which many have already described as being a period of 
civilizational  crisis,  a  new international  debate  developed about  what  Gladstone,  British  Prime 
Minister at  the time, called a 'scourge to civilization':  the increasing militarization of European 
society. In a large conflict, which soon developed between various Peace Movements and those who 
argued that the prospect of war was saving Europe from an effeminate and materialist future, the 
concept  of  civilization  was  used  on  all  sides.  These  debates,  not  coincidentally,  were 
contemporaneous with major shifts in the power-structure of the international sphere, as Japan, in 
what it unsurprisingly claimed was a display of civilized warfare, defeated China in the war of 
1894/1895. In Europe, especially in a circle surrounding the German emperor Wilhelm II, these 
developments were interpreted as a new threat to European civilization, that needed to be stopped. 
This anti-Asian civilizational rhetoric built up during that conflict later dominated the discussions 
surrounding  Boxer  rebellion,  to  which  half  of  the  last  chapter  of  this  thesis  is  dedicated.  The 
attempts of the Kaiser and others to describe the intervention in China as one for civilization were 
heavily criticized by those, predominantly on the left, who had started to interpret the continuous 
use of civilization as a cover-up for imperialism. Such ideas also dominated the other conflict, 
which shook the world around the same time, and which is the other subject of this final chapter: 
the Boer War. German, but also British critics of the official depiction of the war as one between 
civilization and backwardness, started to chastise such use of civilizational language. In the writings 
of German journalists, and future British prime ministers, the language of civilization was actively 
criticized, and it is a rhetoric, that, although in some sense changed, continues until today. It was 
around the turn of the century, I argue, that the negative association of the term civilization with 
empire, which has dominated recent literature, began in earnest. As I will show in this thesis, it is a 
mistake to assume that this type of civilizational rhetoric showed the true character of the concept of 
civilization, as the word itself formed the basis of many, very different, international debates.
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Chapter 1. Civilization: from the Greeks to Guizot and Mill
Introduction
Although the word civilization (with a sense resembling contemporary usage) was only coined in 
the  1750s,  its  intellectual  roots  stretch  back  much  further.  In  this  chapter,  I  investigate  the 
etymological and intellectual origins of the concept of civilization. I argue that while the term itself 
is modern, some of its contents are based on the philosophies of Ancient Greece and Rome. I then 
move on to a personality of the sixteenth century, often associated with an international concept of 
civilization: Francisco de Vitoria. While this attribution is historically false, I examine how, why, 
and with which  arguments,  Vitoria  has  come to be associated with  a  contemporary concept  of 
civilization, and where the roots of this intellectual appropriation lie. In a third part, I examine the 
real origins of the concept of civilization in mid-eighteenth century Europe, and make the argument 
that while civilization is most often associated with a relatively homogeneous liberal and colonialist 
ideology, it was from the beginning a deeply contested concept in European affairs. Already at its 
inception in the 1750s, civilization was claimed both by conservative and progressive thinkers. I 
show that these different interpretations have endured throughout the nineteenth century. The fourth 
and final part focuses on the French liberal politician and historian Francois Guizot, and the impact 
of his works on civilization of the late 1820, not just in France but in Europe. I explore how the  
inevitable  rise  of  the rhetoric  of  civilization in  the first  half  of the nineteenth century made it 
possible for this language to enter into the vocabulary of international politics and to become one of 
its most defining terms.
The Etymological Roots of Civilization and the Problems of Philosophy
The word civilization has held sway over intellectual minds for centuries. Yet, attempts to extract its  
actual meaning have been a sure source of frustration for a long line of philosophers and others 
engaged in similar exercises.1 As John Armstrong confessed in the most recent attempt:  
With the possible exception of God, civilization is the grandest, most ambitious idea that 
humanity has devised. If we could get to the heart  of civilization and uncover its secret 
meaning,  we  would  understand  something  deep  and  important  about  ourselves  and  the 
human condition and of urgent present relevance. But the question: 'What is civilization?' is 
1 Kenneth Clark asked the same question in his highly successful TV Series and gave the, deliberately haphazard, 
answer: 'I don't know. I can't define it in abstract terms yet, but I think I can recognize it when I see it. 
“Civilisation - A Personal View by Kenneth Clark,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ElcYjCzj8oA (London: 
BBC, 1969), 3:35.
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bewildering. When we try to spell out the idea the word points to we find ourselves at a loss.2
Civilization is a difficult word for those trying to fix its meaning, as they have very little to hold on 
to. The classic philosophical method of understanding through etymology, trying to locate the core 
meaning of a word through a study of its ancestry, seems to draw a spectacular blank.3 As R.G. 
Collingwood, who started out on the same quest as Armstrong more than sixty years earlier, noted: 
'Etymology by itself tells us very little about a word like “civilization”, and what it tells us is not 
trustworthy'.4 Etymology itself is not treacherous, as Collingwood rightly understood, but the hope 
to establish the current (or any historic) meaning of the term purely through an examination of its 
linguistic roots is. Intellectual historians are undoubtedly in a more comfortable position, as the 
'secret meaning of civilization',  should such a thing exist,  is really none of their concern. Their 
question is not: 'what is civilization?', but what did civilization mean at a given point in time, and 
why? 
The  historical  interest  in  etymological  questions  is  thereby also  of  a  different  nature  than  the 
philosophical one,  as are the conclusions drawn there-from. The reason Collingwood found the 
etymological  investigation  of  civilization  so  hopeless  was  that  he  realized  that  to  establish  a 
universal definition of civilization, it was inadequate to merely know
that civilization should mean the process of rendering something civil,  or the process of 
becoming civil; or alternatively the state of being civil which is the result of either process. 
And civil should mean of or belonging to a townsman so that the process should be one of 
conversion into, or becoming, a townsman or like a townsman.5
For historians, this is the wrong way of going about etymological research. Instead of trying to  
understand  what  the  history  of  civilization  can  tell  us  about  its  present  meaning,  we  should 
investigate why, what Armstrong calls, 'the grandest, most ambitious idea humanity has devised' 
should have the townsman as its root. In other words, a true meaning of civilization does not exist 
for historians, and their aim can only be to reconstruct the different meanings given to the word 
civilization at various points in time.
2 John Armstrong, In Search of Civilization: Remaking a Tarnished Idea (London: Penguin UK, 2009), 2.
3 For philosophers and etymology see Martin Jay, Songs of Experience: Modern American and European 
Variations on a Universal Theme (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 9–11.
4 R.G. Collingwood, The New Leviathan: Or Man, Society, Civilization, and Barbarism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1947), 281.
5 Ibid.
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The word civilization is indeed derived from the latin word civis, the citizen, or townsman, yet like 
most Roman words denoting abstract philosophical concepts, it has its origins in Ancient Greece.6 
The word civitas has its equivalent in polis, the central component of Ancient Greece's economic, 
political, and intellectual life. So fundamental was this concept that the Ancient Greeks considered 
the ability to form a polis a sign of humanity and proof of reason.7 Consequently, the only way to be 
truly human was to live and participate in the activities of the polis. The foreigners outside of this 
realm, structured by what the Greeks called  logos, simultaneously meaning reason or (the Greek) 
language, were simply babblers, or as they became known as: barbaroi.8 While a relatively neutral 
word at first,  barbaros had become, once Greek political theory hardened into its most definitive 
form in the fourth century: 'a word which was used only for cultural and mental inferiors.'9 
Similarly,  the  Greeks  classed  those  as  inferior  whose  political  systems  could  not  afford  their 
members the same fulfilment as the  polis, as they assumed that the type of political association 
revealed something about the 'human status' of their inhabitants. In his taxonomical investigations, 
Aristotle found Greece's eastern neighbours particularly lacking. Their conditions of government, 
he  alleged,  were  not  like  tyranny,  an  acceptable,  circumstantial  form  of  governance,  but  a 
systematic state of oppression: despotism.10 The reasons for the success of despotism in the East lay, 
he hypothesized,  with the nature of Asians, who were more servile than Europeans, and would 
therefore not rebel against treatment considered undignified by the Greeks.11 Needless to say, the 
words  barbarism and  despotism derived  from these  considerations,  have  their  own conceptual 
history worthy of investigation, and their precise relationship to words like civilization has varied 
over time, and with the linguistic context they were deployed in.12 Nonetheless,  it  is  not  at  all 
surprising that the mental map the Ancient Greeks supplied later generations with should have the 
independent city dweller at its centre, and barbarians and those living in despotic conditions defined 
in inferior positions to it. Although the Greeks neither possessed words in any way comparable to 
modern conceptualizations of culture and civilization, their ideas of the superiority of the politically 
6 Jörg Fisch, “Zivilisation, Kultur,” Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen 
Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992), 682–683.
7 Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 16.
8 Fisch, “Zivilisation, Kultur,” 683; Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man, 16.
9 Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man, 16.
10 Joan-Pau Rubies, “Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism: Botero to Montesquieu,” Journal of Early 
Modern History 9, no. 1–2 (2005): 115–116.
11 Ibid.
12 Rubies, “Oriental Despotism”; Franco Venturi, “Oriental Despotism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 24, no. 1 
(1963): 133–42; W. R. Jones, “The Image of the Barbarian in Medieval Europe,” Comparative Studies in Society  
and History 13, no. 04 (1971): 376–407.
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active 'townsman' has remained a trope in European political thought.13  
The  peculiar  Greek  obsession  with  cities  and  their  inhabitants,  which  owed  much  to  the 
geographical character of their land, could not be replicated in the republic and later empire of 
Rome.14 Nonetheless,  the  Romans  did  accord  the  concept  of  citizenship  special  importance, 
particularly the citizenship of Rome itself. In his speeches against Verres, the corrupt governor of 
Sicily,  Cicero coldly recounts  one of  his  most  atrocious  deeds:  to  have tried,  beaten,  and later 
crucified one of his  opponents.15 The heinous nature of the crime lay not in  the fact that such 
behaviour was generally considered to be unethical; it mattered because the man had been a Roman 
citizen. As such, he had the right to be tried in the capital itself and, even if found guilty, was always 
to  be  spared  the  cross.16 Cicero  dramatically  expressed  the  enormous  discrepancy between the 
brutality of the treatment and the status of the victim: 
Then he [Verres] orders the man to be most violently scourged on all sides. In the middle of 
the  forum of  Messana  a  Roman  citizen,  O judges,  was  beaten  with  rods;  while  in  the 
meantime no groan was heard, no other expression was heard from that wretched man, amid 
all his pain, and between the sound of the blows, except these words, “I am a citizen of 
Rome.”17
Much like the inhabitant of the Greek  polis, the citizen of Rome was thought to be an elevated 
being, who solely by membership of this city could hope to avoid the treatment reserved for those 
living outside. With time, the special consideration paid to those living inside the city would make 
the word civil take on the meaning of refined, and consequently well-mannered and affable.18 Its 
opposite meanwhile, the word describing wildness and ferocity, silvaticus, had its roots in silva (or: 
sylva), the woods and is the etymological ancestor of the modern 'savage'.19 In much the same way, 
the modern 'villain' owes its existence to the peasant: villanus, and the slightly antiquated 'urbane' 
has  its  roots  in  urbs,  the  city.  While  the  Greeks  arguably  invented  such  dichotomous 
13 Fisch, “Zivilisation, Kultur.”
14 Ibid., 683–689; Michael Pflaum, “Geschichte Des Wortes Zivilisation” (PhD diss., Ludwig-Maximilians-
Universität, 1961), 1–4.
15 Marcus Tullius Cicero, “In Verrem,” http://perseus.uchicago.edu/perseus-cgi/citequery3.pl?
dbname=PerseusLatinTexts&query=Cic.%20Ver.&getid=0, Perseus: Latin Text and Translations, (n.d.), 
accessed August 25, 2014.
16 Jane F. Gardner, Being a Roman Citizen (London: Routledge, 1993).
17  Marcus Tullius Cicero, “Cicero in Verrem,” http://perseus.uchicago.edu/perseus-cgi/citequery3.pl?
dbname=PerseusLatinTexts&getid=1&query=Cic.%20Ver.%202.5.160, Perseus: Latin Text and Translations, 
(n.d.), 2.5.162.
18 Pflaum, “Zivilisation,” 1.
19 George Stocking, Victorian Anthropology (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 10.
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conceptualizations of the town and the outside, these deepened and augmented in Ancient Rome, 
and created a pool of words and ideas that deeply influenced later European thought.
As the empire slowly crumbled, these connotations of civility similarly diminished and virtually 
disappeared  until  they  were  resuscitated  in  fourteenth  century  Humanism  and  the  later 
Renaissance.20 In the sixth century, the historian Cassiodorus, writing under Ostrogoth rule, would 
still  fondly  remember  Rome  as  'this  seat  of  civility'  (ipsam  civilitatis  sedem).21 By  then,  the 
insecurity  precipitated  by the  downfall  of  the  empire  had driven  many to  seek  refuge  in  new 
metaphysical realms, and the idea of a more ordered and secure life was similarly expressed in 
religious language.  The  civitate dei, about which Augustine preached to his followers,  replaced 
previous ideas of civility, merely bound up with the city, and instead connected them to God, a 
heritage that dominated the rest of the Middle Ages. It was only through the curious restoration of 
latinized Aristotelian vocabulary and ideas in the thirteenth century that Thomas Acquinas could 
utter  the argument  that  it  was  in  fact  'the political  that  renders  man civil'  (politicus  enim facit  
hominem civilem), as he recognized that 'the political is itself the civil' (politicum idem est quod 
civile).22 
This  Aristotelian  reception,  combined with  the  economic  and  political  rise  of  Italian  and later 
northern European towns, re-established the close implicit connections between the political unit 
and an idea of manners and elegant behaviour. As the city grew in economic importance, its citizens 
sought to distinguish themselves through the consumption of ever more elaborate goods, as well as 
through personal refinement. Particularly important in this context was Erasmus' book of manners 
for young boys, whose title clearly explained its contents: De civilitate morum puerilium, and which 
is the early cornerstones of Elias' theory of the civilizing process.23 By the early sixteenth century, a 
notion of civility associated with good manners and behaviour had become firmly established both 
in Latin and in the ever more popular  vulgate,  and these ideas came to describe individuals and 
whole societies.24 It is tempting to see the success of these words in the sixteenth century as an early 
stage of, what might be described as 'theories of civilization'. This would be a crude anachronism.  
20 For a powerful critique of this, generally accepted, interpretation see John Gillingham, “Civilizing the English? 
The English Histories of William of Malmesbury and David Hume,” Historical Research 74, no. 183 (2001): 
17–43.
21 Fisch, “Zivilisation, Kultur,” 688.
22 Ibid., 694.
23 Pim den Boer, “Towards a Comparative History of Concepts: Civilisation and Beschaving,” Contributions to the  
History of Concepts 3 (2007): 216–218; This book plays a major role in Norbert Elias theories, see Norbert 
Elias, Über den Prozess der Zivilisation: soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen, vol. 1, 2 vols. 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981). 'A Handbook on the Good Manners for Children'
24 Fisch, “Zivilisation, Kultur.”
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Despite the fact that it slowly became possible to speak of civilised and barbarian nations, there was 
no  theory  to  sustain  these  assertions;  neither  the  word  nor  the  idea  of  a  'process/progress  of 
civilization' existed.25 The idea of civility or a civilized character was not  embedded into a 'ladder 
of civilization', an invention of the eighteenth century.26
Civilization and the Manipulations of Francisco de Vitoria
Even so, such a concept of civilization has often come to be associated with Francisco de Vitoria, a  
Dominican  monk  of  the  early  sixteenth  century.  Historically  speaking,  the  attribution  is 
fundamentally mistaken, and the debates about it of only minimal interest. What these discussions 
do reveal is the political nature of attempts to ground the concept of civilization in history, and the 
extent to which historical figures have been co-opted to serve the aims of those seeking to use 
historical arguments to justify their reading of a contemporary concept of civilization. It is therefore 
not primarily the historical figure of Vitoria that is of interest for an investigation of the concept of 
civilization, but those who have tried to attribute the concept to him, and the question of why they 
have done so. Until the inter-war period of the twentieth century, Vitoria was on the margins of 
academic discourse, known amongst early modernists as the author of De Jure Belli Hispanorum in  
Barbaros and  De Indis 27 Although  such an  attribution  is  slightly  problematic,  given the  fluid 
boundaries of medieval curricula, one might term De Indis a legal document, as it was written to 
justify Spanish claims over the new world and its inhabitants.28 The remarkable nature of this book 
consisted in the fact that it questioned many previous arguments proposed to justify this process of 
colonization, such as the idea, based on Aristotle, that the Indians were slaves by nature (a theory 
advanced  by the  likes  of  Juan  Ginés  de  Sepúlveda).  Similarly, the  more  classically  medieval 
assertion that 'universal monarchy', at the time exercised by Charles V, stretched over the whole 
world, was also dismissed.29 Nonetheless, Vitoria reached the conclusion that the Spanish incursions 
on Indian territory were admissible in a number of cases, which Vitoria called 'just'. Among them: if 
the Indians voluntarily agreed to be ruled by a Christian Prince, if they could be proven mad or 
25 Marc Pauka, Kultur, Fortschritt und Reziprozität: Die Begriffsgeschichte des zivilisierten Staates im Völkerrecht 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012), 69–83.
26 Despite the fact that some have been using misleading language suggesting that it was indeed used, see D. Alan 
Orr, “Inventing the British Republic: Richard Beacon’s ‘Solon His Follie’ (1594) and the Rhetoric of 
Civilization,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 38, no. 4 (2007): 975–94; George Huppert, “The Idea of 
Civilization in the Sixteenth Century.,” in Renaissance: Studies in Honour of Hans Baron (Dekalb, IL: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 1971), 757–70.
27 Francisco de Vitoria, Vitoria: Political Writings, ed. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991). 'About the American Indians'
28 As a separate legal sphere, detached from general theological considerations, had not been created it is difficult 
to argue that De Indis is indeed a purely a legal document.
29 Peter Fibiger Bang and Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, eds., “‘Elephant of India’: Universal Monarchy Through Time 
and Across Cultures,” in Universal Empire: A Comparative Approach to Imperial Culture and Representation in 
Eurasian History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1–42.
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insane, should they violently obstruct missionary activity, or should there be danger  of innocents 
living under tyranny.30 The last of these has come into sharper academic and political focus in recent 
years,  as  Vitoria's  status  within  the  realm  of  'humanitarian  intervention'  and  'responsibility  to 
protect' has been investigated more thoroughly.31 Earlier in the twentieth century, when Vitoria saw 
his first renaissance, it  was another article in his treatise that was heavily debated, an article of  
which Vitoria himself was not particularly sure, and styled a 'possible' not a 'just'  title. Spanish 
incursions  could  potentially be just,  he  argued,  if  'these barbarians,  though not  totally  mad,  as 
explained before, are nevertheless so close to being mad that,  they are unsuited to setting up or  
administering a commonwealth both legitimate and ordered in human and civil terms.'32 
During  the  inter-war  period,  Vitoria's  work  more  broadly,  and  specifically  this  article,  was 
rediscovered  in  a  number  of  circles,  most  importantly  by the  American  internationalist  lawyer 
James Brown Scott, who used Vitoria as a justification for the newly inaugurated mandate system. 
As the secretary of the Carnegie foundation, Scott had been instrumental in pushing the agenda of 
international law even before the First World War, and as a US envoy to the Paris Peace Conference 
he had helped to negotiate the Covenant of the League of Nations, containing the notorious 22nd 
article,  specifying  that  the  mandate  system was:  'a  sacred  trust  of  civilization'.33 In  numerous 
lectures and in print, Scott did not just preach the virtues of international law, he also sought to 
establish the roots of its illustrious history. Vitoria, he argued, was the first to establish a universal 
secularized realm of law for all of humanity to have a part in, a concept on which the League of 
Nations  heavily  relied.  In  order  to  make  this  argument,  Scott  carefully  overlooked  the  final 
conclusions Vitoria had drawn, and focused instead on the arguments he had rejected, namely that 
the  Indians  were slaves  by nature,  and the  rights  of  universal  monarchy.34 Scott  took Vitoria's 
reluctance to accept these arguments and his potential willingness to argue that Spanish rule was 
just, if these barbarians were unable to set up their own commonwealth, as evidence that he was not  
the medieval thinker many took him to be, but the first apostle of modern liberal international law.  
30 Vitoria, Vitoria, 288.
31 William Bain, “Saving the Innocent,Then and Now: Vitoria, Dominion and World Order,” History of Political 
Thought 34, no. 4 (2013): 588–613; Pekka Niemelae, “A Cosmopolitan World Order? Perspectives on Francisco 
de Vitoria and the United Nations,” Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 12 (2008): 301–44; Beate Jahn, 
“Humanitarian Intervention – What’s in a Name?,” International Politics 49, no. 1 (2012): 36–58; James 
Muldoon, “Francisco De Vitoria and Humanitarian Intervention,” Journal of Military Ethics 5, no. 2 (2006): 
128–43; Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith, “Humanitarian Intervention and Just War,” Mershon International Studies 
Review 42, no. 2 (1998): 283–312; Anne Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
32 Vitoria, Vitoria, 290.
33 For James Brown Scott's biography see George Augustus Finch, Adventures in Internationalism: A Biography of 
James Brown Scott (London: Lawbook Exchange, Limited, 2012).
34 James Brown Scott, The Spanish Origins of International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), 116–137.
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He drew a clear connection between his own work and Vitoria's: 
Victoria (sic!) recognized that there were peoples in an imperfect state of civilization; but 
that  they were human beings,  and human beings,  to  his  way of thinking,  should not be 
subject to exploitation [...] Therefore it was proper – and indeed praiseworthy – for a state in 
the plentitude of civilization to take, as it were, these children of nature in hand in order to 
educate them in their rights and in their duties, that their principalities might be admitted to 
the international community. The action however of the enlightened nation was not to smack 
of self-interest, much less exploitation; it was to be on behalf of the laggards in the march of 
civilization. This was a nameless principle in Victoria's system – a principle thought some 
four centuries later to have been newly created by the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
and as such christened with the dignified name of mandate.35
It should perhaps have been obvious to Scott that to draw a connection between the 'nearly mad 
barbarians'  of  Vitoria's  account  and  the  mandate  system was  a  risky  move,  and  he  was  duly 
ridiculed by many of his colleagues in the discipline. Arthur Nussbaum, professor at Columbia and 
the author of one of the earliest general histories of international law, judged Scott's attempts to link 
Vitoria and the mandate system of the United Nations 'disarmingly naïve'.36 Scott's idea of Vitoria as 
a (proto)-liberal, Nussbaum argued, was fundamentally mistaken: 'Vitoria has been emphatically 
praised as a liberal. No tribute to him could be more inappropriate.'37 He was, Nussbaum claimed, 
despite rejecting certain claims over the newly discovered lands, 'a staunch, if not extreme, advocate 
of ecclesiastical and papal authority'.38 The problem with Scott's interpretation was not that he had 
merely misinterpreted  Vitoria's  political  intentions,  he  had failed  to  grasp,  as  Nussbaum added 
gleefully, that the arguments Vitoria advanced were not part of a secular and liberal universe at all.  
Instead,  they 'derived from holy scripture,  from natural law, and from  ius gentium'.39 The most 
fundamental  distinction  between the  legal  bases  of  Vitoria's  argument  and those sustaining  the 
mandate  system  was  the  idea  of  progress.  Whereas  the  'nearly  mad  barbarians'  of  Vitoria's 
imagination were condemned to remain 'nearly mad' until the end of their unfortunate lives, the 
inhabitants  of  Syria,  the  Marshall  Islands,  and  other  mandates  in  the  twentieth  century  were 
explicitly promised progress. The whole point of the mandate system, one might argue, was that it  
was, at least theoretically, defined through its eventual termination.
35 Ibid., 287.





Carl Schmitt,  far from sharing any political  allegiance with Nussbaum who had to leave Nazi-
Germany just as Schmitt advanced to its crown-jurist, saw the same deficiencies in Scott's account, 
and he was particularly irritated by the use of the word civilization.40 To make an argument based on 
civilization, Schmitt claimed, one needed to have a philosophy of history that included civilization 
as a specific process. The fact that Vitoria based his argumentation solely on natural law and holy 
scripture made it impossible for him to imagine such a process. As Schmitt put it: 
Aber was werden die Vertreter moderner Zivilisation dazu sagen, daß Vitoria überhaupt nicht 
von  dem  Recht  einer  überlegenen  Zivilisation  oder  Kultur  spricht;  nicht  von  einem 
Herrschaftsrecht  der  Zivilisierten  gegenüber  Halbzivilisierten  oder  Unzivilisierten; 
überhaupt nicht von “Zivilisation", einem Begriff, der doch vom 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert 
eine  ganze  Epoche  des  europäischen  Völkerrechts  beherrscht?  Hier  zeigt  sich  der  tiefe 
Gegensatz, der sowohl eine geschichtliche Denkweise überhaupt, wie insbesondere auch die 
humanitäre  Geschichtsphilosophie  des  19.  Jahrhunderts  von  der  ungeschichtlichen 
Argumentation des Scholastikers trennt.41
Unlike Nussbaum, Schmitt never thought Scott 'disarmingly naïve'. He suspected a more nefarious 
act  of  what  he  called  'politische  Mythenbildung'.42 In  other  words,  Schmitt  argued  that  these 
interpretations of medieval thinkers were politically motivated.43 Scott's reading of Vitoria, as if he 
had  been  a  contemporary  thinker,  was  a  thinly  veiled  attempt  to  re-integrate  long-forgotten 
arguments of morality and ideas of 'just war' into international politics.44 As such ideas could not be 
expressed in the 'immoral' and secularized language of contemporary European public law, those 
seeking to make such a case reverted back to medieval thinkers. In this process, Vitoria became a 
'Fundgrube von Argumenten', even though these had to be violated in order to fit 'ein ihm fremdes 
Gedankensystem'.45 The arguments of Vitoria were mixed together with a philosophy of history they 
40 Carl Schmitt, Der Nomos Der Erde Im Völkerrecht Des Jus Publicum Europaeum, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1974); Wilhelm Georg Grewe, Epochen Der Völkerrechtsgeschichte (Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1984), 222–223.
41 Schmitt, Nomos, 76; Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum 
Europaeum (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2003), 107–108. 'But what would the representatives of modern 
civilization say about the fact that Vitoria says nothing about the right of a superior civilization or culture, the 
right of civilized peoples to rule over half-civilized or uncivilized peoples, or about “civilization”, which has 
been a decisive concept in European international law since the 18th century.'
42 Schmitt, Nomos, 119. 'act of political mythmaking'.
43 Ibid., 89.
44 Ibid.; for Schmitt's general theory see William Hooker, Carl Schmitt’s International Thought: Order and 
Orientation (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
45 Schmitt, Nomos, 87–89. 'A treasure trove of arguments', 'a system of thought alien to him'.
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did not fit, so that they could provide the starting point for a further moralistic infringement of the 
international sphere. To Scott, Vitoria was no historical thinker, merely a suitable basis for his own 
arguments. The attribution of a concept of civilization to Vitoria, an intrinsic part of this  process, 
was, as Schmitt put it in characteristic fashion: 'tragische Möglichkeit heterogener Verwertung'.46 It 
is hardly a coincidence that Schmitt, as his protocols at the Nuremberg trials amply demonstrate, 
saw himself as the victim of just such an interpretation of international law. This does not take away 
from the fact that his reading of Scott's misunderstanding is correct.47 Historically speaking, there is 
no  connection  between  Vitoria  and  the  idea  of  civilization,  and  it  does  not  take  a  malign 
interpretation of Scott's work to see the political manipulation behind the historical account.
Ironically, Scott would soon suffer a similar fate, as his own arguments were, as Ian Hunter has 
sarcastically  put  it,  'revived  for  post-colonial  use',  and  the  connections  he  had drawn between 
Vitoria  and  the  mandate  system  not  just  criticized,  but  reversed.48 Around  the  turn  of  the 
millennium, Schmitt and Scott would again both be swept to the intellectual surface. While Schmitt 
was revived by thinkers on the right and left seeking to question the political consensus of the 
1990s, and later the moralistic language of the 'war on terror', Scott's work was given the subaltern 
treatment.49 First in a 1996 article, and later in a much expanded book, Anthony Anghie affirmed 
Scott's  position  that  Vitoria  should indeed be seen  as  the originator  of  international  law.50 Yet, 
Anghie fundamentally disagreed that international law had been the blessing for humanity Scott had 
presented it  as.  What Vitoria had created,  Anghie claimed, were the legal tools of imperialism. 
Where Scott had seen Vitoria endorsing benevolent action 'on behalf of the laggards of civilization', 
Anghie suspected more sinister imperial motives. Vitoria's arguments, he claimed, were 'insidious' 
in  that  they  presumed  the  human  nature  of  the  Indians  to  set  them up  for  exploitation.51 By 
identifying the Indians as fellow humans in need of care and development and not sovereign rulers, 
Anghie  argued,  the  Spanish  were  free  to  infringe  on  their  territory.  Because  the  Indians  were 
defined purely through their lack (of development) vis-a-vis the Spanish, who themselves defined 
46 Ibid., 96. 'tragic possibility of heterogeneous use'.
47 Joseph W. Bendersky, “Carl Schmitt’s Path to Nuremberg: A Sixty-Year Reassessment,” Telos 2007, no. 139 
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Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 26.
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the parameters of such development, they could never hope to emancipate themselves from this 
system. Through this argument, the Spanish incursion became permanent, and the inhabitants of the 
Americas could always be ruled over.52 It is this concept of 'unequal sovereignty', that, according to 
Anghie,  continued and continues to  dominate the theory and practice of  international  law.  The 
language of justification changed, Anghie argued, but Vitoria's arguments were the basis  of the 
'civilizing mission' and the 'sacred trust', in which the ideas of Vitoria would be reflected several 
hundred years later.53
The connections Anghie and Scott drew between Vitoria and the development of international law 
are essentially the same,  except  with reversed political  aims. Whereas Scott  tried to  justify the 
mandate system and the civilizational claims of the League of Nations through a political reading of 
Vitoria, Anghie inverted this reading, seeking to prove that the (now considered) imperialist idea of 
the 'sacred trust'  had its  roots with the alleged founder of international law. The real  historical 
problems  with  this  argument  remained  untouched,  and  both  cases  are,  in  Schmitt's  language, 
'tragische Möglichkeit heterogener Verwertung'.54 To read Vitoria as the predecessor of the 'sacred 
trust', as Schmitt and Nussbaum rightly recognized in the 1950s, it was necessary to attribute to 
Vitoria a philosophy of history he could not possibly have understood. The historical connections 
between  Vitoria's  concepts  and  those  employed  in  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  century 
international law are close to non-existent, and have consequently to be, as Georg Cavallar has 
argued: 'suggested rather than demonstrated'.55
Unfortunately,  Anghie's  historical  interpretation  has  been immensely successful,  especially with 
those seeking to ground the concept of civilization in a long imperial history, supplying them with 
an incredibly potent starting point. This project is most pronounced in the work of Brett Bowden, 
whose many articles and book  The Empire of Civilization  explicitly rely on Anghie's argument.56 
Bowden seeks to use Anghie's  work to  argue that  something like a  concept of civilization had 
already been formulated by Francisco de Vitoria. Carefully avoiding Scott's direct attribution of the 
idea of civilization to Vitoria, Bowden has merely suggests that Vitoria had a concept of civilization 
without saying that he did. Consequently, he variously speaks of 'earliest expressions of the idea of 
52 Ibid., 330–331.
53 Ibid., 331–333.
54  'tragic possibility of heterogeneous use'
55 Georg Cavallar, “Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel: Accomplices of European Colonialism and 
Exploitation or True Cosmopolitans?,” Journal of the History of International Law 10 (2008): 183.
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the  “burden of  civilization”',  a  'reference  to  something  akin  to  a  standard  of  civilization',  and 
perhaps most remarkably, about the fact that Vitoria 'has a major impact in shaping the soon-to-be 
legally  entrenched,  European “standard  of  civilization”'.57 It  might  be  possible  to  call  a  vague 
connection  a  'major  impact',  but  that  the  word  'soon'  should  come  to  represent  350  years  is 
astonishing. As in Scott's case, these formulations raise the question of ulterior motive, and why 
Bowden is so intent on proving a connection when there seemingly is none. It is indeed plausible 
that  what  Bowden  is  producing  is  what  Schmitt  would  have  called  an  'Akt  politischer 
Mythenbildung'.58 To prove that the concept civilization is an imperial one, and is embedded in the 
history of international law, Bowden (relying on Anghie's work) manipulates the historical figure of 
Vitoria  to  serve  particular  political  aims.  Such  assertions  do  not  just  misrepresent  Vitoria's 
arguments, they also obscure the history of the concept of civilization that, in the form Bowden 
imagines, only starts in the mid-eighteenth century.59
The Invention of Civilization in the Eighteenth Century
A recognizably modern meaning only came to be attributed to the term civilization in the mid-
eighteenth century. When exactly, why, where, and by whom, is still a matter of discussion. In most 
European countries, the word civilization had a juridical meaning before it started to be used as a 
sociological term.60 Within a legal context, it simply meant turning a procedure of criminal law into 
a civil one. Around 1750, a new meaning, describing social development through time, was added 
to the word, but the historical circumstances under which this happened are not entirely clear. In 
Les transformations de la langue française de 1710 à 1789, Gohin argued that the word had first 
been used by Turgot  in  the early 1750s.61 Judging from Turgot's  interests  and ideas,  it  was an 
plausible explanation, and it was fitting that such a famed word should have its origins with him. 
Yet,  this  illustrious  patronage  was  soon  disputed  by  Lucien  Febvre  in  his  1930  Civilisation. 
l'évolution d'un mot et  d'un groupe d'idées,  in which the latter argued that Turgot's text,  where 
Gohin had suspected the first use of civilization, had been tampered with posthumously, and that 
Turgot himself had never used the word.62 Instead, he thought it plausible that Boulanger, and more 
57 Ibid., 115; Brett Bowden, “The Colonial Origins of International Law. European Expansion and the Classical 
Standard of Civilization,” Journal of the History of International Law7 7, no. 1 (2005): 9.
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specifically his  L'Antiquité devoilée de ses usages, were the origin of the first printed instance.63 
Nonetheless, he seems not to have been too content with this finding, as he explained: 'je souhaite, 
naturellement, que d'autres chercheurs, plus heureux, dépossèdent Boulanger'.64 Febvre's wish was 
granted merely a year later with Joachim Moras' discovery that the word had previously been used 
in the Ami des Hommes: ou Traité de la population by the elder Marquis de Mirabeau, a whole ten 
years earlier, in 1756.65 
This  attribution  has  since  gained  the  greatest  following,  although  it  is  not  undisputed.66 What 
convinced many of Moras' account was that he provided both the evidence and an explanation as to 
why he thought Mirabeau responsible. As Moras argued, the father of the later revolutionary was 
famed for having created many new words, and civilization was just one product of his prolific 
creativity.67 Some, such as Fernand Braudel and following him, Niall Ferguson, have nonetheless 
insisted on previous  interpretations,  namely that  Turgot should be seen as the originator of the 
concept.68 Others have wrongly claimed that earlier works by Rousseau already contain the word 
civilization.69 More recently, some authors have again tried to re-attribute the word. Jan Ifversen, in 
an article seeking to establish the usefulness of electronic databases for conceptual research, argued 
that these could prove that civilization was first used by Montesquieu in 1721.70 Ironically, this 
assertion ended up demonstrating that electronic databases should be treated with caution, as the 
instance Ifversen 'found' was most likely a footnote from a much later edition of Montesquieu's text 
added to the original.71
Most remarkably in recent years, Javier Fernandez Sebastian has argued that the word civilization 
was in  fact  first  used in Spanish and not  in French, a  whole two years before the Marquis de 
Mirabeau, in 1754.72 These findings raise new questions about the spread of the word civilization. 
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Until then, it had widely been assumed that the word civilization first emerged simultaneously in 
Britain and France, in a case of parallel evolution, but spread from France to the rest of Europe, as 
Emile  Benveniste  first  argued.73 At  least  one  of  these  assertions  has  been  made  unlikely  by 
Sebastian's recent arguments. Either we are looking at a peculiar case of parallel evolution in three 
separate countries, or the idea that the word spread from France to the rest of Europe is untenable.  
Sebastian's assertion that the word spread within Spain not as a 'homegrown product',  but as a 
French concept, makes the first possibility more likely, but the idea that the word should have been 
invented separately in three different instances is still  rather mysterious and certainly worthy of 
more thorough investigation.74 
Whether coined in Spain,  France,  or Britain,  the usefulness of the term civilization to describe 
sociological developments and their outcome was obvious to most, and the concept of civilization 
became embedded in various theories of progress.75 Throughout the eighteenth century, Aristotelian 
models of the world slowly lost their significance, and more contemporary means of explanation 
started to gain ground, amongst them the idea of the gradual progress of humanity.76 Some, like the 
renowned historian of historiography, Mamigliano, have even gone so far as to assert that with the 
rise of theories of progress, 'the idea of civilization became the main theme of history'.77 Itself a 
highly  controversial  concept,  theories  of  progress  took  a  number  of  different  forms.78 Most 
important amongst them was the idea that throughout its history, humanity had proceeded through 
more of less clearly defined stages.79 In France, Turgot has once again been associated with this 
process, but the philosophers who, arguably, perfected it were Scottish.80 
The stages of development the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment outlined corresponded to 
the means of subsistence of different societies. To arrive at the most refined type of society the 
Scots identified, their own commercial society, humanity had had to go through stages of hunting,  
pastoralism, and agriculture. It was the word civilization that connected these various stages and, 
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broadly speaking, fulfilled two functions within these models: it was both the process itself as well 
as its final result.81 Adam Ferguson, for example, frequently used it in his Essay on the History of  
Civil Society, sometimes to denote a stage: 'This progress in the case of man is continued to a 
greater extent than in any other animal. Not only the individual advances from infancy to manhood, 
but the species itself from rudeness to civilization', but equally often to describe the process itself,  
'the progress of civilization' as a whole.82 The rhetoric of civilization became the staple of those who 
sought to criticize Rousseau's negative interpretations of contemporary civil society, and the results 
of such civilizational theorizing were seen as proof of his mistakes, and as a defence of the current – 
last – stage of civilization more broadly.83 Despite the fact that many of these theories are often 
associated with a purely naïve and idealist description of the progress of the world, many of the 
Enlightenment philosophers who used the concept were ultimately aware of its limitations.84 As 
Ferguson himself put it: 
Our method, notwithstanding, too frequently, is to rest the whole on conjecture; to impute 
every advantage of our nature to those arts which we ourselves possess; and to imagine; that  
a mere negation of all our virtues is a sufficient description of man in his original state. We 
are  ourselves  the  supposed  standard  of  politeness  and  civilization;  and  where  our  own 
features do not appear, we apprehend, that there is nothing that deserves to be known.85 
Despite  such  cautious  argument,  civilization  soon  became  the  centre  of  one  of  the  largest 
philosophical  debates  of the late  eighteenth century,  which revolved around whether,  and how, 
Russia  could  advance  to  that  last  stage  of  civilization  philosophers  had  outlined  as  the  most 
desirable.86 Following the agenda of Peter I to turn Russia into a more European country, Catherine 
II  heavily  relied  on  Enlightenment  philosophers  to  supply  her  with  the  basis  for  such  an 
undertaking.  What  these  debates  ultimately  revealed  was  the  immense  divergence  of  opinions 
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amongst them.87 Catherine's hopes that her plans to civilize Russia would find a large European 
following were disappointed. Almost everyone was sceptical, apart from Voltaire, who argued that 
while Europe had gone through the history of civilization very slowly, Russia could achieve the 
same results much sooner.88 Some remained on the fence about their final judgement on Russia's 
reforms, whereas others, like Diderot, who had been invited to Russia by Catherine herself, started 
out  as  supporters  of  her  political  agenda,  but  ended  up  disappointedly  rejecting  the  reforms 
themselves,  and  finally  even  their  underlying  ideas.89 Diderot  thereby  joined  those,  who,  like 
Rousseau, had from the outset been downright hostile to the idea of Russian civilization.90 Already 
in the year 1762, when Catherine ascended to the throne,  Rousseau had argued in the  Contrat  
Social that any project of civilization in Russia had to fail, because it would be an attempt to turn 
Russians into something they were not. Instead of imitating the English or the Germans and their 
civilization, Russia's leaders should instead focus on 'making Russians', whose development would 
not necessarily follow prescribed philosophical stages.91
It is not in the debates about Russia, but about Western European political development that we 
should  look  for  the  first  properly  political  use  of  civilization.  Already in  the  first  mention  of 
civilization in France, the word was attributed at least two meanings. In his Ami des Hommes, the 
Marquis  de  Mirabeau  had  spoken  not  only  about  civilization  as  such,  but  also  about  false 
civilization, directly connecting his positive idea of civilization to religion.92 Mirabeau was one of 
the few physiocrats with a positive stance towards religion and the church, something that also 
separated  him  from  the  more  radically  anti-religious  Encyclopédistes  to  whom they  were 
intellectually  close.93 As  Moras  and  Binoche  have  argued,  Mirabeau's  use  of  civilization 
immediately  became  part  of  a  larger  ideological  battle.94 The  first  dictionary  to  take  note  of 
Mirabeau's  specific  use  of  the  word  civilization  was  a  Jesuit  publication,  the  Dictionnaire  de  
Trévoux which explained: 'L’ami des hommes a employé ce mot pour sociabilité. Voyez ce mot. La 
religion est sans contredit le premier et le plus utile frein de l’humanité; c’est le premier ressort de 
la civilisation. Elle nous prêche, et nous rappelle sans cesse la confraternité, adoucit notre coeur'. 95 
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To understand the polemical direction of this entry, it is important to know that the popular concept 
of  sociabilité  had been defined without reference to religion by the  Encyclopédistes.  The Jesuit 
dictionary entry set out to prove was that one of the most influential philosophers of the time agreed 
with their positions.96
Through its connection to these underlying political  battles between religious conservatives and 
those  seeking  to  explain  historical  developments  without  reference  to  religion,  civilization 
automatically became an object  of ideological  dispute that  intensified with the outbreak of  the 
French Revolution. Although opinions differed about the exact status of the term civilization during 
the revolutionary period, there is no dispute that it  was used on both sides of the argument: in 
support  of  the  ancien  régime,  like  the  Jesuits,  as  well  as  by  those  who  advocated  a  new 
revolutionary program many associated with some of the Encyclopédistes.97 While the supporters of 
the revolution claimed that it was another stage in the development of civilization, its opponents,  
like Edmund Burke, used the concept of civilization to defend the existing order. They similarly 
perceived it as having been the product of civilizational development, albeit an organic instead of a 
philosophical one.  In his  Reflections on the Revolution in France,  Burke blamed the 'barbarous 
metaphysics',  which  had  replaced  Christianity  in  the  minds  of  the  revolutionaries  –  who  he 
compared to savages – for what he saw as excess and a danger to civilization.98 As he put it: 
Nothing is  more certain,  than that our manners,  our civilization,  and all  the good things 
which are connected with manners and with civilization have, in this European world of 
ours, depended for ages upon two principles and were, indeed, the result of both combined: I 
mean the spirit of a gentleman and the spirit of religion.99
In a debate that quickly gained international dimensions,  Burke had to  defend his conservative 
viewpoints on several fronts. Primarily against the propagandists of the revolution in France, like 
Garat, the minister for justice in the early 1790s who argued that the results of the revolution were  
'dernier fruit de la nature humaine et de la civilisation perfectionée', but in this international debate 
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Burke was also attacked on the other side of the Atlantic.100 As Thomas Paine asserted: 'All the 
European governments (France now excepted) are constructed not on the principles of universal 
civilization, but on the reverse of it', and that civilisation could only ever be accomplished by 'a 
revolution in the system of government'.101 The repercussions of this discussion could be felt all 
over Europe, even in provincial Thuringia, where Paine's book was reviewed by the  Allgemeine 
Literatur-Zeitung  which  argued  that,  rigorously  interpreted,  Paine's  argument  would  question 
civilization  in  its  entirety.102 The  editors  of  the  Allgemeine  Literatur-Zeitung  were  undoubtedly 
aware that they were participating in a larger, almost world-wide struggle about the meaning of 
civilization. It was an argument often repeated by those treating the subject around the same time,  
like  the  royalist  Jacques  Mallet  du Pan who argued in his  Considérations  sur  la  nature  de la  
revolution  de  France  et  sur  les  causes  qui  en  prolongent  leur  durée: 'Chaque  Européen  est 
aujourd'hui partie dans ce dernier combat de la civilisation.'103 
The constant use of civilization on all sides of the political spectrum continued, and possibly even 
increased as the dust settled after the initial phases of the French Revolution,  slowly spreading 
amongst both conservative and more progressive elements of the population. No matter on which 
side one stood at the cusp of the nineteenth century, one had to defend civilization. As Fourier noted 
in 1808, civilization had become: 'l'idole de tous les partis philosophiques et dans laquelle on croit  
voir le terme de la perfection.'104 The popularity of the concept amongst the Saint-Simonians, Comte 
and other progressive parties has been amply described.105 But in the continuation of a battle that 
had already been drawn up before the Revolution, conservatives used it equally heavily and even 
integrated ideas such as the natural progress of society into their arguments. The famed conservative 
Bonald  worried  in  his  Théorie  du  pouvoir  politique  et  religieux,  published in  1796,  that  the 
revolution could be the first step of de-generation, after a long process of civilization. Naturally, he 
suspected that France, previously leading in civilization, would be the first victim of this historic 
reversal:  'La France […] est  l'ainée des societés de l'Europe. Ce souvenir  arrache une réflexion 
100 Dominique-Joseph Garat, Considérations sur la révolution française et sur la conjuration des puissances de 
l’Europe contre la liberte & contre les droits des hommes ou eamen de la proclamation des gouverneurs des 
pays-bas (Paris: Buisson, 1792). 'the last fruit of human nature and of perfected civilization'
101 Thomas Paine, Rights of Man, Being an Answer to Mr. Burke’s Attack on the French Revolution, vol. 1 (London: 
J. Parsons, 1792), 7, 39.
102 Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, October 18, 1792, 274 edition, sec. Staatswissenschaften, 122.
103 Jacques Mallet du Pan, Considerations sur la nature de la revolution de France et sur les causes qui en 
prolongent leur duree (London: Emm. Flon, 1793), v. 'Considerations on the nature of the Revolution in France 
and the causes that prolong it'. 'Every European is today party to this last battle of civilization.' 
104 Moras, Zivilisation, 62.
105 Walter M. Simon, “History for Utopia: Saint-Simon and the Idea of Progress,” Journal of the History of Ideas 
17, no. 3 (1956): 311–31; Keith Taylor, Political Ideas of the Utopian Socialists (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); 
Osama Abi-Mershed, Apostles of Modernity: Saint-Simonians and the Civilizing Mission in Algeria (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010).
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douloureuse: le retour à la barbarie suivrait-il le même ordre que la civilisation a suivi, et la sociéte 
qui s'est formée la premiere, serait-elle la première à se dissoudre?'106 Jacques Necker, Louis XIV 
last finance minister, argued that this had already taken place: 
Il semble en y pensant que la Révolution Francaise ait parcouru dans son rapide cours le 
cercle entier du Monde moral car ayant eu pour point de départ l'état de civilisation dans tous 
ses raffinemens et dans tous ses abus ayant ensuite traversé sous l'Assemblée Constituante le 
pays  des chimères et  des  abstractions  elle  est  arrivée,  sous  les  Tyrans  de la  Convention 
Nationale, à l extrême au dernier période des idées brutales et des conceptions féroces.107
Similarly,  de Maistre  argued that  through the revolution,  France had rid itself  of the civilizing 
aspects of previous centuries and, under the banners of freedom and equality, the beastly side of 
humanity, and its barbarism had once again been revealed.108 Logically, he placed his hopes for the 
return of true civilization in the Pope, who he described as  'le chef naturel, le promoteur le plus 
puissant, le grand Démiurge de la civilisation', and hoped would once again repress the animalistic 
forces  of  revolution.109 This  distinction  between  two  types  of  civilizational  propaganda,  one 
supporting  the  traditional  (religious)  order  and  the  other  supporting  the  ideas  of  civilization 
associated  with  the  revolution  existed,  as  McMahon  has  pointed  out,  not  just  throughout  the 
nineteenth, but even longer. Conservative thinkers in the twentieth century, like Gustave Gautherot, 
still identified the Revolution as the main crack in European history.110 A crack that had inaugurated, 
as he put it, the: 'gigantic drama that continues in the world between Christian civilization and the 
counter-civilization  issued  from  Encyclopédisme.'111 As  I  will  argue,  over  the  late  nineteenth 
106 Louis-Auguste Bonald, Théorie Du Pouvoir Politique et Religieux Dans La Société Civile Démontrée par le 
raisonnement et par l’histoire suivie du divorce, Considéré Au XIX Siecle Relativement a L’état Domestique et a  
L’état Public de Sociéte (Paris: Union Generale D’editions, 1965), 47. 'Theory of Religious and Political Power'. 
'France is the eldest of the societies of Europe. Yet, to remind oneself of this evokes a painful thought: could the 
return to barbarism follow the same order as the rise of civilization and would the society that formed first also 
be the first to dissolve?'
107 Jacques Necker, De la revolution francaise., vol. 2 (Paris: J. Drissonnier, 1797), 237. 'Thinking about it, it seems 
as if the French revolution has in its rapid course covered the whole circle of the moral world; it had as a starting 
point the state of civilization with its refinements and its downsides but then after crossing, under the national 
assembly, the land of fantasy and abstractions, it arrived, under the tryants of the National Convention at a final 
episode of brutal ideas and savage conceptions.'
108 Graeme Garrard, “Joseph de Maistre’s Civilization and Its Discontents,” Journal of the History of Ideas 47, no. 3 
(1996): 429–46.
109 Joseph de Maistre, Du pape, vol. 2 (Lyon: Rusand, 1819), 425; Groh, Russland und Europa: Ein Beitrag zur 
europaeischen Geistesgeschichte, 3:101–113. 'The natural leader, the great advocate, the demiurge of 
civilization'.
110 Darrin M. McMahon, Enemies of the Enlightenment : The French Counter-Enlightenment and the Making of 
Modernity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 192–203.
111 Ibid., 194.
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century, many more debates about civilization would develop, but it is important to remember that 
all of them, in one way or another, have their origins in the propaganda wars surrounding the French 
Revolution.
The Nineteenth Century, Vulgarisation, Guizot, and Mill
While civilization had been a philosophical concept in use for almost half a century by 1800, its 
deployment in public discourse increased  dramatically over the next few decades. This spike in 
civilizational language after the revolution, already suspected by scholars like Moras, has become 
traceable  through modern  means.  The statistics  supplied by  googlebooks'  ngramviewer make it 
possible to graph the development of the use of certain words in books and other published sources . 
In French, German, and English, the use of civilization spread widely over the first third of the 
nineteenth century, as the following graphs demonstrate. Using the same criteria, the spike is most 
pronounced in English, and most even in French, but all three languages were clearly seeing the 
same phenomenon.
1. Civilisation – English, from 1756 to 1850112
2. Civilisation – French, from 1756 to 1850113
112 “Civilization - English,” Ngram Viewer, June 6, 2015, https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?
content=civilisation&year_start=1756&year_end=1850&corpus=15&smoothing=10&share=&direct_url=t1%3B
%2Ccivilisation%3B%2Cc0.




3. Civilisation – German, from 1756 to 1850114
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This popular explosion of civilizational language has often been associated with Napoleon. Some, 
like Osterhammel, have described his military actions as an almost paradigmatic civilizing mission 
114 “Civilization - German,” Ngram Viewer, June 6, 2015, https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?
content=Civilisation&year_start=1756&year_end=1850&corpus=20&smoothing=10&share=&direct_url=t1%3
B%2CCivilisation%3B%2Cc0.




and such an attribution does appear logical given the preceding history of the word civilization.116 It 
was,  in  fact,  with  Napoleon's  opponents  that  civilization  entered  the  politics  of  the  nineteenth 
century.117 In  1814,  the  famed  liberal  Benjamin  Constant  noted  that  the  'esprit  de  conquête  et 
l'usurpation' that had reigned in France during Napoleon's time in power was not compatible with 'la 
civilisation actuelle'.118 The rising tide of nineteenth century liberalism that Constant anticipated was 
also felt by those not classically associated with it, and many started to refer to the inevitability of 
further  civilizational  development.  Just  a  year  after  Constant's  publication,  a  subcommittee 
(containing amongst others Wellington and Humboldt)  of the Congress of Vienna,  declared the 
slave trade 'as repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal morality'.119  While, as the 
document's English version asserted, the slave trade's character had been known through all ages by 
'just and enlightened men', it was now 'the public voice, in all civilized countries' that 'calls aloud 
for  its  prompt  suppression'.120 Given  the  later  history  of  the  restoration,  this  declaration  is  a 
remarkable document, as it not only justified political action through popular appeal, but also used 
the expression 'civilized state' for the first time.121 By the second decade of the nineteenth century, 
therefore,  the  idea  of  the  civilized  state,  yielding  to  the  demands  of  its  increasingly  liberal 
population, was for the first time formally enshrined in an international treaty. As I will show in the 
next chapter, this trend continued and the concept of civilization owes a large part of its success to 
its connection with the burgeoning politics of liberalism.
While the use of civilization had undoubtedly already been popularized in the early years of the 
nineteenth century, it was the curious character of French liberalism in the 1820s and 1830s that 
gave it political and intellectual clout on a more international level. Throughout the early nineteenth 
century, liberals had had to wrestle with the difficult inheritance of the French Revolution. 122 On the 
one hand, they were supportive of its early principles and on the other, repelled by its later excesses. 
116 Jürgen Osterhammel, Europe, the “West” and the Civilizing Mission (London: The German Historical Institute 
London, 2006), 15.
117 Stuart Woolf, “French Civilization and Ethnicity in the Napoleonic Empire,” Past & Present 124 (1989): 96–
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118 Benjamin de Constant de Rebecque, De l’esprit de conquête et de l’usurpation, dans leurs rapports avec la 
civilisation européenne. - Londres, J. Murray 1814 (London: J. Murray, 1814); For Constant's liberalism see 
Helena Rosenblatt, Liberal Values. Benjamin Constant and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 'the spirit of conquest and usurpation'. 'Current civilization'.
119 Thomas Curson Hansard, ed., The Parliamentary Debates from the Year 1803 to the Present Time, vol. 23 
(London: T.C. Hansard, 1816), 200.
120 Ibid., 23:199.
121 Pauka, Begriffsgeschichte des zivilisierten Staats, 104.
122 Laurence Jacobs, “‘Le Moment Libéral’: The Distinctive Character of Restoration Liberalism,” The Historical 
Journal 31, no. 02 (1988): 479–91; Cheryl B. Welch, “Une Société Civilisée et Religieuse: Postrevolutionary 
French Liberalism and the Character of Europe,” The Tocqueville Review/La Revue Tocqueville 35, no. 1 (2014): 
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As they slowly pushed the Bourbon restoration out of power, they were in deep need of a clearer  
definition of the relationship between their movement and the popular concept of civilization.123 The 
first major electoral victory of 1827 brought their ideological leaders back into the public sphere, 
and it is no surprise that the most important of them should celebrate his return to the Sorbonne with 
a series of lectures dedicated to L'Histoire de Civilisation en Europe.124 Guizot's course, entirely 
concerned  with  civilization,  would  simultaneously  be  a  historical  as  well  as  an  ideological 
justification for the juste milieu he was propagating. For this reason, he attempted to eliminate any 
ideological doubt with which the word civilization could still be associated, and to downplay the 
difficult inheritance of previous civilizational debates associated with the Revolution.  As Guizot 
asserted, civilization was merely a fact: 'Je dis du fait Messieurs et je le dis à dessein: la civilisation 
est un fait comme un autre, fait susceptible, comme tout autre, d'être étudié, décrit, raconté.'125
While the rise of civilization could not be disputed, Guizot argued, it was through the opposition of 
various  forces  that  it  was  originally  set  in  motion.  Civilization,  he  asserted,  had  been  created 
through a clash between two opposing forces that he associated with worldly and spiritual power. In 
Guizot's description, the English Revolution became 'le premier choc des deux grands faits auxquels 
est venue aboutir, dans le cours du seizième siècle, toute la civilisation de l'Europe primitive, la 
monarchie  pure  d'un  côté  et  le  libre  examen  de  l'autre'.126 The  rest  of  Europe,  as  Guizot 
painstakingly described it, would have to wait two centuries for a similar event that would come in 
the  form of  the  French  Revolution.  In  it,  the  spirit  of  free  enquiry  and  the  spirit  of  absolute 
monarchy would once again clash. Both were responsible for the advance of civilization and both 
had its excesses. Guizot brilliantly summed up his simultaneous admiration and disdain for the type 
of thinking he thought responsible for the French Revolution and its conception of civilization: 
je me hâterais de dire que le dix-huitième siècle me paraît un des plus grands siècles de 
l'histoire, celui peut être, qui a rendu à l'humanité les plus grands services qui lui a fait faire 
le plus de progrès et les progrès les plus généraux; appelé à prononcer dans sa cause comme 
123 Constant de Rebecque, De l’esprit de conquete et de l’usurpation, dans leurs rapports avec la civilisation 
europeenne. - Londres, J. Murray 1814.
124 François Guizot, Cours d’histoire moderne: histoire générale de la civilisation en Europe depuis la chute de 
l’empire romain jusqu’à la révolution française (Paris: Pichon et Didier, 1828). 'The History of Civilization in 
Europe'.
125  François Guizot, Cours d’histoire moderne: histoire générale de la civilisation en Europe depuis la chute de 
l’empire romain jusqu’à la révolution française (Paris: Pichon et Didier, 1828), 6–8. 'The happy medium'. 'I 
speak of a fact, Gentlemen, and I say it on purpose, civilization is a fact like any others, a delicate fact, to be 
studied, described, and to be narrated.'
126  François Pierre Guillaume Guizot, Histoire générale de la civilisation en Europe (Bruxelles: Langlet et Comp., 
1838), 357. 'the first great crash of the two principles towards which, in the course of the sixteenth century, the 
civilization of primitive Europe tended. On the one side pure monarchy and on the other free inquiry'.
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ministère public, si je puis me servir de cette expression, c'est en sa faveur que je donnerais 
mes conclusions. Il n'en est pas moins vrai que le pouvoir absolu,  que l'esprit humain a 
exercé,  à  cette  époque,  l'a  corrompu,  qu'il  a  pris  les  faits  contemporains,  les  opinions 
différentes, de celles qui dominaient, dans un dédain, dans une aversion illégitime; aversion 
qui l'a conduit à l'erreur et à la tyrannie.127
In this rhetoric of reconciliation Guizot both defended the civilization of the ancien régime – and its 
religious grounding – as well as the ideas of the Enlightenment. He thereby attempted to fuse the 
two different conceptions of civilization into one, the civilization that was no more disputed, and 
was simply a fact.128
One should be careful neither to overstate the novelty of Guizot's claims and to underestimate the 
criticism made of his work, nor to assume that his explanation of civilization completely superseded 
all previous discourse. Nevertheless, Guizot's writings had an enormous impact on liberal European 
political and social thought. R.A. Lochore has referred to a time 'before and after Guizot' and noted 
that during the mid-nineteenth century 'whenever a writer asks, what civilization is, his first care is 
to make a judgement, usually respectful, of Guizot's conception of it.'129 Apart from France, where 
other books on civilization took their  cues from Guizot,  his  influence in the latter  parts  of the 
nineteenth century stretched not only all over Europe, but even into Japan, where his work would 
form one of  the  bases  of  Fukuzawa Yukichi's  Outline  of  a  Theory of  Civilization.130 European 
writers and thinkers relied most heavily on Guizot. While some dedicated their works directly to 
him, others, like John Stuart Mill, were brought to the subject of civilization through Guizot, an 
influence they readily acknowledged.131 Over the next decades, in Britain as well as in the German-
speaking  countries,  Guizot's  lectures  on  civilization  became  an  important  ideological  basis  for 
liberal arguments, and his thoughts and ideas were extended by other political thinkers. 
127 François Pierre Guillaume Guizot, Histoire générale de la civilisation en Europe (Bruxelles: Langlet et Comp., 
1838), 385. 'I would hasten to say that the eighteenth century seems to me one of the greatest centuries of 
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than the dominating ones - an aversion that led to terror and tyranny.' 
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In the case of Mill, the result of a close reading of Guizot's writings was a short essay entitled 
simply: 'Civilization'.132 Mill relied directly on Guizot's thinking on civilizational development, but 
he added his own, slightly sceptical touch. In political terms, Mill and Guizot broadly agreed. A new 
era of liberal civilization had started and its analysis, Mill (in rhetoric very similar to the one used 
by the new 'sociology of civilization' in the early 2000s) argued would have to rely on new political 
language. Civilization, for Mill as for Guizot, was a fact which called for a renewed conception of  
politics, no longer based on old distinctions. More conservative thinkers and politicians in England, 
Mill argued, had not understood the changes in society associated with liberalism and this new type 
of politics, and were stuck with old categories and prejudices:
`Il faut',  as M. de Tocqueville has said, `une science politique nouvelle à un monde tout 
nouveau.' The whole face of society is reversed---all the natural elements of power have 
definitively  changed  places  and  there  are  people  who  talk  of  standing  up  for  ancient 
institutions, and the duty of sticking to the British Constitution settled in 1688! What is still  
more  extraordinary,  these  are  the  people  who  accuse  others  of  disregarding  variety  of 
circumstances,  and  imposing  their  abstract  theories  upon  all  states  of  society  without 
discrimination.133 
Similar  arguments  could  be  found  in  the  German-speaking  countries,  where  the  language  of 
civilization  had  also  become  closely  associated  with  ideas  of  liberalism  and,  importantly  for 
German debates: nationalism. Where Guizot and Mill saw a new era of civilization developing, 
German-speakers with national ambitions interpreted the rise of civilization to mean the fulfilment 
of their national desires. Some, in the style of Guizot, attempted to understand the whole history of 
civilizational development, whereas others like the liberal educator Adolph Diesterweg published 
series of pamphlets with titles like Beiträge zur Lösung der Lebensfrage der Civilisation, einer  
Aufgabe dieser Zeit.134 At the  Hambacher Fest,  where German nationalists met in 1832, similar 
slogans could be heard from several speakers who argued that the ruling classes had to give in to the 
'Forderungen der Vernunft und Civilisation', which they saw as national politics.135 Such voices 
132 John Stuart Mill, “Civilization,” The London and Westminster Review 5, no. 48 (1836): 1–16; Levin, Mill on 
Civilization and Barbarism.
133 Mill, “Civilization,” 5. 'We need, as Mister Tocqueville has said, a new political science for a new world'.
134 Johann Schön, Allgemeine Geschichte und Statistik der Europäischen Civilisation (Leizpig: J.C. Hinrichssche 
Buchhandlung, 1833); Adolph Diesterweg, Beiträge zur Lösung der Lebensfrage der Civilisation, einer Aufgabe 
dieser Zeit (Essen: G.D.Bädeker, 1837). 'Contributions to a solution of the “life-question” of civilization, a task 
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135 Johann Georg August Wirth, Das Nationalfest der Deutschen zu Hambach (Neustadt: In Commission bei Philipp 
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were also prominent amongst the new radicals of German literature at the time, as pamphleteers 
influenced  by  the  Jeune  Allemagne were  drawing  links  between  the  rise  of  the 'deutsche 
Nationalität'  with the 'Befestigung der Civilisation'.136 Civilization to them was a natural process 
that  would  include  the  establishment  of  Germany  as  an  independent  state  and  the  end  of 
dynasticism and the ancien regime.
Yet, in German debates too, the conservatives that Mill had criticized existed. They were sceptical 
about  these  new  civilizational  claims,  still  identified  with  the  French  Revolution.  Men  like 
Oswaldsohn von der Schley, who in his  Die Civilisation der Gegenwart drew a clear distinction 
between on the one hand new ideas of civilization, associated with the revolutionary and nationalist 
sympathies of 'Germany's youth' and the correct ideas of civilization which could only be found in 
religion.137 As a conservative journal summarized his ideas: 
Nachdem der Verfasser nachzuweisen versucht hat, wie wenig seit dem Mittelalter für die 
wahre  Civilisation  gewonnen  worden,  wie  nachtheilig  auf  dieselbe  die  französische 
Frivolität,  die  Revolution  und  die  Herrschaft  Napoleons  gewirkt  habe,  stellt  er  das 
Zeitbedürfniss  auf  die  niedere,  sinnliche  Civilisation,  und  die  höhere,  sittliche,  welche 
letztere er auch nennt die Theorie und Praxis des Christenthums.138
In many ways, the debates about German nationalism and civilization were a reincarnation of the 
discussions that had surrounded the French Revolution. Liberal nationalists and their ideas of a new 
civilization opposed older and more conservative notions of civilization. As I will show in the next 
chapter  these  debates  would  continue  over  the  next  decades,  where  ideas  of  nationalism and 
civilization started to dominate international discourse.
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Chapter 2. The First War for Civilization
Introduction
At the same time as the use of the word civilization increased in popularity in all quarters, the 
landscape of international politics changed fundamentally, and slowly allowed for the application of 
civilization as a justification for intervention and war. In this chapter, I trace the development of the  
rhetoric of international politics in the run-up to what I will argue was the first official 'war for 
civilization': the Crimean War. I will show that over the 1830s and 1840s, western European support 
for  Russia,  especially  amongst  liberals,  declined  –  a  process  that  indirectly  correlated  with  an 
increase  in  support  for  Turkey.  Slowly  but  surely,  many  in  Europe,  particularly  those  with 
sympathies for the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, started to argue against Russia in civilizational 
terms,  namely  that  Russia  was  a  danger  to  what  they  defined  as  European  and  even  global 
civilization. Needless to say, others disagreed, the developments leading up to the Crimean War 
reveal a fascinating landscape of civilizational debate, with individuals and groups taking different 
positions on Russia,  Turkey,  and the rise of civilization more broadly.  Despite the fact that the 
increase  of  the  use  of  the  word  civilization  proved  to  be  a  pan-European  occurrence,  I  will 
demonstrate that the debates within Britain and Prussia differed fundamentally from each other, and 
that  the  positions  various  political  commentators  took vis-a-vis  the  word  civilization  depended 
largely on their place within the domestic political sphere, and on how they imagined the future of 
international developments. 
As war between Britain, France and Russia became more likely,  civilizational debates similarly 
intensified.  While  the  word  civilization  was  used  by  almost  all  participants  in  these  debates, 
especially in Britain, I argue that those who expressed support for the Muslim Ottoman Empire 
relied on it to a far greater degree, as it allowed them to sidestep the awkward issue of religion. 
When war did break out, it was largely justified in the name of civilization, as I show tracing British 
parliamentary debates. In Prussia, where the war split the political establishment in two, those who 
supported the Western powers similarly argued for liberal  civilization,  and even claimed that if 
Prussia did support the war the old liberal promise of German unification was an actual possibility. 
Prussian conservatives,  meanwhile,  were sceptical  and argued that  the new political  rhetoric  of 
civilization was reminiscent of the revolution, and therefore dangerous. Yet some of them, as I will 
demonstrate, offered surprisingly prophetic interpretations of the changing political landscape, and 
rightly  argued  that  with  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  which  concluded  the  hostilities,  a  new  era  of 
civilizational rhetoric had started to dominate the international sphere.
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Debating Russian Civilization
The  geopolitical  origins  of  the  first  war  fought  for  civilization  lie  with  the  campaign  for 
independence that constituted modern Greece. It was not, as one might think, the admiration for 
ancient civilizations, driving thousands of western European philhellenes into battle, that inspired 
the new language of civilization, but instead new, modern ideas associated with the same word.1 
Greek  separatists  and their  western  European supporters  had  been  fighting  for  an  independent 
Greek state for the better part of the 1820s, but this independence could only be secured after the 
Russian Empire joined the fight.2 At exactly the same time as Guizot started his lectures on the 
history  of  European  civilization,  in  April  1828,  Russian  troops,  under  the  command  of  Peter 
Wittgenstein,  moved  into  the  Ottoman-controlled  Danubian  principalities  of  Wallachia  and 
Moldavia,  officially  to  protect  their  Christian  populations.3 Despite  the  fact  that  the  word 
civilization was not mentioned in the campaign itself, to many the subject Guizot was addressing 
and these international  events  were intimately connected.4 In all  European states,  including the 
German ones, international appeals for Greece in the name of civilization were well received and 
the outcome of the Greek struggle for independence was widely depicted as an effect of increasing 
civilization.5 As the historian and diplomat Dufour de Pradt paradigmatically argued, in the case of 
Greece, the rise of civilization became visible: 'unabwendar ist das Bedürfniss der Civilisation, sie 
ist die Universalnothwendigkeit'.6
The question of how the matter of civilization related to the recent military clashes was discussed as 
far  away as  the Grand Duchy of Hesse,  where D.A.  Lips,  professor at  the local  University of 
Marburg, dedicated a whole book to the subject:  Der Krieg in Osten, aus dem Gesichtspunkt des  
Rechts, der Civilisation, und der Politik betrachtet.7 Much like Guizot, Lips thought of civilization 
1 Margarita Miliori, “Ambiguous Partisanships. Philhellenism, Turkophilia and Balkanology in 19th Century 
Britain,” Balkanologie. Revue D’études Pluridisciplinaires VI, no. 1–2 (2002): 127–53; William St. Clair, That 
Greece Might Still Be Free: The Philhellenes in the War of Independence (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 
2008); Res¸at Kasaba, “The Enlightenment, Greek Civilization and the Ottoman Empire: Reflections on Thomas 
Hope’s Anastasius,” Journal of Historical Sociology 16, no. 1 (2003): 1–21; Joseph Peysson, Barbarie et 
civilisation ou plaidoyer pour les Grecs (Paris: Librairie Universelle, 1827); Georg Friedrich Kramer, 
Griechenland unter der Tyrannei der Türken (Augsburg: Hamm’sche Buchdruckerei, 1821).
2 Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 7–45.
3 François Guizot, Cours d’histoire moderne: histoire générale de la civilisation en Europe depuis la chute de 
l’empire romain jusqu’à la révolution française (Paris: Pichon et Didier, 1828); Barbara Jelavich, Russia and the 
Formation of the Romanian National State, 1821-1878 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 28–29.
4 See for example Leopold Krug, ed., Porträt von Europa: Gezeichnet von einem alten Staatsmann ausser 
Diensten und in Druck gegeben (Leipzig: Verlag von Ch.E. Kollmann, 1831).
5 See specifically Oliver Schulz, Ein Sieg der zivilisierten Welt? Die Intervention der europäischen Grossmaechte 
im griechischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg (1826-1832) (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2011).
6 Dominique Georges Frédéric de R. de Pradt, Europa in seinen Verhältnissen zu Griechenland und zu den Stats-
Veränderungen in der Türkei. Aus dem französischen (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichssche Buchhandlung, 1827), 50. 'the 
needs of civilization are irrepressible, it is a universal necessity.'
7 D.A. Lips, Der Krieg in Osten, aus dem Gesichtspunct des Rechts, der Civilisation und der Politik betrachtet: 
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as a progressive force, driven at different points by different states. This time, he argued, it was 
Russia's turn. A victory over the Ottomans, a fact Lips did not doubt for a moment, would be a 
victory for  civilization,  and  the  end  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  the  beginning  of  a  new duty for 
civilization and humanity:
Wird es nicht Pflicht werden, auf die Ruinen dieser Barbarei die Fundamente einer neuen 
durchgebildeten  Cultur  und  Civilisation  zu  legen  und  die  Herrschaft  über  diese  einem 
erbärmlichen Despotismus unterliegenden Länder auf Staaten von Cultur und Civilisation zu 
übertragen,  um  auch  hier  den  Saamen  der  Humanität  auszustreuen,  und  um  die 
unglücklichen Bewohner jener Erdstriche von einer absoluten Tyrannei zu befreien?8
Russia, Lips argued, was fulfilling the duty of civilization, which liberals like him saw as anti-
ottoman national politics and it was doing so not for its own good, but for the progress of humanity 
as a whole.
Yet, while Lips was certainly not alone with the idea that Russia's intervention was a benevolent one 
to benefit the Christian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire, his claims for Russian civilization were 
questioned by those who doubted Russia's altruistic actions.9 Lips' hopes for new national Christian 
states in the Balkans were indeed soon dashed. The Ottoman Empire did not crumble, the sultan 
sued for peace, and the Treaty of Adrianople, concluding the Russo-Turkish war, gave the Tsar vast 
new possessions on the Black Sea.10 While Greece was founded as an independent state, Russia 
itself arguably profited most, and certainly more than the Christian minorities Lips and others had 
backed.  For  those who had doubted what  Russia's  supporters  called its  'mission',  the Treaty of 
Adrianople  was  proof  that  Russia's  intentions  were  not  benevolent,  but  based  on more  selfish 
motives. Already over the previous decade, French and British liberals and conservatives alike, had 
started regard Russia in a more anxious fashion.11 Especially the British elite, always concerned 
ein Versuch die verschiedenen Interessen der Kabinette Europas hierbei zu vereinigen (Nuremberg: Riegel und 
Wießner, 1828). 'The war in the east, from the point of view of law, of civilization, and of politics.'
8 Ibid., 11. 'Will it not be a duty, to build the bases of a new sophisticated culture and civilization on the ruins of 
this barbarism, and to transfer dominion over these lands, suffering from despotism, to states of culture and 
civilization, so as to spread the seeds of humanity and to free the unfortunate inhabitants of this part of the world 
from absolute tyranny.'  
9 “The Military Power of Turkey,” The Oriental Herald 56 (1828): 268; Rudolf Stadelmann, Moltke und der Staat 
(Kreveld: Scherpe-Verlag, 1950), 85–86.
10 Erik Goldstein, Wars and Peace Treaties: 1816 to 1991 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), 23.
11 Raymond T. McNally, “The Origins of Russophobia in France: 1812-1830,” American Slavic and East European 
Review 17, no. 2 (April 1958): 173; Paul Ducret Passenans, La Russie et l’esclavage, dans leur rapports avec la 
civilisation européenne: ou: De l’influence de la servitude sur la vie domestique des russes, sur leur existence 
civile, morale et politique, et sur les destinees de l’Europe (Paris: Pierre Blanchard, 1822).
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about a balance of power (not limited to Christian countries) in Europe, had, as it would later be 
put: 'stopped fearing Turkey and started to fear for it.' The designs of Russia, many in Westminster 
argued, were unclear; and its enormous expansion over the last decade and the alleged threat this 
posed to British possessions in India were a matter of continuous discussion in London's corridors 
of power.12 
These voices of caution would soon be proved right, as the authoritarian tendencies of the Tsar 
started to show with the brutal suppression of the 1830 uprisings, and a first wave of Russophobia 
started  to  spread  through  Britain.  In  Poland,  whose  ancient  liberties  were  revoked  after  the 
revolutions had been brutally crushed, the opponents of Russia thought to glimpse the true face of 
Russian  foreign  policy.13 Throughout  the  early  1830s,  Russophobia  in  Britain  increased 
dramatically, a process driven partly by the publication of apocryphal documents detailing Russia's 
plans to conquer Constantinople, partly by a deliberate political campaign of 'ardent Russophobes', 
intent on turning England against Russia.14 Outside and inside Parliament, serious questions were 
raised about the Tsar's empire, its expansion, and what had often been referred to as its 'civilising 
activity'. The British and Foreign Review mocked those who saw Russia as bringing civilization to 
Turkey, presenting their arguments as ridiculous: 'The government of Russia promote civilization! – 
and with the Russian army as its instrument of improvement!'15 The liberal MP Lord Dudley Stuart 
similarly addressed the House in 1836:
They used to  hear  of  Russia  civilising  the  barbarians  of  the  earth:  the  time  when such 
language could be used was gone for ever. He believed that those who had once used it were  
now conscious of their folly and their ignorance, and cared little to be reminded of their 
former sentiments. If they wanted to know the character of Russia, they had only to inquire  
into the history of her late conduct towards Poland and towards her unhappy people.16
Such sentiments were shared by many, and curiously Russophobia had started to spread even in the 
quarters of the former philhellenes. Most prominently, the writer, political agitator, and later MP, 
12 See for example M. A. Yapp, “British Perceptions of the Russian Threat to India,” Modern Asian Studies 21, no. 
04 (1987): 647–65.
13 Oscar J. Hammen, “Free Europe versus Russia, 1830-1854,” American Slavic and East European Review 11, no. 
1 (1952): 27.
14 Albert Resis, “Russophobia and the ‘Testament’ of Peter the Great, 1812-1980,” Slavic Review 44, no. 4 (1985): 
681–93; Margaret Lamb, “Writing up the Eastern Question in 1835-1836,” The International History Review 15, 
no. 2 (1993): 239–68.
15 de Lacy Evans, “The Designs of Russia,” The British and Foreign Review 35 (1835): 280.
16 HC Deb 19 February 1836 vol. 31 col. 632
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David  Urquhardt,  who  had  joined  the  fight  for  Greece's  independence  in  1827,  had  become 
convinced that the Ottoman Empire was less decrepit than he and his comrades had previously 
argued, and that British attention should instead now be focused on Russia.17 Whereas Turkey could 
now be seen as reliable partner of British diplomacy and trade, Russia was a perpetual danger to 
civilization, as Urquhart claimed in several best-selling publications. The fate of Poland and the 
Ottoman Empire were intrinsically connected as: 'one hand of iron is laid on both'.18 With Russia's 
continuous expansion, a fact to which Urquhart had alerted his readers, Europe was no longer safe.19 
Should Russia manage to reach Constantinople 'the possibility of all useful union against her on the 
part of England and France vanishes; and civilisation itself is threatened with a more dangerous 
eclipse than it suffered from the overflow of barbarians in 604.'20 Urquhart's rhetoric  might have 
been a curious reversal of philhellenic claims from less than a decade earlier, when many of them 
had seen Russia as the bearer of civilization, but in the ever more fearful climate of the mid-1830s, 
Urquhart was successfully riding a wave of anti-Russianism that had gripped large parts of Europe.
Others,  some  of  them  liberals,  still  supported  Russia  and  even  its  alleged  plans  to  conquer 
Constantinople, and they too continued to employ the language of civilization. As the Silesia-born 
liberal writer and poet Wolfgang Menzel would put it, the Russian government had to be interested 
in the 'Ausbildung […] aller Elemente fortschreitender Civilisation'  and would certainly receive a 
boost in these undertakings should it succeed to conquer Constantinople.21 Similar positions were 
held even amongst certain sections of British liberalism not traditionally associated with support for 
Russia.  The  free-trade  liberal  Richard  Cobden,  who  signed  his  pamphlets  'A  Manchester 
manufacturer', had a clear opinion on the subject of Russia and civilization more broadly:
The annals  of  the  world  do  not  exhibit  an  example  of  a  great  nation  […] united,  well 
governed,  rising  in  intelligence,  morals,  and  religion,  and  advancing  in  wealth  and 
civilization — falling beneath the destroying hand of a conqueror.  Such a catastrophe is 
17 Gertrude Robinson, David Urquhart: Some Chapters in the Life of a Victorian Knight-Errant of Justice and 
Liberty (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, Co., 1920); Margaret Lamb, “The Making of a Russophobe: 
David Urquhart - The Formative Years, 1825–1835,” The International History Review 3, no. 3 (1981): 330–57; 
G.H. Bolsover, “David Urquhart and the Eastern Question, 1833-37: A Study in Publicity and Diplomacy,” The 
Journal of Modern History 8, no. 4 (1936): 444–67; Dieter Groh, Russland und Europa: Ein Beitrag zur 
europäischen Geistesgeschichte, vol. 3, POLITICA (Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1961), 162–163.
18 David Urquhart, England and Russia: Being a Fifth Edition of England, France, Russia, Turkey (London: James 
Ridgway and Sons, 1835), 4.
19 David Urquhart, Turkey and Its Resources: Its Municipal Organisation and Free Trade; the State and Prospect 
of English Commerce in the East, the New Administration of Greece, Its Revenue and National Possessions 
(London: Saunders and Otley, 1833).
20 Urquhart, England and Russia: Being a Fifth Edition of England, France, Russia, Turkey, 139.
21 Wolfgang Menzel, Europa im Jahr 1840 (Stuttgart: Sonnewald’sche Buchhandlung, 1839), 42–43. 'the 
cultivation of all elements of advancing civilization'.
60
reserved for the chastisement of the self-abandoned, depraved, disorganized, ignorant, and 
irreligious communities, and their anarchical governments — for Babylon and Persepolis — 
for Poland and Turkey!22
The  argument  the  manufacturer  from Manchester  made  throughout  his  pamphlets  was  largely 
predictable.23 Britain should continue to pursue a policy of free-trade and non-intervention, and the 
slow and progressive development of civilization would do the rest.  Poland's downfall,  Cobden 
argued,  was  not  primarily  the  result  of  Russian  despotism  and  aggression,  but  an  indirect 
consequence of Poland's corrupt internal politics, which had weakened it morally and politically.24 
Russia, Cobden argued in rhetoric more popular a decade earlier, was merely fulfilling its part of a  
larger international development towards a more positive future. Contrary to what Urquhart and his 
associates argued, England had no business to stand in her way and the development of civilization 
more broadly.
The Rise of Turcophilism and the Revolutions of 1848
This  first  great  wave  of  anti-Russianism  that  swept  through  Britain  in  the  1830s  was  partly 
sustained  by  a  simultaneous  increase  in  turcophilism  in  most  western  European  states,  again 
expressed in the language of civilization. While anti-Russianism was largely based on the foreign 
policy of Russia, the debates regarding Turkey focused on (intimately connected) domestic issues. 
As the political pressure increased from Russia on the outside, but also from internal rivals like 
Mehmet Ali over the early nineteenth century, Sultan Mahmud II had decided in favour of large-
scale reforms, aiming to turn the Ottoman Empire into a more European country. It was a reform 
movement grounded in the new rhetoric of civilization, which had become so popular in western 
Europe. Indeed, Mustafa Reshid Pasha, Mahmud's vizier, who drew up the original documents for 
the reform, saw Turkey's salvation only in 'the way of civilization', a word he transliterated into 
Ottoman Turkish for official use.25 These liberal reforms served partly to strengthen the sultan's 
position vis-a-vis his external and internal enemies, but also to curry favour with the European 
powers.26 In Europe, these attempts were well received, and specifically in Britain saw a positive 
resonance in journals and newspapers, which interpreted them as a step of the Ottoman Empire to 
22 Richard Cobden, Russia: By a Manchester Manufacturer (London: William Tait, 1836), 18; Groh, Russland und 
Europa: Ein Beitrag zur europäischen Geistesgeschichte, 3:164–165.
23 Richard Cobden, England, Ireland, and America. By a Manchester Manufacturer (London: William Tait, 1836).
24 Cain helpfully points out that Cobden's position regarding Russia's domination of Poland ran counter to his ideas 
of English non-intervention see Peter Cain, “Capitalism, War and Internationalism in the Thought of Richard 
Cobden,” British Journal of International Studies 5, no. 3 (1979): 236.
25 Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 116.
26 Frederick F. Anscombe, “Islam and the Age of Ottoman Reform,” Past & Present 208, no. 1 (2010): 159–89.
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become a civilized and western state.27 
More surprisingly, even in the German-speaking countries, with arguably less geopolitical interest 
in Turkey's internal developments, the sultan's reforms were widely discussed from varying political 
points of view. As the  Allgemeine Zeitung  attested in 1839, these debates were rather confused: 
'Hier  bietet  sich  eine  hohe  Frage.  Welches  ist  die  richtige  Bedeutung,  der  Umfang  der  Worte 
'Reform  und  Civilisation'  in  Beziehung  auf  das  ottomanische  Reich.  Die  Meinungen  Europas 
hierüber erscheinen uns sehr vage und verwirrt.'28 Many kept insisting that true civilization was not 
in the reach of Turkey, because of its religion, and warned those 'die sich den Täuschungen über die 
vielgerühmte Civilisation hingeben' that Turkey would never become a 'normal' European country.29 
In  fact,  and this  was  a  common argument,  the  reforms  might  bring  the  Ottoman  Empire  to  a  
premature  end,  as  the  principles  of  its  ancient  organization  could  not  be  combined  with  the 
European reforms the  Sultan  was trying  to  push through.30 Others,  like  the  more  idiosyncratic 
Austrian  diplomat  Anton  von  Prokesch-Osten,  questioned  whether  these  European  notions  of 
civilization should be applied to the Ottoman Empire at all: 
Civilisation? – Was heisst das? – Es gibt keine oder sie ist in der geregelten, dem Lande, den 
Sitten, den Gebräuchen, und der Religion angepassten Entwicklung des Volkes zu suchen. 
Was über die Verhältniss hinausgeht, ist Verzerrung und Missgriff, ist Kampf anmassenden 
Schwindels gegen die Stützen des Lebens.31 
27 see Dogan Guerpinar, “The Rise and Fall of Turcophilism in Nineteenth-Century British Discourses: Visions of 
the Turk, ‘Young’ and ‘Old,’” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 39, no. 3 (2012): 346–71.
28 “Mahmud Und Mehemet Ali,” Allgemeine Zeitung, May 26, 1839, 146 edition, sec. Beilage zur Allgemeinen 
Zeitung, 1130; “Ueber die Reformen in der Türkei,” Das Ausland: Eine Wochenschrift für Kunde des geistigen 
und sittlichen Lebens der Völker, August 16, 1839, 228 edition. 'Here we have an important question. What is the 
real meaning and scope of the words 'reform and civilization' with respect to the Ottoman Empire. The European 
opinions about it seem to us very vague and confused.'
29 “Voyage de M. Le Mareshal Duc de Raguse En Hongrie, En Transylvanie Dans La Russe Meridionale En 
Crimee et Sur Les Bords de La Mer D’azoff. Vier Bände,” Blätter Für Litterarische Unterhaltung, April 14, 
1838, 104 edition, 421–422; “Die Türkei Seit Dem Frieden von Andrianopel,” Conversations-Lexicon Der 
Neuesten Zeit Und Literatur (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1834); Serbien, Russland und die Türkei (Berlin: G. H. 
Schröder, 1843); “Mahmud und die Reform in der Türkei,” Magazin für die Literatur des Auslandes, 1841, 19 
edition, sec. Türkei. 'who are falling for the chimeras of the much-praised civilization.'
30 Friedrich Haupt, Mustersammlung der Beredsamkeit: Für die Schule und das Leben (Aarau: H.R. Sauerländer, 
1838), 260; “Politische Lage der Türkei, insbesondere der Kampf Mehemet Ali’s, Vicekönigs von Aegypten mit 
dem Sultan Mahmud und dessen muthmassliche Folgen,” Bayerisches Volksblatt: Eine constitutionelle 
Wochenschrift, November 17, 1832, 16 edition; Gottlieb August Wimmer, Neuestes Gemälde der europäischen 
Türkei und Griechenlands, vol. 29, Schuetz’s allgemeine Erdkunde, oder Beschreibung aller Länder der fuenf 
Welttheile. (Vienna: In Kommission bei A. Doll, 1833).
31 Daniel Bertsch, Anton Prokesch von Osten (1795-1876): ein Diplomat Österreichs in Athen und an der Hohen 
Pforte : Beiträge zur Wahrnehmung des Orients im Europa des 19. Jahrhunderts (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 
2005), 277. 'Civilization? What does that mean? There is none, or she is to be found in the development of a 
people adapted to its customs, its traditions, and its religion. Anything beyond this, is a misrepresentation and an 
error, is a fight of fraud against the bases of life.' 
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Meanwhile, the sections of the German-speaking public, which defined themselves as progressive, 
lauded the positive changes the reform had brought for women and religious minorities.32 Especially 
the inauguration of the Tanzimat in 1839, which promised equality before the law to all the subjects 
of the sultan, whether Christian or Muslim, was seen as a dramatic change in German as well as 
European debates.33 As Friedrich Schott argued in his Die orientalische Frage und ihre Lösung aus 
dem Gesichtspunkte der Civilisation, which directly compared the programs of the Sultan with his 
opponent Mehmed Ali: 
In fast gleich innigem Verhältnisse zu den europäischen Nationen befindet sich auch heute 
die Türkei; weil sie Mahmud II. der Civilisation näher gebracht hat und Europa nicht mehr 
erlauben kann, dass sie in die alte Barbarei zurücksinke, deren Princip der Fanatismus und 
der damit verbundene Fatalismus ist.34
The concept of civilization fulfilled a curious function in this argument. Internal reforms and the 
development of civilization brought the Muslim Ottoman Empire and the Christian states of Europe 
closer.  While  Europe  was  obviously  still  predominantly  defined  through  its  Christianity,  its 
relationship  to  the  Ottoman Empire  could  now also  be  grasped through  the  similarity  of  their 
reforms. The fact that those were liberal reforms, concerned with religious freedom and equality 
before the law is not insignificant, as it  is certainly possible that many liberals  in the German-
speaking states would see the attempts at Ottoman reform as paralleling their own demands and 
aims.35
It was not only liberals who employed the language of civilization in the late 1830s and early 1840s. 
Amongst  those  who hoped for  more than just  liberal  reforms,  a  complete  change in  European 
32 “Der Harem des Paschas von Widdin,” Das Pfennig-Magazin zur Verbreitung der Gesellschaft zur Verbreitung 
gemeinnütziger Kenntnisse, June 29, 1839, 326 edition.
33 Selim Deringil, “‘There Is No Compulsion in Religion’: On Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman 
Empire: 1839–1856,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 42, no. 3 (2000): 556.
34 Fr Schott, Die orientalische Frage und ihre Lösung aus dem Gesichtspunkte der Civilisation (Leipzig: F.A. 
Brockhaus, 1839), 4. 'The Oriental Question and its Solution from the Perspective of Civilization'. 'Turkey is in 
nearly as a close a relationship to the European nations today, because Mahmud has brought her closer to 
civilization, and Europe can no longer let her fall back into the old barbarism, whose principle is fanaticism and 
its closely connected fatalism'.
35 Ingrid Lohmann et al., “Wie die Türken in unsere Köpfe kamen. Das Türkei-Bild in der deutschen Pädagogik 
zwischen 1820 und 1930,” Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft 16, no. 4 (2013): 757; Johann Georg August 
Wirth, Die politische Reform Deutschlands: Noch ein dringendes Wort an die deutschen Volksfreunde (Strasburg, 
1832).
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affairs,  support  for Russia  was still  strong, and they too used the concept of civilization as an 
explanatory  tool.  As  liberal  dissatisfaction  with  the  political  arrangements  on  the  continent 
increased, more radical and utopian projects were similarly gaining traction. To many further on the 
left,  Russia  was  not  the  brutal,  barbarian,  and  authoritarian  state  the  liberals  described,  but  a 
potential harbinger of a completely new political era. This argument has been most forcefully made 
by Adamovsky for the case of France after 1848, but such a position had arguably already been 
outlined before, and enjoyed pan-European success.36 Adam Gurowski's 1840 work La Russie et la  
civilisation, for example, was translated into German a year later as Russland und die Civilisation.37 
To the  chagrin  of  liberals  like  the  Austrian  politician  Schuselka,  who admitted  to  having read 
Gurowski's  work 'mit  einem Gefühle  von  Ekel', Gurowski  argued  that  the  liberal  project  had 
failed.38 After the disaster of the Polish revolution of which he had originally been a supporter, 
Gurowski now saw Russia,  and what he described as its  panslavic mission,  as the next step in 
civilization, in this quest, he did not just support Russia but the Tsar personally.39
While Gurowski's work should be seen as an indication that civilization could be and was used on 
all sides of the political spectrum, its most prominent exponents in the 1840s continued to be liberal  
thinkers, who adopted the word civilization as a short-hand for European-wide liberal reform. The 
writer  and  journalist  Andre-Luigi  Mazzini,  whose  Italie  et  la  civilisation  moderne  was  first 
published in 1847, argued that the word civilization expressed a more general idea that had started 
to gain ground in Europe over recent years.40 As he explained to his German readers, countries like 
Italy were behind the times:  'In Italien zum Beispiel  ist jenes Wort weder so bekannt,  noch so 
gebräuchlich, wie in Deutschland, in Frankreich, in England, und in allen übrigen Ländern, wo die 
Civilisation einen zu ihren Entwickelungen, zu ihren Eroberungen geeigneten Boden vorgefunden 
hat.'41 Mazzini was right, as in the German-speaking countries whole books were dedicated to the 
36 Ezequiel Adamovsky, Euro-Orientalism: Liberal Ideology and the Image of Russia in France (c. 1740-1880) 
(Bern: Peter Lang, 2006), 153–177; Ezequiel Adamovsky, “Russia as a Space of Hope: Nineteenth-Century 
French Challenges to the Liberal Image of Russia,” European History Quarterly 33 (2003): 411–49; Ezéquiel 
Adamovsky, “Russia as the Land of Communism in the Nineteenth Century?,” Cahiers Du Monde Russe 45, no. 
3 (2004): 497–520.
37 Adam de Gurowski, La civilisation et la Russie (St.Petersburg: J.Haner & Co., 1840); Adam Gurowski, Rußland 
und die Civilisation (Leipzig: Verlag von Heinrich Hunger, 1841); Andrzej Walicki, “Adam Gurowski: Polish 
Nationalism, Russian Panslavism and American Manifest Destiny,” Russian Review 38, no. 1 (1979): 1–26.
38 Franz Schuselka, Oesterreich und Russland (Leizpig: Druck und Verlag von Phillip Reclam jun., 1844), 35. 'with 
a feeling of disgust'.
39 Alexander Maxwell, “Walerian Krasinki’s ‘Panslavism and Germanism’ (1848): Polish Goals in a Pan-Slav 
Context,” New Zealand Slavonic Journal 42 (n.d.): 101–20.
40 André Luigi Mazzini, De L’Italie dans ses rapports avec la liberté et la civilisation moderne (Leipzig: 
Brockhaus & Avenarius, 1847). 'Italy and Modern Civilization'. 'In Italy, for example, this word is neither as well 
known, nor as frequently used as in Germany, France, and England, where civilization has found a fruitful acre 
for its developments and conquests.'
41 Andreas Ludwig Mazzini, Italien in seinen Beziehungen zur Freiheit und modernen Civilisation (Grimma & 
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development of civilization. The subject of civilization and liberalism, for example, was treated en 
détail  in Hans Christoph Freiherr von Gagern's 1847 book, simply entitled:  Civilisation.42 Gagern 
was  seemingly  incapable  of  defining  the  term  itself: 'Civilisation,  hat  darum  keine  gültige 
allgemeine anerkannte Bedeutung, noch Werth, noch Gränze. Es ist alles mit den griechischen wie 
mit den deutschen Worten, je nachdem'. Nonetheless he asserted: 'sie ist […] unstreitig ein Ziel', an 
opinion most liberal thinkers at the cusp of 1848 would have shared.43
A year after Gagern and Mazzini had published their books, the overheated European political kettle 
boiled  over,  a  pan-European  liberal  revolution  broke  out  and  the  questions  of  civilization, 
previously  discussed  in  pamphlets  and  political  speeches,  became  disturbingly  real  political 
concerns.44 The language of the nationalist movements all over Europe was one of civilization. The 
Hungarian  declaration  of  independence,  for  example,  announced  that  Hungary,  after  the 
establishment of a revolutionary government, would be 'at once the main organ of civilization in 
eastern Europe and the guardian of that civilization when attacked' and referred to Hungary as a 
bulwark  against  Russian  despotism.45 Even  those  whose  claims  were  not  aimed  at  complete 
independence, but mere reform, used the language of civilization. If Austria was to give its peoples 
a constitution, an anomymous pamphleteer explained, it would 'seine Zwecke unbeirrt, von der Welt 
bewundert, von allen Geistern und Zungen des Fortschrittes, und der Civilisation getragen verfolgen 
können.'46 As in many instances since 1789, the language of civilization could again be used to 
express the wishes of those Europeans who opposed the revolution. The conservative journalist 
Hugo Hellmar  argued in  his  1848 publication  Der Untergang der  Civilisation,  eine  Folge  der  
Revolution that  the  demands  of  the  revolutionaries  endangered  the  'herrlichsten  Güter  der 
Menschheit,  und  damit  die  Civilisation  selbst'.47 Similar  sentiments  were  expressed  by  the 
conservative  economist  Lorenz  von Stein  who argued that  contemporary Europe was  suffering 
under a  'fehlerhafte Civilisation' and the German lawyer and writer Ludwig Aegidi who claimed 
that the revolutionaries would 'für die Freiheit die Civilisation preisgeben'.48
Leipzig: Druck und Verlag des Verlags-Comptoirs, 1850), 5.
42 Hans Christoph Freiherr von Gagern, Civilisation (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1847).
43 Ibid., 7. 'Civilization does therefore not have a clear meaning, value, or border. It is always the same with Greek 
and German words, it depends. (…) It is, however, undoubtedly an aim.' 
44 For the revolutions see Jonathan Sperber, The European Revolutions, 1848-1851 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005).
45 Phineas Camp Headley, The Life of Louis Kossuth (Auburn: Derby & Miller, 1852), 162.
46 Des Oesterreichers richtiger Standpunkt (Cologne: Peter Hammer, 1848), 9. 'follow its ends, uninhibited, 
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On an international level, the prejudices against Russia harboured by many of Europe's liberals 
would be confirmed through the revolutions and the discourses of liberalism and anti-Russianism 
fused into a more coherent whole. As Austria and some of the German states had great trouble to 
suppress the uprisings, the Tsar intervened to save the conservative European order, not even asking 
for financial or territorial compensation.49 Although not a surprise to many of England's liberals, the 
tone of those who had, secretly or openly, supported the uprisings changed dramatically. Russia's  
intervention could no more be interpreted as a minor stain on its civilizing vest. Instead, as the 
liberal MP for Bath, John Arthur Roebuck explained: 'the uncalled for interference on the part of 
Russia' was a danger to 'the civilisation of the world'.50 To most English liberals, the revolutions and 
their suppression had even more clearly drawn the lines between civilization and barbarism on the 
continent,  and raised the question whether  England should become more actively involved.  As 
Russia  was  simultaneously  putting  down  rebellions  in  Eastern  Europe,  and  again  moved  into 
Wallachia and Moldavia, many would have agreed with Colonel Thompson, who took the floor in 
the House of Commons with an impassioned speech to announce that England: 'ought, therefore, to 
contrive to make friends somewhere or of somebody, and to place herself at the head of the great 
struggle which  was going on between civilisation and freedom on one side,  and barbarity and 
despotism on the other.'51 While Russia's international interventions in the late 1820s had been seen 
as  positive  by many,  by 1848 a  majority  of  the  European,  and specifically  the  British,  public 
regarded Russia with deep suspicion. 
Yet despite the wide-spread support for liberal civilization on the continent, the friends Colonel 
Thomson  had  proposed  England  should  make  were  rather  difficult  to  find,  until  Turkey 
unexpectedly joined this new coalition for liberal civilization. With the governments of Prussia, 
Austria,  and Russia arguably engaged on the side of despotism and France in turmoil,  English 
liberals were feverishly looking for allies on the continent. After the last Hungarian revolutionaries 
had been defeated, the English public had to watch from afar as an Austro-Russian coalition chased 
their  remaining  leaders  through  Europe.52 It  was  a  surprise  to  them  when  the  Hungarian 
revolutionary leader, Kossuth, and many others were given asylum by none other than the Sultan, 
who, for perhaps not completely unselfish reasons, positioned himself clearly in the camp of liberal  
revolution and civilization. As the Ottoman Empire was pressured by Austria and Russia to give up 
Wigand, 1848), 63. 'flawed civilization'.'to give up freedom for civilization'.
49 Sperber, The European Revolutions, 1848-1851, 244.
50 HC Deb 21 July 1849 vol. 107 col. 801
51 HC Deb 22 March 1849 vol 103 col. 1143 
52 Headley, The Life of Louis Kossuth, 162.
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the revolutionaries, John Stuart Mill, in uncharacteristically frantic language, announced that:  
Many thousands in  England,  and millions,  I  will  venture  to  say,  in  Europe,  are  waiting 
anxiously to  see  whether  the  noble  conduct  of  the  Sultan  in  refusing  to  deliver  up  the 
defenders of Hungarian liberty to the crowned employers of the scourgers of women, the 
butchers of Warsaw and Pesth, is to have the support of England or not.53
While  the  English  government  shied  away  from  too  outright  a  support  for  the  Sultan,  its 
international friends had arguably been found. As more conservative European commentators did 
not seize to point out, it was no surprise that Kossuth, after having left Turkey for a tour of the 
United States, would come to settle in London, which became the home of the majority of the 
refugees  from  the  continent.54 Although  the  European  order  was  still  intact,  a  clear  rift  had 
developed between those governments sympathetic to the revolution, and a liberal conception of 
civilization, and those who still supported the old European order.
The Debates Preceding the Crimean War
While 1848 can be seen as redrawing the political lines on the continent, it was events in France 
that further advanced Europe on its way to war. International events were quickly pushed forward 
by Napoleon III's coup d'état in 1851, and the ensuing foreign policy that most likely had domestic 
origins.55 While Napoleon III's pamphleteers and supporters were already hailing him as the saviour 
of civilization, the emperor himself perceived his main domestic problem to be a lack of Catholic 
support and quickly identified foreign policy,  and specifically the difficult situation of the Holy 
Places in the Ottoman Empire, as the best field to (re)-gain it.56 For a long time, the dispute over the 
religious control of the Holy Places had been one of the most delicate areas in the relationship 
between the major European powers and the Ottoman Empire. Orthodox and Latin churches alike 
were vying for control and could be certain of more worldly support from various governments. 
After a show of military strength, deploying the newly-built Charlemagne, Napoleon III gained the 
keys to the Church of the Nativity, and the guarantee of supreme Christian authority over the Holy 
Places, for the Catholic Church. It was from this point on that the situation spiralled out of control. 
53 Quoted in Benjamin Day, “Mill’s Liberty, the Ribald Press, and the Politics of War,” Canadian Journal of 
History 40, no. 2 (2005): 237.
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56 Arthur Dubreuil-Hélion de La Guéronnière, Portraits Politiques Contemporain: Napoléon III (Paris: Amyot, 
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The Tsar, presumably misunderstanding the various stances of other European powers, again moved 
into the principalities  of  Wallachia  and Moldavia under  the  pretext  of  protecting  the Orthodox 
Christians of the area and thereby started a series of conflicts that would mark the beginning of the  
Crimean  War,  in  which  Britain  and  France  would  protect  the  Ottoman  Empire  against  these 
incursions.57
The British debates in the run-up to the war have recently become the subject of academic inquiry, 
most importantly in the books of Markovits and Dereli, which have both focus on the literature 
surrounding the conflict.  Little has been written about the use of civilization in these debates. 58 
Dereli has only argued that there was a conscious effort on the part of certain magazines, mostly 
liberal ones, to build 'up a new public image of the Turks as reasonable, civilised, hospitable, and 
generally acceptable allies, deserving of protection.' which was easy to sustain given Turkey's recent 
reforms and benevolence towards  revolutionary refugees.59 But  this  debate was a wider  one in 
which the concept of civilization could also be found on the other side, which claimed that potential 
British  support  for  Turkey was  in  fact  a  betrayal  of  civilization,  as  the  Turks  were  not  truly 
civilized. As the Russian emigrant and publicist Ivan Golovin put it: 'Byron may prize the Turkish  
sword; even Turkish tobacco is excellent; but the women enjoy in Turkey only a nominal freedom. 
The  condition  of  women  is  always  the  criterion  of  the  civilization  of  a  nation.'60 The  British 
government was equally split into supporters of Turkey and Russia. The leader of the conservative 
opposition, Disraeli, would eventually refer to the two positions taken by the various members of 
the government, as manifestations of what he called the 'two theories upon that important subject 
which, in common phrase, is called ‘the Eastern question'.61 The government, Disraeli argued, was 
split  between  those  who  thought  that  there  was  'vitality  in  Turkey'  and  that  it  'might  form a 
substantial and a real barrier against Russia' and those who believed it 'decaying and decrepit—that 
57 For the Crimean War see Brison D. Gooch, “A Century of Historiography on the Origins of the Crimean War,” 
The American Historical Review 62, no. 1 (1956): 33; Candan Badem, The Ottoman Crimean War (1853 - 1856) 
(Leiden: Brill, 2010); Andrew D. Lambert, The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy Against Russia, 1853-56, 
2nd ed. (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2011); Orlando Figes, Crimea (London: Penguin UK, 2011); Olive 
Anderson, A Liberal State at War: English Politics and Economics During the Crimean War (London: 
MacMillan, 1967); Georg Maag, Wolfram Pyta, and Martin Windisch, eds., Der Krimkrieg als erster 
europäischer Medienkrieg (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2010); Winfried Baumgart, The Crimean War, 1853-1856 
(London: Arnold, 1999).
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its  resources,  always  imperfectly  developed,  perhaps,  are  now virtually  exhausted'.62 The  main 
proponents of the first theory, as Disraeli saw it, were Palmerston and Russell and of the second the 
prime minister, Aberdeen, and Disraeli's favourite enemy, Gladstone, whose russophile politics were 
widely known.63 
What Disraeli did not explicitly state was that the discussions amongst the various ministers about a 
potential war were essentially debates about Turkey's relationship to civilization. Whereas Aberdeen 
and Gladstone thought civilization in the modern world intrinsically connected to Christianity and 
could  not  imagine  supporting  a  Muslim  power,  the  more  realist  Palmerston  and  Russell,  also 
sensing the public mood against Russia, had no qualms about such an undertaking. The exchange of 
letters between the various members of government during 1853 clearly bears this out. In February 
1853, Aberdeen stated his principal position, in a letter to Russell:
 
These barbarians hate us all, and would be delighted to take their chance at some advantage, 
by embroiling us with the other powers of Christendom. It may be necessary to give them a 
moral support, and to endeavour to prolong their existence; but we ought to regard as the 
greatest misfortune any engagement which compelled us to take up arms for the Turks.64
Palmerston, certainly aware of the positions his political nemesis Aberdeen took, indirectly replied 
to the letter through the First Lord of the Admirality, Graham:
It has been said, that we should be reproached with supporting a barbarous Mahomedan, 
against a civilized Christian power […] But it may well be contended, that in many points of  
civilisation, Turkey is in advance of Russia. The Turkish Commercial System is far more 
liberal and enlightened than that of Russia. Justice is quite as well administered in Turkey as 
in  Russia;  pecuniary  corruption  is  not  a  bit  more  prevalent  in  Constantinople  than  at 
Petersburg: Religious toleration is fully as great in the Southern as in the Northern Empire; 
all the inhabitants of Turkey, except the few Negroes and Circassians, are free; by far the 
largest number of the inhabitants of Russia are still slaves. Personal liberty is much more 
secure and the Press is more free in Turkey than in Russia; and the Sultan has no Siberia, and 
no Poland, in his dominions. I should be glad if you let Lord Aberdeen see this letter.65
62 Ibid.
63 For the whole problematic see Ibid., 55–79.
64 Aberdeen to Russell 18 February 1853 in Winfried Baumgart, ed., Englische Akten Zur Geschichte Des 
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Although Palmerston had adduced virtually every single argument liberals had produced in Turkey's 
favour, over the last decade, Aberdeen was unimpressed:
I return Palmerston's letter, which you had the goodness to send me according to his desire; 
and without entering into any formal discussion, I will make a few remarks on it. [...] In a 
case, where great national interests are concerned, it is useless to enter into any comparison 
of the governments of Russia and Turkey. I am no admirer of either of them; but everyone is  
free to form his own opinion. For my own part, I should as soon think about preferring the  
Koran  to  the  Bible,  as  of  comparing  the  Christianity  and  civilisation  of  Russia  to  the 
fanaticism and immorality of the Turks.66
The word civilization had clearly become important in all camps, but it was obvious that those 
arguing for Turkey had to rely on it to a much greater extent. To Aberdeen's position, civilization 
was merely an added factor, as the opposition to Turkey was already covered by Christianity; to 
Russell and Palmerston, civilization itself  had to be the core argument.67 Support for a Muslim 
power could only be based on its alleged advance in civilization, and it is for this reason that they 
used the idea of civilization in their  argumentation knowing that a large part  of the population 
would be more positively predisposed towards Turkey than towards Russia.  
In the German-speaking countries,  the question of  how Russia  and Turkey stood in relation to 
civilization  was  equally  heavily  discussed.  Whereas  the  main  arguments  in  England  revolved 
around questions of foreign policy, in the German debates, Germany's future was perceived to be at 
stake.  In  Prussia,  as  in  most  of  the  German  speaking  states,  1848  had  left  a  deep  mark  on 
civilizational debates, and Russia's intervention had not been forgotten in liberal circles.68 As the old 
48er Gustav Diezel explained to his readers in Deutschland und die abendländische Civilisation, the 
friends of Russia had abused the language of civilization, which could never be associated with the 
66 Aberdeen to Graham 31 May 1853 in Ibid., 1:243.
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despotism of the Tsar:
Civilisation!  Sicherlich hat  man zu keiner  Zeit  mehr von Civilisation gesprochen,  als  in 
unsern Tagen, gewiß aber auch ist nie ein Wort vergeblicher und heuchlerischer im Mund 
geführt worden als dieses. Wir haben gesehen, wie man Tausende ohne Urtheil und Recht, 
gehängt,  erschossen,  deportirt,  alle  Freiheiten  confiscirt,  ganze  Länder  unter  das 
Kriegsgesetz  gestellt  hat,  “um  die  Civilisation  zu  retten;”  […]   dass  das  Haupt  eines 
asiatischen Barbarenreiches […] sich  öffentlich als den einzigen noch  übrigen Beschützer 
dieser Civilisation proclamiren durfte, und […] eine unermessliche Zahl von “Besitzenden 
und Gebildeten” in ganz Europa hat seinen Worten Beifall und Zustimmung gezollt.69
The fact that Russia had suppressed the revolutions and national ideas in Europe made it the true 
enemy of civilization and therefore the enemy of Germany, on whose constitution the future of 
civilization  was  to  be  based.  As  Diezel,  who was  later  imprisoned  for  the  publication  of  this 
pamphlet,  explained:  'Die  Fortentwicklung  der  Civilisation,  hängt  von  der  Constituirung  der 
deutschen Nation ab.'70 But while the chance of a German national revolution had been missed or 
suppressed  in  1848,  the  new developments  and a  possible  war  against  Russia  made this  crisis 
another possibility at developing the German nation, as Diezel explained in his Die Bildung einer  
nationalen Partei in Deutschland. Eine Nothwendigkeit in der jetzigen Crisis Europa's.71 A war 
against  Russia  and a  victory of  what  Diezel  called  occidental  civilization  (in  other  words:  the 
liberalism of the western powers), would finally bring about Germany's unification, as the anti-
national power of Russia was checked by the progressive powers of the west.
Diezel's opinion was not a lonely one as similar slogans were even voiced by a certain section of the 
Prussian elite,  which grouped around a newspaper called  Wochenblatt,  and which was violently 
opposed by the adherents of the old order, who were similarly associated with a newspaper, the 
Kreuzzeitung.72 The  leaders  of  the  so-called  Wochenblattpartei,  Bethmann-Holweg  and  the 
69 Gustav Diezel, Deutschland und die abendländische Civilisation: Zur Läuterung unserer politischen und 
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ambassador in London, Bunsen, wanted to persuade the Kaiser,  a close friend of them, to join an 
eventual  war  against  Russia.  Through this  war,  they,  like  Diezel,  hoped their  aims  of  German 
unification could be achieved.  These rather careful liberal nationalists were in their turn violently 
opposed by a more conservative group, also close to the Kaiser, but split into several sections.73 The 
hardliners of this conservative grouping called the Kreuzzeitungpartei, because of their connection 
to the Neue Preussische Zeitung that carried a huge cross on the cover, were its editors Goedsche 
and Wagener.74 Both of them were rabid conservatives, not only opposed to any sort of western idea 
to  which  the  Wochenblattpartei  was drawn,  but  to  western  vocabulary  tout  court.  Wagener 
disparagingly referred to the 'Phrasen von dem Kampfe der Civilisation gegen die Barbarei, von 
dem Siege der Freiheit  über den Despotismus und wie alle diese schönen Redensarten klingen' 
which were used by those who hoped for a more liberal future.75 Indeed, he identified the language 
of civilization entirely with foreign and dangerously French ideas, as he explained in an article in 
his  Conversationslexikon,  published a few years later:  'Civilisation: der franzöische Ausdruck für 
das was die deutschen Geschichtsschreiber Cultur nennen'76 
But the Kreuzzeitung was a broad church movement and contained both more moderate as well as 
downright opportunistic thinkers. The more moderate wing of the conservatives was dominated by 
Ludwig von Gerlach and Friedrich Julius Stahl. Although they were not as anti-western as Wagener 
and Goedsche,  both had become, through their theoretical works on the legitimate conservative 
state, as the contemporary historian Wachsmuth explained, the intellectual descendants of Burke, 
De Maistre,  and Bonald.77 This attribution does not appear to be mistaken, if one reads Stahl's 
eulogy to his King Wilhelm IV in 1861. Wilhelm was, Stahl explained, the representative of truth 
against the:
”verneinenden  Geist  der  Zeit”.  Nenne  man  diesen  Geist  Revolution,  Civilisation, 
Rationalismus, “Liberalismus”, Ideen von 1789. Es ist die Denkart wie die philosophischen 
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und politischen Lehren des siebzehnten und achtzehnten Jahrhunderts sie erzeugten, es ist 
die  Emanzipation  von  Gottes  Offenbarung  und  gottgesetzter  Ordnung,  die 
Selbstgenügsamkeit und Überhebung des menschlichen Geschlechts, auf seiner Vernunft und 
seiner Gerechtigkeit zu stehen und seinen Willen zum Herren der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung 
zu machen.78 
Meanwhile,  the  outlier  of  the  conservative  camp was a  young and charismatic  politician  who, 
despite being firmly anchored in this milieu, flirted with the idea of supporting the Western powers 
in a potential war: Bismarck.79 Whereas Goedsche and Wagener were opposed to the concept of 
civilization as such and Gerlach and Stahl imagined a more conservative one, Bismarck was not 
only more realistic  about  foreign  policy,  but  had also  started  to  see the word civilization  as  a 
Redensart.80 It was a political tool used by politicians of the western powers to drum up support for 
the international wars, and was no more directly connected to the revolution, as so many of his 
conservative colleagues thought.
The Crimean War and the Concept of Civilization
On 28 March 1854, France, Britain, and the Kingdom of Sardinia, which had joined them, finally 
declared war on Russia.81 In England, Aberdeen had been bullied into the conflict by an unholy 
coalition of the always turcophile Disraeli, Russell and Palmerston. Throughout March and April, 
Parliament served as a propaganda station for liberal  ideas of civilization.  Already three weeks 
before the declaration of war, Napoleon III announced that France was fighting for 'all those who 
wish the triumph of law, justice and civilization'  and in Britain too, civilization, in one way or 
another, featured in all the arguments for the war, which was widely seen as a necessity.82 As John 
Stuart Mill wrote to his wife: 'There is perfect unanimity among all parties here & the war feeling 
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seems to pervade everybody in a manner which nobody thought would ever happen again'.83 While 
the Tsar employed the rhetoric of Christianity in letters to other monarchs, seeking to present Russia 
as the keeper of the faith against revolutionary Europe, most in Britain had turned away from such 
rhetoric.84 The Earl of Shaftesbury explained to the House of Lords that England was right:
to prefer, as I most heartily do, the Turkish to the Russian autocrat—the autocrat that has 
granted  such  great  facilities  to  the  advancement  of  Christianity  and  civilisation  to  the 
autocrat  who denies  them in  his  own dominions,  and who would deny them still  more 
fiercely, should he ever become, by our neglect, the master of those noble provinces that he 
so ardently covets.85
The Earl Fitzwilliam agreed, arguing that: 'It was not England or France that was siding with the  
enemies of Christianity, but he said that England and France were cordially uniting together in order 
to  avert  a  state  of  things in  which barbarism and infidelity might  prevail  over civilisation and 
religion.'86 It was an opinion shared by the Earl of Clarendon: 'It is not merely the protection of 
Turkey  against  the  aggressions  of  Russia  that  is  concerned  in  the  Eastern  question,  as  it  is 
commonly called, but it is the battle of civilisation against barbarism, for the maintenance of the 
independence  of  Europe.'87 Similar  arguments  were  made in  the  House  of  Commons  were  Sir 
Robert Peel affirmed that the liberties of Europe were at  stake,  and that this was a war in 'the 
interests of civilisation and humanity'. His colleague Monckton Milnes called the war 'an instrument 
of civilisation',  and Austen Henry Layard reminded the House that  'this  is  a  question not  only 
affecting the general civilisation and freedom of Europe, but our own material interests'.88 Some 
remained opposed,  like  Richard  Cobden and John Bright  who would  later  chastise  the  'absurd 
language of the liberties of Europe and the civilization of the world'.89 But overall the language of 
civilization had firmly become associated with those who supported the Ottoman Empire in what 
was the first war for civilization.
In Prussia, these civilizational arguments were taken up, reverberated, and liberal politicians and 
83 John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill – The Later Letters of John Stuart Mill 1849-1873, ed. 
Francis E. Mineka and Dwight N. Lindley, vol. XV (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 163–164. Mill 
softened his approval by arguing that he did not agree with the way this unanimity strengthened Napoleon III.
84 Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations (London: 
Routledge, 1996), 46.
85 HL Deb 10 March 1854 vol. 131 col. 593.
86 HL Deb 10 March 1854 vol. 131  col. 615.
87 HL Deb 31 March 1854 vol. 132 col. 749.
88 HC Deb 13 March 1854 vol. 131 col. 710; HC Deb 31 March 1854 vol 132 col. 235.
89 John Bright, Speeches on Questions of Public Policy (London: Macmillan and Company, 1869), 495–496.
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journalists inside and outside the Prussian parliament chastised the government for the position of 
neutrality it had taken towards the war. Implicitly referring back to the debates of 1848, the liberal 
politician Riedel  argued that  the reforms and liberal spirit  of Turkey had made it  the target  of 
Russian aggression: 'Reformen im Geiste der Civilisation und der Toleranz, wodurch Mahmud und 
Abdul Meshid ihr alterndes reich verjüngten, sind es ja auch vorzugsweise gewesen, was jetzt die 
russischen Waffen gegen Constantinopel in Bewegung gesetzt hat.'90 He added that the refusal to 
participate in this just war against Russia was also a betrayal on the Prussian population which had 
'Sympathie  für  die  Civilisation,  gegenüber  der  Barbarei'.91 Outside  of  Parliament, liberal 
publications like the Grenzboten supported such sentiments and lamented that the western powers 
had not succeeded in convincing Prussia to join them: 'Preussen' […] für ihre Sache, die Sache des 
Welttheils und der Civilisation zu gewinnen [...]  Noch heute,  in letzter Stunde, kann man nicht 
genug  die  Kurzsichtigkeit  des  Berliner  Cabinets  bedauern...'.92 It  was  a  short-sightedness,  they 
argued, which in the end endangered the future of Germany as a nation state.
Prussian conservatives agreed that the war in Crimea was a momentous occasion, although they 
naturally supported the Russian cause. Hermann Goedsche, the editor of the Kreuzzeitung, travelled 
to Turkey to report from the Crimean War, and privately published a pamphlet dealing with the 
larger  international  situation.  In  Die  Russen nach Constantinopel!, as  he had called it  to  court 
further  controversy, he  branded  the  new  alliance  fighting  in  the  Crimea  'die  Allianz  der 
Schutzmächte der europäischen Revolution!'.93 He also went on to explain to his readers what he 
saw as Russia's historic mission, an idea he expressed with rhetoric more typically associated with 
the  First  World  War:  'Russlands  grosse  Mission  ist  es  der  rationalistischen  englischen 
Krämerherrschaft  in  Europa Schranken zu setzen.'94 Other  anonymous pamphleteers  agreed and 
mocked the slogans of the western powers, which they argued had become simultaneously money-
mad and prone to revolutionary tendencies: 'Es handelt sich um einen Kampf der Civilisation gegen 
die Barbarei, sagen sie. Aber was ist das für eine Civilisation und was ist das für eine Barbarei?'95 In 
90 Stenographische Protokolle ueber die Verhandlungen der ueber die Allerhechste Verordnung vom 29. Oktober 
einberufenen Kammer. Zweite Kammer, vol. 2 (Berlin: Druck und Verlag der Decker’schen geheimen Ober-
Hofbuchdruckerei, 1854), 833. 'Reforms in the spirit of civilization and tolerance, with which Mahmud and 
Abdul Meshid were rejuvenating their aging empire, were the reason why Russian arms started to move against 
Constantinople.' 
91 Ibid., 2:834. 'sympathy for civilization against barbarism'.
92 “Ein Blick auf die bevorstehende Campagne,” Die Grenzboten: Zeitschrift fuer Literatur, Politik und Kunst 14, 
no. 2 (1855): 178. 'to win Prussia, for their cause, the cause of this part of the world and civilization. Even today, 
in the last hour, we can still lament the myopia of the Berlin cabinet.'
93 Hermann Goedsche, Die Russen nach Constantinopel! Ein Beitrag zur orientalischen Frage (Berlin: Verlag von 
Hugo Bieler & Comp., 1854), 78. 'The Russians to Constantinople'. The alliance of the protectors of the 
European revolution.' 'It is Russia's great mission to delimit England's rationalist commercial rule'.
94 Ibid., 74.
95 Preussen in seinem Geiste und seiner Kraft. Ein Wort der Entgeguung auf die Angriffe gegen Preussens Politik 
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the Prussian parliament, the more reserved Stahl sought to reverse liberal rhetoric by arguing that 
Russia had previously saved the old European order and therefore civilization. As he put it, in not 
particularly  flattering  language  for  Russia:  'Kosackenhorden  haben  zweimal  die  Deutsche,  die 
Europäische Civilisation geschützt, gegen die Barbarei, die von dem gebildeten Westen losbrach'.96 
In the international debate about the war, Prussia's conservative stance and the various positions 
concerning civilizational questions were frequently discussed. Some, like the French traveller and 
journalist Louis Léouzon Le Duc, found Prussia's and specifically Stahl's position admirable. As he 
put it in his La Russie et la civilisation européenne: 'L'Allemand Stahl a, en effet, raison d'appeler le 
gouvernement  russe  un  gouvernement  conservateur,  et  de  nous  traiter,  nous,  hommes  de  la 
civilisation  occidentale  et  de  la  liberté  de  perturbateurs  du  genre  humain  et  d'apôtres  de  la 
révolution!'97 The British press, large sections of which had hoped for Prussian participation in the 
war, started to portray Wilhelm IV as a swaying and indecisive drunk.98 While the government of 
the king was presented as weak and uncertain, its population, many of whom had signed up to fight 
in  foreign  legions  active  in  the  Crimean  War,  were  specifically  lauded  for  their  efforts  for 
civilization. As John Russell put it in Parliament: 
 
And though some of the Sovereigns of Europe—some of the Sovereigns, I regret to say, of 
the great States of Europe, and even of the great States of Germany—have each a stake in 
the momentous question at issue, and have, nevertheless, left to us the brunt of a battle which 
they ought to fight along with us; still that is no reason why the subjects of these and other  
princes should not take a part with us, and, entering into the service of Her Majesty, uphold 
side by side with the English troops what  I  have termed the general cause of European 
liberty,  but  which  is  not  the  cause  of  European  liberty  alone,  but  also  of  European 
civilisation.99
(Berlin: Verlag von Ludwig Rauh, 1855), 9–10. 'It is a fight of civilization against barbarism, they claim, but 
what sort of civilization is this, and what sort of barbarism.'
96 Friedrich Julius Stahl, “Der Orientalische Krieg. (Sitzung Der Ersten Kammer Am 25. April 1854),” in Siebzehn 
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97 Louis Léouzon Le Duc, La Russie et la civilisation européenne (Paris: Victor Lecou, 1854), 76. 'The German 
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98 Oliver Stenzel, “The ‘Mad Czar’ and ‘King Cliquot’: Russland und Preussen als Feindbilder in den Karikaturen 
des ‘Punch,’” in Der Krimkrieg als erster europäischer Medienkrieg, ed. Georg Maag, Wolfram Pyta, and Martin 
Windisch, vol. 14, Kultur und Technik (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2010), 139–62.
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Civilizational discussions continued throughout the war, which, after a victory western powers, was 
concluded  with  the  Treaty  of  Paris.  It  was  in  its  aftermath  that  many  discovered  a  changed 
landscape of political debate, and examined the new language of civilization in more detail. The fact 
that civilization had firmly become established was visible in the way it was used to mock other, 
even  smaller,  conflicts.  As  the  Münchener  Punsch sarcastically  explained  regarding  a  smaller 
altercation between Danes and Germans in Schleswig-Holstein:  'Wenn die Schleswig-Holsteiner 
Türken wären, dann wäre es freilich was Anderes, dann könnte man sie als Representanten der 
Civilisation hinstellen, dann wären alle humanen Mächte Europa's bereit,  für ihre Integrität und 
Selbstständigkeit  einzustehen'.100 But  more  serious  questions  were  asked about  where  this  new 
language of civilization had emerged. The prominent conservative Austrian politician, Ficquelmont, 
suggested that the word 'civilization' had been a compromise between English and French policy, 
because it could mean anything and nothing at the same time.101 The Prussian conservative Wagener 
later argued that it had been the French 'unter Louis Napoleon die Civilisation im orientalischen 
Krieg zum Feldgeschrei gegen Russland gemacht'.102 Bismarck would  write in his memoirs that 
England was responsible for the rhetoric of civilization: 'war uns doch während des Krimkrieges 
von England aus nicht ohne Wirkung auf die Stimmung gepredigt worden, daß wir “zur Rettung der 
Civilisation” die Waffen für die Türken ergreifen müßten'.103
Wherever this language had started to appear, both in Britain as well as in the German-speaking 
countries,  many  started  to  wonder  about  the  legacy  of  the  use  of  the  word  civilization.  Two 
seemingly opposite viewpoints emerged. The first one, that civilization was, and would remain, 
merely  a  rhetorical  tool  of  whatever  party  wanted  to  use  it,  the  second  that  the  concept  of 
civilization had fundamentally changed the international sphere. David Urquhart, the famous anti-
Russian  Turcophile  had  become  suspicious  of  Palmerston's  rhetoric  and  his  basis  for  support. 
Specifically  irritating  to  Urquhart  was  Palmerston's  use  of  the  word  civilization,  whose  real 
meaning  no  one  seemed  to  understand.  As  Urquhart  explained,  referring  to  the  debates  in 
Aberdeen's government:
there were the reasonable and political men who cared not a fig about Turkey or civilization 
100 “Rundschau,” Münchener Punsch, July 6, 1856, 210. 'If the inhabitants of Schleswig-Holstein were Turks, then 
the case would be a different one, then they could be presented as the representatives of civilization, then all the 
humane powers of Europe would be willing to defend their integrity and independence'.
101 Carl-Ludwig von Ficquelmont, Zum künftigen Frieden: eine Gewissensfrage (Vienna: Verlag von Freidrich 
Manz, 1856), 28–35.
102 Wagener, “Civilisation,” 369. 'under Louis Napoleon civilization was made the main slogan against Russia.'
103 Bismarck, Gedanken Und Erinnerungen, 2:110.
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but who with profound sagacity saw that Russia had to be kept out. This great principle 
being established, endless contention arose. Are the Turks civilized or not – is the Ottoman 
empire to be destroyed or preserved – are we fighting for, or against civilisation – for or 
against ourselves?104
Civilization, Urquhart like Bismarck argued, was nothing but a rhetorical tool. It could be used for 
everything because its meaning was so undefined: 'Civilization is, in fine, a monster without a brain  
or heart, but with a life of mere limb'.105 While civilization had seemingly become an important 
factor in international politics, nobody would really profit from it, as its meaning would remain 
forever undefined.
While this was certainly a heavy charge, more conservative commentators in Prussia suspected that 
something else was happening. As Leopold von Gerlach explained in his  Rundschau in the  Neue 
Preussische  Zeitung,  the  concept  of  civilization  as  political  ideology  was  the  heritage  of  the 
revolution, anti-religious and, as a term of politics, inherently opposed to the traditional order. The 
use of civilization was intended purely to de-christianize the European public sphere, to integrate 
the  Ottoman  Empire  and to  fulfil  the  wishes  of  revolutionary Europe.  With  the  integration  of 
civilizational language into the realm of European public law, old Europe and its true, and Christian 
civilization had come to an end:  
Die  Aufnahme  der  Türkei  in  den  Bund  der  Christenstaaten  soll  das  Freiheits  und 
Civilisationswerk vollenden. Es soll also das Bekenntnis zur heiligen Dreieinigkeit aus den 
grossen  Staatsverträgen  Europa's  verdrängt  werden  […].  So  verstopft  man  die  allein 
mögliche und zugleich unerschöpfliche Quelle aller Freiheit und Civilisation.106
While the concept of civilization was not directly integrated into the 1856 Treaty of Paris, Gerlach 
was right that the international sphere after the Crimean War had dramatically changed. In 1856, the 
winners  of  the  Crimean War  met  Russia  in  Paris  and the  resulting  treaty changed the  face  of 
104 David Urquhart, Familiar Words, as Affecting the Conduct of England in 1855 (London: Trübner & Company, 
1855), 186.
105 Ibid., 182.
106 Ludwig Gerlach, Fünf politische Quartal-Rundschauen: von Michaelis 1854 bis Neujahr 1855 (Berlin: Wilhelm 
Hertz, 1856), 53. 'The acceptance of Turkey into the league of Christian nations is meant to finish the great work 
of freedom and civilization. The allegiance to the trinity will be pushed out of the great treaties of Europe. Like 
this one blocks, the only possible and simultaneously endless well of all freedom and civilization.'
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European politics. Turkey was for the first time formally integrated into the Concert of Europe, as 
Gerlach had feared. Although the word civilization was not mentioned in the treaty itself, Gerlach 
was right that the old idea of the European Concert had been destroyed and that civilization was the 
new principle of politics.107 If this was not visible in the final treaty itself, the protocols noted that 
the various parties present understood the Sultan's renewed pledge to protect the Christians in his 
realm,  equally  as  a  sign  of  increasing  civilization:  'Leursdites  Majestés  acceptent  cette 
communication comme un nouveau gage de l'amélioration du sort des chrétiens d'Orient, en objet 
commun de leurs vœux dans un intérêt général d'humanite, de civilisation, et de piété'.108
By the mid-1850s, therefore, civilization had officially become part of the international sphere, and, 
as I have shown, colonialism should not be blamed for its appearance, but ideas of liberalism and 
nationalism that had slowly changed the face of Europe over the previous decades. The political 
language of civilization was at first a national, and perhaps even an anti-imperial one. The origins of 
civilizational language lie not in later imperial projects, but inner-European conflicts. The word 
civilization, although used by all sides, was primarily associated with liberal politics and with the 
western powers,  which more broadly stood for these new and progressive ideas.  Yet,  as  I  will 
demonstrate in the next chapter, conservative notions of civilization had not disappeared and would 
be taken up by the Catholic Church and its supporters during the following decade, which saw the 
continuation and further proliferation of civilizational language in Europe.
107 Marc Pauka, Kultur, Fortschritt und Reziprozität: Die Begriffsgeschichte des zivilisierten Staates im Völkerrecht 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012), 106–107.
108 Quotation in Édouard Gourdon, Histoire du Congrès de Paris (Paris: Librairie nouvelle, 1857), 77. 'Their 
majesties accept this communication as a new pledge for the amelioration of the Christians in the Orient, 
common object of their wishes in the interest of general humanity, of civilization, and of piety.'
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Chapter 3. Civilization, Nationalism, and War
Introduction
Over  the  1860s,  the  language  of  civilization  became  even  more  firmly  established  in  the 
international sphere. Its continuous rise was again, I argue, sustained by controversy, as a strong 
nexus emerged between nationalism, ideas of modern civilization, and Protestantism, opposed to 
Catholicism and the old order. Continuing the rhetoric established during the Crimean War, the first 
war  of  the decade,  the  Second Italian  War  of  Independence,  was again  fought  in  the name of 
civilization. Its supporters abroad, who tended to be Protestants, or at least opposed to the temporal 
power  of  the  Catholic  Church,  perceived  it  to  be  part  of  a  wider  conflict  between  modern 
nationalism,  and  the  defenders  of  the  old  order,  most  importantly:  the  Catholic  Church.  Such 
rhetoric was responded to by the Vatican, which not only published a journal dedicated to Catholic 
civilization, but also formally condemned the idea that the Pope should reconcile himself with the 
demands of modern civilization, liberalism and nationalism. Needless to say, such statements added 
fuel  to  the  flames  and  all  over  Europe,  but  specifically  in  the  German-speaking  countries,  a 
continuously brewing conflict developed that Wolfram Kaiser has referred to as an inner-European 
'clash of civilizations'.1 
In  the  Austro-Prussian  war,  a  struggle  many again  portrayed as  a  battle  between old  and new 
principles of rule, these two fronts collided once more, but the war also opened up a new avenue for 
the  concept  of  civilization  to  enter  international  law.  Throughout  the  early  1860s,  the  glaring 
discrepancy between the rhetoric of civilization, and the frequency and brutality of nationalist wars 
had become a poignant issue in European debates. It was liberal supporters of international law, 
deeply steeped in civilizational rhetoric, who argued that the civilization of warfare equally had to 
form part of the project of progress they associated with nationalism and liberalism. I argue that 
throughout  the  mid-nineteenth  century the  idea  that  the  progressive  national  state  was  defined 
through its  attempts to  wage civilized war became a staple  of liberal,  national  thinking.  While 
Russian  officials  made  early  attempts  of  using  the  regulations  of  warfare  to  rehabilitate  their 
country's  tarnished reputation,  the  nexus  of  civilization  and warfare  became most  prominently 
visible  in  the  last  war  of  western  European  nationalism:  the  Franco-Prussian  war.  Both  sides 
claimed that their war effort represented civilization, but German liberals specifically accused the 
French of leading uncivilized and non-national warfare by using non-European troops in battle, a 
1 Wolfram Kaiser, “‘Clericalism – That Is Our Enemy!’: European Anticlericalism and the Culture Wars,” in 
Culture Wars: Secular Catholic Conflict in Nineteenth Century Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 47–76.
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fact, they argued, which showed that Germany was now the leading civilizational power in Europe, 
representing truly national principles.
Civilization and Italian Unification
While the Crimean War had come to an end in 1856, the rhetoric of civilization had not, and its 
application  continued  seamlessly  throughout  the  next  conflicts  the  war  itself  had,  directly  or 
indirectly, sparked.  Throughout the 1850s, and even afterwards, the coalitions the Crimean War had 
forged remained stable, and kept the language of civilization alive. In many ways, victory in the  
Crimean War convinced large sections of the British public that they were not only, as has been 
argued, leading civilization against the despotisms of eastern and southern Europe, but that Britain, 
like France, had a global mission.2 In the Second Opium War, started almost immediately after the 
Crimean adventure, the new alliance of France and Britain was fighting, as the Allgemeine Zeitung 
in  Augsburg sarcastically  put  it:  'wie  einst  in  der  Krim,  einen  Krieg  der  Gerechtigkeit  und 
Civilisation'.3 Like the Crimean War, the conflict sparked large public and parliamentary debates in 
Britain, and here too the concept of civilization fulfilled several different functions. While some 
argued that the shelling of Canton, which had started the war, could justly be labelled an act of 
civilization, as it was opening China to trade, others saw the British intervention as barbarian.4 In 
fact, as can be seen in the parliamentary debates that Andrew Phillips has ably traced, the fault-lines 
in Britain were remarkably similar to the ones of the Crimean War.5 While most liberals advocated 
intervention in the name of civilization, Cobden and a loose coalition of MPs, which also included 
conservatives, refused British involvement for the same reason. For the time being, at least in global 
debates, civilization continued its schizophrenic career on various sides of the political spectrum, 
and was not necessarily associated with any particular ideology. 
The third victor of the Crimean war, the rulers of the Kingdom of Sardinia, similarly remained 
allied with  France and they too continued to  use  the rhetoric  of  civilization,  albeit  in  a  rather  
different, more domestic, context. Although the Crimean War itself had proved to be a failure for 
the ambitious politicians of Sardinia, as their demands at the Paris Conference had largely been 
ignored,  the  coalition  with  France,  strengthened through the  Crimean  experience,  continued  to 
2 Jonathan Parry, The Politics of Patriotism: English Liberalism, National Identity and Europe, 1830-1886 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 8.
3 “Frankreich,” Allgemeine Zeitung, June 4, 1860, 156 edition.'just as in Crimea, a war of justice and civilization'
4 Andrew Phillips, “Saving Civilization from Empire: Belligerency, Pacifism and the Two Faces of Civilization 
during the Second Opium War,” European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 5 (2011): 5–27; see also 
Erik Ringmar, “Free Trade by Force: Civilization against Culture in the Great China Debate of 1857,” in Culture  
and External Relations: Europe and Beyond, ed. Monika Mokre and Jozef Bátora (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 
2013), 15–32.
5 Phillips, “Saving Civilization from Empire.”
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benefit them.6 Victories over Austrian troops in Magenta and Solferino, achieved with substantial 
help from France, gave the kingdom of the young Vittorio Emmanuele Lombardy, and over the next 
year  Parma,  Modena,  and  Tuscany were  annexed  and  the  first  Kingdom of  Italy  proclaimed.7 
Although Italy immediately had to yield Nice and Savoy to Napoleon III, as had previously been 
agreed in a secret treaty, Italian officials did not tire of mentioning the great service to civilization 
they had achieved together. On the birthday of the emperor in August 1860, the municipality of 
Milan  took the  opportunity to  thank the  French officially for  'la  délivrance  de  l'Italie,  pour  le 
généreux allié qui s'est donné la noble mission de marrier, sous le sceptre de Victor Emmanuel, des 
peuples déjà assortis par la nationalité et la civilisation.'8 Continuing this rhetoric, the king himself 
announced in his first parliamentary speech that the foundation of Italy was not only a great feat of 
civilizational advance and of liberalism, but that Italy would now itself become the instrument of 
universal, liberal civilization: 'L’opinione delle genti civili ci è propizia; ci sono propizi gli equi e 
liberali  principii  che  vanno  prevalendo  nei  Consigli  d’Europa.  L’Italia  diventerà  per  essa  una 
guarentigia di ordine e di pace, e ritornerà efficace stromento della civiltà universale.'9
In  a  European-wide  debate  that  had  naturally  ensued,  Italian  nationalism,  the  language  of 
civilization, and the support of Napoleon III, were heavily discussed. John Stuart Mill, although 
supportive of Italian unification, could not support the way it came about, mainly because of his 
opposition to Napoleon III, who he regarded as a despot and danger to humanity.10 It was a position 
frequently heard on the continent, but opposed by those who, like Ferdinand Lassalle, argued that 
the ends justified the means. As he put it in Der italienische Krieg und die Aufgabe Preussens: 
Wenn die Aufgabe, Italien vom österreichischen Joche zu befreien, eine grosse und civilisatorische 
ist, - liegt sie denn darum weniger in den Interessen der Civilisation, weil es Louis Napoleon ist,  
6 For the Treaty of Paris see the works of Winfried Baumgart, especially Winfried Baumgart, Der Friede Von 
Paris 1856. Studien Zum Verhältnis Von Kriegführung, Politik Und Friedensbewahrung. (Munich: R. 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1972).
7 For a brief introduction see Christopher Duggan, A Concise History of Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 118–143.
8 Belgioioso, “Le 15 aout a Milan,” in Grand almanach de la France guerrière pour 1861. Proclamations et 
harangues militaires. Ordres du jour remarquables, etc. (Période de 1830 à 1860.), ed. Eugène Pick (Paris: 
Grande Librairie Napoléonnienne, 1860), 131. 'the deliverance of Italy, for the generous ally who has given 
himself the noble mission to marry under the sceptre of Victor Emmanuel peoples already united in nationality 
and civilization'.
9 Vittorio Emanuele II, “Discorso Pronunziato Da S.M. Vittorio Emanuele II Nella Sollene Apertura Del 
Parlamento Italiano Addi 18 Febbraio 1861” (Camera dei Deputati), 2, accessed August 30, 2014, 
http://archivio.camera.it/resources/feaCms/percorsi/150/mostra/02-003.pdf. 'The opinion of the civilized peoples 
is favourable; favourable to the fair and liberal principles which will prevail in the councils of Europe. Italy will 
become for them a guarantee of order and peace, and an effective instrument of universal civilization.'
10 Georgios Varouxakis, Liberty Abroad: J. S. Mill on International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 77–100.
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der, obwohl aus den erbärmlichen Motiven, es über sich gewonnen hat, sich ihr zu unterziehen?'11 
While the supporters of the new Italy were not entirely clear about the bases and consequences of 
what had happened, more conservative thinkers understood the Second Italian War of Independence 
as a natural continuation of the destruction of the old European order that had started with the  
Crimean War. Austrian publications, for example, argued that 'das ganze Geschrei' about 'Krieg im 
Namen der europäischen Civilisation' – first used in Crimea and now in the Austrian conflicts – was 
a 'Komödie' thought up by revolutionaries, intent on breaking the last vestiges of the traditional 
order.12
Many saw the repeated use of civilizational language as a new phase in the break of European 
traditions. As German readers were told in Carpentier's Über Civilisation:
Unserer  Zeit,  dem  modernen  Zeitalter  der  Erfindungen,  war  es  vorbehalten,  Worte  zu 
erfinden oder in neuer Weise zu verwenden um unter ihrem blendenden (ach bisweilen sogar 
unsauberen) Deckmantel beliebige Absichten geltend zu machen und sich einen bequemen 
Weg über wohlbegründete Rechte hinweg zu bahnen.13
The  German  mathematician  and  philosopher  Constantin  Frantz  dedicated  a  whole,  and  very 
successful,  book,  which  he  called  Untersuchungen über  das  europäische  Gleichgewicht, to  the 
problem.14 Frantz, whose writings would later inspire Richard Wagner's anti-French rhetoric, saw 
the  ideas  of  civilization  now  proclaimed  as  directly  linked  to  the  historical  separation  the 
Revolution had created between the French past and the French present.15 Because France had lost 
11 Ferdinand Lassalle, Der italienische Krieg und die Aufgabe Preussens (Berlin: Verlag von Franz Duncker, 1859), 
5–6. 'The italian war and the task of prussia'.'If the task of liberating Italy from Austrian domination is truly a 
great and civilizational one, is it less in the interest of civilization, if it is Louis Napoleon, who, albeit for 
miserable motives, has decided to pursue it?'
12 Die Folgen der Verschwörung von Plombiers, oder Enthüllungen der hinterlistigen Anschläge unserer Feinde 
zum Raubanfalle gegen Oesterreich in Italien und Ungarn.Aufdeckung aller geheimen Pläne, welche die 
Revolution zur Vernichtung Oesterreichs entworfen, und einige sehr interessante Blicke in die Vergangenheit, 
Gegenwart und Zukunft für Oesterreiche Völker (Vienna: In Commission der Mechitaristen=Buchhandlung, 
1861), 3; for instances of the use of civilization on the Austrian side see Geschichte der deutschen Politik unter 
dem Einfluss des italienischen Kriegs: eine Kritik (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1860), 20; Rudolf 
Marggraff, Vor und nach dem Frieden von Villafranca. Studien zur Geschichte und Kritik der politischen 
Entwickelung des letzten Zeitdrama’s (Leizpig: Adolph Lehmann, 1860), 141–142. 'all this pathos'. 'war in the 
name of European civilization'. 'comedy'.
13 George Carpentier, I. Herr Forcade und die römische Frage. II. Über Civilisation (Dresden: Ch. G. Ernst am 
Ende, 1862), 13. 'It was the privilege of our time, the modern age of inventions, to invent words or to use old 
ones in a new way, so as to, under this blinding and often dirty shield, find a new and comfortable way over old 
and and just rights.'
14 Constantin Frantz, Untersuchungen über das europäische Gleichgewicht (Berlin: Ferdinand Schneider, 1859). 
'Investigations into the European Balance'. 
15 See Richard Wagner, Deutsche Kunst und deutsche Politik (Leipzig: Verlagsbuchhandlung von J.J. Weber, 1868), 
9.
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its connection to the past, Frantz argued, it now had to inspire ideas of nationality in other states to  
overcome the previously existing equilibrium and destroy the old order, which would have excluded 
its revolutionary tendencies.16
Similar ideas were uttered in Italy where civilizational debate had intensified over the last decade.  
For roughly ten years, preceding the Italian wars of unification, two fundamentally opposed ideas of 
civilization had been formulated by Italy's intellectual elites. While the liberals and nationalists of 
1848 had agitated for what they called 'modern civilization', the Catholic Church and the Pope had 
drawn the theoretical outlines of a more conservative notion: Catholic civilization.17 Already in 
1850, after the Pope had been exiled to Naples during an earlier episode of liberal uprising, the 
journal  Civilta  Cattolica  had  been  founded.  It  was  a  Jesuit  publication  intended  to,  as  its 
contemporary  editors  remember:  'difendere  “la  civiltà  cattolica”,  minacciata  dai  nemici  della 
Chiesa,  in  particolare dai  liberali  e dai  massoni'.18 The  Civilta  Cattolica,  unusually for  a  papal 
publication,  was written in  Italian,  to  gather  maximum attention,  and outlined a  clear  program 
defining Catholic  civilization.19 It  was opposed to liberalism,  to  nationalism,  to  changes  of the 
traditional order, and to freedom of religion, briefly: to everything the new Italian state claimed to 
stand for. Consequently, the ideologies of the liberal elite and the Papal States (which physically 
stood in the way of a full  Italian unification)  were opposing political  programs heading for an 
intellectual and political collision. 
Although the discrepancies between these two programs of civilization had been obvious from the 
beginning, the two ideas first clashed openly in March 1861.20 The government of the Kingdom of 
Italy claimed Rome as its natural capital and demanded the Pope abdicate his sovereign titles to the 
city. Prime Minister Cavour added fuel to the flames by explaining to parliament that papal rule was 
'incompatable with modern civilization.'21 The Pope's predictable answer came in the form of an 
allocution that directly outlined the positions of the Church and the distinctions between the two 
16 Frantz, Untersuchungen über das europäische Gleichgewicht, 119–147.
17 André Luigi Mazzini, De L’Italie dans ses rapports avec la liberté et la civilisation moderne (Leipzig: 
Brockhaus & Avenarius, 1847); “Il giornalismo moderna ed il nostro programma,” La Civilta Cattolica: 
Pubblicazione periodica per tutta l’italia 1, no. 1 (1850): 5–24.
18 “La nostra storia: l’Idea,” http://www.laciviltacattolica.it/it/storia/storia/lidea/, La civiltà cattolica, (n.d.), 
accessed August 20, 2014. 'to defend catholic civilization, which was attacked by the enemies of the church, in 
particular the liberals and the Freemasons'.
19 “Il giornalismo moderna ed il nostro programma.”
20 For an introduction to pre-unification anti-catholicism see Manuel Borutta, “Anti-Catholicism and the Culture 
War in Risorgimento Italy,” in The Risorgimento Revisited: Nationalism and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Italy, 
ed. Silvana Patriarca and Lucy Riall (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 191–213.
21 Camillo Benso Cavour, La question romaine devant le parlement italien: discours et discussion à la chambre 
des députés (Paris: Dentu, 1861), 4.
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civilizations, as the Vatican saw them:
Jamdudum Cernibus, Venerabiles Fratres quo misero sane conflictu ob invicem pugnantia 
inter  veritam et  errorem,  inter  virtutem et  vitium inter  lucem et  tenebras  principia,  hac 
miserrima  nostra  praesertim aetate  civilis  exagitetur  societas.  Namque  alii  ex  una  parte 
tuentur  quaedam  moderne,  uti  appellant,  civilitatis  placita,  alii  ex  altera  iustititae 
sanctissimaeque  nostrae  Religionis  iura  propugnant.  Ac  primi  postulant,  ut  Romanus 
Pontifex cum Progressu  cum Liberalismo,  uti vocant, ac recenti civilitate se reconciliet et 
componat.22
As Borutta has pointed out, the Italian liberal-nationalists were certainly aware of what they were 
doing, demanding the vacating of Rome, and were actively risking an international controversy. 
They certainly achieved what they had bargained for.23 While some, like the  Allgemeine Zeitung, 
had previously written sceptically about the 'Kreuzzug der Civilisation', the Italian government was 
engaged in, the Allocution itself now rallied the  Times  and other papers around a clear position 
against the Pope: 
In yesterday's consistory the Pope's reaction was most violent and extreme […] the pontiff 
spoke out in a manner calculated to satisfy the black party, but which will hardly gratify the 
more liberal section of his adherents […]. He declares modern progress and liberalism to be 
incompatible, and announces his fixed determination to uphold the rights transmitted to him 
by his predecessors.24
Yet  there  was  a  sense  that  the  Pope's  message  had  been  as  calculated  in  its  clarity  than  his 
opponents'  and  that  the  lines  of  a  long-standing  battle  had  now been  clearly  outlined.  As  the 
Edinburgh Review explained in an article dedicated to the European book scene: 'It is impossible to 
delude oneself as to the temper of these words. The declaration is in its sense not a whit less explicit 
than  its  counterpart  by Count  Cavour.  When Pius  IX spoke this  allocution,  it  is  plain  that  he 
22  For a long time, venerable brethren, we have seen into which misery of conflict civil society has been 
plunged.In our unhappy times a war has broken out between truth and error, virtue and vice, light and darkness. 
Some argue for the   maxims of modern, as they call it, civilization; while others advocate the rights of justice 
and of our sacred religion. The first group claim that the Roman Pontiff should reconcile himself and make peace 
with progress, with liberalism, as they say, and with today's civilization. 
23 Borutta, “Anti-Catholicism and the Culture War in Risorgimento Italy”; C. T. McIntire, England Against the 
Papacy 1858-1861: Tories, Liberals and the Overthrow of Papal Temporal Power During the Italian 
Risorgimento (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
24 “Foreign Intelligence,” The Times, March 27, 1861; “Berlin,” Allgemeine Zeitung, April 8, 1860, 99 edition; 
Frantz, Untersuchungen über das europäische Gleichgewicht.
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deliberately meant to burn his ships.'25
 
The English interest in these questions was not limited to those who cared about foreign policy, as 
the struggle between the Pope and the Kingdom of Italy heavily overlapped with an already existing 
debate about the relationship between Catholicism and civilization. The role of Catholicism within 
English politics had always been a contested one, and had often served as the negative backdrop to 
the positive stories of the rise of English freedom and prosperity, which allegedly arose first in 
opposition to the Pope and then to the equally catholic French.26 As William Alexander MacKinnon 
argued  in  his  famous  1846  publication  History  of  Civilisation,  the  connection  between 
Protestantism and liberalism went back even further than the Glorious Revolution: it had caused it. 
As MacKinnon explained: 'The civilisation of the people was gradually but decidedly extending 
itself, and the Protestant faith and desire for a liberal form of government were advancing, hand in 
hand, to bring about the change in 1688.'27 By the 1860s, this opposition to the Catholic Church was 
arguably no longer solely based on an affirmation of specific theological differences or the personal 
beliefs of kings, but on arguments about the relationship between Protestantism, and an idea of 
progress and civilization more broadly.28 Already in November 1854, the height of the  Crimean 
War, the liberal Catholic periodical The Rambler published a long article dedicated to what it called: 
'The “Civilization” argument': 
Catholics who mix much with the world are often attacked with some such questions as 
these: If Catholicism is from God and is the only true Gospel, how is it that the political and 
social condition of Catholic countries is often so degraded. How is it that while freedom, 
commerce,  and national power have attained so glorious a  height  in Protestant  England, 
Catholic Spain is a prey to factions, revolutions, tyranny, and general decay […] To put the 
whole question in a sentence: “If England is wrong and Rome is right, why is the civilisation 
of the Papal States inferior to that of England?”29
25 “Church Reform in Italy,” The Edinburgh Review 231 (1861): 267.
26 Walter Ralls, “The Papal Aggression of 1850: A Study in Victorian Anti-Catholicism,” Church History: Studies 
in Christianity and Culture 43, no. 02 (1974): 242–56; Clement Fatovic, “The Anti-Catholic Roots of Liberal 
and Republican Conceptions of Freedom in English Political Thought,” Journal of the History of Ideas 66, no. 1 
(2005): 37–58; Yvonne Maria Werner and Jonas Harvard, “European Anti-Catholicism in a Comparative and 
Transnational Perspective. The Role of a Unifying Other: An Introduction,” European Studies 31 (2013): 13–22; 
Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837, 2nd ed. (London: Pimlico, 2003), 11–54.
27 William Alexander Mackinnon, History of Civilisation (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 
1846), 195.
28 Hugh McLeod, in Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia, ed. Peter van der Veer and Hartmut 
Lehmann (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), 44–70.
29 “The ‘Civilization’ Argument,” The Rambler 2, no. 11 (1854): 365.
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In  the  late  1850s,  these  debates  about  the  rise  of  civilization  (and  its  connection  to  religion) 
increased in intensity, and reached their pinnacle with the publication of Henry Thomas Buckle's 
History  of  Civilisation  in  England,  which  fused  previous  arguments  into  a  larger  national-
civilizational perspective.30 In the two volumes he could complete before his death, Buckle carefully 
examined and traced the specific conditions that had led to the slow and continuing civilisation of 
England, and the less successful politics of Catholic countries. Already, the title was an attempt 'to 
integrate  the  nation  into  a  civilisational  perspective',  and as  Arnold  Ruge,  who later  translated 
Buckle's tomes into German, put it, the book 'ist ein Ereignis geworden […] die Nation hat den 
Geist adoptirt  (sic),  der es durchweht'.31 The rise and development of the English nation was a 
lesson on civilizational development more broadly, as it was in the development of English history 
that  the general rise  of civilization became visible.  Buckle used political,  social,  and economic 
examples to show how the development of England correlated with the development of civilization 
more broadly. Characteristically, he described the Crimean War as a major sign in the advance of 
civilization, as England and France had started to oppose the despotic and backward Russia, instead 
of fighting each other.32 The slow rise of civilization was also visible in how the various religions 
related to each other. As Buckle, who hoped for a non-religious future altogether, explained to his 
readers in no uncertain terms: 'The Catholic religion bears to the Protestant Religion exactly the 
same relation as the Dark Ages bear to the sixteenth century.'33 
The fusion of these 'scientific' descriptions of the relationship between liberal values, Protestantism, 
civilization  and  history,  with  debates  relating  to  Italian  unification,  the  Crimean  War,  and  its 
connection to modern civilization created an awkward position for English Catholics.  Since their 
emancipation in 1829, the politically active members of the Catholic community, predominantly 
from recusant  families,  had  been Whig  MPs;  primarily  because  they were  concerned  with  the 
protection of  their  own religious  freedoms,  a  position  they felt  more safely protected with the 
liberals.34 As  the  international  discussions  on  the  Italian  question  and  the  debates  about  the 
relationship between religion and civilization simultaneously intensified, the odd position of the 
30 Bernhard Semmel, “H. T. Buckle: The Liberal Faith and the Science of History,” The British Journal of 
Sociology 27, no. 3 (1976): 370–86; There were others, not so famous examples like George Harris, Civilization 
Considered as a Science (London: Bell and Daldy, 1861).
31 Peter Mandler, “‘Race’ and ‘Nation’ in Mid-Victorian Thought,” in History, Religion, and Culture: British 
Intellectual History 1750–1950, ed. Stefan Collini, Richard Whatmore, and Brian Young (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 224–44; Henry Thomas Buckle and Arnold Ruge, “Vorwort des 
Übersetzers,” in Geschichte der Civilisation in England, trans. Arnold Ruge (Leipzig und Heidelberg: C.F. 
Winter’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1860), V. 'it has become an event, the nation has adopted its spirit'
32 Henry Thomas Buckle, History of Civilization in England (London: John W. Parker & Son, 1857), 177.
33 Ibid., 239.
34 Josef L. Altholz, “The Political Behavior of the English Catholics, 1850-1867,” Journal of British Studies 4, no. 
01 (1964): 89–103.
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English Catholics became ever clearer. The liberal leadership under the three pro-Italians Gladstone, 
Russell,  and  Palmerston,  despite  remaining  ostensibly  neutral,  was  certainly  not  helping  the 
Catholic cause, and it was obvious that the general liberal position was one of support for Italian 
nationalism and modern civilisation against the Pope.35 Instead of remaining inconspicuous, some 
Catholic Papers, like the Tablet, did everything to exacerbate the situation further by comparing the 
threat of the new Italian government with previous dangers of Islamism to civilization. As they put 
it in April 1860: 'Catholic Christianity is the life of civilization. Europe is threatened by revolution, 
as it formerly was by Islamism. The cause of the Pope is that of civilization and liberty.'36
Those less keen on antagonizing majority opinion, like the famed liberal Catholic Lord Acton, 
attempted to reconfigure and disentangle the ideas of liberalism and nationalism, a position that has 
frequently been misread. As Acton explained in his famous 1862 essay 'On Nationality': 
The co-existence of several nations under the same State is a test, as well as the best security 
of its freedom. It is also one of the chief instruments of civilisation; and, as such, it is in the  
natural and providential order, and indicates a state of greater advancement than the national 
unity which is the ideal of modern liberalism.37
Many,  like  Mandler,  have  read  this  utterance  as  a  British  'civilizational'  argument  against  a 
continental 'nationalist' one, arguing that Acton's position can best be understood with reference to 
his admiration for the non-national history of Britain and his allegedly typically British disdain for 
the  national  politics  of  the  continent.38 This  reading  completely  ignores  an  important  layer  of 
debate,  which  is  that  most  liberal  Protestant  politicians  in  England  supported  the  politics  of 
nationality on the continent. It seems more appropriate therefore to read Acton not primarily as a 
British thinker, but as a Catholic one, opposing the majority of liberal opinion, not only on the 
continent but also in Britain. Whether one includes Acton in these debates or not, the discrepancies 
between  the  Catholic  positions  on  nationality  and  the  Protestant  liberal  support  for  Italian 
unification  drove  the  coalition  of  Catholics  and  liberals  ever  further  apart.  Even  outside  of 
Parliament, Catholics started to agitate against the government and their MPs, despite not formally 
35 Ibid., 99; McIntire, England Against the Papacy 1858-1861.
36 Quoted in McIntire, England Against the Papacy 1858-1861, 191.
37 John Dalberg Acton, “Nationality,” Home and Foreign Review 1 (1865): 1–25; see also Timothy Lang, “Lord 
Acton and ‘the Insanity of Nationality,’” Journal of the History of Ideas 63, no. 1 (2002): 129–49; Jeremy Black, 
“Lord Acton’s Theory of the Supranational State and Today’s Europe: Between the Tradition of the British 
Empire and of the Holy Roman Empire,” The European Legacy 3, no. 6 (1998): 76–86.
38 Mandler, “‘Race’ and ‘Nation’ in Mid-Victorian Thought,” 230.
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breaking their alliance started to vote against the government and to leave the House to avoid voting 
on certain issues.39
In the German-speaking countries, the repercussions of the Italian question, and the debates about 
civilization and nationalism,  were even greater,  primarily because Catholics were not a  distinct 
minority, but a substantial part of the population potentially opposed to German unification. It was 
this  confessional  divide,  as  the  liberal  and Protestant  Johann Caspar  Bluntschli  explained  in  a 
pamphlet  published  shortly  before  the  Papal  Allocution,  that  caused  the  German  nation  to  be 
'weniger  als  irgendein  anderes  europäisches  Volk  in  der  Lage  eine  gemeinsame  Meinung 
auszubilden und einen einheitlichen Willen zu äussern.'40 Now that the Catholic Church was taking 
a more pronounced political position against nationalism and liberalism, those invested in a modern 
state and liberal ideas had to be even more careful. As the example of other continental European 
countries like Belgium had already showed in the 1850s, the biggest rift in European politics had 
become one where liberalism and nationalism opposed Catholicism, a position that was now also 
popularized in the German speaking countries. As an opponent of more extreme political tendencies 
of  Catholicism  (generally  referred  to  as  ultramontanism)  had  already  explained  before  the 
allocution:
Die Zeit wird über ihn hinschreiten, das ist gewiss. Aber mit wie viel Leiden und Unglück, 
das hängt wesentlich davon ab, in welchem Maasse Diejenigen, die den Beruf und die Pflicht 
haben,  die  Civilisation  und  den  modernen  Staat  zu  vertreten,  das  Wachsthum  des 
Ultramontanismus träge oder leichtsinnig gewähren lassen.41 
German Catholics agreed that this was a large-scale international conflict,  but they naturally,  as 
Catholics in all other European countries, disagreed on which side civilization was to be found. 'Die 
Civilisation von Europa ist eine Tochter des Papsthums', as their publications emphasized, and the 
new principles of nationalism and liberalism, although they were supported by a large international 
coalition, were a mere chimera.42 As the Jesuit theologian Daniel Rattinger would later explain in 
39 Altholz, “The Political Behaviour of English Catholics,” 99.
40 Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Das Papstthum vor der Napoleonischen und Deutschen Politik (Berlin: Verlag von 
Julius Springer, 1860), 5. 'less than any other European peoples capable of forming a collective opinion and a 
common will'.
41 Der Kampf der liberalen und der katholischen Partei in Belgien. Eine Warnung für Deutschland. Briefe eines 
Belgiers an einen Süddeutschen (Zurich: Verlag von Meyer und Zeller, 1857), 19. Time will move on beyond it, 
that is certain. But with how much pain, suffering and misfortune, that depends entirely to what extent, those, 
who have the calling and duty to represent civilization and the modern state, will let the rise of ultramontanism 
sluggishly or carelessly happen.'
42 Giacomo Margotti, Die Siege der Kirche in dem ersten Jahrzehent des Pontifikates Pius IX aus dem 
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the  introduction  to  his  pro-papal  Der  Papst  und  der  Kirchenstaat,  which  sought  to  order  the 
international sphere for his readers: 
Drei Staaten werden vorzugsweise mit in Vergleich zu ziehen sein: Piemont, welches, der 
Ankläger des Papstes, den Beruf beansprucht, den Kirchenstaat mit seiner Civilisation zu 
beglücken;  sodann Frankreich  und England,  welche  jenes  unter  ihre  schützenden Flügel 
genommen haben und sich rühmen, an der Spitze der Civilisation einherzuschreiten.43
Nevertheless, as Rattinger added, real civilization could never be found amongst the new liberal 
states. It was a privilege of Rome, as the Vatican itself had emphasized:
In Rom ist Civilisation eine Wahrheit. Ein unter den Auspicien des Papstes gegründetes, von 
zehntausend Abonnenten gehaltenes, wohl unter hundertausenden Lesern circulirendes Blatt 
trägt dieses Wort (Civilta) an der Spitze und richtige Kenntnis der römischen Zustände gibt 
von ihr Zeugnis, während der ohne die Kirche errungene Fortschritt zwar glänzt, aber, einem 
übertünchtem Grabe ähnlich, Moder und Fäulniss in sich schliesst.44
Given these associations of anti-national ideas of civilization with Catholicism, it was only logical 
that the project of German unification should be reared in the Protestantenvereine, where the liberal 
elite  came  together  and  lambasted  the  presumed  anti-nationalism of  the  Catholic  population.45 
Already in the early 1860, in Prussia, but also in other German states, this milieu produced the 
German  variety  of  the  nexus  between  Protestantism,  nationalism,  and  advocacy  of  modern 
civilization that many in Britain regarded as an idiosyncratic phenomenon. In several pamphlets, 
Protestant liberals attacked the Catholic Church, its unnational and backward policies, and were 
happy to employ, as often as possible, the idea of (modern) civilization that the Pope and his states  
opposed. The Papal state, as the famous theologian Schenkel argued in a book dedicated to the link 
between Protestantism and nationalism:  'hat […] den Beruf, einen permanenten Kampf gegen die 
Italienischen von Pius Gams, 2nd ed. (Innsbruck: Verlag der Wagner’schen Buchhandlung, 1860).  'Civilization 
is the daughter of the Papacy'
43 Daniel Rattinger, Der Papst und der Kirchenstaat, 2nd ed. (Freiburg i. Breisgau, 1866), 20–21. 'Three states will 
have to be compared: Piedmont, which as the prosecutor of the papal state claims the role to bring it civilization, 
then France and England, which have taken it under its wings and who laud themselves as marching at the head 
of civilization.'
44 Rattinger, Der Papst und der Kirchenstaat, 40–41.
45 See Michael B. Gross, The War Against Catholicism: Liberalism and the Anti-Catholic Imagination in 
Nineteenth-Century Germany (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004); Manuel Borutta, 
Antikatholizismus: Deutschland und Italien im Zeitalter der europäischen Kulturkämpfe (Goettingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010).
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moderne Civilisation und Cultur zu führen'.46 It is remarkable that ten years before the outbreak of 
the Kulturkampf, German Protestants and liberals were already arguing in very similar terms against 
the Catholic Church. Even more remarkable is the extent to which the language of civilization was a 
shared phenomenon amongst mid-nineteenth century liberals. The vocabulary of a debate that was 
ostensibly triggered in Italy travelled throughout Europe, and split many countries into strikingly 
similar camps.
The Syllabus of Errors and the War of 1866
Despite its popularity, the civilizational language of the early 1860s could have slowly died away 
had  events  in  Italy  and  the  publication  of  a  new Encyclica  not  again  fanned  the  flames  of  a 
European-wide debate. In 1864, the Pope pushed civilizational language onto another level with the 
publication  of  a  new Encyclica:  Quanta  Cura.47 The  Encyclica  itself,  although  important,  was 
certainly less controversial than the document that was attached to it: the Syllabus of Errors.48 The 
Syllabus  was dedicated to the condemnation of what the Vatican described as common errors in 
belief, ranging from pantheism to latitudinarianism. Hidden away at the end was article 80 that 
word for word integrated the Allocution of 1861 against the Italian government, stating that it was 
an error to believe that 'The Roman Pontiff can, and ought to, reconcile himself, and come to terms 
with progress, liberalism and modern civilization.'49 In other words, it was a final positioning of the 
Catholic Church as a clear representative of the opposition to all modern political developments,  
and it became a reference point for anti-clerical critique over the next decades. As Victor Hugo 
would put it, almost a decade later: 
On pourrait dire que dans notre siècle il y a deux écoles. Ces deux écoles condensent et 
résument en elles les deux courants contraires qui entraînent la civilisation en sens inverse, 
l’un vers l’avenir,  l’autre  vers  le  passé ;  la  première de ces  deux écoles  s’appelle  Paris, 
l’autre s’appelle Rome. Chacune de ces deux écoles a son livre ; le livre de Paris, c’est la 
Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme ; le livre de Rome, c’est le Syllabus. Ces deux livres 
donnent la réplique au Progrès. Le premier lui dit Oui ; le second lui dit Non.  Le progrès, 
46 Daniel Schenkel, Die kirchliche Frage und ihre protestantische Lösung, im Zusammenhange mit den nationalen 
Bestrebungen und mit besonderer Beziehung auf die neuesten Schriften I. I. I. von Döllinger’s und Bischof von 
Ketteler’s (Elberfeld: Verlag von  R.L. Friderichs, 1862), 121; Gross, The War Against Catholicism, 104–109. 
'has the calling to lead a permanent struggle against modern civilization and culture.'
47 “Quanta Cura: Condemning Current Errors,” Papal Encyclicals Online, accessed August 31, 2014, 
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius09/p9quanta.htm.




c’est le pas de Dieu.50
Although universally discussed, European reactions to the Syllabus of Errors differed considerably 
and  ranged  from derision  in  England,  to  rabid  and fanatic  discussion  in  the  German-speaking 
countries. The Anglican opposition to the positions of the Catholic Church certainly intensified with 
the Syllabus, but not enough to sway the government away from its course of (ostensible, yet not 
actual)  neutrality.51 Despite  the  fact  that  Catholic  Papers  like  the  Dublin  Review alleged  that 
specifically article 80 had been 'wildly misinterpreted by the anti-Catholic press', it is, as Quinn has 
rightly pointed out, 'important not to exaggerate Protestant outrage.'52 Although some were certainly 
surprised and the Syllabus was quickly used as a political tool, the actual debates remained rather 
tepid.53 This calm political reaction was possible due to the fact that nobody would have gained 
from a large public dispute. The Catholics were still in a coalition, though loose and decaying, with 
the  liberals.  The  conservatives,  despite  moving  closer  to  the  Catholics,  could  not  have  been 
interested in alienating the rest of their electorate by large discussions about their relationship to 
Catholic principles. Furthermore, the positions of the government and the Catholic Church were not 
in themselves new, and were continuously discussed amongst the leaders of the various movements, 
in  an almost  intimate and amicable atmosphere that  softened the sharpness  of  their  arguments. 
Shortly before the official publication of the Syllabus, Henry Edward Manning, the later Archbishop 
of  Westminster,  had  written  to  his  friend  and  prime  minister,  Gladstone: 'I  feel  a  very  deep 
conviction that  the  Christian  civilization of  Europe is  at  this  moment threatened by a  political 
movement which has rejected Christianity. And that the influence of England has been of late on the 
wrong  side.'54 Despite  his  indirect  accusation  that  Gladstone  was  party  to  the  destruction  of 
Christian civilization, Manning ended his letter on a friendly note: 'I hope you are well & enjoying 
your rest.' 
The courtesy of this friendly exchange between leading lights of British society was not replicated 
50 also quoted Jean Starobinski, “The Word Civilization,” in Blessings in Disguise; Or, the Morality of Evil 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), 1–35, who gives the following translation 'One can say that in our century there 
are two schools. These two schools condense and epitomize the two contrary currents that carry civilization in 
opposite directions, one toward the future, the other toward the past: the first of these two schools is called Paris, 
the second, Rome. Each of these two schools has its book; the book of Paris is the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man; the Book of Rome is the Syllabus. These two books answer Progress. The first says yes; the second says 
no. Progress is God's footstep.'
51 Robert Fitzsimons, “The Church of England and the First Vatican Council,” Journal of Religious History 27, no. 
1 (2003): 29–46.
52 Dermot Quinn, Patronage and Piety: The Politics of English Roman Catholicism, 1850-1900 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1993), 12–13; “The Encyclical and Syllabus,” The Dublin Review 4 (1865): 492.
53 Quinn, Patronage and Piety, 13.
54 Peter C. Erb, ed., The Correspondence of Henry Edward Manning and William Ewart Gladstone: Volume III 
1861–1875 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 31–32.
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in the debates on the continent. After the publication of the Syllabus of Errors the climate of opinion 
had become even more hostile.  The exact meaning of the Pope's notion of civilization and the 
differences between 'modern' and 'Catholic' civilization were heavily debated. It was not just a case, 
as Christopher Clark has described it, of an ideological fight in which everyone claimed to speak for 
civilization, these were truly different conceptions of it and in contrast to the British debates it was 
possible to gain political capital through these discussions.55 This was true for both Catholics, as 
well as their liberal Protestant opponents, all of whom gained through exaggerating the differences 
between their positions. Bluntschli, who had previously held relatively nuanced opinions, called the 
Syllabus 'a manifesto of war by ecclesiastical absolutism over the modern world and its culture'.56 
The  future  MP of  the  Catholic  Zentrum Anton Westermayer  preached to his  congregation  that 
'modern civilisation',  advocated by men like Bluntschli,  was not just  opposition to the Catholic 
Church, but possibly a program of annihilation of Christianity as such. Directly referencing article 
80 of the  Syllabus Westermayer explained: 'Da man aber unter dem Namen der Civilisation ein 
eigens  zur  Schwächung,  vielleicht  sogar  zur  Vernichtung der  Kirche  Christi  gebildetes  System 
verstehen will, können der heilige Stuhl und der römische Papst gewiss nie mit solcher Civilisation 
übereinkommen'.57
The Catholic contribution was by no means limited to Westermayer's ideas as several theologians 
and laypeople would over the next months offer various opinions.58 Although some, who considered 
themselves Catholic, argued against the  Syllabus,  the general effect was that of an even stricter 
separation  between  two  camps.59 As  the  Syllabus  defined  true  Catholicism  in  opposition  to 
modernity,  the  two  religions  became  even  more  clearly  identified  as  supporting  and  opposing 
progress. Throughout the 1860s, long before the later Kulturkampf, the positions of Catholics and 
Protestants  in  German politics  hardened.60 In  this  climate,  all  attempts  of  the  defenders  of  the 
55 Christopher Clark, “The New Catholicism and the European Culture Wars,” in Culture Wars: Secular Catholic 
Conflict in Nineteenth Century Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 41.
56 Quoted in Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–
1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 65.
57 Anton Westermayer, Der Papst im Kampfe gegen den Fortschritt, den Liberalismus, und die moderne 
Civilisation (Regensburg: Verlag von Friedrich Pustet, 1865), 25. 'Because one understands under the name of 
civilization a system designed to weaken and possibly even to destroy the Church of Christ, the Holy See and the 
Roman Pope can never reconcile themselves with such a civilization.
58 Florian Riess, Eine Vorfrage über die Verpflichtung (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 
1866); Der Papst und die modernen Ideen. II Heft. Die Encyclica vom 8.Dezember 1864 nebst einem Vorworte 
von P. Clemens Schrader S.J. (Vienna: Verlag von Carl Sartori, 1865).
59 For an exception see Jakob Frohschammer, Beleuchtung der päpstlichen Encyclica vom 8. December 1864 und 
des Verzeichnisses der modernen Irrthümer: nebst einem Anhang: Kritik der Broschüre des Bischofs von 
Orleans. An den Klerus und das Volk der katholischen Kirche von einem Katholiken (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 
1865).
60 Manuel Borutta, “Enemies at the Gate: The Moabit Klostersturm and the Kulturkampf: Germany,” in Culture 
Wars: Secular Catholic Conflict in Nineteenth Century Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
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Catholic church to point out that the war against 'modern civilization' was not a war against the 
amenities  of  modern  life,  but  instead  against  what  they  saw  as  a  particular  interpretation  of 
modernity, were unsuccessful.61 Whether all Catholics really desired to be portrayed as defenders of 
a bastion of conservatism and reactionary politics is doubtful, the political circumstances forced 
most to take a stand for a position that was probably more extreme than they had anticipated. The  
political worlds outlined by these two segregated blocks were so incoherent that it is not wrong to  
speak of a 'clash of civilizations' within Europe.62
The opposition between a national, anti-Catholic position and a Catholicism that had come to be 
associated with everything the old order stood for dominated the next major European conflict: the 
Austro-Prussian War of 1866. To many liberals the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, joined by Italy on 
the  side  of  Prussia,  was  a  war  of  nationalism against  the  prison-house  of  nations:  modernity, 
progress,  and  Protestantism  opposing  backwardness,  dynasticism,  and  support  of  the  Catholic 
Church.63 As an anonymous pamphleteer explained shortly after the war, Austria's defeat was clear 
from  the  beginning,  as  it  was  obvious  that  'das  entschiedene  Zurückbleiben  hinter  den 
Entwicklungen Europas, hinter der Culturströmung des Zeitalters, das starre Festhalten an, bereits 
zu den Todten (sic) gezählten Staatsmaximen und Institutionen das Verderben dieses Staates zur 
Folge haben musste'.64 Similar opinions were expressed by non-German nationalists within Austria, 
and it was an opinion directly connected to the idea of civilization. As one of them put it: 
während die europäische Civilisation eine Solidarität bei den gebildeten Völkern hervorrief 
blieben wir vereinsamt, vereinzelt in der Welt, ohne volkswirtschaftliche Entwickelung und 
ohne  Verbindungen,  als  letztes  Bollwerk  einer  dahingeschwundenen  Zeit,  abgeneigt  den 
Wegen  und Zielen  denen  wir  zueilen  sollen,  und eine  Wehre  für  eine  längst  von  Allen 
aufgegebene Sache.65
228.
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63 Heinrich August Winkler, Geschichte des Westens: Von den Anfängen in der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert 
(Munich: C.H.Beck, 2011), 772.
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Needless to say, these tendencies were also supported by those German Protestants who had always 
seen the national cause as the progress of civilization and Austria as a backward and Catholic 
power. Schenkel, once again, explained: 'Auf dem Schlachtfelde von Königgrätz hat nicht nur der 
österreichische Staat, sondern das ultramontan-jesuitische System eine schwere Niederlage erlitten 
[…]  Preussen  ist  und  bleibt  auf  dem  europäischen  Continent  die  Burg  des  protestantischen 
Geistes.'66 Prussia's project, now closely associated with the civilizational rhetoric of nationalism, 
was not over yet. As the nationalist historian Treitschke prophesized in the language of civilization: 
'Ein Zeitalter wahrhafter Civilisation, gesicherten Weltfriedens kann nicht eintreten, so lange der 
nationale Staat der Deutschen nicht vollendet ist.'67 In striking similarity to the ideas uttered just a 
few years before by the Italian king, the supporters of Prussia now also claimed to be a bulwark of  
civilization in the world. Arnold Ruge remembered his feelings at the time, merely two years later: 
Die Heilige Allianz ist aufgelöst und wir nehmen von nun an die selbstständige Stellung ein, 
die  Mitteleuropa  zukommt.  Und  wenn  wir  auch  allen  umliegenden  Nationen  dieselbe 
Selbstständigkeit  zugestehen,  die  wir  fortan  geniessen,  so  werden  wir  doch  zu  denen 
gehören, die über das Heil der Civilisation, schon aus eigenen Interessen zu wachen haben.68
While not all liberals agreed with these descriptions, the conservatives in Prussia were violently 
split into two camps. Bismarck, un-ideologically, relied on (tacit) liberal support for his policies, 
against  Austria.  His original political friends, on the other hand, were still  in favour of the old 
European order, supported dynastic legitimacy, and could not reconcile themselves with the new, 
ostensibly  liberal,  course  of  their  government.  As  Leopold  von  Gerlach  explained  in  his  Die 
Annexionen und der Norddeutsche Bund, Bismarck was now, for selfish reasons, doing the work of 
Napoleon III. By supporting the cause of nationalism and anti-Catholicism, he was destroying not 
just the basis for peace in Germany, but European tradition.69 It was an opinion voiced by many who 
away from the aims which we should have pursued, and a last stronghold of something that had already been 
given up by everyone.'
66 Quoted in Hedda Gramley, Propheten des deutschen Nationalismus: Theologen, Historiker und 
Nationalökonomen 1848-1880 (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2001), 138. 'On the battlefield of Sadowa, not just the 
Austrian state has been beaten, but the whole ultramontane-Jesuit system. Prussia is, and stays, on the European 
continent, a bastion of the Protestant spirit.'
67 Heinrich von Treitschke, Zehn Jahre deutscher Kämpfe. (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1879), 134. 'An age of true 
civilization, of assured world peace cannot start, as long as a national German state has not been founded'
68 Arnold Ruge, An’s Volk und an Politiker. Zur Förderung des Umschwungs seit 1866 (Berlin: Verlag der 
Stuhr’schen Buch und Kunsthandlung, 1869), 24. 'The Holy Alliance is dissolved, and we are now taking on our 
independent role reserved for central Europe. And although we happily grant all the surrounding nations the 
same independence, which we will from now on enjoy, we will be part of those who have to guard the future of 
civilization out of their own interests.'
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favoured  the  old  German  order,  and opposed Bismarck's  willingness  to  side  with  the  ideas  of 
modern  civilization  against  tradition.  Taking up the  criticisms  that  had  been voiced  during  the 
Italian war of unification, the philosopher Gustav Ferdinand Thaulow argued that the principles, 
responsible for the war, were French ones.  'Der  terminus technicus,  welcher seitdem für diesen 
neuen Zeitgeist gebräuchlich geworden ist und welchen deshalb auch keiner mehr im Munde führt, 
als Napoleon III, ist der der Civilisation!'70 Hermann von Gauvain sarcastically expressed the same 
opinion in his clearly entitled  Graf Bismarck und die Legitimität der Dinge; oder, wie Napoleon  
Deutschland  zerstörte:  'Jene  vorwaltende  Sache  der  Frankreich  dient,  sie  ist  die  Quelle  aller 
legitimen Autorität, sie heißt Civilisation!'71
These  two  ideas  of  legitimacy,  which  relied  on  different  definitions  of  civilization,  further 
articulated  the  gap  that  had  developed  between  Catholics  and  Protestants,  as  some  Prussian 
conservatives, despite  their  opposition to  the Catholic  Church, joined the political  party widely 
associated with it: the Zentrum. Dynastically oriented Lutherans, like Gerlach, were so alienated by 
Bismarck's new political course that, without converting, they became full members of what they 
perceived to be the new, true force of conservatism in Prussia: the Catholic party, of which Gerlach 
would remain a member until his death.72 In many ways, this was the final stage of a process of 
political  distancing that  had already started during  the Crimean War,  as  I  have  outlined  in  the 
previous chapter, when Gerlach had criticized the idea of modern civilization as the foundation of a 
new European order he did not want to support. Although Bismarck himself described the loss of 
Gerlach to his political project as more painful than the assassination attempt he had survived the 
same day, he made no serious effort to change his political course.73 In the aftermath of the Austro-
Prussian war and especially by the late 1860s, two curious coalitions had started to gather around 
two differing conceptions of civilization. Bismarck, himself not a liberal, found support amongst 
those liberally oriented politicians and thinkers who saw the national development of Germany as a 
step towards higher civilization. His opponents, and former political friends like Gerlach, rallied 
around the definitions of Catholic civilization, which stood for a defence of the old European order.
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The repercussions  of  these  events  could  even  be  felt  in  Britain.  Some,  more  liberally  minded 
thinkers, argued that this war was more than just a small European conflict and had everything to do 
with civilization. Despite the fact that many downplayed the significance of the Austro-Prussian 
conflict for Britain, and within the government and the highest circles, attempts were undertaken to 
stop the war, allegiances could certainly be felt in the religious camps.74 As the most vocal liberal 
opponent of 'Popery'  George Hammond Whalley explained the situation to the House,  this  was 
merely another episode in a continuous struggle:
The noble Lord said on Friday night that there never was a European war in which the 
interests of England were less concerned than in this; but he (Mr. Whalley) ventured to think 
that there never was a war in which our interests were more concerned. The right of opinion, 
civil and religious liberty, and what was called the Protestant question, were involved, and it 
was singular that, however Protestants might happen to be divided in opinion, there was no 
doubt a remarkable unanimity of Roman Catholic opinion in favour of Austria.75
After the war, Whalley would have been relieved, Protestants were much less divided in opinion 
and the support for Prussia, and its allegedly liberal and civilizational aims, increased enormously. 
Even if most did not characterize Austria as an enemy of civilization, the relationships of the two 
states were clear to British periodicals and dailies. As a provincial newspaper put it: 'the Prussians  
are at the head of German civilization, the Austrians at the tail.'76 Because of its similarly oriented 
principles, Prussia would also be no danger to Britain, as the British Quarterly Review explained: 
'We have no fears at beholding Prussia take her place in the vanguard of political power, because 
she is already in the vanguard of civilization'.77 In fact, as the Westminster Review added 
Germany laced in full possession of its just influence should bear its part in promoting the 
advancement and civilization of the world in the matter of political self government and in 
questions of international policy as well as in the regions of thought, science, and literature 
in each of which it holds so leading a position.78
74 W.E. Mosse, “The Crown and Foreign Policy. Queen Victoria and the Austro-Prussian Conflict, March-May, 
1866,” Cambridge Historical Journal 10, no. 2 (1951): 205–23.
75 Mr Whalley 'Question' 184 H.C. Deb. 3s, col.1326
76 Edward W. Ellsworth, “The Austro-Prussian War and the British Press,” The Historian 20, no. 2 (1958): 190.
77 “The New Germanic Empire,” The British Quarterly Review 14 (1866): 535.
78 “Italy and the War of 1866,” The Westminster Review 172 (1867): 132.
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The Civilization of Warfare
Even in this Prussia-friendly atmosphere, questions would eventually be raised about where this 
new system of civilization was to lead, and whether the strengths of Prussia's state were not also its 
greatest  weakness.  In  Prussia  itself  some had argued before  the  war  that  exaggerated  ideas  of 
nationalism, of leading civilization, the system of conscription, and the military organization that 
was necessary to sustain it were creating 'a nation in barracks', as Ute Frevert has recently called 
it.79 Such interventions were shouted down by those who argued that fears of a new era of Prussian 
'Eroberungskriege'  and  the  potential  'Ruin  des  Wohlstandes  und  aller  Errungenschaften  der 
Civilisation'  was  a  'Pompanze'  for  'Ruhe  über  alles  liebende  Deutsche  Spiessbürger'.80 But  the 
seriousness of these questions can be gauged from their international spread, as even in England, 
where, as outlined before, public opinion tended to be friendly towards Prussian civilization, many 
started to question its system of military governance. Over the next few years, fears of a future 
dominated by national European armies based on conscription was gaining ground in England, and 
was seen as a possible danger to civilization.81 As the positivist Henry Dix Hutton would later put it: 
Regarded  as  a  mere  temporary  expedient  for  repelling  the  First  Napoleon,  the  military 
system of Prussia was praiseworthy, but when made a permanent institution, it is eminently 
retrograde, a step back in the direction of barbarism, and only proves that Prussia, in point of 
real civilisation, has no claim to the leadership of Europe.82 
These questions  about  Prussian  militarization were a  small  aspect  of  a  larger  debate about  the 
paradoxical relationship between the rhetoric of civilization (and nationalism) and the immense 
destruction of war that had come in its wake. Since the proliferation of civilizational language in the 
mid-1850s, Europe had continuously either been at war, or at the brink of it. Some explained this as 
a  natural  phenomenon,  as  the  brutality  and  impact  of  the  war  sometimes  correlated  with  the 
civilizational and national advance gained from it. As the famous doctor and liberal Robert Bolz 
explained to an equally liberal audience in Karlsruhe:  
79 Ute Frevert, A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society (London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2004).
80 Friedrich Walther, Über den Anschluss Süddeutschlands an den norddeutschen Bund. Betrachtungen eines 
Süddeutschen im Spätherbste 1866 (Nördlingen: Druck und Verlag der C.H. Beck’schen Buchhandlung, 1867), 
41. 'Wars of Conquest'. 'The destruction of wealth, and all accomplishments of civilization'. 'stupid game'.' for 
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81 See Jörn Leonhard, “Nation-States and Wars,” in What Is a Nation?: Europe 1789-1914, ed. Mark Hewitson and 
Timothy Baycroft (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 231–54.
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Duty (London: Edward Truelove, 1870), 48.
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Wir verkennen allerdings nicht, dass oft die grössten Fortschritte der Civilisation, zumal die 
sprungweisen und die lange gewaltsam zurückgehaltenen, durch Kriege eingeleitet wurden, 
wenn verrottete Einrichtungen niedergeworfen, wenn zurückgebliebene Völker aufgerrüttelt 
wurden  –  die  Schlacht  bei  Jena  hat  einem  Volk  die  Augen  geöffnet,  die  Schlacht  bei 
Königgrätz einem anderen.83 
The irony of this correlation of civilization and barbarism was not lost on those who were skeptical 
about the new ideas of civilization. As August Reichensperger, who was not coincidentally Catholic, 
would  gleefully  note  in  his  anti-liberal  dictionary Phrasen  und  Schlagwörter:  ein  Noth-  und  
Hülfsbüchlein für Zeitungsleser: 'Als eine der hervorstechendstens Errungenschaften der modernen 
Civilisation ist die Kunst, möglichst viele Menschen von Nation zu Nation, möglichst schnell und 
möglichst sicher zu töten, besonders hervorzuheben. (S[iehe] auch d[as] W[ort] Culturvolk).'84 But 
even those not opposed to liberal ideas, like the Swiss businessman Henry Dunant, recognized the 
discrepancy  between  the  lofty  language  of  civilization  and  the  barbarity  of  the  wars  justified 
through it. As he told the German readers of his bestseller Un Souvenir de Solferino: 
Ist  es endlich nicht in einer Zeit in welcher man so viel von Fortschritt und Civilisation 
spricht und in welcher die Kriege einmal nicht immer vermieden werden können ist es da 
nicht  dringend nothwendig,  Alles  zu thun, um den Schrecken derselben zuvorzukommen 
oder diese mindestens so viel wie möglich zu mildern?85
These questions were even asked across the Atlantic, where a German-American thinker, Francis 
Lieber, first addressed the problem the same year. A participant of the Greek War of Independence, 
who, even after his emigration to the United States, remained in close contact with the leading lights 
of German liberalism, Lieber was, just as much as them, convinced of the close connection between 
civilization and nationalism. As he would later explain in his  Fragments of Political Science on 
Nationalism and Internationalism: 'No groupings of human beings, short of nations, are adequate to 
83 Robert Bolz, Das rothe Kreuz im weissen Felde, vol. 47, Sammlung gemeinverstaendlicher Vortraege, II (Berlin: 
Luederitz’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1868), 7. 'We do not deny that often the greatest advances in civilization, 
especially the sudden and long repressed ones, were started by war, when rotten institutions were destroyed, 
when backward peoples were shaken up – the battle at Jena opened the eyes of a people, the battle of Sadowa 
those of another.'
84 August Reichensperger, Phrasen und Schlagwörter: ein Noth- und Hülfsbüchlein für Zeitungsleser (Paderborn: 
Druck und Verlag von Ferdinand Schöningh, 1872). 'Phrases and Catch-words: An Aid for Readers of 
Newspapers'. 'We have to mention as one of the greatest advances of modern civilization the art of killing as 
many people as possible in various nations, as fast and as quick as possible. See also: A Cultured People'
85 Jean-Henry Dunant, Eine Erinnerung an Solferino (Basel: Verlag von H. Georg, 1863), 115–116. 'Is it not finally 
in a time when one speaks so often of progress and civilization and in which wars cannot always be avoided 
necessary to do everything to avert its horrors, or to, at least, alleviate them as far as possible.'
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the high demands of modern civilization. Without a national character, States (sic) cannot obtain 
that longevity and continuity of political society, which is necessary for our progress.'86 Although 
Lieber was fully convinced of the inevitable rise of civilization, which would also bring down the 
ancient  institution  of  slavery,  he  was  equally aware  of  the  pitfalls  to  civilization  presented  by 
modern war.87 It  was  precisely for  this  reason that  Lieber  got  involved with drafting  the  legal 
guidelines for the Union Army during the American Civil War, that would become known as the 
Lieber Code.88 It was a remarkable document, partly because many of its assumptions where based 
on an entity practically unknown in official legal documents: the civilized state. Although the idea 
of the civilized state had been alluded to in the declaration concerning the abolition of the slave 
trade in 1815 and had then featured in some legal textbooks, like Wheaton's, it was by no means a 
term in frequent use. But in the Lieber Code the ideas of civilization and the civilized nation were 
not just decoration, as one might have expected for terms with such little legal pedigree, they were 
foundational.  In  the  Lieber  Code,  nations  were  'law and requisite  of  civilized  existence',  legal 
distinctions had changed 'as civilization has advanced', his definition of military necessity was that 
'understood by modern civilized nations', which had a legal character themselves as they could, as  
one paragraph specifically put it 'look with horror upon offers of rewards for the assassination of 
enemies as relapses into barbarism'. With this code, Lieber, who admitted some of his legal sources 
were 'a sincere love of truth, justice, and civilization', defined the civilized state as both basis and 
recipient of his new rules. It was an ingenious solution to the problems that also plagued the old  
continent, and it was no surprise that Lieber's code was soon copied to serve as a manual for the 
wars of nationalism in Europe.
Lieber's ideas would inspire the rather practical Geneva Declaration of 1864, but more importantly, 
they served as the theoretical framework for the discussions surrounding the Austro-Prussian war of 
1866. It was the spectre of war that persuaded the perhaps most famous scholar of international law 
on the continent, Bluntschli, to publish his Kriegsrecht der civilisierten Staaten earlier than he had 
anticipated. As he explained in the introduction: 'Die drohende Kriegsgefahr für Deutschland hat 
86 Francis Lieber, Fragments of Political Science on Nationalism and Internationalism (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s & Co., 1868), 8.
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The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity,” The American Journal of International Law 92, 
no. 2 (April 1, 1998): 213–31, doi:10.2307/2998030; Theodor Meron, “Francis Lieber’s Code and Principles of 
Humanity,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 36 (1998): 269; Jordan J. Paust, “Dr. Francis Lieber and the 
Lieber Code,” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 95 (April 4, 2001): 
112–15.
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den Verfasser bestimmt, das Kriegsrecht ohne Verzug herauszugeben.'89 Bluntschli acknowledged 
his debt to Lieber, whose work served as 'Vorbild für diese Arbeit', and stressed the novelty and 
necessity of such an undertaking, because knowledge about the modern laws of war was not widely 
spread.90 Bluntschli would have been relieved as the war itself was generally celebrated as a rather 
civilized affair.  The short time in which it could be concluded was, as an anonymous pamphleteer 
put  it,  a  'riesenhafter  Fortschritt  der  Civilisation  und  Humanität.'91 The  technical  advance  of 
armaments,  which  led  to  less  severe  injuries  and  fewer  deaths  similarly  made  correspondents 
exclaim: 'das  Zündnadelgewehr,  ein  wirklicher  Fortschritt  der  Civilisation.'92 The  journal  Die 
Grenzboten agreed,  adding that it was not just technical means that had improved, but the general 
level of civilization: 
Die  Entwicklung  des  bürgerlichen  Wohlstands,  der  Civilisation  und  Sittlichkeit  hat  sehr 
grosse  Fortschritte  gemacht.  Der  deutsche  Krieg  dieses  Jahres  ist  bis  jetzt  mit  einer 
Humanität geführt worden, welche neben dem vielen Schrecklichen, welches unvermeidlich 
durch ihn hervorgebracht wird, doch als ein Glück moderner Cultur erfreuen muss.93
As the  language  of  civilization  had become firmly established,  insults  and  denigrations  of  the 
opponent were also expressed through such concepts. The war correspondent Adolph Boerstaedt, 
for example, explained to his readers in some detail how Austria's lower level in civilization was 
visible as its soldiers saw 'Äusserungen wahrer Humanität und echter Zivilisation als Zeichen der 
Mattherzigkeit und der Schwäche'.94
In the early 1860s, civilizational ideas had mainly been used to judge the reasons for a war, i.e to 
what extent it was a national one. As the decade drew to a close, it became obvious that the way war 
was waged had also become a means of categorizing it, a fact that quickly drew the attention of 
other interested parties, most importantly Russia's. Since the death of his father and the practically 
89 Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Das moderne Kriegsrecht der civilisirten Staaten: als Rechtsbuch dargestellt 
(Nördlingen: C.H. Beck, 1866), III. 'The impending danger of war for Germany was persuaded the author to 
publish his guide to the wars of law without further ado.'
90 Ibid., iii. 'example for this work' 
91 Karl Braun, Vier Briefe eines Süddeutschen an den Verfasser der “Vier Fragen eines Ostpreussen” (Leipzig: 
Verlag von G. Hirzel, 1867), xii. 'an enormous progress in civilization and humanity'
92 Gustav Billig, Deutschlands verhängnissvolles jahr 1866. Chronik der denkwürdigsten Ereignisse (Dresden: 
Verlag von C.G. Lohse, 1867), 322. 'The development of commercial well-being, of civilization, and of manners, 
has greatly advanced. The German war of this year has so far been conducted with a humanity, which, apart from 
the horrors that naturally emanated from it, has to be celebrated as fortuitous for modern culture.'
93 “Abseits der Heerstrasse,” Die Grenzboten: Zeitschrift für Literatur, Politik und Kunst 25, no. 2 (1866): 173.
94 A. Borbstaedt, Preussens Feldzüge gegen Oesterreich und dessen Verbündete im Jahre 1866. (Berlin: Druck und 
Verlag E.G. Mittler und Sohn, 1866), 21–22. 'expressions of true humanity and true civilization as signs of 
timidness and weakness'
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simultaneous end of the Crimean War, the young Tsar Alexander II had tried to innovate his country, 
following the examples of Peter I and Catherine II.95 In 1861, he abolished serfdom. In 1864, a new 
judicial administration and penal code, based on French models, were introduced, and, shortly after, 
the Russian elite turned its attention to the new area of international law. As Myles and Holquist 
have argued, the period after the Crimean War, and specifically the late 1860s can be seen as a new 
era of Russian engagement with the civilizational rhetoric of international law.96 On this subject the 
Tsar would later heavily rely on the work and advice of Fyodor Martens, who as a Baltic German 
could  claim knowledge  of  Western  European  thought  closed  to  many of  his  colleagues.97 But 
Martens was certainly not alone and the increasing westernization of Russian policies also  swept 
others, familiar and interested in Western concepts, into the highest echelons of power.98 These were 
soon  to  called  to  convene  an  international  conference,  dedicated  to  the  laws  of  war  so  often 
discussed in Europe in recent years, and to show that Russia too was party to the civilizational 
advance in Europe.
In December 1868, several delegates from European countries, including Blunschli, came together 
in St. Petersburgh to discuss a ban on new ammunition developed in previous years. The language 
in  which  they  formulated  their  suggestions  was  that  of  civilization.  The  Declaration  of  St.  
Petersburgh, which continued a long debate on the civilization of warfare, was the first European 
document that not only integrated the idea of a civilized state, but directly referred to civilization 
itself:
On the proposition of the Imperial Cabinet of Russia, an International Military Commission 
having assembled at St. Petersburg in order to examine the expediency of forbidding the use 
of  certain projectiles  in  time of  war  between civilized nations  […] is  authorized [...] to 
declare as follows: [...] That the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating 
95 Filippo Costa Buranelli, “Knockin’ on Heaven’s Door: Russia, Central Asia and the Mediated Expansion of 
International Society,” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 42, no. 3 (2014): 823–828.
96 E. Myles, “‘Humanity’, ‘Civilization’ and ‘the International Community’ in the Late Imperial Russian Mirror - 
Three Ideas ‘Topical for Our Days,’” Journal of the History of International Law 4 (2002): 310–34; Peter 
Holquist, “The Russian Empire as a ‘Civilized State’: International Law as Principle and Practice in Imperial 
Russia, 1874-1878,” Title VIII Program (Washington D.C.: The National Council for Eurasian and East 
European Research, 2004).
97 Lauri Mälksoo, “The History of International Legal Theory in Russia: A Civilizational Dialogue with Europe,” 
European Journal of International Law 19, no. 1 (2008): 220; Lauri Mälksoo, “The Liberal Imperialism of 
Friedrich (Fyodor) Martens (1845-1909),” in Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law, 
ed. Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Vincent Tomkiewicz, and Emmanuelle Jouannet, vol. 1 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), 
173–80.
98 Myles, “Civilization in Late Imperial Russia,” 313–314; Tarja Långström, Transformation in Russia and 
International Law (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 36–50; Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in 
Identity and International Relations (London: Routledge, 1996), 47.
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as much as possible the calamities of war.99  
While  civilizational  language  was  quickly  becoming  fundamental  to  the  structure  of  the 
international  sphere,  it  also  started  to  find  its  first  non-Catholic  critics.  It  was  at  the  German 
Protestantentag in  1868,  a  couple of  months  before Bluntschli  left  for  Petersburg,  that  he was 
publicly  confronted  with  a  differing  definition  of  civilization  than  the  one  he  had  advocated. 
Bernhard Spiegel, a Protestant theologian and Pastor at Osnabrück, asked Bluntschli whether one 
could really use the word civilization to describe the progress he was advocating. Referring back to 
the writings of Pestalozzi, he argued: 
“Civilisation” bezeichnet nämlich nur etwas Aeusseres, wer Civilisation hat, weiss sich zu 
benehmen, wie ein anständiger Bürger, wie es in civilisirten Staaten erforderlich ist. Es giebt 
aber einen Unterschied zwischen civilisirten Staaten und Cultur=staaten, welchen zu machen 
mit hier am Platze scheint. […] Deshalb möchte ich vorschlagen, dass an Stelle des Wortes 
“Civilisation” das Wort “Cultur” trete,... .100   
Bluntschli  brushed  such  semantic  discussions  aside,  and  stated  merely  that  he  was  basing  his 
thought on Dante 'welcher schon im dreizehnten Jahrhundert die Civilisation, d.h. die Entwicklung 
des Menschen zur Humanität, für die grösste Aufgabe des Staates erklärt.'101 Although Bluntschli 
clearly did not care much for such distinctions, Spiegel was not alone in advocating them. The same 
year, Matthew Arnold started to propose culture as a remedy for the mechanical civilization and 
anarchy, that he saw as enveloping England, in a series of essays later fittingly entitled Culture and 
Anarchy.  Even  in  Prussia,  Spiegel  had  semantic  allies  who  started  to  draw  clear  distinctions 
between culture and civilization. One of them was Adolf Lasson, whose Culturideal und der Krieg  
celebrated culture as an opposition to civilization, and the reason for recent European wars. It was 
culture, Lasson argued, that states sought to protect when they went to war with each other and the 
word civilization, just as Spiegel had argued, merely expressed something external and superficial, 
related to trade and finance, but not to the inner-being of a nation: 
99 “Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Certain Explosive Projectiles. Saint Petersburg, 29 
November/11 December 1868,” http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?
action=openDocument&documentId=568842C2B90F4A29C12563CD0051547C, ICRC Treaties and States 
Party to Such Treaties, (n.d.), accessed August 30, 2014.
100 Der dritte deutsche Protestantentag gehalten zu Bremen am 3. und 4. Juni 1868 (Elberfeld: R.L. Friderichs, 
1868), 44.
101 Ibid., 68. 'who, already in the thirteenth century, has declared civilization, which means the development of 
persons to humanity, to be the greatest task of any state'. 
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Die Civilisation also mit ihren egoistischen Interessen, kann nicht leicht den Grund zum 
Kriege abgeben: dagegen führt sie zu Handelsverträgen und dem geräuschlosen Wettkampfe 
der Conkurrenz. Aber nicht als Schildhalter der Civilisation, sondern als Grundmacht der 
Cultur führt der Staat Kriege, und er führt sie, während er scheinbar nur um seine Existenz 
kämpft, für die Culturbewegung der Menschheit.102 
Although Lasson's book was an important contribution, it would be wrong to see his opinion, as is 
sometimes asserted, as a majority one, or as expressing an ancient German opinion. Lasson was 
clearly on the fringes of a German debate that developed in the late 1860s, but that would only start  
to have a wider impact by the late 1880s, as I will show in the next chapters. 
Civilization and German Unification
Just two years later, Prussia would again be at war, and pace Lasson, many interpreted it to be a war 
for civilization. Given the vocabulary employed, it was peculiar that it was a war against France. As 
shown in the early parts of this chapter, the French use of civilizational rhetoric had been criticized 
in the German-speaking countries for a long time. Sometimes, this critique had been spiced with 
suggestions that it would be better if Germany would take the baton of civilization from France. As 
the professor of law at the University of Würzburg, Josef von Held, had already argued in a small 
book entitled with the rhetorical question:  Frankreich an der Spitze der Civilisation?,  civilization 
could not be claimed by one state alone, and France was doing more harm than good.103 Writers like 
the Hungarian politician Guido v. Bausznern agreed and in his 'Die deutsche Frage, eine Frage der 
Civilisation' he had already argued for the necessity of a greater Franco-German war to protect the 
future of civilization.104 Now that France and Prussia were potentially at war, the French lead in 
civilization,  for  which  Napoleon  III  had  stated  France  was  fighting,  was  more  frequently 
disputed.105 In the run up to the war, as the Preussische Jahrbücher would later argue, the French 
had become the enemies of civilization: 'während sie die Civilisation und die Freiheitsideen von 
1789 im Munde führen, geradezu Feinde aller Civilisation, Verräther des Rechts und der Freiheit 
102 Adolf Lasson, “Das Culturideal und der Krieg,” in Jahresbericht über die Louisenstädtische Realschule (Berlin: 
Druck von W.Moeser, 1868), 28. 'Civilization with its egoist interests can therefore not easily serve as the reason 
for war: it leads to commercial treaties, and to silent competition. But not as a defender of civilization does a 
state make war, but as the main power of culture; and it leads them, although seemingly just interested in its own 
defence, for the general cultural development of humanity.'
103 Joseph von Held, Frankreich an der Spitze der Civilisation? (Würzburg: Verlag von A. Stuber’s Buchhandlung, 
1863). 'France at the Head of Civilization'.
104 Guido von Bausznern, “Die deutsche Frage, eine Frage der Civilisation,” in Deutschland und Österreich-
Ungarn. Abhandlungen, Reden und Briefe, 1868-1889. (Leipzig: Duncker & Homblot, 1890), 26–46. 'The 
german question, a question of civilization'.
105 Ludwig Karl Aegidi and Alfred Klauhold, eds., Das Staatsarchiv: Sammlung der officiellen Actenstücke zur 
Geschichte der Gegenwart (Hamburg: Otto Meissner, 1870), 173.
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der Völker, Verschwörer gegen die Selbstständigkeit gleucklicher und zufriedener Staaten geworden 
sind.'106
Especially amongst the German liberals, the French rhetoric of civilization was not the opposite of 
Kultur, as one might assume, but a mockery of the true principles of civilization they associated 
with Prussia and its national politics. Whereas Prussia was fighting for nations and true civilization, 
France  was  hiding  behind  the  vocabulary  of  nationalism  to  conceal  its  desire  for  self-
aggrandisement. The famous German physician and then head of the University of Berlin, Emil du 
Bois-Reymond, gave a paradigmatic inaugural speech, merely a month into the war: 
 
Die  Deutschen,  Schweizer,  Italiener,  Belgier,  Holländer,  Skandinaven,  Engländer, 
Amerikaner  verstehen unter Civilisation den Zustand da jedes Volk mit  allen anderen in 
Künsten des Friedens wetteifert, jedes durch Fleiss und durch Thaten des Geistes für sich, 
und  so  zugleich  für  alle  dem  Ziele  höchster  dem  Menschen  erreichbarer  Macht  und 
Wohlfahrt  zustrebt,  auf  dem  durch  die  Wissenschaft  eröffneten  Wege  bewusster 
Naturbeherrschung. […] In diese einmüthige verträgliche Völkerfamilie passt das heutige 
Frankreich nicht. Es wähnt sich an der Spitze der Civilisation, aber es täuscht sich trotz dem 
Glanze seiner Hauptstadt, trotz seiner Wissenschaft, Kunst und Industrie, seinem Luxus und 
seiner Eleganz. Denn es hat versäumt den grossen Schritt mitzumachen der im letzten halben 
Jahrhundert fast alle anderen Völker zur Erkenntniss ihrer wahren Aufgabe geführt hat. Es 
träumt noch epileptisch von Kriegsruhm und Eroberung. In unserem Sinne daher sind die 
Franzosen kein civilisirtes Volk.107
Indeed the two accusations German liberals levelled at France, that they were not civilized and not 
fighting for national principles, were soon united in an outrage that the French were using non-
106 “Das diplomatische Vorspiel des Krieges,” Preussische Jahrbücher 26 (1870): 236. 'while they were 
pronouncing civilization and the ideas of freedom of 1789, they were, in fact, the enemies of all civilization, the 
betrayers of the rights and freedoms of all peoples and conspirators against the national self-determination of 
happy and content states.'
107 Emil Heinrich Du Bois-Reymond, Über den Deutschen Krieg: Rede am 3. August 1870 in der Aula der Königl. 
Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin gehalten von dem zeitigen Rector Emil Du Bois-Reymond (Berlin: 
Verlag von August Hirschwald, 1870), 37. 'The Germans, the Swiss, the Italians, the Belgians, the Dutch, the 
Scandinavians, the English, and the Americans, interpret civilization to be the state in which all the peoples 
compete against each other in the arts of peace, where each through dedication and through the deeds of the 
spirit travels towards the aim of power and welfare for all, on a path of controlling nature through science. In this 
unanimous family of peoples, today's France is an outsider. It thinks itself at the head of civilization, but it is 
wrong, despite the glitter of its capital, and despite its science, art and industry, its luxury and its elegance. 
Because it has failed to take the great step which has, over the last fifty years, opened the eyes of almost all other 
peoples to recognize their true calling. France still dreams, epileptically about the honour of war and of conquest. 
In our eyes, the French are therefore not a civilized people.'
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European troops to fight their battles. It infuriated Germans, as the historian Wilhelm Zimmermann 
put in his triumphantly entitled Deutschlands Heldenkampf: 'dass der verruchte Verbrecher auf dem 
Kaiserthron, welcher “an der Spitze der Civilisation zu marschieren” prahlte, solche wüste Horden 
heran führte, um ihren Heimathboden, den Boden der schönsten deutschen Bildung und Gesittung, 
durch dieselben zertreten zu lassen.'108
Such accusations would not only be repeated throughout the next few months, but they also served 
as proof for the argument that Prussia was now leading civilization into the future. As Carl Georg 
Bruns, who had taken over as the head of Berlin's main university from Bois-Reymond, explained, 
the undisciplined and uncivilized nature of the French army was implicitly connected to its non-
national troops:
Und was für eine Armee ist das, die ihre Haupthoffnung auf die Wildheit ihrer Afrikaner 
setzt, nach einer Niederlage alle Disciplin verliert, auf Ambulancen schiesst, Capitulationen 
bricht […] Wie anders erscheint da die Armee […] in der der gemeine Soldat mit seinem 
König  Reminiscenzen  aus  Horaz  austauscht,  und  seine  Siege  im  reinsten  Sanscrit  nach 
Hause schreibt. Da ist die Civilisation und ihr Sieg! Und es ist auch nicht nur eine civilisierte 
Armee, die siegt, sondern die Civilisation selber die hier zur Herrschaft kommt.109
Needless to say, wherever the word civilization was used it was disputed, and where Bruns and 
others were claiming that Germany was now leading civilization, on the French side of the battle, 
and to a certain extent internationally,  Prussia's actions were seen as destroying civilization. As 
Victor  Hugo famously put  it  in  a  speech '[…] to  destroy Paris  was  to  destroy civilization'.  In 
Prussia, Bismarck was furious about such propaganda, and he even remembered 25 years later,  
when he penned his autobiography, how he despised the propaganda of the Western powers, which 
he described as effeminate. He remembered all the talk about the '''endlichen Auffindung'' Europas, 
oder von dem Glanznebel [...] der die englischen resp. westmächtlichen Schlagworte: ''Humanität, 
108 Wilhelm Zimmermann, Deutschlands Heldenkampf, 1870-1871 (Stuttgart: Verlag von Gustav Weise, 1873), 103. 
'that the despicable criminal sat on the emperor's throne, who brags about “marching at the head of civilization”, 
should bring such horrible hordes to destroy their native soil, the foundation of the most beautiful German 
culture and manners, and to have them trample all over it'.
109 Carl Georg Bruns, Deutschlands Sieg über Frankreich (Berlin: Verlag Puttkammer & Mühlbrecht, 1870), 11. 
'And what sort of an army is this, which puts its main hopes on the ferocity of its Africans, which loses all 
discipline after a defeat, which breaks capitulations and attacks ambulances? How different does an army appear 
in which the normal soldier, exchanges thoughts about Horace and who describes his victories in letters written 
in perfect Sanskrit. There is civilization and its victory! And it is not just a civilized army that is victorious, but 
civilization itself that starts to rule'
106
Civilisation''  in  deutschen  namentlich  weiblichen  Gemüthern  an  grossen  Höfen  umgab.'110 The 
destruction of Paris had nothing to do with civilization, Bismarck and Moltke argued, but was mere 
military necessity. To Bismarck in particular, who had already criticized the rhetoric of civilization 
during the Crimean War, the concept itself was spurious.
But to the German liberals, these discussions of civilization were real and they arrogantly hoped 
that the German intervention would push France on right way, despite all international animosity. 
The  historian  Heinrich  v.  Sybel  argued  that  France's  security  about  leading  civilization  had 
undermined its  national  character:  'Die Weltbeherrschung befördert  nicht,  sondern gefährdet  die 
Bildung des herrschenden Volkes, und ein sicheres Mittel, allmählich die Fähigkeit zur Civilisation 
zu verwirken, ist der selbstgefällige Anspruch, ein für alle Mahle an der Spitze der Civilisation zu 
marschieren.'111 It  was the same argument David Friedrich Strauss put to Ernest Renan in their 
exchange of letters that would later be published both in German as well as in French. As Strauss  
put it, one could only hope that Germany's victory would turn French culture around and make her 
focus on true civilization, instead of Napoleonic aggrandisement: 
Ein Volk, dass sich erhalten will darf nicht über dem Jagen nach Glanz und Genuss seinen 
sittlichen Kern verfaulen lassen; und das französische könnte nur dabei gewinnen, wenn es 
durch  unser  Einschreiten  veranlasst  würde,  statt  mit  Turkoshorden  an  der  Spitze  der 
Civilisation zu marschieren, lieber daheim seine Schulen zu verbessern.112
While liberals  celebrated Germany's  role  in  leading the world to  a  higher  civilization,  German 
Catholics and conservatives remained sceptical about these claims to civilization and nationalism.113 
The first article in the Historisch-politische Blätter für das Katholische Deutschland  in the year 
1871 proclaimed that 'der unnennbar grausige Verlauf des Kriegs' had:
doch  wohl  vor  Allem  bewiesen,  daß  in  Wahrheit  der  revolutionäre  Nationalismus  die 
gefährlichste  Irrlehre  der  Zeit  ist.  Die  christliche  Civilisation  wird  zurückkehren  in  die 
heidnische Barbarei, wenn es der Menschheit nicht gelingt das falsche Nationalitäts=Princip 
110 Otto v. Bismarck, Gedanken und Erinnerungen, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Verlag der J.G.Cotta’schen Buchhandlung, 
1898), 102.
111 Heinrich von Sybel, Der Frieden von 1871 (Düsseldorf: J. Buddens, 1871), 36.
112 David Friedrich Strauss, Krieg und Friede. Zwei Briefe an Ernst Renan nebst dessen Antwort auf den ersten 
(Leipzig: G.Hirzl, 1870), 56.
113 Ludwig Brunier, Deutschland und Frankreich (Bremen: J. Kühtmann’s Buchhandlung, 1873), 379.
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von  sich  auszustoßen:  so  lautet  jetzt  die  Blutpredigt  der  französischen  Schlacht=  und 
Leichenfelder.114
These ideas were once again supported by conservatives like Gerlach, who saw the Franco-Prussian 
war as the end of a long process that had started with the Crimean War, and who remembered how 
'Recht  und Freiheit  aus  Gott'  had  been replaced by 'Zivilisation  und Nationalität'.115 The  Neue 
Preussische Zeitung similarly argued that the principles that were used to justify the new Empire 
were not the same as the ones that had dominated the old, specifically in its relationship to Rome. 
As its readers could see: 
Man preist die Wiederherstellung von Kaiser und Reich, man betrachtet sie als Erfüllung 
langer  und  tiefer  Sehnsucht  des  Volkes  –  doch  wohl  aufgrund  der  Erinnerung  an  die 
Herrlichkeit des alten Reiches – und man hat nichts Besseres zu thun, als diess zu schmähen, 
in völliger Verkennung des Werthes,  welchen für die deutsche Bildung und für die doch 
sonst so hoch gehaltene “Civilisation” die enge Verbindung von Deutschland und Italien 
hatte.116
As I will show in more detail in the next chapter, the late 1860s and the early 1870s should be seen 
as the end of the old European ideas of civilization that men like Ludwig Gerlach sought to protect.  
With the foundation of Germany and Italy, the Holy Alliance, already weakened by the admittance 
of Turkey after the Crimean War, was completely destroyed and the principles of liberal civilization 
formed the new coordinates of the European political sphere. The 1860s should therefore be seen 
simultaneously as the start of a new international era, as they were naturally the end of another one. 
While some debates that had preceded the foundation of a national German state, like the fervent 
opposition between liberals and Catholics, continued to hold sway over national and even global 
politics, other aspects of civilizational discourse that had dominated the 1860s naturally faded out. 
Through  a  provisional  end  to  the  questions  of  nationalism in  western  Europe,  the  rhetoric  of 
civilization also changed. The idea of civilization as showing a path to national unification had been 
dominant on the continent throughout the 1850s and 1860s, now other ideas were more closely 
114 Joseph Edmund Jörg and Franz Binder, eds., “Das grosse Neujahr,” in Historisch-politisch Blätter für das 
katholische Deutschland, vol. 67 (Munich: In Commission der Literarisch-artistischen Anstalt, 1871), 4.
115 Max Hesse, “Die politische Haltung Ludwig von Gerlachs unter Bismarcks Ministerium 1862 bis 1877” (PhD 
diss., Marburg, 1912).
116 Reinhold Baumstark, Der erste Deutsche Reichstag und die Interessen der Katholischen Kirche (Freiburg im 
Breisgau: Herder’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1871), 52.
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associated with civilization. As I will demonstrate, the end of the 1860s marked the finale of a 
mostly European discourse of civilization, and through the 'era of internationalism' which followed 
in the next decade civilization became a truly international concept and the aims that were attached 
to it equally so. It is here, at the cusp between the 1860s and the 1870s, the end of an old era, and  
the  beginning  of  a  new,  that  civilization  started  to  take  on  some of  the  colonial  and imperial 
characteristics with which it has traditionally been associated, and whose development I will trace 
in the next two chapters.
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Chapter 4. The Development of International Civilization (1870s)
Introduction
While civilizational debates of the 1860s had been dominated by ideas of national unification, I 
argue  that  the  1870s  saw  liberal  politicians  engaged  in  a  fight  on  two  fronts:  to  protect  the 
achievements of what they called modern civilization at home, and to spread their ideas further 
afield. Following attempts by the Vatican to assert its power more globally with the proclamation of 
papal infallibility, German liberals commenced an official Kulturkampf against the Catholic Church, 
which  was  equally  described  as  a  civilizational  struggle.  British  liberals,  most  importantly 
Gladstone, quickly followed suit and denounced the Pope as an enemy of civilization, in what the 
'grand old man' understood to be a larger international battle of progress and civilization against 
regression and despotism. The liberal agenda was, however, not only focused on further subverting 
the negative international influence of the Catholic church as it also aimed at spreading liberal ideas 
of civilization more broadly.  Throughout the early 1870s, the adherents of European liberalism, 
heavily opposed by socialists and Catholics with a differing political imagination, developed more 
global ambitions. Under the guise of liberal civilizational ideas, which they had been propagating 
since the 1860s, Russia's elite further expanded their empire in central Asia, Leopold II organized 
large conferences dedicated to the civilization of Africa, and all over Europe colonial groups started 
to agitate for the spreading of civilization on a world-wide scale.
These stirrings of what liberals had learned to call an esprit d'internationalité would be the first real 
instances  of  the  civilizing  mission  defined  as  such,  but  these  abstract  ideas  of  international 
civilization and appeals to an international conscience equally affected the ever-fragile European 
balance, as I argue in the second half of this chapter. In 1875, a series of revolts started to shake the 
Ottoman Balkans. While Russian officials were immediately engaged in pushing for a civilizational 
intervention, European and specifically German liberals slowly warmed to similar ideas. This was a 
curious reversal of 1850s rhetoric,  when the Ottoman Empire was celebrated in German liberal 
circles as the last hope of civilization against the Tsar's despotic empire. But with the changing 
international sphere, the civilized status of countries varied as well. Most of the Nationalliberale,  
now in coalition with Bismarck, backed the chancellor's policy of neutrality, which amounted to 
tacit  support  for  Russia.  In  Britain,  the  russophile  leader  of  the  opposition,  Gladstone, 
opportunistically moved away from anti-Catholic pamphleteering and explicitly supported Russia's 
interventions in the name of civilization. Showing the immense versatility of civilizational rhetoric 
during the last third of the century, he defended his engagement in exactly the same language in 
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which he had previously attacked the Catholic Church.
Gladstone's personal engagement did not just show the many fields in which civilizational language 
could now be used, but also that in the early 1870s the old dichotomous opposition between liberals  
and Catholics had received an international update. While many German liberals, now ostensibly 
controlling  a  state,  had  started  to  support  Russia's  civilizing  mission,  English  and  continental 
Catholics alike supported the Ottoman Empire against  the Russian advance. In Catholic circles, 
Russia was seen as an international ally of the dreaded liberals of Europe, and the advance of Russia 
on the Ottoman Empire as a sign of their impending victory, which led the Vatican to a policy of 
tacit Ottoman support. The Catholic Church was not the only opponent of Russia's liberal civilizing 
mission.  German socialists  took up anti-Russian  civilizational  rhetoric  previously pioneered  by 
liberals in 1848, and agitated in and outside of parliament against the negative influence of Russian 
politics.  By  the  end  of  the  1870s,  I  argue,  new  players  and  developments  had  transformed 
civilizational debates. While civilization had entered the international sphere as a watch-word of 
liberal nationalism it was now at the heart of increasingly complex internationalist debates, which, I 
will show in the next chapters, are the root of the dominance of civilizational language in the last  
decades of the century.
Old and New Civilizational Debates
Despite  the  fact  that  Prussia  had  won the  war  for  civilization  in  1871,  domestic  civilizational 
debates continued in the newly formed German Empire, with contributions on various sides of the 
political spectrum. Although the tone of liberals was positive, and commentators like Sybel were 
hopeful that the new German Empire would not endanger the 'Fortschritt der Civilisation', critical 
voices  began to assert  themselves  in  the early 1870s.1 There  were  those,  like  the  conservative 
Constantin Frantz, who had opposed German unification from the beginning, and now argued that 
the  new,  modern,  and  international  character  of  the  capital  Berlin  had  undermined  German 
traditions of civil coexistence. 'Unter der Hülle einer schimmernden Civilisation', Frantz explained 
in his sarcastically entitled  Die preussische Intelligenz und ihre Grenzen, 'bricht oft eine Rohheit 
und Verwilderung hervor, die wohl in keiner deutschen Stadt ihres gleichen finden würde.'2 While 
Frantz  was  worried  about  the  effects  of  modernization,  more  liberal  commentators  feared  the 
opposite. The MP Julius Wigger, for example, questioned whether Germany was truly ready to 'lead 
1 Heinrich von Sybel, Der Frieden von 1871 (Düsseldorf: J. Buddens, 1871), 35. 'progress in civilization'
2 Gustav Adolph Constantin Frantz, Die preussische Intelligenz und ihre Grenzen (Munich: Druck und Verlag des 
literarischen Instituts von Dr. M. Huttler, 1874), 22. 'Under the shell of a shiny civilization, rawness and 
savagery erupts, which could not be found in any other German city.'
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civilization', as many of its newly acquired provinces were clearly lagging behind in development:
Wir gehen davon aus, dass das deutsche Reich an der Spitze der Civilisation marschieren 
soll. Aber wie soll es an der Spitze der Civilisation marschieren können, wenn noch einzelne 
Staaten zu denselben gehören, deren Zustände tief im Mittelalter wurzeln? Und was werden 
wir  gegenüber  denjenigen  sagen  welche  uns  zurufen:  Wie!  Ihr  wollt  an  der  Spitze  der 
Civilisation marschieren, und die Zustände der einzelnen Staaten sind noch solche, dass sie 
im vollkommenen Widerstreit zu eurem Vorhaben stehen?3
While  liberals  lamented  the  development  of  certain  German  states,  prominent  socialists  were 
arguing that,  as a whole,  the newly formed empire was the result  of anti-civilizational politics.  
Already four years before the Franco-Prussian war, which set the final stage of German unification 
in motion, left-wing organizations like the Berliner Maschinenbau=Arbeiterverein had chastised a 
potential war against France, which they saw as a danger to civilization. In a published message to 
their  French colleagues they had written:  'Wir  verabscheuen jeden Krieg,  und halten besonders 
einen Krieg zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland für gleich sehr schädlich den Interessen der 
Civilisation und der Freiheit.'4 Just two years later, as war with France became more likely, such 
rhetoric  was  adapted  by  some  of  the  leaders  of  the  newly  founded  SDAP,  by  then  the  only 
politically relevant worker's party. At a party conference in 1869, shortly before war was declared, 
Liebknecht harangued his colleagues in the southern German states to oppose a war with France 
more fervently: 
Wir Norddeutsche sind vorläufig vergewaltigt.  Aber Sie im Süden sind noch nicht völlig 
gefesselt. Zerreissen sie die Schlinge der Militärverträge, und ersparen sie Europa, der Welt 
jene  Todsünde  wider  den  heiligen  Geist  der  Zivilisation:  einen  Nationalkrieg  zwischen 
Frankreich und Deutschland.5
3 Verhandlungen des durch die allerhöchste Präsidialverordnung vom 15. Juli 1870 zu einer ausserordentlichen 
Session einberufenen Reichstags des Norddeutschen Bundes. Vom 19. bis 21 Juli 1870 (Berlin: Gedruckt bei 
Julius Sittenfeld, 1870), 112. 'We assume that the German empire should take the lead in civilization. But how 
could it take the lead in civilization, if it counts amongst its counties some whose state can be described as 
medieval. And what will we say to those who tell us: What! You want to take the lead in civilization and the 
situation of some of your counties are the opposite of what you want to achieve.'
4 “Augsburger Tagblatt,” Augsburger Tagblatt, April 20, 1867, 109 edition, sec. Vermischte Nachrichten, 987.'We 
detest any war, but hold specifically a war between France and Germany to be equally dangerous to freedom and 
civilization.'
5 Quoted in Kurt Eisner, Wilhelm Liebknecht. Sein Leben und Wirken (Berlin: Expedition der Buchhandlung 
Vorwärts, 1900), 36. 'We the Germans in the North are currently coerced, but you, in the south, are not 
completely enchained yet. Rip the noose of military treaties apart, and save Europe and the world from the 
mortal sin against the holy spirit of civilization: a national war between France and Germany.'
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The war,  despite  Liebknecht's  best  intentions,  was  no  more  to  be  stopped,  but  the  rhetoric  of 
civilization continued to dominate SDAP perspectives on further developments, like the annexation 
of Alsace-Lorraine. Shortly after the war,  Liebknecht and Bebel claimed in a manifesto that the 
integration  of  Alsace-Lorraine  into  the  newly-founded  empire  did  not  fulfill  the  national  and 
civilizational  aims for which the war  had allegedly been fought.  Instead,  it  bred new potential 
crises. France would be forced to ally with Russia to reconquer its territories. Instead of ending the 
great power-struggles that had dominated Europe for so long, the new German Empire had merely 
become a part of it. In this manifesto, a document that would later be used against them in a trial for 
treason,  they  asserted  their  misplaced  confidence  in  the  power  of  the  German  workers:  'Die 
deutschen Arbeiter werden, im Interesse Frankreichs wie Deutschlands, im Interesse des Friedens 
und  der  Freiheit,  im Interesse  der  westlichen  Civilisation  gegen  die  kosackische  Barbarei,  die 
Annexion von Elsass und Lothringen nicht dulden.'6 Associating Russia with intervention and war, 
German socialists advocated a pacifist and specifically anti-tsarist civilization.7 The newly formed 
empire should put a stop to territorial ambition and conquest, as embodied by Russia, they argued, 
and if it wanted to lead in civilization, it should purely be focused on defense. As the prominent 
politician  Wilhelm Hasenclever  succinctly  put  it  in  a  parliamentary debate  concerned with  the 
military budget: 'Nochmals, meine Herren, schaffen Sie ein Verteidigungsheer, verurtheilen Sie eine 
Eroberungsarmee,  und  dann  erst  können  Sie  sagen:  Deutschland  marschiert  an  der  Spitze  der 
Civilisation.'8
Despite all socialist rhetoric, the greatest civilizational debate in early 1870s Germany was once 
again connected to the Catholic Church and to its relationship to modern liberalism. Shortly before 
the war between France and Prussia broke out, Pius IX had called for a council in Rome to deal 
with the continuing problem of liberalism and nationalism; and which was conceived to build on the 
6 Leipziger Hochverrathsprozess. Ausführlicher Bericht über die Verhandlungen des Schwurgerichts zu Leipzig in 
dem Prozess gegen Liebknecht, Bebel und Hepner wegen Vorbereitung zum Hochverrat. vom 11. bis 26. März 
1872. Bearbeitet von den Angeklagten (Leipzig: Druck und Verlag der Genossenschaftsdruckerei, 1874), 318. 
'The German workers will, in the interest of France and Germany, in the interest of peace and freedom, in the 
interest of western civilization against cossack barbarism not allow for an annexation of Alsace-Lorraine.' 
7 Literature on the international of early social democrats are few and far between, for a good introduction see 
Sinclair W. Armstrong, “The Internationalism of the Early Social Democrats of Germany,” The American 
Historical Review 47, no. 2 (1942): 245–58.
8 Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages. ". Legislatur=Periode. 1. Session  
1874. Erster Band. Von der Eröffnungssitzung am 5. Februar bis sechsundzwanzigsten Sitzung am 28. März 
1874 (Berlin: Verlag der Buchdruckerei der “Norddeutschen Allgemeinen Zeitung,” 1874), 86. 'Again, 
gentlemen, build an army of defence and denounce an army of conquest, and only then will you be able to say 
that Germany marches at the head of civilization'
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Syllabus of 1864. The political character of the council was clear from the beginning, as the French 
journalist Jean Hugot explained to his German readers: 
So  hätte  den  das  Concil  einen  im  eminenten  Grade  politischen  Charakter,  und  in  der 
Meinung Derjenigen, die  es ausgedacht  und vorbereitet  haben,  würden dessen Anatheme 
gegen alles Dasjenige gerichtet werden, was man so gewöhnlich “die Errungenschaften der 
modernen Civilisation” nennt. Es ist unmöglich sich den Ernst einer solchen Unternehmung 
und die Neuerung, die darin liegt, zu verhehlen.9
The political and civilizational debates surrounding the council, which liberals and Catholics had 
equally anticipated, were quickly overshadowed by the Franco-Prussian war. The council itself had 
to be adjourned, as Napoleon III's troops, originally sent to protect the pope, were needed in the 
defense of France. A few days later, the Italian army seized the opportunity to take Rome, and the 
same month the eternal city became the new capital of Italy. Despite its abrupt ending, the first 
Vatican council managed to pass some highly controversial propositions, most important among 
them,  papal  infallibility.10 It  was  a  dogma intended to strengthen papal  power beyond national 
borders and to make the authority of the pope absolute when speaking ex cathedra. Although the 
original document affirmed that papal infallibility had in fact always existed, as the church had 
always  stood 'firm against  the  gates  of  hell',  it  was  at  this  special  time,  when the  church was 
particularly threatened, that this infallibility needed to be pronounced a dogma:
But since in this very age when the salutary effectiveness of the apostolic office is most 
especially  needed,  not  a  few  are  to  be  found  who  disparage  its  authority,  we  judge  it 
absolutely necessary to affirm solemnly the prerogative which the only-begotten Son of God 
was pleased to attach to the supreme pastoral office.11
While liberals were outraged, Germany's new chancellor had a distinctly pragmatic interpretation of 
events, based on historical rather than ideological ideas. The Vatican Council was, according to 
9 Jean Hugon, Wie es auf dem Concil zugeht (Munich: Rudolph Oldenbourg, 1870), 53. 'The Council had an 
eminently political character, as, in the minds of those who had conceived and planned it, its anathema would be 
directed against everything one generally calls 'the achievements of modern civilization'. It is impossible to deny 
the seriousness and novely of such an undertaking.
10 For the background to the debates about Papal infallibility at the First Vatican Council see Richard F. Costigan, 
The Consensus of the Church and Papal Infallibility: A Study in the Background of Vatican I (Washington D.C.: 
CUA Press, 2005).
11 Mary Gerhart and Fabian Udoh, The Christianity Reader (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 498.
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Bismarck, who was allegedly willing to grant the Pope asylum after his flight from Rome, nothing 
more than another episode in an endless power-struggle:
es handelt sich um den uralten Machtstreit, der so alt ist wie das Menschengeschlecht, um 
den Machtstreit zwischen Königtum und Priestertum, den Machtstreit, der viel älter ist als 
die Erscheinung unseres Erlösers in dieser Welt,  den Machtstreit,  in dem Agamemnon in 
Aulis mit seinen Sehern lag, der ihm dort die Tochter kostete und die Griechen am Auslaufen 
verhinderte, den Machtstreit, der die deutsche Geschichte des Mittelalters bis zur Zersetzung 
des Deutschen Reiches erfüllt hat.12
Keeping with this rhetoric and referring back to Heinrich IV and the debates about investiture in the 
11th century, Bismarck promised the Reichstag that there would not be another Canossa:  'Seien Sie 
außer  Sorge,  nach Canossa gehen wir  nicht,  weder  körperlich noch geistig',  an expression that 
became so legendary,  it  remains  until  today inscribed at  various Bismarck monuments.13 While 
Bismarck remained firm in his opposition to papal power-claims, and is often thought of as the head 
of the  Kulturkampf  campaign, he did not think of the pope's assertions as endangering modern 
civilization or progress. Indeed, he was unwilling to see the Catholic Party, which had taken nearly 
a fifth of the vote at the first elections of 1871, as anything more than political opposition to his 
plans.14
The Nationalliberale, in a fragile alliance with the chancellor, were certainly less nonchalant about 
this conflict, which they saw not as another incarnation of Agamemnon's struggle, but as precisely 
the  opposite:  a  stumbling  block towards  further  progress  and civilization.15 As  Blackbourn  has 
argued,  for  them,  it  was  a  struggle  between  two  different  ways  of  existence:  progress  or 
12 Moritz Busch, Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of His History (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1898), 220–221; Gordon 
Alexander Craig, Deutsche Geschichte 1866 - 1945: vom Norddeutschen Bund bis zum Ende des Dritten Reiches 
(Munich: C.H.Beck, 1980), 91. 'It is the age-old power struggle, which is as old as humanity itself, the power 
struggle which is much older than the appearance of our saviour in the world, the power struggle in which 
Agamemnon was involved with his seers, that cost him his daughter and made it impossible for the Greeks to 
leave the harbour, the power struggle, which has dominated German history from the Middle Ages until the 
dissolution of the German Empire.'
13 Baedeker, Baedeker Reiseführer Harz (Ostfildern-Kemnat: Baedeker, 2013), 137. 'Do not worry, we are not 
going to Canossa, neither physically nor mentally'.
14 Sylvie Toscer-Angot, “Le Kulturkampf: le choix de la laicite?,” in La laïcité en question: religion, état et société 
en France et en Allemagne du 18e siècle à nos jours, ed. Sylvie Le Grand (Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses Univ. 
Septentrion, 2008), 74–75.
15 Heinrich Bornkamm, “Die Staatsidee im Kulturkampf,” Historische Zeitschrift 170, no. 1 (1950): 53; Armin 
Heinen, “Umstrittene Moderne. Die Liberalen Und Der Preußisch-Deutsche Kulturkampf,” Geschichte Und 
Gesellschaft 29, no. 1 (2003): 140–143.
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regression.16 Liberals like Bluntschli were willing to admit that the Church had once represented 
civilization, but argued that it had become obsolete and had been superseded by the better and freer 
arrangement of the modern state.17 The Catholic Church, its insistence on infallibility, and its Jesuit 
mercenaries, remained a danger to the modern state. The momentary powerlessness of the church, 
some argued, did not represent a break in spirit,  as its fundamental character had not changed. 
Bluntschli, once again employing the language of civilization, explained that if the Jesuits could 
still treat their opponents as they did in the thirty-years war, they would. They were merely stopped, 
because 'die gesammte Fortbildung des Staatsrechts und des bürgerlichen Rechts und die heutige 
Civilisation, einem so heftigen Vorgehen, unübersteigliche Hindernisse in den Weg legen.'18 This 
modern  civilization  needed  to  be  protected,  Bluntschli  and  others  claimed,  and  the  political 
agitation of the church should be responded to in kind. The influence of the Jesuits in particular  
needed to be curbed, or, even better, the whole order expelled, a claim that would soon become one 
of the central tenets of the Kulturkampf.
Although the large debates about the church, and the expulsion of the Jesuits in particular, have 
become known as the Kulturkampf, it would be wrong to think that the word Kultur was used at the 
exclusion  of  civilization.19 Both  outside  and  inside  of  parliament,  the  word  civilization  was 
employed practically interchangeably with Kultur, with the Jesuits being presented as the enemies 
of civilization and culture alike. In the public sphere, anti-Jesuit publications were alleging that 
even the Jesuit's motto 'omnia ad majorem dei gloriam ist ein Schlag ins Gesicht der humanen Welt 
und ein Protest wider den Zug der Cultur und Civilisation des Jahrhunderts'.20 Inside parliament, 
there was a similarly agitated atmosphere when a potential expulsion of the Jesuits was discussed.  
While the vice-president of the Reichstag, Dr. Dove, took the lead in reminding his colleagues about 
the anti-civilizational stance the Catholic Church had recently taken, Catholic MPs lamented that 
the liberals had nothing better to do than to collate allegedly anti-civilizational passages:
Man liest uns aus Büchern vor, von allen Ecken und Enden her sucht man zusammen, was 
16 David Blackbourn, “Progress and Piety: Liberalism, Catholicism and the State in Imperial Germany,” History 
Workshop Journal 26, no. 1 (1988): 57–78.
17 Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Rom und die Deutschen. (Berlin: C.G. Lüderitz’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1872), 23.
18 Ibid., 66; Der Katholicismus Und Der Moderne Staat :Andeutungen Zur Richtigern Würdigung Ihres 
Gegenseitigen Verhältnisses, Namentlich in Deutschland Und Italien. (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg 
Reimer, 1873), 100. 'because the development of state law, civil law, and today's civilization, were an 
insurmountable blockade to such drastic actions.'
19 Roísin Healy, The Jesuit Specter in Imperial Germany (Leiden: Brill, 2003); Matthew P. Fitzpatrick, Purging the 
Empire: Mass Expulsions in Germany, 1871-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
20 Quoted in Philaletes Freimuth, Das moderne deutsche Kaiserreich und die Katholiken, 2nd ed. (Luxemburg: 
Druck und Verlag von Peter Brueck, 1872), 166. 'omnia ad majorem dei gloriam is a slap in the fact of humanity 
and an explicit protest against the advance of culture and civilization in this century.'
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während des achtzehnhundertjährigen Bestehens der Kirche nur immer gegen die “moderne 
Civilisation”,  gegen die  “liberalen  Ideen”,  gegen den “modernen Rechtstaat”,  gegen das 
“moderne Culturwesen” von Katholiken geschrieben worden ist; das wird alles in pikanter 
Auswahl hierhin gebracht.21
Attempts by Catholic MPs to defend the influence of the Jesuits on civilization, and protests that 
with this civilizational language the baby was thrown out with the bathwater were largely ignored. 
Conciliatory voices arguing that they understood 'in welcher Lage so viele unter Ihnen sind, welche 
glauben, den Jesuiten als den Erzfeinden jeder Civilisation entgegentreten zu müssen', yet that such 
feelings did not make the expulsion just, were laughed at; and shortly after the Reichstag forbade 
the presence of Jesuit institutions within the territory of the new German state.22 
These discussions reveal the complex nature of 1870s German liberalism, whose ironically illiberal 
tendencies have been the focus of many studies.23 The strong civilizational convictions that formed 
the core of the Kulturkampf campaign have even been made responsible for many later, apparently 
unconnected  events.  Fitzpatrick  has  in  a  recent  publication  compared  the  policies  of  Jesuit 
expulsion, pioneered in the early 1870s, with later instances of similar policies directed against 
Danes  and  Socialists,  which  were  only  made  possible  by  these  early  instances  of  illiberal 
liberalism.24 Zimmermann,  meanwhile,  has  argued  that  the  ferocity  and  determination  of  the 
Kulturkampf  debate  and  the  attempts  at  exclusion  and  denigration  of  a  minority  make  the 
Kulturkampf the direct predecessor of the civilizing missions against the indigenous populations of 
later German colonies, which not coincidentally also relied on civilizational arguments.25  What both 
seem to suggest is that these various instances were sudden and violent over-reactions, betraying the 
unstable character of day-to-day German politics, and the situation of liberals in the  Kulturkampf  
not as one of strength, but of weakness.
21 Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages. I. Legislaturperiode. III. Session. 
Von der einunddreissigsten bis achtundvierzigsten Sitzung am 19. Juni 1872, vol. 2 (Berlin: Verlag der 
Buchdruckerei der “Norddeutschen Allgemeinen Zeitung,” 1872), 1130–1131. 'One reads us from books, from 
near and far one carries evidence of what, during the 1800 years of the church's existence, has been written by 
Catholics against “modern civilization, against “liberal ideas”, against the “modern state” and all of this is 
presented to us in a delicate collection.'
22 Ibid., 2:1023. 'understand in which position so many of you are, who think they have to confront the Jesuits as 
the arch-enemies of civilization'.
23 For an overview see Michael B. Gross, The War Against Catholicism: Liberalism and the Anti-Catholic 
Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 241.
24 Matthew P. Fitzpatrick, Purging the Empire: Mass Expulsions in Germany, 1871-1914 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015).
25 Andrew Zimmerman, “Race and World Politics: Germany in the Age of Imperialism, 1878–1914,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Modern German History, ed. Helmut Walser Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 359.
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Such liberal weakness would show soon after, as at  the next elections in 1874 liberals  all  over 
Europe were suffering crushing defeats. Within two weeks, German and British liberal parties were 
beaten badly at their respective elections. Gladstone, who had lost despite winning the majority of 
the popular vote, announced his immediate retirement from politics, citing as the main reason that 
he wanted 'some time between parliament and the grave'.26 While Gladstone had been beaten by his 
conservative opponent, the liberal situation in Germany was arguably much worse. Not only had the 
various liberal parties lost, the Catholics had won. The Catholic Zentrum increased its proportion of 
the vote by 10% to almost a third of the electorate, while all the various liberal parties had been 
decimated. In recent historical literature, this Catholic victory has generally been interpreted as a 
sign of successful and modern campaign tactics, and of the better organization of Catholic politics 
in Germany.27 Liberals at the time interpreted it simply as regression and the result of lacking liberal 
fervour, and logically resumed their aggressive politics in the aftermath of the elections.
The events of 1874 fanned anti-Catholic civilizational flames all over Europe, and even in Britain 
where  the  Vatican  decrees  had  not  had  nearly  the  same  impact  as  in  Germany.  Gladstone's 
retirement proved short-lived as he returned, within weeks, to the centre of political action with a 
tract  designed to  stir  up further  tension with the Catholic  Church, and to  criticize the negative 
effects of recent Vatican politics. Gladstone and his friends were, as A.J.P. Taylor once put it, 'all, 
without exception, fervent patriots, eager to crush anyone who should challenge the moral code of 
their civilization', and in the eyes of many liberals, the Vatican decrees did just that.28 Gladstone 
signalled that he agreed with those who saw the results  of the Vatican council  as completing a 
process started with the  Syllabus of  Errors in  1864, and that  they were a challenge to  modern 
civilization as such.29 As he explained in the second of a series of pamphlets detailing his position:
Without doubt, progress, liberalism, modern civilisation are terms more or less ambiguous; 
but  they are,  under  a  sound  rule,  determinable  by the  context.  Now the  context  of  the 
syllabus and the Encyclica are perfectly unambiguous: they perfectly explain what the Pope 
26 Matthew R. Temmel, “Gladstone’s Resignation of the Liberal Leadership, 1874-1875,” Journal of British 
Studies 16, no. 01 (1976): 153–77.
27 For a good introduction to this literature, see Margaret Lavinia Anderson, “Piety and Politics: Recent Work on 
German Catholicism,” The Journal of Modern History 63, no. 4 (December 1, 1991): 681–716; Margaret Lavinia 
Anderson, “The Limits of Secularization: On the Problem of the Catholic Revival in Nineteenth-Century 
Germany,” The Historical Journal 38, no. 03 (1995): 647–70.
28 Cameron Whitehead, “Reading Beside the Lines: Marginalia, W.E. Gladstone, and the International History of 
the Bulgarian Horrors,” The International History Review 0, no. 0 (2014): 6.
29 Josef L. Altholz, “The Vatican Decrees Controversy, 1874-1875,” The Catholic Historical Review 57, no. 4 
(1972): 594.
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means by these words.  He means to condemn all  that  we consider  fair  limitation to the 
claims of priestly power; to repudiate the title of man to general freedom of thought, and of 
speech in all its varied forms of utterance; the title of a nation to resist those who treat the 
sovereignty over it as a property, and who would enforce on the people – for example of the 
Papal States – a government independently of or against its will; in a word the true and only 
sure titles of freedom in all its branches, inward and outward, mental, moral, and political, as  
they are ordinarily understood in this age and country.30
Not only did the Vatican decrees infringe on sovereignty, Gladstone claimed, they also undermined 
freedom and progress more broadly: 'To secure rights has been, and is, the aim of the Christian 
civilisation: to destroy them, and to establish the resistless, domineering action of a purely central 
power, is the aim of Roman policy.'31 Deliberately exaggerating a potential international threat of 
the Catholic Church, as German liberals had done for a while, Gladstone argued that if the church 
was not firmly opposed, not only were English freedoms in danger, but European civilization in 
general.32 As he dramatically put it: 'nothing shall remain, except an Asian monarchy; nothing, but 
one giddy height of despotism, and one dead level of religious subserviency'.33
In many ways,  Gladstone's  sudden criticism of the Catholic  Church came as a surprise,  as the 
Vatican decrees, three years earlier, had not caused great outrage in Britain. Now, a huge debate 
developed, taking up many of the tropes pioneered on the continent in the 1860s (see chapter 4). In 
England, as Altholz has asserted, the general public had almost forgotten about the Vatican decrees 
by the time Gladstone decided to pull them to center of political attention.34 Various notions of 
civilization were frequently discussed in Church circles in the early 1870s, yet rather as a general 
phenomenon and hardly ever directly connected to the Syllabus or the Vatican decrees.35 Now that 
the debate had started, Gladstone was heavily attacked by Catholic papers and intellectuals alike. 
The Catholic Review The Month, seeking to reverse Gladstone's argument, claimed that he 'had cast 
30 William Ewart Gladstone, “Vaticanism,” in Rome and the Newest Fashions in Religion (London: John Murray, 
1875), 31.
31 W. E. Gladstone, Vaticanism. An Answer to Replies and Reproofs (London: John Murray, 1875), 95.
32 William Ewart Gladstone, The Vatican Decrees in Their Bearing on Civil Allegiance: A Political Expostulation 
(New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1875), 50–51; Josef L. Altholz, “Gladstone and The Vatican Decrees,” 
Historian 25, no. 3 (1963): 315; Heinen, “Umstrittene Moderne. Die Liberalen Und Der Preußisch-Deutsche 
Kulturkampf,” 138.
33 Gladstone, Vaticanism. An Answer to Replies and Reproofs, 9.
34 Altholz, “The Vatican Decrees Controversy, 1874-1875,” 595.
35 John William Henry Molyneux, Christianity and Modern Civilization. A Letter to the Bishop of Ely (London: 
Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, & Green, 1871); R.W. Church, Civilization. Before and after Christianity. 
Two Lectures Delivered in St. Paul’s Cathedral at the Tuesday Evening Services, January 23d & 30th, 1872 
(London: Macmillan & Co., 1872).
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in his lot' with 'the bands of desperadoes, gathered from the scum of the earth' that were questioning 
the pope's  temporal authority.36 Other  more nuanced figures  like Manning,  Acton and Newman 
replied  in  more  detail,  and  most  of  their  critique  took  up ideas  developed in  the  1860s  when 
liberalism and Protestantism had first become more closely associated.37 
By attacking  the  church  through the  principles  of  liberalism and modern  civilization,  Catholic 
opinion leaders in England argued, Gladstone clearly demonstrated the close connection between 
Protestantism and revolutionary,  atheist  ideals.  The ideas  that  Gladstone was defending were a 
dangerous mix of Lutheranism and revolutionary ideals, or, as Manning succinctly explained: 'The 
principles  of  1789 are  Lutheranism applied  to  politics.'38 The  later  rector  of  the  University  of 
Ireland, Henry Canon Neville, similarly attacked Gladstone for supporting the wrong side of the 
battle and not the church, 'against that liberalism, which runs into Red Republicanism throughout 
France and Italy, into Communism in Paris, into Internationalism in England and Germany'.39 The 
conservative MP Robert Montagu had an even more dramatic take on the subject, as he explained to 
students at the Catholic Union of Ireland:
I have repudiated modern thought, if the great leader of the liberal party means by modern 
thought the mischievous ideas of 1789, and, by fervour in religion, a little harmless artistic 
taste. I belong to the Church of God, not to the synagogue of Satan. I look to the church to 
remove now, as she did in the early centuries, the evils of modern thought by the remedial 
agency of her plenitude of authority.40
This debate was not a purely British one. In the early 1870s, an international dialogue developed in 
the countries of the Anglo-sphere as well as in Europe, which treated the disputes between liberals 
and the Catholic Church as a prime issue of international politics. As has recently been argued, anti-
Catholicism was strong in the US in the 1870s, where, over the next few years, politicians like 
Richard Thompson adopted the anti-papal rhetoric of Europe and complained that: 'We are classed, 
36 T.B. Parkinson, “Mr Gladstone’s ‘Expostulation.’ Part the Second.,” The Month and Catholic Review 13, no. 1 
(1875): 91–92.
37 Altholz, “The Vatican Decrees Controversy, 1874-1875,” 599–601.
38 Henry Edward Manning, The Vatican Decrees in Their Bearing on Civil Allegiance (New York: Catholic 
Publication Society, 1875), 128.
39 Henry Neville, A Few Comments on Mr. Gladstone’s Expostulation. (London: B.M. Pickering, 1875), 49.
40 Robert Montagu, Civilization and the See of Rome. A Lecture Delivered under the Auspices of the Catholic 
Union of Ireland (Dublin: M’Glashan & Gill, 1874), 31.
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by him and  his  hierarchy,  along  with  the  infidels,  socialists,  and  communists  of  Europe.'41 In 
Australia,  where  the repercussions  of  this  international  debate were equally felt,  Catholics  saw 
civilization endangered by a new wave of anti-papal propaganda. The Melbourne Jesuit O'Malley 
condemned  Gladstone  and  the  liberals  in  a  tract  entitled  Secular  Education  and  Christian  
Civilisation, which alleged that without Catholicism civilization could not exist, and that Gladstone 
was doing the work of the devil.42 In European countries, like Belgium, where Catholic politicians 
had,  as  in  Germany,  been strengthened in the countryside,  liberal  internationalists  continued to 
complain about the 'Unverträglichkeit zwischen moderner Civilisation und römischen Ideen'.43
Arguably,  the  strongest  links  in  this  international  fight  had  developed  between  Germany  and 
Britain, where all liberal parties had suffered a backlash in 1874. Not only did Gladstone take the 
word Vaticanism from German and were his books translated into it, even official political meetings 
were held  to  support  the  German cause  in  Britain.44 Gladstone  himself  also  felt  that  Germany 
represented the vanguard of the liberal struggle he thought himself a part of, and sent the first copy 
of his new tract to a person he mistakenly thought of as embodying the liberal spirit of Europe: 
Bismarck. The chancellor, as his comments on the  Kulturkampf  show, had never believed in the 
great liberal project of men like Gladstone, whose idealist politics he despised, and whom he would 
later refer to as 'incompetent as a politician' but 'a great demagogue'.45 Nonetheless, he thought it 
fair to reply:
I am very sensible of your kind attention in sending me the first copy of your Vaticanism, of 
which  I  anticipate  some hours  of  instructive  reading.  It  affords  me  a  deep and hopeful 
gratification  to  see  the  two  nations,  which  in  Europe  are  the  champions  of  liberty and 
conscience, encountering the same foe, stand henceforth shoulder on shoulder in defending 
the highest interests of the human race.46
41 Timothy Verhoeven, “Transatlantic Connections: American Anti-Catholicism and the First Vatican Council 
(1869–70),” The Catholic Historical Review 100, no. 4 (2014): 695–720; Richard W. Thompson, The Papacy 
and the Civil Power. (New York: Nelson & Phillips, 1876), 213.
42 O’Malley, Secular Education and Christian Civilisation (Melbourne: Thomas E. Verga, 1875).
43 Emile de Laveleye, Protestantismus und Katholizismus in ihren Beziehungen zur Freiheit und Wohlfahrt de 
Völker. (Nördlingen: Druck und Verlag der C.H. Beck’schen Buchhandlung, 1875), 10. 'The incompatibility of 
modern civilization and Roman ideas'.
44 Gladstone, Vaticanism. An Answer to Replies and Reproofs, 7; W. E. Gladstone, Vaticanismus. Eine Antwort auf 
Erwiderungen und Vorwürfe (Nördlingen: Verlag der C.H. Beck’schen Buchhandlung, 1875); Altholz, “The 
Vatican Decrees Controversy, 1874-1875,” 596.
45 Edgar Feuchtwanger, Bismarck: A Political History (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 226.
46 Otto v. Bismarck, Gesammelte Werke: 1 , Schriften. Bd. 1. 1871-1873, ed. Konrad Canis (Paderborn: Schöningh, 
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Russia, the East, and the Public Conscience of the World
Such pronouncements  about  the  highest  interest  of  the  human  race,  even when  they were  not 
entirely sincere,  had become conspicuously frequent  around the middle of the 1870s.  Although 
some have referred to the whole nineteenth century as an era of internationalism, the idea of the 
international as a field of engagement had certainly intensified in the last third.47 In the 1860s, 
practitioners of international law had referred to a growing esprit d'internationalité, in the 1870s it 
was formally institutionalized.48 In 1873, the Institut de droit international, dedicated to the study of 
the science of international law and intending to push for legislation to further civilize warfare and 
the international sphere more broadly, was inaugurated.49 It was, as its initiators cheekily explained: 
'une  espèce  de  concile  juridique-oecuménique,  sans  pape  et  sans  infaillibilité'.50 The  Universal 
Postal Union, created to guarantee safe communications around the globe, was founded merely a 
year later, the international gold standard started to be widely accepted, and the mid-1870s saw a 
sudden rise in geographical organizations for the exploration and civilization of the globe as a 
whole, as well as a mushrooming of organizations dedicated to such problems as prison reform.51
This  deluge  of  newly-founded  international  organizations  was  accompanied  by  a  barrage  of 
literature  dedicated  to  what  many perceived  to  be  a  new state  of  affairs.  While  Henry James 
dissected the differences between Britain and the US in his An International Episode, authors more 
directly interested in forcing political change, like Frederic Marshal, dedicated their books to the 
reform of  the  arcane  rituals  of  international  diplomacy,  which  he  referred  to  as  International  
Vanities.52 On both sides  of  the  Atlantic,  men of  letters  and politicians  were  calling for  global 
reforms to start a new era of what some had started to call internationalism. The historian Frederic 
Seebohm collected his  thoughts on the future of the international  sphere in  an essay he called 
International  Reform,  American  politicians  like  Elihu  Burrit  were  calling  for  an  'International  
Congress  for  the  purpose  of  elaborating  and  commending  to  the  governments  and  peoples  an 
International  Code',  and  Britain  even  saw  the  publication  of  books  simply  entitled: 
Internationalism.53 In all of these, allegedly newly existing ideals of a liberal, global civilization 
47 Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (London: Penguin, 2012), 3–188.
48 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 13.
49 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations.
50 Ibid., 39.'A type of ecumenical-juridical council without pope and infallibility.'
51 Christopher M. Meissner, “A New World Order: Explaining the International Diffusion of the Gold Standard, 
1870–1913,” Journal of International Economics 66, no. 2 (2005): 385–406.
52 Henry James, An International Episode. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1879); Frederic Marshall, International 
Vanities. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1875).
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were lauded, and the inevitable internationalist future of the world praised in the highest tones. 
The idea that a new, international spirit of civilization had started to dominate the politics of the 
century was  an  oft-repeated  theme in  mid-1870s discussions  in  western  Europe,  and one  even 
philosophers not primarily interested in politics started to engage with. The writer and philosopher 
Arthur Elley Finch expounded on it in great detail as he addressed the Sunday Lecture Society in  
Westminster in February 1876 on the topic of 'Civilisation: A sketch of its rise and progress; its  
modern safeguards and future prospects'.54 The Sunday Lecture Society was a liberal bastion which 
had counted T.H. Huxley, Herbert Spencer, and Charles Darwin as its vice-presidents, and whose 
listeners must have been pleased to hear Finch advance classic liberal doctrine for an international 
era.  Freedom of speech,  the steam engine and the physical  sciences,  Finch argued,  had helped 
humanity to advance to a new level which was now taking on international forms. As Finch put it,  
an 'International Conscience' had developed, 'to whose dictates each state becomes more or less 
sensitive,  and thereby acts of inhumanity,  aggression, and persecution, that were of so frequent 
perpetration in the isolated communities of antiquity, are shrunk from beneath the reproachful gaze 
of surrounding nations'.55 Civilization was advancing all over the globe, Finch claimed, and those 
countries and peoples who remained closed to the international conscience would, pressured by 
developments, at some point have to give in. 
It was specifically one part of the globe, he argued, that had remained resilient to the advance of 
international civilization and whose racial and theological make-up impeded its further rise: the 
East. As he explained:
Eastern  civilizations  appear  to  have  reached  a  certain  point,  and there  to  have  stopped, 
hindered  probably  from advancing  by  reason  of  their  knowledge  being  bound  up  with 
theological  opinions  held  to  be  sacred  and  immutable,  or  by  reason  of  their  mental 
constitution  having  attained  the  natural  limit  imposed  by their  climate  and  surrounding 
physical circumstances.56
In many ways, Finch's pronouncements were nothing new. Broad tropes of eastern inferiority had 
original.
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existed since antiquity and ideas of the theological backwardness of the east were a common staple 
of nineteenth century liberal argument. Indeed, merely a year earlier, Gladstone had referred to the 
danger of the Catholic Church as akin to an Asian monarchy. Yet, while theological opinions were 
mutable and prone to change, Finch and others were now referring to the 'natural limits' of the 
peoples of the East. As recent contributions by historians like MacMaster and Beasley have shown, 
Finch was not alone in these beliefs, as scientific conceptions of race, partly informed by previous  
discourses, started to dominate European political discussions about the international sphere from 
around 1870.57 Reynaud-Paligot has even suggested that the phenomena of internationalism and 
scientific  racism  were  intrinsically  connected,  as  an  increasingly  international  community  of 
scholars fed with new research material from ever more far-away parts of the globe were actively 
engaged  in  producing  racial  maps  of  the  world,  that  would  later  be  reflected  in  international 
politics.58
This  new  rhetoric  had  a  grave  impact  on  both  domestic  as  well  as  international  politics,  as  
politicians in the west could be denigrated as inferior,  and whole countries could be conquered 
under the premiss of civilizational and racial superiority. As Wohl has shown in an excellent article,  
the British prime minister,  Disraeli,  suffered from a flood of racial  anti-Semitism in the 1870s, 
which was of an entirely different nature from the religiously-based insults he had been accustomed 
to since his youth.59 While at his early hustings, pieces of pork had been dangled in front of his 
nose, he was now depicted as oriental and, given what contemporaries would have called his racial 
ancestry,  as  incapable  of  understanding  British  civilization.  While  Disraeli  had,  despite  such 
rhetoric, reached the top of the greasy pole and was himself often engaged in racial analysis, the 
actual population of the 'Orient' arguably suffered more from such insidious thought, as the new 
wave of Russian conquests that swept over Asia in the 1860s and 1870s, was directly justified with 
civilizational and racial superiority.60 As Alexander II had taken over after Nicholas' death during 
the Crimean War Russia had moved towards more liberal policies, seeking to rehabilitate itself 
internationally.  After  the  abolition  of  serfdom  in  1861  and  several  military  reforms,  Russia's 
international politics were now also justified in the name of civilization. As the international lawyer 
57 Neal McMaster, Racism in Europe 1870-2000 (Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001), 20–30; Edward 
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Fjedor Martens explained to the international audience of the  Revue de droit international et de  
législation comparée:
Plus l'Angleterre et la Russie seront pénétrées du sentiment de la solidarité de leur intérêts 
réciproques en Asie, plus elles convaincront que le trait caractéristique de la civilisation est 
l'esprit de cooperation pour le même but élevé, plus deviendront solides les bases de leur 
domination sur les peuples asiatiques et plus seront efficaces les garanties générales de la 
paix générale, en Europe et en Asie.61
The Russian elite had much to gain from such civilizational rhetoric, and its officials attempted to 
present most of their Asian conquest as serving the international civilization of humanity. Already in 
the mid-1860s, Russia had started to expand further into Central Asia, and Russian officials had 
specifically justified the conquest of Turkestan with the vocabulary of civilization. Russian rhetoric 
was internationally known, as several books published in German directly quoted from the official  
note justifying intervention:
Das  Kaiserliche  Kabinett,  in  dem  es  sich  dieser  Aufgabe  widmet,  hat  die  Interessen 
Russlands  im  Auge.  Es  glaubt  aber  gleichzeitig  den  Interessen  der  Humanität  und 
Civilisation zu dienen. Es hat ein Recht auf die gerechte und loyale Würdigung des Ganges 
den es verfolgt, und der Prinzipien, die es leiten, zu zählen.62
As some have argued, having a civilizing mission in Central Asia was widely seen as a short-cut to 
being accepted as a truly European state.63 In order to gain this acceptance, Russian officials sought 
to establish a civilizing mission for themselves, and to explicitly compare their actions in Central 
Asia  to  Britain's  endeavours.  As  Morrison  has  explored,  Russian  officials  and  political 
commentators specifically focused on Britain's civilizational claims in India to build the reputation 
61 Fedor Fedorovich Martens, “La Russie et l’Angleterre dans l’Asie centrale,” Revue de droit international et de 
législation comparée 11 (1879): 233.  'The more Britain and Russia are penetrated by the feeling of solidarity 
concerning their interests in Asia, the more they are convinced that the main characteristic of civilization is the 
shared spirit of cooperation for the same elevated aim, the more the bases of their domination over Asian peoples 
will be strengthened, and the general peace in Europe and Asia will be guaranteed.'
62 Alexander Petzholdt, Turkestan. Auf Grundlage einer im Jahre 1871 unternommenen Bereisung des Landes 
(Leipzig: Verlag von Bernhard Schlicke, 1874), 70–71. 'The Imperial Cabinet has, in concerning itself with these 
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of their own civilizing mission in Central Asia.64 
In this international war of civilizational propaganda that accompanied the strategic competition 
many had started to refer to as the 'Great Game', Russia's positions were loudly touted in Britain by 
allegedly  private  individuals  who  filled  the  reviews  of  the  1870s  with  pro-Russian  essays, 
describing the success and purpose of Russia's civilizing mission. The most prominent amongst 
them was Olga Novikoff, whose supporters, like W. T. Stead, called 'the MP for Russia', while her 
opponents frequently accused her of being an agent of the Tsar.65 In essays and pamphlets, under her 
own name or  a  pseudonym,  Olga  Novikoff  presented the official  Russian line  of  civilizational 
advance. What Martens sought to tell those engaged in international law, she explained to the wider 
reading public in Britain. 'The only hope of barbarism in Asia lies in discord of the two civilising 
Empires', she argued, 'if we are united, civilisation is safe; but a policy of antagonism, even though 
we do not draw the sword, may end in restoring Asia to the Asiatics'.66 This was the official Russian 
position, but Novikoff also sought to engage with the argument that Russia was an inferior and 
uncivilized  power,  and argued that  while  this  might  have  been true,  Europe owed its  civilized 
existence to it:  'Upon us the Asiatic wave spent its force. We were overwhelmed, but we saved 
Europe from the  Mongol  horde.  While  we saved,  we suffered:  we emerged from the  flood of 
barbarism partially barbarous; our progress has been arrested for centuries'.67
Yet in the new international atmosphere of the 1870s, Russia had been re-established as a civilized 
power and was, Novikoff argued, sometimes even superior to the old ones. While the British were 
boisterously confident about their own civilizational head-start, Russia's new civilizational reforms 
had put it ahead in many crucial areas. Russia had a reformed criminal code, whereas British sailors 
were  still  lashed,  and  by  the  standards  advocated  by  the  rapidly  disseminating  international 
organizations, Russia was ahead in civilization: 
We  may  be  'barbarians'  but  our  criminal  code  judged  by  the  standard  of  the  Howard 
Association is more humane than that of at least one other nation, which retains the lash in 
the  army  and  navy,  applies  the  cat-o-nine-tails  to  the  garotter,  and  secretly  strangles 
64 Alexander Morrison, “Russian Rule in Turkestan and the Example of British India, C. 1860-1917,” The Slavonic  
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67 Ibid., 43.
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murderers in the recesses of her gaols.68
Cleverly, the Russian elite and those propagating in its name used the new rhetoric and ideas of the 
international sphere to  their  advance.  Russia  had sunk in the appreciation of western European 
liberals since the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, and specifically since the Crimean War, its new 
policies and official  diplomatic strategy now sought to reestablish it  as a civilized and western 
power, whose reforms and international stance rivaled the traditional powers of civilization in the 
west.
The Eastern Crisis
While Russia was arguably on the way up, the Ottoman Empire had suffered a sharp descent in 
international  civilizational  appreciation.  Despite  the  integration  of  Turkey  into  the  European 
concert,  many in Europe and increasingly those under its rule criticized the Ottoman Empire as 
lacking in civilization, although no concrete action was taken against it in western Europe. During 
the twenty years that had passed since the last major war in the area, the status of Turkey's Christian 
populations weighed heavily on the newly developing liberal international conscience. Since the 
Crimean War, in which Britain had supported Turkey in the name of civilization, relations between 
the two countries had remained strained. Already in the immediate aftermath of the Treaty of Paris 
in  1856,  Lord  Clarendon,  the  then  Secretary  of  State  of  Foreign  Affairs  wrote  to  the  British 
ambassador in Constantinople, Stratford de Radcliffe: 
the Turkish government should be made aware that if this systematic misgovernment, and 
the persecution of Christians, and violations of engagements continue, it will be impossible 
to arrest the progress of opinion which is now manifesting itself that Mahomedan rule is 
incompatible with civilisation and humanity, and can no longer be endured.69
In Britain, this progress of opinion had not been arrested until the 1870s, but with the spread of the  
language of civilization, even those personally revolting against the Ottoman Empire had learned to 
phrase  their  grievances  as  civilizational  ones.  Already  during  the  Crete  Revolt  in  1866,  the 
provisional Crete government had called on the rest of the world in the name of civilization. It was 
logical that Turkey was a despotic country,  the petition asserted,  'it  is,  however,  surprising that 
Europe should continue to tolerate the so-oft repeated falsehood and so much effusion of blood in 
68 Ibid., 84.
69 Quoted in George Douglas Campbell Argyll, The Eastern Question from the Treaty of Paris 1856 to the Treaty of  
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Crete. If not justice, ought not civilization at least to put an end to this affair?'70 Despite a few 
volunteers, civilization had not come to the aid of Crete and European politicians, continuously 
concerned about the fragility of the Ottoman Empire, preferred to ignore such claims, despite their 
ever-increasing volume.
In  1875,  a  new  revolt  broke  out  against  Ottoman  rule  in  Herzegovina  and  this  time  the 
repercussions became more difficult to ignore, although the status of civilization in this conflict 
remained heavily debated.71 The revolt quickly spread all over the Balkans and in 1876 had reached 
Bulgaria, where the Ottoman Army, to the chorus of an international outcry, brutally suppressed 
several uprisings. Using irregular troops, the Ottomans managed to get the uprisings under control, 
yet only at enormous cost. Russia immediately promised to come to the aid of civilization and the 
christian  populations,  but  despite  all  Russian  rhetoric,  international  enthusiasm  for  such  an 
undertaking remained tepid. The official British response was muted, as Disraeli had not changed 
his opinions on the threat of Russia and was not willing to terminate an alliance because of an 
uprising. As Henry Elliot, the ambassador to Constantinople chillingly argued, British policy was 
'not  affected  by  the  question  whether  it  was  10,000  or  20,000  persons  who  perished  in  the 
suppression'.72 Many in Britain agreed with the government and argued that in contrast to Russian 
claims, Russia itself was a danger to civilization. The writer John Mill quickly identified Russian 
ideas of panslavism as the real threat in the Eastern Crisis:  'It  has taken the field in open arms 
against  treaties,  races,  religions,  culture  –  in  one  word  civilisation,  as  understood  in  Western 
Europe'.73 While Mill was not alone in regarding Russian claims to civilization with scepticism, 
others had even more original critiques of Russian propaganda. The conservative politician Munro-
Butler  Johnstone  argued  that  Turkey  was  having  to  be  considered  as  more  civilized  than  the 
countries which were opposing it, because it did not know such abstract words as 'civilisation' and 
was thereby not trapped in metaphysical abstractions.74 
On the continent, many agreed with the British conservative leadership and in German debates, it 
was predominantly Hungarians and Poles, sharing a border with Russia, who most mistrusted the 
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Tsar's pronouncements. The famed Hungarian orientalist Vambery had already argued in his 1871 
work Russlands Machtstellung in Asien that Russian rhetoric was not to be trusted. One should not 
hope,  Vambery  explained,  that  Russia  was  now  purely  being  lead  by  civilizational  motives: 
'Russlands Politik trägt noch immer zu sehr den mittelalterlichen Zuschnitt. Ihm ist es noch immer 
um neue  Besitzungen  und  Ländereien  zu  thun'.75 Now that  another  Russian  civilizing  mission 
became more likely,  the Slavist Josef Perwolf observed, Hungarians were openly showing their 
contempt  for  Russia's  claims,  and  like  many conservatives  in  Britain,  argued  that  Russia  was 
endangering civilization:
Magnaten und Bocskorose, Juraten und Literaten, Journalisten und Deputirte, Studenten und 
Czikose  –  sie  alle  überfliessen  von  Liebe  zu  den  “Brüdern”  Osmanen,  donnern,  im 
Reichstage,  auf  Meetings und Festcommerzen gegen den “eisigen Hauch des  nordischen 
Kolosses”,  “gegen die  barbarischen Moskowiter,  welche  die  Civilisation  bedrohen”,  und 
predigen einen förmlichen Kreuzzug.76
They were joined by leading German socialists like Liebknecht who formally condemned Russian 
claims to civilization, as Russia itself was not civilized, and merely adopted civilizational language 
to cover-up its own atrocities. As I have shown in the beginning of this chapter, German socialists 
had traditionally been skeptical towards Russia. They now became increasingly aggressive in tone. 
As Liebknecht argued in the socialist newspaper Vorwärts, Russia was 'eine halbbarbarische Macht, 
die sich gerade soviel Civilisation angeeignet hat, um ihre barbarischen Ziele mit dem Raffinement 
der Civilisation verfolgen zu können'.77 Remembering previous revolutions and Russia's treatment 
of Poland, Liebknecht elaborated on what he perceived to be Russian hypocrisy:
Der  brutalste  Raubstaat  den  die  Geschichte  kennt,  der  einzige  welcher  der  langen 
ununterbrochenen  Reihe  von  an  der  Menschheit  begangenen  Verbrechen  keinen  der 
75 Ármin Vámbéry, Russlands Machstellung in Asien. Eine historische-politische Studie (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 
1871), 76. 'Russia's policy is still defined by its medievalism, as it is still concerned with new conquests and 
possessions'.
76 Josef Perwolf, Die slawisch-orientalische Frage;eine historische Studie (Prague: T. Mourek, 1878), 142. 
'Magnates and the poor, lawyers and authors, journalists and MPs, students and peasants, all of them overflow 
with love for the Ottomans and thunder in meetings and commercial festivities against the “icy breath of the 
nordic collossus”, against the barbarian muscovites which are threatening civilization. They are threatening a 
veritable crusade.'
77 Wilhelm Liebknecht, Zur orientalischen Frage, oder Soll Europa kosakisch werden?: ein Mahnwort an das 
deutsche Volk (Leizpig: Höhme, 1878), 7. 'a half-barbarian power, which has acquired just as much civilization, 
to pursue its barbarian aims with the refinement of civilization'.
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Menschheit  erzeigten  Dienst  mildernd  an  die  Seite  stellen  kann,  dieser  räuberischste 
grausamste  und  heuchlerischste  aller  Raubstaaten  darf  es  wagen  sich  als  Vertreter  der 
Menschheit und der Menschlichkeit aufzuspielen und die Hände noch rauchend vom Blute 
des gemordeten Polen Krokodilstränen zu vergießen über die Türkengräuel?78
For English liberals, to whom Russia's previous propaganda had predominantly been addressed, this 
crisis  had  a  completely  different  civilizational  meaning.  While  many had  still  agitated  for  the 
Ottoman Empire and against Russia during the Crimean War, it was now obvious to most, as the 
MP Holms put it, that 'the march of civilization had come to a stand-still in Turkey'.79 The fact that 
once again Christians had been attacked, a part of Ottoman society many liberals liked to see as 'an 
element of progress, a germ of civilisation, a beam of day-dawn, a promise of better things', further 
infuriated the enemies of the Ottoman state.80 Some argued that non-intervention would solve the 
problem by itself. William Harcourt told the house that 'in the name of humanity and civilization'  
they were to 'let them sink beneath the crushing weight of their own wickedness'.81 Others actively 
demanded Russian intervention, and especially those who saw the Eastern crisis as a possibility to 
make good the faults of the Crimean War actively advocated in the name of Russia. John Bright, 
previously opposed to turkophile policies, invoked the spirit of Richard Cobden, whose pamphlets 
were  reprinted  to  mark  the  occasion,  and  argued  that  this  was  finally  a  chance  to  reconquer 
Constantinople  for  a  Christian  power.82 Using  previous  Russian  declarations  about  their 
civilizational intentions, Bright decried the portrayal of the Russians as dangerous intruders, and 
rhetorically asked his constituents at a Town Hall meeting: 'Does not every man know that Russia is  
continually advancing in the field of civilization?'83
Some British liberals even saw the current crisis as a potential step towards the truly internationalist 
future many of them hoped for.  The famous international  law scholar,  James Lorimer,  publicly 
argued that a potential Russian intervention against the Ottoman Empire would finally help it to 
78 Ibid. The most brutal state of robbers history knows, and the only one which cannot adduce a single positive 
deed to the long and continuous list of crimes against humanity it has committed. This most brutal, cruel, and 
deceitful of all states of robbers dares to present itself as the representative of mankind and humanitarianism and, 
with hands still smoking with the blood of the murdered Poland, cry fake tears about the brutality of the Turks?'
79 HC Deb 31 July 1876 vol. 231 col. 170
80 William Gifford Palgrave, Essays on Eastern Questions (London: MacMillan and Co., 1872), 165.
81 HC Deb 11 August 1876 vol.231 col. 1135
82 Richard Cobden, Russia, Turkey, and England. Reprinted from the Political Writings of Richard Cobden 
(London: Cassell Petter & Galpin, 1876).
83 John Bright, Speech on the Eastern Question. Delivered in the Town Hall, Birmingham, December 4th, 1876 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1877), 21.
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crumble, and would open the door for a grand project of a denationalized and truly international 
Constantinople.84 As he explained to his students, he was not: 
one of those who has ever  seen grounds for the jealousy and suspicion which the mere 
mention of the name of Russia awakens in the mind of so many in this country. Much of the 
ambition with which we charge Russia seems to me perfectly legitimate, and greatly to her 
honour.  There can be no question,  at  all  events,  that  it  is  an ambition that  very closely 
resembles our own, and that so far from being a badge of discord, it ought to be a bond of 
union and a source of sympathy between us. So far as we have yet gone, I see no reason to 
doubt that the efforts both of Russia and of England have tended to advance the cause of 
civilisation against barbarism, or order against anarchy; and those who fight for so good a 
cause surely ought not to fight each other.85
Despite  such high-praise  for  Russia,  Lorimer  argued  that  he  'should  tremble  to  see  her  in  the 
prominent position which must necessarily belong to the possessor of Constantinople.'86 While the 
Russians  could  potentially  do  the  fighting,  Lorimer  argued,  Constantinople  itself  should  later 
become 'the common property of civilised mankind'.87
Whereas  Lorimer interpreted this crisis as a starting point to an internationalist future, Gladstone 
judged  the  present  more  realistically  and  immediately  spotted  an  opportunity  to  gain  political 
capital, with a renewed attack on Turkey and its crimes against civilization. He left the agenda of 
Vaticanism to take up the case of the Bulgarians in Britain. In essence, the target was the same: 
Asian monarchy and the enemies of civilization. The result of this endeavor, a pamphlet entitled 
Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East, was an immediate success, sold 200000 times in 
the first month, and Gladstone became the figure-head of a large movement calling for some form 
of  international  intervention.88 Only  the  'thorough  riddance'  and  'most  blessed  deliverance'  of 
Turkish rule was a 'reparation' to 'the civilization which has been affronted and shamed', Gladstone 
explained,  and  his  liberal  constituency  seemed  to  agree.89 Gladstone's  critics,  however,  were 
84 James Lorimer, Of the Denationalisation of Constantinople and Its Devotion to International Purposes. 




88 William Ewart Gladstone, Bulgarian Horrors and the Questions of the East (London: John Murray, 1876); for 
the argument that this was the first instance of an argument for humanitarian intervention see Gary J. Bass, 
Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 
2008).
89 Gladstone, Bulgarian Horrors and the Questions of the East, 62.
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unimpressed. Disraeli mocked him, alleging that the pamphlet was 'vindictive and ill-written' and 
was 'of all the Bulgarian Horrors, perhaps the greatest'.90 Marx apparently caustically quipped that if 
Gladstone's  speech had introduced conscience into diplomacy,  he had even more so introduced 
diplomacy into  conscience.  Indeed,  on  all  sides  of  the  political  spectrum,  there  was  a  general 
suspicion that Gladstone's sudden support of Bulgaria had more selfish motives, as an anonymous 
writer put it in a pamphlet fittingly entitled The question of the day:
As the Earl  of Beaconsfield is  now at  the head of affairs  in our country,  and the Right 
Honourable W. E. Gladstone is not, it looks uncommonly like a bid for power [...] “A man 
must be wild in the extreme who can imagine for a moment (all greater interest being put 
aside),  that  the  Christians  would  better  their  condition  by being  under  the  energetically 
tyrannical Russian, rather than the indolently indifferent Turk.”91
Gladstone was criticized both for his power-hungry politics, and the way he characterized Turkey's 
relationship to civilization. Scientific ideas of race had started to dominate liberal discourse in the 
early 1870s, and now they were an integral part of new discussions about the Ottoman Empire. 
Liberal racists and British supremacists like E.A. Freeman analysed and criticized the racial make-
up of the Ottoman Empire in several works, and other commentators on the Eastern Crisis, like the 
MP George Campbell, also sought the opportunity to present the Eastern Crisis as a racial one.92 
Gladstone held similar opinions, as he explained at length in his pamphlet. In Turkey, the worst 
aspects of 'Mahometanism' and racial inferiority combined to form the most oppressive of empires. 
'Let me endeavour very briefly to sketch, in the rudest outline what the turkish race was and what it  
is.  It  is  not  a  question  of  Mahometanism simply,  but  of  Mahometanism compounded with the 
peculiar character of a race.'93 For Gladstone, the Muslims of Turkey were not comparable to the 
'gentle Indians’ or the 'Moors of Spain'; they were instead 'the one great anti-human specimen of 
humanity. Wherever they went a broad line of blood marked the track behind them; and as far as 
their  dominion  reached  civilisation  disappeared  from  view.'94 The  increased  racialization  in 
argument was almost immediately noted by contemporaries. Two years after Gladstone's pamphlet, 
90 Quoted in Ian St John, Disraeli and the Art of Victorian Politics (Anthem Press, 2010), 173.
91 An Englishman, The Question of the Day: Turk Or Christian? An Answer to Mr. Gladstone’s Pamphlet; with a 
True Narrative of the Bulgarian Horrors (London: Diprose, Bateman & Company, 1876).
92 Vicky Morrisroe, “‘Eastern History with Western Eyes’: E.A. Freeman, Islam and Orientalism,” Journal of 
Victorian Culture 16, no. 1 (2011): 25–45.
93 Gladstone, Bulgarian Horrors and the Questions of the East, 9.
94 Ibid.
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the orientalist Vambery explored in detail how liberal arguments against the Ottoman Empire had 
changed. Their explanations for the lack in civilization and adaptation to the West were now no 
longer rooted in theological ideas, but racial ones:
Aber, verkünden uns die Herren Freeman und Gladstone, die allerneuesten Widersacher der 
moslemischen  Macht,  nicht  die  Lehre  Mohammeds,  nicht  die  Prinzipien  und  Theorien, 
welche  ihr  entstammen,  sind  die  Ursachen  der  mangelnden  Assimilitationsfähigkeit  der 
Türken ans Abendland, sondern vielmehr ethnische schwerwiegende Gründe, die, weil in 
Fleisch und Blut gedrungen, nicht wegdisputirt werden können.95
Vambery was right and his analysis  confirms what modern historians have described as a shift  
towards more racialized international rhetoric in the 1870s. While civilization and race had been 
connected in racial writings since Gobineau's  Essai sur l'inegalite des races humaines,  the 1870s 
should be seen as the starting point of a racialized civilizational rhetoric that would, as I will show 
in the next chapters, become ever more dominant over the last decades of the century.
Debating the 1877/1878 War and Russia's Mission
The effects  of the debates of what  had quickly become known as the Eastern Crisis,  were not 
limited to the introduction of a more racialized discourse of civilization, but also showed the new 
front lines of international politics more broadly.  It  was Gladstone himself  who quickly had to 
discover the effects of his own civilizational rhetoric, when he asked for  Catholic support for a 
potential international intervention in the Ottoman Empire.96 Given previous pronouncements on the 
civilizational relationship between Russia and Turkey by now leading members of the Catholic 
Church, he was hoping that they would be positively predisposed for a war of civilization against 
Turkey. Gladstone undoubtedly knew about the speeches Newman had given during the Crimean 
War  about  the  way  Russia  as  a  Christian  power  was  spreading  civilization  and  Turkey  was 
impeding it.97 The situation had now changed. Whether it was Gladstone's increasingly racial and 
non-religious  argumentation,  or  general  liberal  antipathy against  the Catholic  Church,  Newman 
95 “Die orientalische Frage als Culturfrage,” in Die Türken in Europa, by James Baker, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Verlag 
von Levy und Müller, 1879), XXIII. 'But do Mister Gladstone and Mister Freeman, the newest adversaries of the 
Muslim power, not proclaim that it is not the teachings of Muhammad, or the principles and theories derived 
from it, which are the root of the Turkish inability to assimilate in the occident; but instead grave ethnic reasons, 
which, because they are part of blood and flesh, cannot be disputed?'
96 For the background to these debates see John P. Rossi, “Catholic Opinion on the Eastern Question, 1876–1878,” 
Church History: Studies in Christianity and Culture 51, no. 01 (1982): 54–70.
97 John Henry Newman, Lectures on the History of the Turks in Its Relation to Christianity (Dublin: James Duffy, 
1854); Jay Newman, “Two Theories of Civilization,” Philosophy 54, no. 210 (1979): 473–83.
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politely declined an invitation to participate in a meeting against Turkish atrocities.98 As Gladstone 
had to find out, opposition to him personally and opposition to a Russian civilizing mission went 
hand in hand. In fact, the same people who had previously been involved in the heated debates 
about his pamphlets on the Vatican decrees now criticized his stance on Russia and civilization in 
no  uncertain  language.  The  conservative  MP  and  Catholic,  Robert  Montagu,  again  attacked 
Gladstone as not being a true Christian and Russian ideas of civilization as pure propaganda:
 
There used to be, in former times, wars for the spread of Christianity; and Christianity meant 
the faithfulness, justice, and mercy of men. Men now are mangled, and cruelly shot down for 
the  cause  of  'humanity';  and  the  ravages  of  war  are  accomplished  for  the  “spread  of 
civilization.”  Civilisation  is  meant  to  mean:  opportunities  for  pleasure,  more  acute 
refinements in enjoyment and more efficacious methods of killing fellow Christians. The real 
aim  of  wars,  hidden  from  the  multitude  under  the  specious  pretexts  of  humanity  and 
civilisation, are the advance of Russian dominion, and of the power of the secret societies,– 
the implacable enemies of the Catholic Church.99
As with the Vatican decrees, this debate had rapidly turned into an international one. The Vatican 
itself, along with German Catholics, started to oppose Russia's civilizational rhetoric, and was in its 
turn criticized as backward by liberals. After papal pronouncements that amounted to tacit support 
for Turkey, the liberal anti-turkish campaigner MacColl saw a new coalition of regression emerge 
and wrote to Gladstone: 'the conduct of the Pope is about as bad as that of the Turkish government 
[and] in some respects worse'.100 It was an opinion shared by German liberals, like Bismarck's son, 
Herbert, who wrote to the state-secretary Bülow: 'Das Bündnis der beiden unfehlbaren Oberhäupter 
ihrer  Confessionen,  des  Sultans  und  des  Papstes,  wäre  an  und  für  sich  ein  logisches  und 
geschichtlich natürliches bei der Gleichheit ihrer Bestrebungen im Kampfe gegen die Entwicklung 
des  menschlichen  Geistes.'101 Catholic  German  papers  responded  in  kind,  arguing  that  Russian 
civilizational rhetoric was merely a cover-up of Slav interests, which German liberals were thereby 
98 Rossi, “Catholic Opinion on the Eastern Question, 1876–1878,” 60–61.
99 Robert Montagu, Foreign Policy: England and the Eastern Question (London: Chapman and Hall, 1877), 127–
128.
100 Rossi, “Catholic Opinion on the Eastern Question, 1876–1878,” 57.
101 Herbert v. Bismarck to Buelow in: O. von Bismarck, Gesammelte Werke. Neue Friedrichsruher Ausgabe (NFA). 
Hrsg. v. K. Canis, L. Gall, K. Hildebrand u. E. Kolb. Abt. 3: 1871-1898. Schriften. Bd. 2: 1874-1876, Nr.410, 599-600. 
'The coalition of the two infallible heads of their religions, the sultan and the pope, would actually be a natural one, 
given their similar struggles against the advancements of the human spirit.'
134
implicitly supporting.102 As Gummer has pointed out, the rhetoric surrounding the Eastern crisis in 
Germany was in many ways a sequel to the Kulturkampf, as the civilizational arguments about the 
Church's  backwardness  were  now  widely  applied  to  the  Ottomans.103 Rhetoric  that  had  been 
conceived  as  part  of  a  liberal  offensive  against  the  Catholic  Church  was  now  employed  in 
international  politics,  where  a  curious  coalition  of  Catholics  and the  Ottoman Empire  opposed 
liberals and Russian civilizational propaganda. 
In April 1877, the Russian Empire attacked Turkey after a series of frustrating talks, and the almost 
year-long conflict that followed inevitably became another war for civilization. Already in 1876, 
critical German writers like Johann Ritcher had argued that a new Russian war in the East would 
logically be justified with civilizational vocabulary: 'Man wird fragen, mit welchem Rechte? – “Mit 
dem Rechte der Menschheit und der Civilisation!”'104 Ritcher was right in that the rhetoric that now 
emanated from the mouths of Russian officials was a truly civilizational one. Fjedor Martens, again 
partly responsible for Russian propaganda, told his German readers: 
Jeder neue Excess des muselmännischen Fanatismus fand in dem Herzen des russischen 
Volkes einen Wiederhall. Konnte unter solchen Umständen das Ziel der russischen Politik 
ein anderes sein, als das, den Interessen der Humanität und Civilisation, und der nationalen 
Sympathien für die Glaubensgenossen, jenseits des Balkans zugleich zu dienen?'105
While German liberals  were positively predisposed, others had decidedly negative opinions and 
criticized  the  Russian  attack  in  the  name  of  civilization  as  a  farce.  The  Hungarian  journalist, 
Maljath, presumably spoke for many of his compatriots when he sarcastically described the new 
Russian  attack  on  the  Ottoman  Empire  in  his  Historische  Spaziergänge  auf  dem  Felde  
moskowitischer  Culturbestrebungen: 'Zum  so  und  so  vielten  Male'  […]  waelzen  sich  die 
bewaffneten Horden des Nordens über die Grenzen des osmanischen Reiches, damit sie […] ein so 
Gott  wie  den  Menschen  wohlgefaelliges  Werk  der  Civilisation,  Cultur  und  guter  Sitte 
102 “Europa Und Das Trauerspiel Im Türkischen Reich IV,” in Historisch-Politisch Blätter Für Das Katholische 
Deutschland (Munich: In Commission der Literarisch-artistischen Anstalt, 1876), 957–958.
103 S.Chase Gummer, “The Politics of Sympathy: German Turcophilism and the Ottoman Empire in the Age of the 
Mass Media 1871-1914” (PhD diss., Georgetown, 2011), 160–162.
104 Johann. Ritcher, Die produktive Politik; gesammelte Zeitfragen (Bodenbach: M. Stopp, 1876), 16. 'One will ask: 
with which right? “With the right of civilization and humanity”'.
105 Fedor Fedorovich Martens, Die russische Politik in der orientalischen Frage. Eine historische Studie 
(St.Petersburg: Verlag der Kaiserlichen Hofbuchhandlung H. Schmitzdorff (C. Röttger), 1877), 23. 'Every new 
excess of Muslim fanaticism found its echo in the heart of the Russian people. Could, in these circumstances, the 
policy of Russia be another one than to simultaneously serve the interests of humanity, civilization and the 
national sympathies of their co-religionists in the Balkans?'
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vollbringen.'106
Not only the reason for the Russian intervention was described as one of civilization, as the Tsar 
and Martens wanted to use the campaign of 1877 and the fighting itself to show Russia's civilized 
nature and its status as a civilized country. Russian officials, as Holquist has shown, vowed to stick 
to the rules of civilized warfare advocated by the Tsar since the 1860s, and to present the conflict as  
a war between a civilized and an uncivilized country.107 The conflict was watched by liberals all 
over Europe, but with specific interest by men like Bluntschli, who commented on the war in the 
periodical  Die  Gegenwart  and  found  Russian  claims  to  civilization  convincing.  Although  he 
admitted that Russia too had troops of dubious civilizational pedigree, it was clearly more advanced 
than Turkey:
  
unter  den  Russen  dienen  einige  Stämme  von  sehr  geringer  Cultur  denen  man  nur  eine 
ungenügende Kenntnis unserer civilisierten Rechtsbegriffe und kaum eine Achtung und vor 
den unverständlichen  Rechtsgeboten  zuschreiben kann.'  Weit  schlimmer  steht  es  auf  der 
türkischen Seite, da sind die halbwilden und barbarischen Stämme ohne europäische Cultur 
viel  zahlreicher  vertreten,  die  Disziplin  in  der  Armee  lockerer  und  unsicherer  und  die 
kriegerischen Traditionen grausamer und wilder.108
Although  some  in  the  military  disagreed,  British  liberals  broadly  subscribed  to  Bluntschli's 
interpretations and also saw Russia as emerging as the more civilized of the two powers. 109 As the 
journalist  and writer  Goldwin Smith put it:  'Though war is  always ferocious and always heart-
rending, the soldiers of Russia maintain, by their comparative humanity, the claim of their country 
to a superior civilization.' The differences between the Turks and Russians was one of discipline, as 
106 Kálmán József Majláth, Historische Spaziergänge auf dem Felde moskowitischer Culturbestrebungen von 
Colomann Josef Graf Majláth (Vienna: Druck und Verlag von H.Gresser, 1877), 5. 'Historical walks on the field 
of Moscovite civilizational intentions'. 'And one more time, the armed hordes of the North push over the borders 
of the Ottoman Empire, to fulfil their task, in the name of God, civilization, culture and humanity'.
107 Peter Holquist, “The Russian Empire as a ‘Civilized State’: International Law as Principle and Practice in 
Imperial Russia, 1874-1878,” Title VIII Program (Washington D.C.: The National Council for Eurasian and East 
European Research, 2004).
108 Johann Caspar Bluntschli, “Das Kriegsvölkerrecht in dem russisch-türkischen Kriege,” Die Gegenwart 23, no. 
11 (1877): 357. 'Amongst the Russians, there are a couple of relatively uncultured tribes, which cannot be made 
responsible for not knowing the concepts of civilized law or to have any appreciation of its, for them, 
incomprehensible demands. Much worse, however, is the Turkish side, where half-wild and barbarian tribes 
without European culture are much more frequent., the discipline in the army is much laxer and uncertain, and 
the traditions of war more cruel and brutal'.
109 Maureen P. O’Connor, “The Vision of Soldiers: Britain, France, Germany and the United States Observe the 
Russo-Turkish War,” War in History 4, no. 3 (1997): 264–95.
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he added: 'It is certain that they habitually give quarter, and respect the general laws of war; while 
Europe  has  had  to  remonstrate  with  the  Turks  on  their  flagrant  breaches  of  the  Geneva 
convention.'110 Similarly, the Duke of Argyll, former Secretary of State for India, concluded that: 
The civilisation of Russia is indeed far behind our own. But it is two centuries at least in 
advance of the civilisation of Turkey […] Those who read the accounts from all sides, which 
have been furnished by Mr. Layard, and who remember as an absolute rule that nothing is to  
be believed except  such facts  that  are  vouched for by the direct  or indirect  evidence of 
European witnesses, will have no difficulty in making up their minds as to which of the two 
parties was the most savage throughout the contest.111
The official Russian policy of an almost aggressive rhetoric of civilization during the war itself 
clearly paid off, as the liberal British public deemed Russia to be, if not fully civilized, certainly 
more so than Turkey, an interpretation that had fundamentally changed in the two decades since the 
Crimean War, when Turkey was still heralded as an exemplary liberal state.
While  Russian  civilizational  propaganda  was  highly  successful  in  liberal  circles,  because  it 
addressed old liberal concerns, Russia's elite arguably also profited from the general international 
shift  that  the finalization of the processes of national  unification had brought  about  in  western 
Europe. In a process that Gummer has traced in more detail, Bismarck's liberal coalition partners 
were increasingly expressing the wish to have a German foreign policy guided by independence and 
an  equidistant  relationship  with  Russia  and  the  western  powers.  As  the  nationalist  historian 
Treitschke would sum up their position: 
das alte Märchen, dass die Westmächte als die alleinigen Vertreter der Civilisation darstellte, 
ist von der liberalen Welt zu lange nachgesprochen worden, als dass der selbstgefällige Wahn 
rasch  wieder  verschwinden  könnte  [...]  seit  den  Niederlagen  der  Franzosen  und  dem 
selbstverschuldeten  tiefen  Sinken  wird  die  gerühmte  Civilisation  der  Westmaechte  ohne 
überschwaengliche Bewunderung gewürdigt;  und seit  dem wir in  einem wohlgesicherten 
nationalen  Staate  wohnen,  fassen  wir  uns  das  Herz  die  polnisch-französische  Brille 
wegzuwerfen und betrachten endlich mit den deutschen Augen das Nachbarreich, das seit 
110 Goldwin Smith, “The Slaveowner and the Turk,” in Current Discussion. A Collection from the Chief English 
Essays on Questions of the Time, ed. Edward L. Burlingame, vol. 1. International Politics (New York: 
G.P.Putnam’s Sons, 1878), 264.
111 George Douglas Campbell Argyll, The Eastern Question from the Treaty of Paris 1856 to the Treaty of Berlin 
1878, and to the Second Afghan War, vol. 2 (London: Strahan & Company Limited, 1879), 43–44.
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Jahrzehnten unser treuer Verbündeter ist.112
In German debates, liberals had therefore at least two reasons to support Russia. Those who, like 
their English colleagues, were convinced by Russian claims to a liberal civilization could support 
them just as much as those who sought to move Germany away from the western powers and into a 
more independent position.
The  fault-lines  of  these  foreign  policy  debates  would  show  in  the  Reichstag  in  1878,  where 
Germany's stance towards the war was first openly discussed.113 It was an unusual debate, as the 
Reichstag  had  very  little  say  on  the  issue  of  foreign  which  remained  the  prerogative  of  the 
chancellor. Nonetheless, the clear separation of German politics into two camps was immediately 
visible. The liberal Bennigsen spoke first, in support of Bismarck's policies. Then Bismarck himself 
explained why Germany was to remain neutral on the oriental question and how his policy of an 
honest broker was in the best interest of Germany. Following Bismarck, one liberal after another  
defended this position. Most argued that Germany needed to stay out of a larger war to prove to the 
rest of the world that they meant no harm, also not to upset Russia which had, after all,  by its  
neutrality towards the Franco-Prussian war set a precedent of non-intervention. 
The tone of the opposition was an entirely different one and the curious coalition that opposed 
Bismarckian and liberal foreign policy started to show. The Catholic representative Windthorst, 
accused the liberals of following Bismarck wherever he went, and questioned whether Germany 
could really remain neutral to the big changes in the world.114 He argued that although Russia had 
attacked under the guise of 'humanistischer Ideen', its brutality was obvious to everyone. One of the 
Polish representatives continued by talking about the brutalities of Russia,  arguing that it  acted 
'unter dem Deckmantel zivilisatorischer Ideen', but had always been, in reality, a despotic power. 
Liebknecht spoke last, accusing Russia of hypocrisy, of enslaving the Poles and at the same time 
pretending  to  be  the  power  for  good  in  the  East.  Russia's  politics  was  a  'Verbrechen  an  der 
Menschheit', and the theories of international law currently proposed in Europe needed a thorough 
112 Heinrich von Treitschke, Zehn Jahre deutscher Kämpfe. (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1879), 594. 'the old fairy-tale, that 
presented the western powers as the only representatives of civilization has been repeated by the liberal world for 
too long for this self-indulgent craziness to disappear any time soon (…) but since the defeats of France and its 
self-induced sinking, the famous civilization of the western powers is lauded without great admiration; since we 
live in a safe national state, we have taken the great step to throw away the polish-french glasses and to look, 
with german eyes, at this neighbourly power, which has been our ally for so long.'
113 Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstags. 3.Legislaturperiode II. Session 
1878. Von der Eroeffnungsitzung am 6. Februar bus zur dreissigsten Sitzung am 6 April 1878, vol. 1 (Berlin: 
Verlag der Buchdruckerei der “Norddeutschen Allgemeinen Zeitung,” 1878).
114 Ibid., 1:102.
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re-evaluation,  and  Liebknecht  demanded  that  ‘auf  einer  anderen  besseren  Grundlage  das 
europäische Staatensystem wieder aufgebaut wird.’115
The response from the government was short, as Bismarck only mocked the unlikely coalition of 
Poles, Catholics and Socialists, but the liberal representative Hellwald showed how deep the rifts of  
foreign  policy  affected  domestic  German  politics,  in  the  last  speech  of  the  day.  Referring  to 
Liebknecht he added:
Wir haben keine Ursache den geringsten Zweifel daran zu hegen dass die kräftige Hand 
welche bisher die Außenpolitik gelenkt hat auch hier das richtige finden werde. Nur eins 
möchte  ich  dem  letzten  Vorredner  gegenüber  noch  bemerken  Er  hat  viel  von  der 
zivilisatorischen  Mission  und  der  Kulturaufgabe  seiner  Partei  gesprochen.  Ich  möchte 
glauben dass eine Vergleichung der zivilisatorischen Mission Russlands für eine lange Reihe 
von Völkern und der zivilisatorischen Mission der Sozialdemokratie möglicherweise sehr zu 
Ungunsten der letzteren ausfallen möchte.116
As the 1870s drew to a close, larger European debates about civilization had arguably taken on a 
new form. The early 1870s had still widely featured many of the tropes that had also dominated the 
1860s, yet by 1878 the discussions about civilization were no more concerned with Europe, but 
with the globe in its entirety. The domestic enmities, which had structured the politics of nationality 
were, to a certain extent, still intact, as the Catholic Church opposed not just European liberals, but 
even Russia's international intervention, associated with international liberalism. Other coalitions, 
however,  had  broken.  As  Russian  politicians  were  wholeheartedly  embracing  the  rhetoric  of 
civilization, the Ottoman Empire had ostensibly failed to live up to the hopes European liberals had 
placed in it since the mid-nineteenth century.  Russia was the new leader in civilization, and its  
mission, as Hellwald's statement showed, could even be favourably compared to the aspirations of 
those questioning this international liberalism, like the German social democrats. As I will show in 
115 Ibid., 1:114. 'Crime against Humanity'. 'that the European state system will be constructed anew on a different 
and better basis.'
116 Stenographische Berichte Über Die Verhandlungen Des Deutschen Reichstags. 3.Legislaturperiode II. Session 
1878. Von Der Eroeffnungsitzung Am 6. Februar Bus Zur Dreissigsten Sitzung Am 6 April 1878, 1:115. 'We have 
no reason to believe that the strong hand which has until now guided our foreign policy will now too find the 
right decisions. But I still have something to say to the preceding speaker. He has spoken much about the 
civilizational mission and the cultural tasks of his party. I think, however, that the a comparison between Russia's 
civilizing mission to some many peoples and the mission of the social democratic party will not be a positive one 
for his side.'
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the next chapter,  international ideas of liberalism soon found a new target in the Scramble for 
Africa, which was also fervently opposed by those who did not agree with the liberal missions. 
Throughout the 1880s the civilizational language of liberalism, which had acquired an international 
character during the 1870s, started to be ever more heavily criticized, and slowly declined.
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Chapter 5. Spreading and Questioning Civilization (1880s) 
Introduction
The roots of a new wave of European colonization that would later become known as the Scramble 
for Africa lay in  the mid-1870s.1 'The disease of  Afromania',  as  the imperial  historian John S. 
Galbraith would later call it, had started to grip larger sections of the European public, and in 1876 
most of those interested in Africa descended upon Brussels to participate in a large conference 
dedicated to its exploration and civilization.2 Over the next decade, which would culminate in an 
even larger conference at the German capital, civilizational rhetoric was seemingly everywhere, and 
it was finally formally inscribed in the sixth article of the general act of the conference of Berlin. 
The article declared, in very clear language, that the signatory powers should bring home to the 
natives 'the blessings of civilization'. Needless to say, the Berlin conference has since then become 
seen as epitomizing European ideas of superiority, and an apparently unanimous stance towards 
civilization and colonization. Indeed, even such a critical voice as Carl Schmitt has argued that the 
general act of the conference should be seen as ‘a remarkable final document of the continuing 
belief in civilization, progress and free trade’.3 In the literature on civilization and colonization, the 
Berlin conference takes a special place, embodying what seem to be the main values of European 
international politics in the last third of the century.
As I will  demonstrate, most of these accounts overlook the complicated landscape of European 
debates on colonization, and the immense disputes over civilization they were intrinsically linked 
to.  The  apparent  connections  between  colonialism  and  civilization,  that  colonial  agitators  had 
started to tout from the mid-1870s, were often heavily criticized by their contemporaries. It was not  
unusual for those who doubted the economic benefits of colonization to also question the claims of 
its civilizational impact, often with direct reference to the atrocities of the Americas in the sixteenth 
and  seventeenth  century.  Large-scale  economic  depression  and  the  often  negative  impact  of 
industrialization on the working populations of Europe led many in the early 1880s not only to 
question whether civilization should be exported, but to ask whether it was a good in itself. They 
saw modern civilization as destroying the countryside – a point romantics had been making since 
the early nineteenth century – and held it responsible for rising rates of insanity and the spread of 
1 Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau, “Introduction: A Missing Link? The Significance of the 1780s–1880s,” in From 
Slave Trade to Empire Europe and the Colonisation of Black Africa 1780s–1880s, ed. Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 1–18.
2 John S. Galbraith, “Gordon, Mackinnon, and Leopold: The Scramble for Africa, 1876-84,” Victorian Studies 14, 
no. 4 (1971): 369.
3 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europäum (New York: Telos 
Press Publishing, 2003), 216.
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what many in Germany would soon call Zivilisationskrankheiten.4 
While such debates gripped predominantly left-leaning politicians and thinkers of the early 1880s, 
on  an  international  political  level,  disputes  over  who  was  entitled  to  bring  civilization,  which 
dominated debates about Asia (see the previous chapter) continued. It was one of these disputes 
between Portugal and Britain, I argue, that sparked the process leading to the conference of Berlin. 
In other words, it was dispute over civilization, rather than unanimity that should be seen as the 
origin of the Congo Conference. Finally, as I show in the last section, dealing directly with the 
conference  protocols,  European  conceptions  of  civilization  and  its  link  to  Christianity  were 
contested by the Ottoman Empire during the final negotiations. The results of this intervention, 
which stressed the civilizing effects of Islam, can be seen in the surprisingly secular formulation of 
Article VI that allowed for the protection of all civilizing agencies 'without distinction of creed or 
nation'.  I  do not  dispute to  what  extent  the negotiations  of  1884/1885 ignored and disregarded 
indigenous concerns, as well as the impact it had on the development of African history. Rather, I  
hope  to  explore  the  intellectual  landscape  that  gave  rise  to  this  document.  The  debates  on 
civilization that preceded it are riddled with complexity, and any uni-dimensional perspective on it 
does it a historical disservice.
A New European Debate on Civilization
The beginnings of the large-scale European colonization of Africa in the nineteenth century can be 
dated with surprising exactness. As the organizers of the Brussels geographic conference in 1876 
remembered:
Vers la fin de l'année 1876, il s'était manifesté, dans les courants généraux de l'opinion un 
mouvement  marqué  vers  l'Afrique  […]  ce  continent  lui-même,  attaqué  d'après  un  plan 
systématique  sur  les  points  essentiels,  pourrait-il  garder  plus  longtemps  ses  secrets  et 
demeurer étranger au bienfaits de la civilisation?5
Leopold enthusiastically greeted the various explorers 'dont j'ai suivi depuis des années les travaux 
et les valeureux efforts en faveur de la civilisation.' He insisted that civilization had made him bring 
all of them together: 
4 'diseases of civilization'.
5 L’Association internationale africaine et le Comité d’études du Haut-Congo. Travaux et résultats de décembre 
1877 à octobre 1882 par un de leurs coopérateurs (Bruxelles: Institut Nationale de Geographie, 1882), 6–7.
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Le sujet qui nous réunit aujourd'hui est de ceux qui méritent au premier chef d'occuper les 
amis de l'humanité. Ouvrir à la civilisation la seule partie de notre globe où elle n'ait point 
encore pénétré, percer les ténèbres qui enveloppent des populations entières, c'est, j'ose le 
dire, une croisade digne de ce siècle de progrès.6
For Leopold, the congress was a remarkable success. In its wake all over Europe geographical and 
colonial organizations were set up dedicated to the civilization of Africa, and that notable explorers 
and  politicians  came  together  in  national  committees  lauding  Leopold's  benevolent  spirit  and 
service to civilization.
Despite such high-flying rhetoric, the impact of Leopold's ideas on international politics was limited 
until  elite  circles  in  countries  like  France  and  Germany  started  to  espouse  such  civilizational 
projects as national ones. Leopold's organizations had been founded in 1876 and the  Portuguese 
government  started  so-called  'public  works  expeditions'  into  Africa  in  1877.  For  France  and 
Germany, it is the year 1878 that can be seen as the real start of a new era of colonization.7 As 
Conklin has argued, by 1878 the French 'republican leadership began to accept the argument that for 
political and economic reasons France should begin asserting itself overseas.'8 Although German 
elites  took  a  little  longer  to  be  convinced,  contemporary  German  papers  and  journals  noted  a 
distinctive shift in rhetoric around the same time.  As the  Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und 
Statistik, put it in 1882: 'Mit dem Jahre 1878 beginnt in der deutschen Literatur über Auswanderung 
und Colonisation eine zweite Periode'.9 It was a second period, because German liberals had briefly 
and  inconsequentially  flirted  with  imperialism  in  the  late  1840s.  Since  then,  as  the  Deutsche 
Rundschau equally noted in 1882, 'ist nichts in dieser Frage geschehen.'10
Despite a recent historiographical trend that asserted the continuities between this early period of 
colonial agitation and later German colonial projects, we need to be careful not to overestimate the 
6 Leopold II., “Discours prononcé par le roi à l’ouverture de la conférence.,” in L’Afrique et la Conférence 
géographique de Bruxelles, ed. Émile Théodore Joseph Hubert Banning, 2nd ed. (Brussels: Librairie européenne 
C. Muquardt, 1878), 185.
7 Alexandre Valentim, “The Portuguese Empire, 1825–90: Ideology and Economics,” in From Slave Trade to 
Empire Europe and the Colonisation of Black Africa 1780s–1880s, ed. Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2004), 120.
8 Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 13.
9 Ernst Hasse, “Auswanderung Und Kolonisation,” Jahrbücher Für Nationalökonomie Und Statistik / Journal of 
Economics and Statistics 4 (38), no. 3/4 (1882): 308. 'With the year 1878, a second period starts in the German 
literature on emigration and colonization'.
10 “Deutsche Colonisation I,” Deutsche Rundschau 31, no. 1 (1882): 39–40. 'nothing has happened regarding this 
question.'
143
similarities of historically very different periods, especially concerning the concept of civilization.11 
While  colonial  debates of the 1840s and 1850s are  indeed predecessors of the agitation of the 
1870s, the rhetoric with which such projects were advanced and defended was an entirely different 
one. The idea of civilizing the rest of the globe was mostly absent in German debates of the mid-
century mainly concerned with overpopulation and emigration.  This is not to suggest that such 
language only started to exist in the 1870s: men like Friedrich Fabri had, a decade earlier, argued 
that Germans had a duty to civilization and an obligation to expand, but in contrast to ten years 
later, nobody had listened to them. As Fabri put it in the fateful year 1866: 'Kolonialbesitz' was part 
of  the  'zivilisatorischen  Aufgabe  der  germanischen  Völker'.12 Yet,  in  the  year  of  the  German 
Bruderkrieg understandably few were interested in expanding a non-existent empire over-seas. By 
1878, times had changed. Germany had become a continental power in its own right, and the main 
crises of the 1870s were a thing of the past. In 1878, with the Treaty of Berlin, the Eastern Crisis  
had found a provisional conclusion, with the death of Pius IX and the new conciliatory stance of 
Leo XIII, the Kulturkampf had ended, and the German chapters of Leopold's organization advocated 
new duties of civilization abroad. Domestically, too, German politics had changed. In an ongoing 
financial  crisis  and  continuously  poor  election  results  of  the  chancellor's  long-term allies,  the 
Nationalliberale,  Bismarck was now leading a coalition of conservatives and the  Zentrum. While 
the Nationalliberale had argued for free trade, Bismarck's new coalition partners were more open to 
protectionist policies. With them, the subject of colonial expansion, anathema with the liberals, was 
back on the agenda. 
It was in this entirely new political climate that Fabri's next publication  Bedarf Deutschland der  
Colonien became a surprising bestseller. His advocacy of 'zivilisatorischer Aufgaben' that tied in 
with the demands of Germany's geographical organizations, gained both other apostles as well as a 
larger following.13 Fabri and his allies described colonial expansion and the spread of civilization 
not only as a panacea to the economic problems that plagued Germany, but also as an important 
project  for  humanity,  in  which  the  young nation should have  a  part.  In  his  introduction,  Fabri 
directly referred to the 'Zeiten der Nothstände und des Druckes' that Germany found itself in and 
11 Susanne Zantop, Kolonialphantasien im vorkolonialen Deutschland (1770-1870) (Erich Schmidt Verlag GmbH 
& Co KG, 1999); Brian Vick, “Imperialism, Race, and Genocide at the Paulskirche. Origins, Meanings 
Trajectories,” in German Colonialism and National Debate, ed. Michael Perraudin and Jürgen Zimmerer (New 
York and London: Routledge, 2011), 9–20; Matthew P. Fitzpatrick, Liberal Imperialism in Germany: 
Expansionism and Nationalism, 1848-1884 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008).
12 Klaus J. Bade, Friedrich Fabri und der Imperialismus in der Bismarckzeit Revolution – Depression – Expansion 
(Freiburg i. Breisgau: Atlantis, 1975), 101. 'colonial possessions'. 'the civilizing task of the Germanic peoples'.
13 Friedrich Fabri, Bedarf Deutschland der Colonien?: eine politisch-oekonomische Betrachtung (Gotha: Perthes, 
1879). Ibid.
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that  it  was  time  'nach neuen Aufgaben […] sich  auszustrecken'.14 Primarily,  the  acquisition  of 
colonies  would  be  a  solution  to  economic  problems,  alleviating  the  dilemma  of  Germany's 
overpopulation as well as opening new markets for German products. It would also give a moral  
purpose to the newly-founded German state. 'Gewichtiger noch freilich ist die Erwägung', Fabri 
argued, 'dass ein Volk, das auf die Höhe politischer Machtentwicklung geführt ist,  nur so lange 
seine geschichtliche Stellung mit Erfolg behaupten kann, als es sich als Träger einer Cultur-Mission 
erkennt und beweist.'15 
Fabri's ideas were quickly taken up by others similarly predisposed, like the traveller, writer and 
later  theosophist  Hübbe-Schleiden.  While  Germany  had  previously  not  been  more  than  a 
geographic expression, Hübbe-Schleiden claimed in several successful publications and speeches, it 
now had to project its positive national power overseas. This was a natural progression, he argued in 
his Überseeische Politik: 'Seitdem wir jetzt aber als Nation reif und stark geworden sind wird auch 
die Entfaltung unserer nationalen Kräfte ihren normalen Fortgang nehmen.'16 As Fabri and Hübbe-
Schleiden stressed in unison, this national project was nonetheless to be embedded in the progress 
of humanity as a whole:
Wie  die  ganze  Menschheit  continuirlich  dem  Ideale  der  Cultur,  einer  organischen 
Entwicklung der Civilisation zustrebt, so muss auch jede Nation, welche ein lebensfähiges 
Glied  dieses  Menschengeschlechtes  bleiben  will,  sich  an  diesem  gemeinsamen  Streben 
beteiligen. Wer an dem Werden der Civilisation nicht Antheil nimmt, und selbst neue Formen 
schafft, dessen eigene Gestaltung muss nach übereinstimmenden Gesetzen der Natur und der 
Cultur unrettbar zugrunde gehen.17
It was a curious mix of competition and cooperation the agitators for colonization and civilization 
in Germany advocated. They were not alone. The civilizational language of cooperation previously 
propagated by Russia was now truly global.  Hübbe-Schleiden asserted that to his chagrin: 'Das 
Prestige  der  Civilisation  war  […]  angelsächsisch  geworden',  and  simultaneously  saw the  three 
14 Fabri, Bedarf Deutschland der Colonien?: eine politisch-oekonomische Betrachtung, III. 'Times of difficulties 
and of pressure', 'stretch to reach new tasks'.
15 Ibid., 111.
16 Wilhelm Hübbe-Schleiden, Überseeische Politik, eine culturwissenschaftliche Studie mit Zahlenbildern 
(Hamburg: L.Friederichsen & Co., 1881), 111. 'Since we have become mature and strong as a nation, the 
development of our national power will take its normal path'.
17 Ibid., 129–130. 'Just as humanity continuously strives towards the ideal of culture, an organic development of 
civilization, every nation, which wants to remain a functioning link in the chain will have to participate in this 
endeavour. Those who do not take part in this development of civilization, and create their own forms, will, 
according to the laws of nature and of culture, die away'
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Germanic  powers,  England,  Germany  and  the  US  (sic)  as  the  most  important  bringers  of 
civilization.18 Such feelings  were reciprocated in  these 'Germanic countries'.  The President  and 
founder  of  Cornell  University,  Andrew  D.  White,  for  example,  saw  Germany  and  the  US 
dominating the century in the name of civilization and hoped:
that  each may regard the other  as a steadfast  ally in the great effort  to move the world 
forward toward higher views of right and duty and toward nobler conceptions of civilization. 
Well may we say with one of the truest souls ever given by the old world to the new: “God 
bless Germany! The future history of mankind and humanity stand in need of her!”19 
In Britain, although ferocious competition for resources had started on the ground, medals were 
given  to  German  explorers  of  Africa  like  Nachtigal,  and  the  German  ambassador  Münster-
Ledenburg  who  received  them  in  his  stead  continued  to  emphasize  the  spirit  of  cooperation 
necessary for those wanting to spread civilization: 'Er schloss mit dem Wunsche, dass, wo immer 
Christenthum  und  Civilisation  in  fernen  und  bisher  barbarischen  Gegenden  verbreitet  würde, 
Engländer und Deutsche stets Seite an Seite neben einander stehen mögen.'20  
 
Reading Fabri's and Hübbe-Schleiden's contributions and seeing the later colonial development of 
Germany, it  is all  too easy to assume that these opinions were widely shared. On the contrary,  
especially amongst liberals, these renewed propositions of colonization and their alleged connection 
to  civilization  were often  not  well  received.  At  the  congress  of  German economists  (Kongress 
deutscher Volkswirthe), a liberal stronghold violently opposed to Bismarck's new tariff politics, the 
newest colonizing tendencies were debated in October 1880.21 Two members from Berlin, Friedrich 
Kapp and F. C. Phillipson, proposed a resolution condemning Fabri's and Hübbe-Schleiden's plans. 
In no uncertain terms, they argued that the congress should distance itself from ideas previously 
propagated by their liberal ancestors. 'Die Colonisation ist [...] ein Anachronismus', the proposition 
read,  which  had had its  place  in  the  debates  of  the  1840s,  but  not  in  a  new Germany.22 This 
refutation was not just based on economic arguments, indeed it went back to old Sallustian tropes of 
moral degradation and corruption. Fabri's and Hübbe-Schleiden's colonial propaganda relied on the 
18 Ibid., 5, 70. 'The prestige of civilization has become Anglo-Saxon'
19 Andrew Dickson White, “The New Germany,” Bulletin of the American Geographical Society 4 (1882): 258.The 
quotation itself is from a letter of Lieber to Holtzendorff 
20 Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin., “Vermischte Nachrichten,” Verhandlungen der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde 
zu Berlin. 9 (1882): 350.
21 M. Broemel, ed., Bericht über die Verhandlungen des neunzehnten Kongresses deutscher Volkswirte in Berlin 
am 21., 22., und 23. Oktober 1880 (Berlin: Verlag Leonard Simion, 1880).
22 'Colonisation is an anachronism'.
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link between civilizational and economic concerns, and Kapp equally engaged with it in the speech 
explaining his resolution: 
Die  Spanier  haben,  wie  sie  wissen,  nach  der  Entdeckung  Amerikas  Handelskolonien 
angelegt,  Gold  gesucht,  mit  Priestern  und  Bluthunden  ihre  sogenannte  Civilisation  den 
Indianern aufzudrängen versucht und Negersklaven importirt, um die Colonien moeglichst 
auszubeuten, und sie sind schliesslich darüber verarmt.23
The moral of this harrowing story for Germany's colonizers, Kapp thought, was obvious. Not only 
was colonization unprofitable, its civilizational impact was dubious. The majority of the economists 
present  agreed,  and  the  resolution  condemning  potential  German  colonization  passed,  as  the 
protocol noted, with 'great majority'.24
Outside of the Kongress deutscher Volkswirthe, the debate about colonization and its civilizational 
impact continued unabated in newspapers and independent publications. Some, like the traveller 
Paulitschke, were naively optimistic that the 'Verwirklichung eines der grossartigsten Gedanken des 
19. Jahrhunderts'  the 'Entdeckung und Civilisation Afrikas'  would peacefully go ahead, whereas 
most anticipated at least some form of violence.25 There were hardliners like the liberal Russian 
expert  Ernst  von  der  Brüggen,  who  argued  that  the  European  conquest  of  the  world  was  an 
undisputable  fact,  and  'es  wäre  höchst  sentimentale  Schwäche,  diese  Thatsache  als  eine 
unberechtigte  Vergewaltigung  anderer  Völker  zu  bedauern.'26 At  the  same  time,  most  were 
ambivalent. The famous African explorer Pechuel-Lösche told the  Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu  
Berlin in 1884: 'Handel, Colonisation, Civilisation in Afrika sind Schlagworte geworden die mehr 
als je zuvor die Gemüther erregen.'27 He questioned whether the spread of civilization was really the 
right word to describe what was currently going on in Africa: 'Die Auffassung der Vorgangs kann 
eine  sehr  verschiedene sein,  muss  es  sein,  je  nachdem die  verlierende oder  gewinnende Partei 
23 Ibid., 123. The Spanish have, as you know, after the discovery of the Americas, constructed commercial 
colonies, looked for gold, with priests and bloodhounds spread their so-called civilization amongst the Indians, 
imported negro-slaves to exploit the colony to the fullest, and they have become, because of all of this, 
impoverished'.
24 Ibid., 147.
25 Philipp Viktor Paulitschke, Die geographische Erforschung des afrikanischen Continents von den áltesten Zeiten  
bis auf unsere Tage, 2nd ed. (Vienna: Brockhausen & Braeuer, 1880), VIII. 'the realization of the greatest idea of 
the nineteenth century, the discovery and civilization of Africa'.
26 van der Brueggen, “Auswanderung, Kolonisation und Zweikindersystem,” Preussische Jahrbücher 49, no. 3 
(1882): 295.
27 Eduard Pechuël-Loesche, “Congoforschung und die Congofrage,” in Verhandlungen der Gesellschaft für 
Erdkunde zu Berlin., ed. Paul Guessfeldt, vol. 11 (Berlin: Verlag von Dietrich Reimer, 1884), 202. 'Commerce, 
colonization, and civilization have become catch-words, which more than ever before agitate the population'.
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urtheilt;  aber  “Verbreitung  der  Civilisation”  wäre  doch  der  letzte  Ausdruck  den  man  darauf 
anwenden könnte.28
In the pamphlets and books published for a wider German public, the negative history of previous 
colonization and its  alleged connection to  civilization were most  fervently criticized.  Critics  of 
colonization  like  H.Loehnis  argued  against  those  who  attempted  to  portray  the  new  wave  of 
colonization as akin to  the conquest  of the Americas  and therefore positive: 'Alle diese Kriege 
waren grausam und blutig, meist ungerecht gegen die Eingeborenen, und wer sie im Namen der 
Civilisation rechtfertigt, darf nicht verschweigen, dass diese mit höchst uncivilisierten Mitteln ihr 
Reich in  Amerika gründete.'29 The famous Protestant  theologian Thiersch saw it  similarly:  'Die 
sogenannte Civilisation hat jenen unglücklichen Stämmen mehr Verderben als Segen gebracht.'30 
Even Emil Deckert, professor of geography and firm believer in the civilizing mission, argued in his 
book  Die civilisatorische Mission der Europäer unter den wilden Völkern  that Europe's previous 
record did not look positive.  Europeans had acted despicably,  burnt  villages and traded slaves: 
'Nachtseiten  und  Laster  der  Civilisation  brachten  wir  den  wilden  Menschen  viele,  Segnungen 
wenige'.31
The Critique of Civilization Itself
The emphasis on 'Nachtseiten und Laster der Civilisation' was a common feature of European in the 
late 1870s and early 1880s, as many liberals and conservatives alike started to question previous 
optimistic ideas of a continuous rise in civilization. In 1878, as the new debate on colonization and 
civilization started to gain traction all over Europe, the famous Scottish physician Arthur Mitchell 
addressed his students at  Edinburgh in a lecture entitled 'What is  Civilization?'32 Nobody could 
really know, Mitchell asserted, because: 'We use it familiarly, as a word well understood; but, in 
reality, we do not attach to it any precise meaning. Both general talk about it, and reference to books 
which treat of it, show that our views towards its nature are very indefinite.'33 Although Mitchell 
28 Ibid., 207. 'The interpretation of this process can take very different forms, has to take different forms, depending 
on whether the winning or the losing party is judging. But “spreading civilization” is really the last expression 
one could apply'.
29 H. Loehnis, Die europäischen Kolonieen: Beiträge zur Kritik der deutschen Kolonialprojekte (Bonn: Emil 
Strauss, 1881), 21. 'All of these wars were cruel and bloody and generally unjust against the native populations, 
and who justifies them in the name of civilization should not deny that this civilization was founded with 
uncivilized means in America.' 'Of the negative influences and of the vices of civilization, we brought many to 
the savages, of the blessings, few.'
30 Heinrich W.J. Thiersch, Ursprung und Entwicklung der Colonieen in Nordamerica. 1496-1776 (Augsburg: 
Verlag von Richard Preyss, 1880), 15. 'The so-called civilization has brought these tribes more misery than bliss.'
31 Emil Deckert, Die civilisatorische Mission der Europaer unter den wilden Völkern (Berlin: Verlag von Carl 
Habel, 1881), 28–30. 'Dark sides and vices of civilization we brought the savages many, of blessing very few'.
32 Arthur Mitchell, The Past in the Present. What Is Civilization? (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1881), 181–197.
33 Ibid., 181.
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was  merely  unsure  about  the  definition  of  civilization,  others  started  to  criticize  old  liberal 
conceptions of civilization more broadly. The Cambridge professor J. R. Seeley, widely considered 
a pro-colonial  scholar,  nonetheless had a distinctly negative opinion of the connection between 
civilization  and colonization.  In  the beginning of  a  lecture to  first  year  undergraduates,  Seeley 
attacked the whole notion of civilization:  
It is a very fair sample of bad philosophizing, this theory of civilisation. You have to explain 
a large mass of phenomena, about which you do not even know that they are of the same 
kind – but they happen to come into view at the same time -; what do you do but fling over 
the whole mass a word, which holds them together like a net. You carefully avoid defining 
this word, but in speaking of it you use metaphors which imply that it denotes a living force 
of unknown, unlimited properties, so that a mere reference to it is enough to explain the most 
wonderful, the most dissimilar effects. It was used to explain a number of phenomena which 
had no further apparent connexion with each other than that they happen to appear often 
together in history; sometimes the softening of manners, sometimes mechanical inventions, 
sometimes  religious  toleration,  sometimes  the  appearance  of  great  poets  and  artists, 
sometimes scientific discoveries, sometimes constitutional liberty. It was assumed, though it 
was never proved, that all these things belonged together and had a hidden cause, which was 
the working of the spirit of civilisation.34
In  the  early  1880s,  both  the  concept  of  civilization  and its  future  were  questioned  in  English 
debates. Travels to the US, which many of England's upper-classes had started to see as a country 
embodying  the  future,  proved  to  be  an  often  frightening  glimpse  into  the  fate  of  civilization. 
Matthew Arnold's Civilization in the United States, an almost dystopian account of a country full of 
wind farms and bereft of anything interesting or elevated, was a not-so-subtle premonition of what 
he thought England would become.35 Oscar Wilde, who similarly toured the US in the early 1880s 
and  shared  many  of  Arnold's  prejudices,  warned  his  readers  that  technical  innovation  was 
endangering true civilization, when it was mistaken for it: 'And let us not mistake the means of 
civilisation for the end of civilisation; steam-engine, telephone and the like, are all wonderful, but 
remember that their value depends entirely on the noble uses we make of them, on the noble spirit 
34 John Robert Seeley, The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures (London: MacMillan and Co., 1883), 
12.
35 Matthew Arnold, Civilization in the United States (Boston: DeWolfe, Fiske & Co., 1900), 157–192.
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in which we employ them, not on the things themselves.'36 US Americans equally weighed in on a 
discussion that quickly engaged both sides of the Atlantic. In 1884, in a series of articles in the 
universally popular  North American Review, the Chicago judge and intellectual John A. Jameson 
not only asked 'Is our Civilization perishable?', but also 'Shall our Civilization be preserved'?, a 
question that must have seemed ludicrous to writers even a generation before him.37 In the middle of 
a second industrial revolution and a rapidly changing social structure, Jameson saw his civilization 
threatened  by  modernity  and,  amongst  other  things,  'the  thickening  danger  of  industrial 
discontent'.38
Most important amongst all the books concerned with danger of industrial discontent and written 
with civilizational concerns in mind was Henry George's Progress and Poverty, published in 1879, 
the  year  civilizational  and colonial  propaganda  heated  up  all  over  Europe.39 In  contrast  to  the 
progressive optimism that drove so much of the colonial movement in the late 1870s, George saw 
civilization in the west if not on the brink of at least close to destruction. In what he described as an 
'inquiry into the cause of industrial depressions', he argued that a new class of aristocrats, with all 
the power but none of the original virtues, were ruling the west whose increasing industrialization 
was  widening  the  gap  between  rich  and  poor.  Only  radical  politics  could  stop  the  otherwise 
inevitable spiral of civilizational decline. In the last chapter of his book dramatically entitled 'How 
civilization might end', he offered a succinct description of how he saw the future of the western 
world: 
What  has  destroyed  every  previous  civilization  has  been  the  tendency  to  the  unequal 
distribution of wealth and power. This same tendency, operating with increasing force, is 
observable in our civilization to-day, showing itself in every progressive community, and 
with  greater  intensity  the  more  progressive  the  community.  Wages  and  interest  tend 
constantly to fall, rent to rise, the rich to become very much richer, the poor to become more 
helpless and hopeless, and the middle class to be swept away.40
36 Oscar Wilde, “Art and the Handicraftsman,” in Essays and Lectures., 2nd ed. (London: Methuen & Co., 1909), 
177.
37 J. A. Jameson, “Is Our Civilization Perishable?,” The North American Review 138, no. 328 (1884): 205–15; John 
A. Jameson, “Shall Our Civilization Be Preserved?,” The North American Review 138, no. 329 (1884): 336–48.
38 Jameson, “Shall Our Civilization Be Preserved?,” 348.
39 Henry George, Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depressions and of Increase of 
Want with Increase of Wealth. The Remedy (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1882).
40 Ibid., 475.
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In Britain, Henry George's civilizational critique was well received and often repeated. As Alfred 
Russell Wallace put it, Progress and Poverty was 'undoubtedly the most remarkable and important 
book of the present century.'41 Many in the higher echelons of power agreed, even personalities less 
idiosyncratic than Wallace. Politicians like Sam Smith,  the liberal  MP for Liverpool,  where the 
effects of the new economic order were arguably as pronounced as in the US, used his book The 
Nationalisation  of  the  Land  to  repeat  many  of  George's  criticisms  of  modern  society  and 
civilization.42 As  he  explained,  even  admitting  taking  his  cues  from  George's  work,  'Modern 
civilisation does not diminish but accentuate moral and intellectual differences […] and there is an 
increased tendency to precipitate the coarser material to the bottom of the social edifice – hence we 
see in all our cities a huge and melancholy deposit of human wretchedness and vice.'43 Skepticism 
of modern civilisation would drive much of the social critique of 1880s England, even that less 
focused on economic problems, as exemplified in Edward Carpenters oft-quoted essay Civilisation: 
Its Cause and Cure  that was first published along with other works in the late 1880s.44 As the 
Fabian philosopher explained: 'We find ourselves today in the midst of a somewhat peculiar state of 
society, which we call Civilisation, but which even to the most optimistic among us does not seem 
altogether desirable.'45
The uneasiness with the civilization of English society that Carpenter felt but could not quite put his 
finger on, was equally perceived on the continent. In 1884, Max Nordau, the later co-founder of the 
World Zionist Congress, claimed that he had started to feel the cracks in the seemingly solid edifice 
of European civilization, or, as he variously called it, the Kulturmenschheit. The slow dissolution of 
western civilization was a process he saw at work everywhere, even in England.46
In England scheint bei oberflächlicher Betrachtung der Boden fest und der Staatsbau ganz. 
Wenn man aber das Ohr an die Erde legt, so fühlt man sie beben, und hört die dumpfen 
Schläge der unterirdischen Riesen, die mit den Hämmern an die Decke ihres Gefägnisses 
pochen, und wenn man die Mauern ganz nahe besieht so erkennt man unter dem Firniss und 
41 David Stack, The First Darwinian Left: Socialism and Darwinism, 1859-1914 (New York: New Clarion, 2003), 
33.
42 Samuel Smith, The Nationalisation of the Land (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1884).
43 Ibid., 36–37.
44 Edward Carpenter, “Civilisation: Its Cause and Cure,” in Civilisation: Its Cause and Cure and Other Essays, 2nd 
ed. (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1891), 1–50.
45 Ibid., 1.
46 Max Nordau, Die conventionellen Lügen der Kulturmenschheit, 13th ed. (Leipzig: Verlag von B. Elischer, 1888); 
Petra Zudrell, Der Kulturkritiker und Schriftsteller Max Nordau: zwischen Zionismus, Deutschtum und 
Judentum (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2003).
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der Vergoldung die gefährlichen Sprünge, die von unten bis oben laufen.47
Whereas the English walls merely showed cracks, Nordau saw his native Germany as divided by 
ethnic strife, antisemitism and the opposition of the ever-growing socialist influence against the 
ruling order. It was not difficult to understand that in the eyes of these cultural critics the rise of 
modern  civilisation  was  to  blame  for  all  of  these  problems. It  was  a  seeming  paradox  the 
industrialist and economist, Flürscheim, expressed the same year in his  Auf friedlichem Wege ein  
Vorschlag zur Lösung der sozialen Frage: 'wir können es uns nicht verhehlen, die Gesellschaft ist in 
ihren Grundlagen untergraben, während wir fragen, wie ist es möglich, dass eine Zivilisation, wie 
diese,  mit  ihren  Eisenbahnen,  Tagesblättern  und  elektrischen  Telegraphen  je  vernichtet  werden 
sollte.'48
In an era that Rohkrämer has rightly described as in search of a new and alternative modernity, 
many described modern civilization itself as ruining humanity.49 As the Austrian writer Friedrich 
Hellwald  explained  at  length  in  his  Kulturgeschichte  in  ihrer  natürlichen  Entwicklung  bis  zur  
Gegenwart, which had reached its third edition in 1884:
Die  Civilisation  umgibt  den  Menschen  mit  unendlichen  Gefahren.  Die  Wasserleitungen 
unterwaschen, wenn sie schadhaft werden, die Fundamente der Häuser. Die Gasleitungen 
strömen die tödliche Luft in die geschlossenen Räume aus, wo Menschen wohnen, um sie zu 
ersticken, oder um sie durch plötzliches Aufflammen zu tödten. Die Drähte der Telegraphen 
und der Telephone, die sich über die Häuser hinwegziehen, sie locken den Blitz an und die 
Zahl  der  vom  Blitz  Erschlagenen  wird  von  Jahr  zu  Jahr  grösser  seit  die  eisernen 
Nervenstränge  der  Civilisation  sich  verdichten.  Das  elektrische  Licht,  es  schwächt  die 
Sehkraft,  und  kommt  jemand  in  ungeschickter  Art  mit  den  Leitkabeln  des  Stromes  in 
Berührung, so kann er das mit seinem Leben bezahlen. Was in den Theatern wie sie die 
moderne Civilisation haben will, durch die szenische Kraft derselben geschehen kann, das 
hat  man  des  öfteren  schauernd  miterlebt.  Wie  die  Kriege  beschaffen  sind,  denen  die 
47 Nordau, Die conventionellen Lügen der Kulturmenschheit, 4. 'In England the ground seems, after superficial 
examination, firm and the state of the institutions safe. Yet, when one puts an ear close to the ground, one hears it 
move, and can listen to the underground giants hitting the ceiling of their prison with hammers, and if one looks 
very closely at the walls, one can see under the cover and the gold dangerous cracks appear.'
48 Michael Flürscheim, Auf friedlichem Wege: ein Vorschlag zur Lösung der sozialen Frage (Baden-Baden: O. 
Sommermayer, 1884), 267. We cannot deny, that the fundaments of this society are damaged, while we ask: how 
is it possible that such a civilization, with its trains, daily newspapers and electric telegraphs should ever be 
destroyed.'
49 Thomas Rohkrämer, Eine andere Moderne? : Zivilisationskritik, Natur und Technik in Deutschland 1880 - 1933 
(Paderborn, Munich, Vienna, Zurich: Schöningh, 1999).
152
Civilisation  ihre  Waffen  der  Zerstörung liefert,  das  zeigen die  Verlustlisten  der  Armeen. 
Niemals hat es früher eine ähnliche Zerstörung des Eigenthums gegeben, niemals ist das 
Leben  des  Menschen  bedrohter  gewesen  als  jetzt,  und  je  grösser  die  Fortschritte  der 
Civilisation werden, desto grösser werden auch die Gefahren, die den Menschen bedrohen.50
It is remarkable how many different phenomena Hellwald mixed in his description of civilization 
and what a plenitude of problems came to be associated with it. Given such widely spread rhetoric, 
it  is  not  at  all  surprising  that  the  designation  of  what  German  doctors  would  soon  call 
Zivilisationskrankheiten was born out of general scepticism towards modern civilization as well.51 
Even though they had previously not referred to these as Zivilisationskrankheiten, a word that was 
first used in 1885, the gist of what they were describing had already been clear in the mid-1870s. 52 
Alois  Geigl,  professor  of  hygiene  in  Würzburg,  felt  he  was  speaking  for  the  whole  medical 
profession  when  he  explained  in  his  Handbuch  der  öffentlichen  Gesundheitspflege  und  der  
Gewerbekrankheiten:
Aber so sehr wir auch […] erkennen müssen, wie diese Civilisation unser Volk nach den 
meisten Richtungen gefördert hat, so sind wir doch alle weit davon entfernt, sie für etwas 
annähernd Vollendetes zu halten. Vielmehr wissen wir recht gut […] dass sie gar manche 
Krankheitsanlage  entwickelt,  die  in  früheren  Zeiten  schlummerte,  und  das  die  hieraus 
entspringenden Gebrechen und Krankheiten,  des einzelnen wie der Gesellschaft  eben die 
Volksseuchen  unserer  modernen  Zeit,  die  Nachtseiten  unserer  humanen  und  nationalen 
Cultur bilden.53 
50 Friedrich von Hellwald, Kulturgeschichte in Ihrer Natürlichen Entwicklung Bis Zur Gegenwart, 3rd ed., vol. 2 
(Augsburg: Lampart & Comp., 1884), 717. 'Civilization surrounds the human being with endless dangers. The 
water pipes weaken, when they fail, the fundaments of houses. The gas pipes bring deadly air into the rooms, 
where people live, to suffocate them or to kill them through sudden inflammation. The wires of the telegraphs 
and of the telephones, that reach across the houses, attract lightning and since the iron nerves of civilization have 
increased, the amount of people dying through lightning is increasing constantly. The electric light, it weakens 
the eyesight, and if someone touches an electric wire in a haphazard way, he can pay with his life. What 
happened in the theatres, which modern civilization demands, we have seen with horror. The character of the 
wars, whose weapons modern civilization supplies, can be seen in the long lists of dead. Never has there been a 
similar destruction of property, never has the life of people been more endangered as now. And the greater the 
progress of civilization is, the greater are its threats to humanity.'
51 'dieseases of civilization'.
52 Pflaum argues that the term Zivilisationskrankheit was an invention of the Nazi period, but in fact there are much 
earlier mentions starting with the 1880s see Pflaum, “Zivilisation,” 325; Josef Gängl von Ehrenwerth, Das 
Eisenhüttenwesen Schwedens (Leipzig: Felix, 1885).
53 Alois Geigl, Ludwig Hirt, and Gottlieb Merkel, Handbuch der öffentlichen Gesundheitspflege und der 
Gewerbekrankheiten (Leipzig: F.C.W. Vogel, 1874), 8. 'But as much as we have to recognize that civilization has 
benefited our people in most ways, we are all far from recognizing it as something entirely positive. On the 
contrary, we know exactly, that it has awoken dormant diseases, and that the pestilences and disabilities in the 
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While Geigl identified several diseases as caused by civilization, the most dramatic of all them was 
the perceived increase in insanity and suicides. The 1880s saw the beginning of a trend linking 
psychological problems to the rise of civilization, a development that would famously culminate in 
Freud's Unbehagen in der Cultur.54 The origins of a debate about the negative impact of civilization 
on the psyche was older. Discussions about the relationship between insanity and civilization had 
shook France as early as the 1820s and 1830s, a time when the French psychiatrist Esquirol had first 
noted that 'madness is the disease of civilisation'.55 But in the early 1880s, this phenomenon had 
reached unprecedented levels, as the Contemporary Review in London explained:
The increase of insanity, so long doubted by the Lunacy commissioners, is now […] too 
patent to admit of question, and, as it is accompanied both here and on the Continent by an 
increase in  suicide,  it  is  beginning to attract  the notice of  Europe.  That  there is  a close 
relationship between insanity and civilization, appears from the fact that where schools and 
newspapers are few the number of insane is small, the ratio rising in the various countries so 
regularly that we might almost say the circulation of daily papers determines the proportion 
of lunatics.56
Writing  in  1883,  the  Contemporary  Review  was  arguably  already  far  behind  scientific 
developments. The European public had already, two years before, been treated to two scientific 
works seeking to establish the connection between suicides and the rise in civilization beyond all 
doubt. Enrico Agostini Morselli's Europe-wide and oft-translated best-seller  Suicide: An Essay on  
Comparative Moral Statistics reached the certain conclusion that 'to our mind it is indisputable that 
madness and suicide are met with the more frequently in proportion as civilisation progresses'.57 
individual and in the society as a whole, it has created are the new plagues of our modern time, the dark-sides of 
our humane and national culture.'
54 Sigmund Freud, Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (Wien: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1930); 
Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (London: Penguin UK, 2002); Eduard Reich, Die Geschichte 
Der Seele, Die Hygieine Des Geisteslebens Und Die Civilisation (Minden i.W.: Brun, 1884); Paul Frederick 
Lerner, Hysterical Men: War, Psychiatry, and the Politics of Trauma in Germany, 1890-1930 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2003).
55 Hugh P. Whitt, “The Civilizing Process and Its Discontents: Suicide and Crimes against Persons in France, 
1825–1830,” American Journal of Sociology 116, no. 1 (2010): 130–86; Sarah York, “Alienists, Attendants and 
the Containment of Suicide in Public Lunatic Asylums, 1845–1890,” Social History of Medicine, 2011, 1–19; 
John C. Weaver and David Wright, eds., Histories of Suicide: International Perspectives on Self-Destruction in 
the Modern World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 19.
56 M.J. Mulhall, “Insanity, Suicide, and Civilization,” The Contemporary Review XLIII (1883): 901.
57 Enrico Agostino Morselli, Suicide: An Essay on Comparative Moral Statistics (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 
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Perhaps  more  importantly  for  the  German-speaking  public,  a  young  doctoral  student  at  the 
University of Vienna, had also published his findings the same year. The young man was Thomas 
Masaryk, who later became the first president of the independent Czechoslovakia, but was in his  
early  life  more  interested  in  psychological  statistics.  In  his  dissertation  Der  Selbstmord  als  
Massenerscheinung der modernen Civilisation,  he reached the same conclusions as Morselli and 
argued that it was beyond doubt 'dass sich die Massenerscheinung des Selbstmordes aus und in dem 
modernen Culturleben entwickelt hat'.58
With such damning sociological criticism of civilization, more theoretical approaches to sociology 
would soon include the concept itself in their repertoire. In 1887, the Frisian sociologist Ferdinand 
Toennies  argued  his  case  for  a  sociological  distinction  between  what  he  called, 
Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft  and  Cultur/Civilisation.  Whereas  Gemeinschaft was characterized as a 
natural community between humans that understood themselves as living together, Gesellschaft was 
a mere agglomeration of individuals driven by their own desires as opposed to communal thought.  
Toennies certainly attempted a vaguely academic understanding of modern society, but his binary 
oppositions  that  included Civilisation  and Cultur  as  corresponding  ideas  to  Gemeinschaft  and 
Gesellschaft were  undoubtedly politicized.  It  was  difficult  not  to  read  between the  lines  when 
Toennies argued that 'die Civilisation des Staatsthums' develops from 'der Cultur des Volksthums' 
and 'da die gesammte Cultur in gesellschaftliche und staatliche Civilisation umgeschlagen ist, so 
geht in dieser ihrer verwandelten Gestalt die Cultur selber zu Ende.'59 Despite Toennies' description 
of  civilization  and  culture  as  ideal-types,  it  was  clear  that  he  saw  the  former  as  lacking  and 
deficient. Conversely, he held up Cultur as an ideal of human cooperation lost in the alienation of 
modernity. Many understood the message, and in a small circle of followers, Toennies developed 
into the 'Nekrolog der modernen Zivilisation', as the philosopher Friedrich Paulsen later put it.60 
The Beginnings of the Berlin Conference
While such skeptical ideas about civilization were brewing in Europe and the US around the 1880s, 
1882), 117.
58 Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, Der Selbstmord als sociale Massenerscheinung der modernen Civilisation (Vienna: 
Verlag von Carl Konegen, 1881), VI. 'suicide as a public phenomenon of modern civilization', 'that the mass-
appearance of suicide has developed in and out of our modern culture'.
59 Ferdinand Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Abhandlung des Communismus und des Socialismus als 
empirischer Culturformen (Leipzig: Fues, 1887), 316, 324. 'civilization of the state develops from the culture of 
the people'. 'and because all culture has become the civilization of the state culture itself, in its changed form, has 
come to an end.'
60 Günther Rudolph, “Ferdinand Tönnies und die Lehre von Karl Marx Annäherung und Vorbehalt,” in Hundert 
Jahre “Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft”. Ferdinand Toennies in der international Diskussion, ed. Lars Clausen 
and Carsten Schlueter (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1991), 311.
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in international politics and diplomacy an older type of optimistic liberalism still reigned supreme. 
It was the Portuguese government that most fervently employed civilizational ideas as the basis for 
territorial claims in Africa. For the better part of the first half of the nineteenth century, various 
Portuguese governments had sought to unify their territories in Central Africa, but this endeavor had 
been  steadfastly  blocked  by  Britain.61 In  the  early  1880s,  with  the  background  of  a  slow 
encroachment  of  explorers  into  territory claimed by the Portuguese  and the  spread of  the new 
vocabulary  of  civilization,  the  Portuguese  government  made  a  new  attempt  at  convincing  its 
international competitors. The foreign minister de Serpa Pimentel wrote to several of his colleagues, 
like France's Laboulaye, urging them to agree: 'les bases d'un arrangement profitable aux relations 
amicales des deux pays, ainsi qu'au dévelopment de leur action civilisatrice sur la côte occidentale 
d'Afrique.'62 The Portuguese pursued a two-tiered strategy, insisting on the one hand on ancient 
rights,  and,  on  the  other,  on  new  and  recent  international  duties.  Both  were  presented  as 
civilizational claims. The papal bull of 1452, the government argued, gave them permission to take 
possession of the territories found; a right, they added in brackets, 'which we may style the right of 
civilisation'.63 The Portuguese government not only invoked a 431-year old document to justify its 
claims to African land, but also alluded to the current situation in many parts of Africa, arguing that 
these were 'incompatible with the principles of international law, and injuriously affect the progress 
of civilisation in Africa.'64 It consequently promised to alleviate these conditions and formally ban 
the  slave  trade,  which  many still  associated  with  regions  informally under  Portuguese  control. 
Pushing the argument to the extreme, Portugal's officials insisted that anyone who opposed their 
claims to territories like the Congo was standing in the way of civilization:
how deplorable, how inhuman, and opposed to civilisation, is the opposition at various times 
manifested against the establishment in the Congo of a permanent and effective legal system, 
a system which we alone have the right to introduce, and which we alone can create with 
efficacy, and in a manner tending to general security.65
These claims to civilization were not taken very seriously in Britain. Gladstone and his new foreign 
61 Perry Anderson, “Portugal and the End of Ultra-Colonialism- Part I,” New Left Review 1, no. 15 (1962): 98–99.
62 M. de Serpa Pimentel to M. de Laboulaye, Lisbon, 13.08.1883 in  Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Documents 
diplomatiques. Affaires du Congo et de l’Afrique Occidentale (16 Octobre 1882 - 2 oct. 1884) (Paris: Imprimerie 
nationale, 1884), 21.
63 Luciano Cordeiro, ed., Portugal and the Congo: A Statement. Prepared by the African Committee of the Lisbon 




minister Granville were nonetheless willing to negotiate a new African treaty, to the outrage of a 
large section of liberal MPs. Over previous decades, Portugal had acquired a horrible reputation as 
lagging behind all  other  European countries  in  civilization.  Since the beginning of  attempts  to 
suppress  the  slave  trade,  various  British  governments  had  been  involved  in  disputes  with  the 
Portuguese,  whose  willingness  to  spread  civilization  had  frequently  been  questioned.66 The 
accusation that Portugal was behind all other European states in its civilizational development was 
not even questioned by its most passionate defenders, like the journalist Oswald Crawfurd. In his 
description  of  Portugal,  Crawfurd,  who had served as  the British ambassador  to  Porto,  merely 
argued that it was 'laughably unjust' to claim that Portugal was a 150 years behind in civilization as 
'the charge dwindles down to this, that the Portuguese nation is only behindhand in civilisation to 
the few nations of Western Europe who, in respect of progress, and civilization, and humanization, 
are, and long have been, the very salt of the earth'.67 Parliamentary opposition to a new Anglo-
Portuguese treaty was not  based on the  situation  of  civilization in  Portugal  itself:  it  had more 
pragmatic  international  considerations.  As  a  French contemporary observer  rightly noted,  there 
were three groups amongst the British liberals, who opposed an Anglo-Portuguese treaty: those who 
thought that England stood to lose power in the region through a treaty with the Portuguese, those 
who thought that the Portuguese would levy high taxes detrimental to trade, and those who were 
sceptical of Portugal's claims to eradicate the slave trade and to bring civilization.68
These  distinctions  overlapped  in  the  person  most  violently  opposed  to  Anglo-Portuguese 
negotiations, and who led parliamentary opposition from the front: John Bright's younger brother 
Jacob.  Elected the MP for  Manchester  in  1880,  Bright  did  everything in  his  power to  nip the 
negotiations in the bud. Already on 3 April 1883, shortly after negotiations had unofficially started, 
Bright brought a resolution to the House:  
That, in the interests of civilisation and Commerce in South West Africa, this House is of the 
opinion that no Treaty should he made by Her Majesty's Government that would sanction the 
annexation by any Power of territories on or adjacent to the Congo, or that would interfere 
with the freedom hitherto enjoyed by all civilising and Commercial agencies at work in those 
regions.69
66 Maeve Ryan, “The Price of Legitimacy in Humanitarian Intervention: Britain, the Right of Search, and the 
Abolition of the West-African Slave Trade, 1807-1867,” in Humanitarian Intervention: A History, ed. Brendan 
Simms and D. J. B. Trim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
67 Oswald Crawfurd, Portugal. Old and New (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1882), 98.
68 Georges Villain, La question du Congo et l’Association internationale africaine (Paris: Chalamel Aine, 1884), 5.
69 HC Deb 03 April 1883 vol. 277 col.1284 
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In the discussion which followed the resolution, Gladstone and Granville were confronted with the 
veritable hatred of liberals against Portugal, which they presented as an enemy of civilization. Most 
agreed that Portugal was a corrupt and mismanaged country, and liberals ‘looked upon [it] as a 
faithless Power’, as the MP George Anderson eloquently put it.70 It was Jacob Bright himself who 
knew best how to charm the liberals by comparing Portugal to the other great enemy of civilization,  
the Ottoman Empire: 
There is a wonderful similarity between Turkey and Portugal. You have a Turkey in the East 
of Europe, and you have a little Turkey in the West. There is similarity in this respect that the 
officials and employees of both are ignorant; they are badly and irregularly paid, and the 
consequence is that they are corrupt and feed upon the Natives. There is also this similarity, 
that where Turkey rules, the Provinces are often desolate; and, according to an authority who 
may be perfectly trusted, the Provinces of Portugal are in many places rendered desolate by 
the presence of the Portuguese.71
The alternative to an agreement with Portugal, which Bright outlined, was to have large parts of the 
disputed areas controlled by an independent association founded by the ‘enlightened initiative and 
public spirit of the King of the Belgians’, the ‘international association of the Congo’ which would 
finally bring the benefits of free trade to the heart of Africa.72 Judging the parliamentary level of 
excitement as too dangerous for his own standing, Gladstone budged and promised the House major 
powers in the rest of the negotiations.73 While he was not willing to give up his prerogative to 
negotiate, the prime minister assured the House that no treaty would be made with the Portuguese 
without the approval of the House, concessions previously unheard of. 
It is unclear whether Bright's fervent support for Leopold's organization in the British parliament 
was entirely idealistic, and not in some way remunerated, as many other influential figures who 
placed their weight behind Leopold's campaign were officially or unofficially in his pay. While the 
historian Barbara Emerson has suggested that  Bright  was in  Leopold's  employ,  the evidence is 
rather sketchy.74 Other major figures, however, were undoubtedly in Leopold's pocket. Fitzmaurice 
70 HC Deb 03 April 1883 vol. 277 col.1327
71 HC Deb 03 April 1883 vol. 277 col. 1294
72 HC Deb 03 April 1883 vol. 277 col. 1316
73 HC Deb 03 April 1883 vol. 277 cols. 1321-1327  
74 Barbara Emerson, Leopold II of the Belgians: King of Colonialism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), 
103.
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has recently traced the unfortunate entanglement of the international lawyer Travers Twiss with the 
Belgian King, but the most important asset for Leopold's endeavours was the journalist and explorer 
Henry Morton Stanley, who did Leopold's bidding in various circles and countries. In all of them, 
he  stressed  either  Leopold's  civilizational  intentions  or  the  benefit  of  doing business  with  him 
instead of the Portuguese.75 'You smile blandly at your “Suum Cuiques”', he told a meeting of the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce,  'who are Portuguese agents in disguise, and for a few cheap 
phrases about expansion of civilisation, ancient allies, friendly power, and so forth, you proceed to 
sign away a future market of £25.000.000 a year to the Portuguese.'76 In a letter to the  Deutsche 
Revue he similarly sought to discredit Portuguese claims, not with monetary considerations, but by 
claiming lack of civilizing fervour:
“Ausbreitung der Zivilisation!” ruft der portugiesische Minister. “Ein friedlicher Zufluchtsort 
für  Kolonisten  und  ein  Ausgangspunkt  für  Unternehmungen”  echoet  die  geographische 
Gesellschaft von Lissabon. Grosser Gott! Was bedeuten solche Redensarten im Munde der 
Portugiesen, einer Nation, welche Afrika während eines Zeitraumes von 200 Jahren nur als 
eine Lieferstätte von Sklaven angesehen hat.77
Such propaganda was highly successful,  as  otherwise independent  German papers  soon copied 
Leopold's and Stanley's rhetoric. The colonialist paper Export, enthralled with Stanley's reputation 
as an explorer, quickly emulated his political rhetoric: 'kaum ist es den Portugiesen in einer ihrer 
Besitzungen  gelungen,  erträgliche  Verhältnisse  einzurichten,  geschweige  denn  Civilisation 
einzuführen, ebensowenig sind sie dem Sklavenhandel energisch auf den Leib gerückt.'78
As a draft treaty between England and Portugal was announced in early 1884, agitation against 
persisted with known men like Bright once again taking the lead. On 5 February 1884, the Queen 
announced in her annual speech that 'An Agreement has been arrived at with Portugal respecting the 
75 Andrew Fitzmaurice, “The Genealogy of Terra Nullius,” Australian Historical Studies 38, no. 129 (2007): 1–15.
76 Henry M. Stanley, Address of Mr. H.M. Stanley: On England and the Congo and Manchester Trade, and the 
Work and Aims of the International Association (Manchester: A. Ireland and Co., 1884), 25.
77 Henry M. Stanley, “Stanley’s Ansicht Über Die Stellung Der Europäischen Maechte Zur Congofrage,” ed. 
Richard Fleischer, Deutsche Revue Über Das Gesammte Nationale Leben Der Gegenwart 9, no. 4 (1884): 102. 
'”Spread of civilization” exclaims the Portuguese minister, “a peaceful haven for colonists and a good starting 
point for expeditions” echoes the geographical organization of Lisbon. Great God! What do these phrases mean 
from the mouth of the Portuguese, a nation which has seen Africa for 200 years only as a place from which 
slaves were delivered.' 
78 “Afrika,” Export: Organ des Centralvereins für Handelsgeographie und Förderung deutscher Interessen im 
Auslande 6, no. 24 (1884): 377. 'The Portuguese have hardly ever succeeded in establishing bearable conditions 
in their colonies, and have never managed to bring civilization, or to energetically stop the slave trade.'
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River Congo and the adjacent territories. This Agreement will be presented to you forthwith.' Soon 
after, British MPs would hold in their hands a draft treaty, the introduction of which announced that 
it was 'animated by the desire to draw closer the ties of friendship which unite the two nations', and 
to  solve  the  difficulties  of  sovereignty  over  the  Congo.79 Perhaps  most  importantly,  the  treaty 
announced the desire of the two states 'to provide for the complete extinction of the slave trade; and 
to  promote  the  development  of  civilization  and  commerce  in  the  African  continent'.80 In  both 
countries  the  treaty  was  heavily  criticized.  In  Portugal,  it  received  a  frosty  response  from 
conservative circles who had hoped for larger territorial concessions.81 In Britain, the main criticism 
came  from those  who  doubted  Portuguese  intentions.  Jacob  Bright  was  furious  and  used  The 
Aborigines' Friend: Journal of the Aborigines Protection Society to vent his anger: 
This  little  country,  which  cannot  pay  its  debts  at  home,  which  fails  conspicuously  “to 
promote the development of commerce and civilisation abroad”, is to be placed by England, 
for some inscrutable  reason,  over a  new and important  territory,  just  at  a  time when its 
commercial value has been made clear.82
He continued his onslaught in various, more mainstream media like the  Daily News  in which he 
announced: 'The world is familiar with the hollowness and insincerity of diplomatic utterances, but 
it would be difficult to find a stronger case of insincerity than in the document from which I quote: 
The Portuguese are to develop commerce and civilisation on the Congo!'83
For obvious geopolitical reasons, these British debates were studied in detail by the ambassadors 
and  leaders  of  the  other  European  countries,  especially  by  Britain’s  main  rivals  France  and 
Germany, whose leaders decided to sink the treaty and start fresh negotiations between all European 
powers. From a purely strategic perspective, both Ferry and Bismarck could not be happy with a 
potential Anglo-Portuguese treaty, as both countries also had major commercial interests in the area 
that would be impeded through sovereign control.84 Traders and chambers of commerce in Germany 
had already written to the chancellor urging him to stop a potential Anglo-Portuguese agreement. In 
these letters,  which were later presented to the Reichstag,  serious doubts were raised about the 
79 Thomas Tomlinson, The Congo Treaty (London: Edward Stanford, 1884), 46.
80 Ibid.
81 Valentim, “The Portuguese Empire, 1825–90: Ideology and Economics,” 123.
82 Jacob Bright, “The Congo Treaty,” The Anti-Slavery Reporter 5 (1884): 100.
83 Tomlinson, The Congo Treaty, 41.
84 Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags. 6. Legislaturperiode. I.Session 1884/1885. 
Anlagen zu den Verhandlungen des Reichstags Nr.287-421, vol. 7 (Berlin: Gedruckt bei Julius Sittenfeld, 1885), 
Nr. 1645.
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civilizational and commercial  promises contained in the draft.  The  Handelskammer des Kreises  
Solingen was but one of many petitioners, which could not put their trust in the Portuguese:
wird die Entwicklung der Handels und der Civilisation auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent als 
zu  erreichendes  Ziel  bezeichnet,  während  in  Wirklichkeit  aber  genügend  Grund  für  die 
Annahme vorliegt, dass der Handel im Congo ernsthaft geschädigt, wenn nicht vollständig 
ruiniert werden wird.85
Following  such  recommendations,  and  undoubtedly  for  other  geopolitical  reasons,  Ferry  and 
Bismarck voiced their strongest opposition against the ratification of the agreement. The concerns 
of the two major political figures in continental Europe left the Gladstone’s government no choice 
but to abandon its endeavor. This situation opened the door for a renewed Franco-German push at 
regulation of African affairs. Bismarck and Ferry had decided to organize a conference in Berlin to 
settle most of the questions relating to trade and exploration.
Together, Ferry and Bismarck drafted a note that was surprisingly matter of fact. The invitation to 
this  major  conference  in  Berlin  finally  settling  African  affairs  did  not  mention  the  idea  of 
civilization  once.  It  is  still  unclear  whether  this  was  due  to  Bismarck's  skepticism  about 
civilizational  claims,  to  which  I  already  alluded  in  previous  chapters,  or  other  reasons  of 
international diplomacy. In the end, the invitation was purely justified on economic and political 
grounds, as this translation later presented to the Reichstag explained:
Die  Ausdehnung  welcher  der  afrikanische  Handel  seit  einiger  Zeit  genommen,  hat  den 
Regierungen  von  Deutschland  und  Frankreich  den  Gedanken  eingegeben,  dass  es  im 
gemeinsamen  Interesse  der  an  diesem  Handel  beteiligten  Nationen  liegen  würde,  die 
Bedingungen,  welche  die  Entwickelung  des  letzteren  zu  sichern  und  Zwistigkeiten  und 
Missverständnisse  zu  verhüten  geeignet  scheinen,  im  Geiste  guten  gegenseitigen 
Einvernehmens  zu  regeln.  Um  dieses  Ziel  zu  erreichen  sind  die  Regierungen  von 
Deutschland  und  Frankreich  der  Meinung,  dass  es  wünschenswerth  sein  würde,  eine 
Verständigung über folgende Grundsätze herbeizuführen.86
85 Aktenstücke Betreffend Die Kongo-Frage, Nebst Einer Karte von Zentral-Afrika von L.Friederichsen in 
Hamburg. Dem Bundestag Und Dem Reichstag Vorgelegt Im April 1885 (Hamburg: L.Friederichsen & Comp., 
1885), 10. 'the development of civilization and commerce on the African continent, is the pronounced aim, but in 
reality there is reason to believe that commercial activity in the Congo will be severely damaged, if not 
completely destroyed.'
86 Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags. 6. Legislaturperiode. I.Session 1884/1885. 
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Those Grundsätze were (in order): free trade in the Congo Area, the application of the principles of 
the Congress of Vienna pertaining to the rivers of that area,  and finally a  series of formalities  
guaranteeing effective appropriation of land.
The invitation reached the majority of European states, but there were some surprises as well. Apart 
from Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain  and Sweden-Norway,  the  United  States  would  be  invited  for  the  first  time to  what  was 
ostensibly  a  European  conference.  Slightly  later,  an  invitation  would  also  be  extended  to  that 
favorite liberal scapegoat: the Ottoman Empire.87 A special letter of invitation also reached the man 
who Jacob Bright had favored for the job of administrating the Congo area, the benevolent king of 
the Belgians Leopold II. His organization, the International Association of the Congo would have 
special status at the Conference and its experts and explorers like Henry Morton Stanley would help 
with the details on the ground. The invitation of Leopold was a surprise given Bismarck's previous 
dealings with him. In an exchange leading up to the conference, in which Leopold had claimed that 
the reason his organization wanted to control tracts of land abandoned by Egypt was to completely 
eradicate the slave trade, Bismarck had, in big letters, written in the margins: ‘swindle’ and further 
down, in a passage detailing Leopold’s plans: phantasies.88 Apart from the United States, no other 
country  had  formally  recognized  Leopold’s  organization.  Strategically,  one  day  before  the 
conference was due to start, Bismarck did the same. After all, Bismarck reasoned, Leopold and his 
organization would be helpful. Firstly, they could be used to play off other European powers against 
each other. Secondly, they could be helpful for Bismarck’s domestic undertakings, so as a special 
part of Leopold’s ‘conference package’ Bismarck reserved the rights to parade Stanley, the great 
explorer, around all of Germany to praise the colonial enterprise, which he was now engaged.
Bismarck’s strategy was enormously successful as a wave of enthusiasm greeted Stanley in Berlin 
and in most other German cities he visited. Bismarck ensured that Stanley spoke to all those who 
were  curious  about  his  colonial  policies,  most  of  all  the  Kolonialvereine.  The  Deutsche 
Anlagen zu den Verhandlungen des Reichstags Nr.287-421, 7:1661. 'The expansion of African trade in recent 
years has convinced the German and the French government that it must be in the common interest of all the 
nations partaking in this trade to find an agreement to protect the conditions which enable it, and to prevent 
disputes and misunderstandings. In order to achieve this aim, the governments of Germany and of France think it 
preferable that the following basic tenets should be agreed on.' 
87 The sample invitation submitted to the Reichstag notes that the same invitation was later also sent to the Ottoman 
Empire.
88 Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1999), 83.
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Kolonialzeitung, whose readership Stanley addressed in November, reported parts of his speech to 
their congregation: 'Fragen Sie mich nun was wir wollen, so sage ich: wir sind gewillt einem jeden 
die Hand zu bieten in jenem freien Afrika der dort an den zivilisatorischen Unternehmungen sich 
beteiligen will, einem jeden, besonders aber den Deutschen (Lebhaftes Bravo).'89 Stanley was not 
only applauded but his engagement for civilization was specifically lauded and for which he was 
even given an honorary doctorate. As the Kolonialzeitung noted:
Der Vorstand des deutschen Kolonialvereins hat Henry Moreland Stanley “in Anerkennung 
seiner durch die Erforschung des Kongogebiets der Zivilisation geleisteten Verdienste‘‘ zu 
seinem Ehrenmitgliede ernannt, wie ihn auch die Universität  Halle durch Verleihung des 
philosophischen Doctogrades ehrte.90
With Stanley's  speeches  and presentations,  the  German public  could  experience,  the  project  of 
African civilization,  as close as possible and an enthusiasm for new German projects  in Africa 
swept through the capital.
The Conference
While the papers had already introduced the various topics of the conference over several days, the 
first official communication started with the publication of Bismarck’s opening speech which set 
the tone for the whole event. Given Stanley's presence and the ubiquitous rhetoric of civilization, 
the media-savvy Bismarck decided to strike a more civilizational tone. He originally wanted to refer 
to  the  successful  introduction  of  Christian  civilization,  but  later  decided  to  drop  this  allusion, 
presumably because of the Ottoman presence.91
En conviant à la conférence le gouvernement Impérial a été guidé par la conviction que tous 
les  gouvernements  invités  partagent  le  désir  d'associer  les  indigènes  d'Afrique  à  la 
civilisation en ouvrant l'intérieur de ce continent au commerce, en fournissant à ses habitants 
les moyens de s'instruire, en encourageant les missions et les entreprises de nature à propager 
les connaissances utiles, et en préparant la supression de l'esclavage, surtout de la traite des 
89 “Stanley in Berlin,” Deutsche Kolonialzeitung 24 (1884): 481. 'If you ask me what we want, then I will tell you: 
we are happy to stretch out our hand to anybody, who wants to partake in the civilizing activities in a free Africa, 
but especially the Germans.'
90 Ibid., 483. The board of directors of the German colonial association has decided to make Henry Moreland 
Stanley an honorary member of its organization  in appreciation of his service to civilization in the exploration of 
the Congo, as the University of Halle has conferred onto him an honorary Doctorate in philosophy'.
91 Jörg Schildknecht, Bismarck, Südwestafrika und die Kongokonferenz: die völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen der 
effektiven Okkupation und ihre Nebenpflichten am Beispiel des Erwerbs der ersten deutschen Kolonie (Münster: 
LIT Verlag, 1999), 295.
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noirs, dont l'abolition graduelle fut déjà proclamée au Congrès de Vienne de 1815, comme 
un devoir sacré de toutes les puissances.92
Most of the pro-colonial papers carried his speech and the Deutsche Kolonialzeitung also published 
it at the next possible opportunity, interpreting it as as an indication of Germany’s new colonial path 
and the positive future, civilization would have in Africa93 
Despite  the  public  enthusiasm  for  civilization,  inside  the  conference,  previous  rivalries  of 
civilizational  questions  continued  unabated.  The  Portuguese  delegate  Penafiel  stressed  the 
importance  of  Portugal  for  the  spread  of  civilization  in  Africa:  'Vous  savez  Messieurs  que  le 
Portugal a introduit les germes de la civilisation en Afrique, vous connaissez aussi les sacrifices 
qu'il s'est imposé pour arriver a l'entière suppression de la traite dans ses territoires.'94 This was 
undoubtedly a snide remark dedicated to the British representatives, whose Liberal party had after 
all been responsible for the fact that Portugal could not just sign one treaty, but now had to fight for 
its possessions in European-wide forum. He added:
Il espère enfin voir les vœux émis par S. E. le Plénipotentaire de la Grande Bretagne pour 
que les indigènes profitent autant que possible des avantages de la civilisation, se réalisent 
d'une manière complète,  au moyen de l'extinction de la  traite  et  de l'esclavage,  les plus 
grands obstacles qui puissent être opposés aux progrès de cette civilisation sur les côtes de 
l'Afrique.95
Similar tactics were pursued by the American representative Kasson. Slightly awkwardly for such a 
gathering, Kasson was unwilling to address the other diplomats in French and instead harangued the 
delegates in English that it had been an American citizen, Stanley who had brought the light of 
civilization to central Africa, an action that in itself justified the US presence at the conference.96
92 Jean Suret-Canale and Frank Th. Gatter, eds., Protocoles et Actes Generale de La Conference de Berlin. 1884-
1885 (Bremen: Übersee Museum Bremen, 1984), 66. 'In setting up this conference, the imperial government was 
guided by the belief that all the invited governments share the desire to enable the African natives access to 
civilization, by opening the interior of the continent to trade, providing its inhabitants with the means of 
education, encouraging missions and companies likely to propagate useful knowledge, and to prepare the 
suppression of slavery, especially the slave trade, the gradual abolition of which had already been proclaimed at 
the Congress of Vienna 1815, as a sacred duty of all the powers.'
93 “Westafrikanische Konferenz Zu Berlin,” Deutsche Kolonialzeitung 1 (1884): 1–6.




While these statements were possibly annoying yet benevolent, it was the Italian contribution to the 
problem of  civilization  which  would  occupy the  conference  for  several  sessions  and  arguably 
showed the distinctions in their understanding of civilization most profoundly. The first sessions 
could  be  used  by  various  delegates  to  make  amendments  to  the  draft  declaration  which  the 
secretariat  had  provided.  The  Italian  representative,  de  Launay,  was  unhappy with  the  neutral 
depiction of civilization in the sixth paragraph of the draft, which read:
Toutes  les  Puissances  exerçant  des  droits  de  souveraineté  ou  une  influence  dans  lesdits 
territoires, prendront l'obligation de concourir à la suppression de l'esclavage et surtout de la 
traite  des  noirs,  de favoriser et  d'aider  les  travaux des missions et  toutes  les  institutions 
servant à instruire les indigènes et à leur faire comprendre et apprécier les avantages de la 
civilisation..97
A specific mention of scientists and christian missionaries was missing, the Italian representative 
claimed. De Launay insisted that no distinction would be drawn between Catholics and Protestants. 
It purely aimed at showing their importance for the idea of civilisation. The impact of his proposal 
was probably less impressive than de Launay had hoped for,  as the general  discussion quickly 
moved on to other topics. Along with all the other proposals, de Launay's amendment would be 
handled by a commission which would decide on the details of Article VI.
On 27 November, the negotiations to article VI were opened again to the delegates themselves and 
de Launay affirmed the point he had tried to make before. This time, however, he elaborated on why 
he  thought  it  was  important  to  mention  scientists,  Christian  missionaries  and  their  service  to 
civilisation:
C’est aux savants, aux explorateurs, dit le Comte de Launay, que nous sommes redevables 
des  merveilleuses  découvertes  faites  dans  ces  dernières  années  en  Africque.  Les 
missionnaires  prêtent,  de  leur  côté,  un  précieux  concours  pour  gagner  ces  pays  a  la 
civilisation inséparable de la religion. Il est de notre devoir de les encourager, de les protéger 
tous, dans leur recherches et expéditions présentes ou ultérieures, et dans un œuvre ou leurs 
efforts se combinent et se complètent. Bien des pays ont fourni un glorieux contingent. Leurs 
noms sont presentés à notre mémoire. Pour ce qui concerne l'Italie, son excellence cite entre 
97 Ibid., 72. 'All the Powers exercising rights sovereignty or influence in those territories, are obliged to contribute 
to the abolition of slavery and especially the slave trade, to promote and assist the work of missions and all 
institutions serving to educate the natives and make them understand and appreciate the benefits of civilization.'
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autres  ceux  de  Massaia,  Cecchi,  Antinori,  Bianchi,  Chiarini,  Antonelli,  Gessi,  Casati, 
Matteucci,  Comtoni,  Piaggia,  Sapeto,  Borghese,  massari,  Giulletti,  Salimbeni,  Colaci, 
Dabbene, Pippo, Naretti, Sacconi, etc. etc.98
The other delegates were skeptical at what appeared as another attempt to specifically mention the 
Italian contribution to civilization. The secretary of the conference, Busch, suggested to add this 
statement to some other article, but not to the declaration itself. Other amendments brought in at the 
same time did not suffer from similar problems, as a proposal by the British representative to insert 
a line on freedom of religious practice was immediately accepted.
De Launay must have known why the rest of the conference reacted so awkwardly to his proposal. 
There were two major problems with it. The first, although virtually unmentioned, was the state 
religion  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Despite  being  invited  late  and  having  been  denigrated  as  an 
opponent of civilization by the then British prime minister, the Ottoman Empire was, for all intents 
and purposes, a civilized state. In fact the status of the Ottoman Empire would be asserted by the  
conference at a later stage.99 It would therefore have been a minor diplomatic affront to specifically 
mention the christian connection to civilization, despite the fact that most of the other delegates 
probably  assumed  it.  The  second  issue  concerned  the  other  European  states,  which  had  very 
diverging approaches to religion. As the Belgian representative Lambermont noted, it  would be 
difficult  to  convince  the  states  in  Europe  with  a  more  secular  agenda  to  agree  to  support  the 
religious  missions  directly.100 Lambermont  was  right,  Gladstone  had  been  fighting  against  the 
church for a while and in the motherland of civilisation, Ferry was working hard to push back the 
influence of the church on public education and the public sphere more generally, and the official 
French  mission  of  civilization  diverged  quite  dramatically  from  those  advocated  by  French 
Catholics.101
The proposal went back to the commission and it  was again impossible to reach unanimity on 
98 Ibid., 83. 'It is to scholars and explorers, said the Count de Launay, we owe the wonderful discoveries made in 
recent years in Africa. Missionaries, in their own way help to win these countries for civilization which is 
inseparable from religion. It is our duty to encourage them, to protect them all, in their research and expeditions 
now or in the future, and where their work and efforts combine and complement each other. Many countries have 
provided a glorious contingent. Their names are present in our memory. Regarding italy, his excellency cites 
those of Massaia, Cecchi, Antinori, Bianchi, Chiarini, Antonelli, Gessi, Casati, Matteucci, Comtoni, Piaggia, 
Sapeto, Borghese, Massari, Giulletti, Salimbeni, Colaci, Dabbene Pippo, Naretti, Sacconi, etc.. etc..'
99 Ibid., 101–102.
100 Ibid., 90.
101 Ahmet T. Kuru, Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 146; see J.P. Daughton, An Empire Divided: Religion, 
Republicanism, and the Making of French Colonialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
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anything  relating  to  Christian  missionaries,  so  a  new  wording  was  recommended  which  just 
contained the word missionaries. It left out the fact, which de Launay had wanted to stress, that they 
had to be christian. Although this diplomatically appeared as a wise choice, de Launay was unhappy 
and when the next session started, he resumed his efforts. At first he merely summed up what the 
Commission had already decided:
Le Comte  de  Launay fait  connaitre  que  les  mots  ‘les  missionnaires’ ont  été  inscrits  au 
paragraphe 2 de l’article à la suite de la demande qu’il en a faite à la Commission. Il avait 
d’abord désiré que l’on écrivit : “Les missionnaires chrétiens’’ mais après avoir pris part à la 
dernière  séance,  il  a  du  se  convaincre  que,  pour  l’assurer  l’unanimité  des  voix  à  la 
proposition, il fallait s’abstenir d’une désignation plus précise à l’égard des missionnaires.102
He went on to suggest that since it was obvious that only Christian missionaries were going to be 
active  in  the  areas  the  Conference  was  considering,  he  would  have  still  liked  to  have  them 
mentioned in a separate part of Article VI.
A period of confused discussion ensued about the exact formulation, which revealed both the lack 
of unanimity about which civilization was to be imported in Africa, but also the strength of Ottoman 
claims to civilization. In recent years, much has been written about an Ottoman civilizing mission, 
with most literature on the topic emphasizing the claims to civilization the Ottoman Empire was 
making about certain groups living inside its boundaries.103 Yet, the Ottoman civilizing mission was 
felt even at the heart of what is often presented as the most European of gatherings. In a moment of  
silence, interrupting intense discussion, the Ottoman representative, Said Pasha, announced that no 
declaration  would  be  passed  that  merely  mentioned  Christian  civilization  as:  'il  doit  être  bien 
entendu  que  s'il  se  produisait  des  missions  religieuses  musulmanes  elles  bénéficieraient  d'une 
protection égale à celles dont jouirent les mission chrétiennes.'104  Without the agreement of the 
Ottoman Empire, and given the general scepticism towards de Launay's proposition, his suggestions 
102 Suret-Canale and Gatter, Protocoles de Berlin, 96. 'Count de Launay made it be known that the words “'the 
missionaries” had been included in paragraph 2 of the article following the request he made to the Commission. 
At first he had wished that one wrote: 'the Christian missionaries' but after taking part at the last meeting, he had 
to convince himself that to assure the unanimity with respect to the proposal, one should refrain from a more 
precise designation with respect to the missionaries.'
103 Selim Deringil, “‘They Live in a State of Nomadism’ : The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 45, no. 02 (2003): 311–42; Birgit Schäbler, “Globale Moderne und 
die Geburt der Zivilisationsmission an der kulturellen Binnengrenze: die mission civilisatrice ottomane,” in 
Westasien und die Moderne, ed. Birgit Schäbler (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2003), 9–29.
104 Suret-Canale and Gatter, Protocoles de Berlin, 99. 'it must be understood that if at some point a Muslim mission 
should materialize that that it would benefit from the same protection as those granted to the Christian mission.' 
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for an amendment would not be the main feature of article VI. The Ottoman and the other European 
representatives, however, did agree that it could form a (completely irrelevant) sub-clause. 
After extended haggling and debate, Article VI, promising civilization to the inhabitants of Africa 
would be the most confused one the conference passed. The final version of the Acte général was a 
mutant of several resistances and compromises. It started off with the original German proposition:
All  the  Powers  exercising  sovereign  rights  or  influence  in  the  aforesaid  territories  bind 
themselves  to  watch  over  the  preservation  of  the  native  tribes,  and  to  care  for  the 
improvement  of  the  conditions  of  their  moral  and  material  well-being,  and  to  help  in 
suppressing slavery, and especially the slave trade. They shall, without distinction of creed or 
nation, protect and favour all religious, scientific or charitable institutions and undertakings 
created  and  organized  for  the  above  ends,  or  which  aim at  instructing  the  natives  and 
bringing home to them the blessings of civilization.
It  continued  by then  integrating  de  Launay's  suggestion:  'Christian  missionaries,  scientists  and 
explorers, with their followers, property and collections, shall likewise be the objects of especial 
protection.' De Launay might have been happy with this addition, but from a point of internationa 
law it was completely irrelevant. In the end, article VI protected a potential Muslim mission, as 
much as any Christian or secular initiative.
The final  version  of  article  VI.  should  therefore  not  be  read  as  a  clear  insistence  on  western, 
Christian civilization. It is a surprisingly secular and pragmatic part of a document, which, although 
it  inscribed the idea of civilization officially in international law, cannot be seen as merely the 
product of the ideology of western powers. Indeed, as I have insisted throughout this chapter, it is  
wrong to read the 1880s as a time period of civilizational unanimity, as in Berlin, but also in the 
other capitals of Europe, the idea of civilization was heavily discussed and criticized. In fact, one 
might argue, that the high-time of liberal civilizational idealism had already passed, as the 1880s 
started and that with the last decade of the nineteenth century, that I will explore in the next two 
chapters, the fragmentation and slow dissolution of the idea of civilization continued. Needless to 
say, I do not suggest that the politics of civilization did not have often catastrophic consequences, 
but merely that the picture of a monolithic ideology that sustained it is in need of revision.
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Chapter 6. Civilization in Danger: The 'Yellow Peril' and the Hague 
Conference (1890s)
Introduction
The last decade of the nineteenth century has often been described as marking a fundamental rift in 
the  international  sphere,  which  arguably  developed  an  ever-more  competitive  and  aggressive 
character.1 While  most  commentators  agree  that  this  was  a  pan-European  or  even  global 
phenomenon, Germany is most often adduced as a case in point. The newly formed nation-state's 
bid for power on a global scale from around 1890 referred to by the young emperor Wilhelm II and 
his entourage as  Weltpolitik,  has served in popular interpretations of German history as the most 
crucial episode of the larger paradigm of the Sonderweg.2 The great post-war historians of Germany, 
Fritz Stern, George Mosse and Hans Rosenberg can be seen as the originators of a still  largely 
accepted  master-narrative  of  a  country  that  politically  and  culturally  slid  away  from  the 
international  community.3 In  such  interpretations,  the  dichotomy  between  German  Kultur  and 
western Zivilisation that was allegedly gaining ground in Germany at the time, serves as the cultural 
background for  this  political  alienation.  From a  cultural  insistence  on singular,  deep  Kultur  as 
opposed  to superficial  civilization,  a  logical  narrative  can  be  built  which  directly  links  a  late 
nineteenth century disenchantment with modernity and First World War propaganda. 
As I seek to show in the first part of this chapter, such interpretations are in need of revision. While 
German foreign policy undoubtedly led to a process of international alienation, this development 
was not connected to the rise of a dichotomous separation between culture and civilization. In fact, I 
1 Richard Langhorn, The Collapse of the Concert of Europe, 1890-1914 (London: Macmillan, 1981); Barbara W. 
Tuchman, The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World Before the War, 1890-1914 (New York: Random House, 
2011); Henry Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890-
1930 (New York: Transaction Publishers, 2002); Robert Wolfson and John Laver, Years of Change: European 
History, 1890-1990, 3rd ed. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2001); Paul Hayes, Themes in Modern European 
History, 1890-1945 (London: Routledge, 1992).
2 Dieter Hertz-Eichenrode, Deutsche Geschichte 1890-1918: das Kaiserreich in der Wilhelminischen Zeit 
(Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1996); Konrad Canis, Von Bismarck zur Weltpolitik: deutsche Aussenpolitik 1890 bis  
1902 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1997); Gregor Schöllgen, “Die Großmacht als Weltmacht. Idee, Wirklichkeit 
und Perzeption Deutscher ‘Weltpolitik’ im Zeitalter des Imperialismus,” Historische Zeitschrift 248, no. 1 
(1989): 79–100; Peter Walkenhorst, Nation – Volk – Rasse: Radikaler Nationalismus im Deutschen Kaiserreich 
1890–1914 (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011).
3 Fritz K. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890–1933 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969); Fritz Richard Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A 
Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961); George L. Mosse, 
The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964); 
Suzanne L. Marchand and David F. Lindenfeld, Germany at the Fin de Siecle: Culture, Politics, and Ideas 
(Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2004); Kevin Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of 
German Modernity: Anti-Politics and the Search for Alternatives, 1890-1914 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2000); Colin Loader, Alfred Weber and the Crisis of Culture, 1890-1933 (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012); R. Hinton Thomas, Nietzsche in German Politics and Society, 1890-1918 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1983).
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argue, although such distinctions were advocated on the fringes of German society, they cannot be 
seen as widely successfully until 1899, when they first received major attention through the work of 
Stewart  Houston  Chamberlain.  Indeed,  throughout  the  1890s,  the  largest  Europe-wide  debate 
featuring civilizational vocabulary – to which the majority of this chapter is dedicated – discussions 
about the threat of militarism to civilization, were conducted in Germany in much the same way as  
in other European states. Far from opposing civilization as such, German-speakers, like all other 
Europeans,  were  embroiled  in  a  large  discussion  about  the  relationship  between  war  and 
civilization. While the later Nobel Peace Price winner, Bertha von Suttner, opposed the increasing 
militarization of European society with reference to older liberal tropes promising the end of war 
through a  rise  of  civilization,  military men  like  Moltke  saw civilization  endangered  through a 
potential absence of war. In these debates, which dominated not just the German-speaking countries 
but Europe in general, culture and civilization were hardly ever opposed, but merely the future and 
character of civilization disputed.
Where  German  discussions  did  differ  from  their  European  counterparts  was  the  widespread 
scepticism towards  the  international  regulation  of  conflict  in  the  name of  civilization,  and the 
acceptance of non-European countries as civilized members of the international sphere. As I show 
in the last two sections of this chapter, dealing with the discussions surrounding the Sino-Japanese 
war  and  the  Hague  Conference  respectively,  the  German  emperor  was  violently  opposed  to 
Japanese claims to civilization, which he perceived to be part of a wider alliance of Asian states  
threatening European civilization.  While  he was therefore seeing his  cousin Nicholas  II  as  the 
easternmost representative of Europe, opposing the yellow peril, he could not support the Tsar's 
suggestions of international peace talks in the name of civilization, which took place at the Hague in 
1899.  Considering  the  threatening  international  environment,  the  Kaiser  argued,  such  peace 
agreements were naïve and not worth the paper they were written on. In the peculiar sphere of 
German politics, even those more likely to be in favour of international agreements opposed them, 
albeit for entirely different reasons. German socialists, who formed a significant part of the German 
peace movement, were also not convinced of Russian pronouncements. To their leaders, Russia was 
still  a  despotic  and tyrannical  country and any Russian idea of civilization to  be seen as mere 
propaganda.
Discussing Culture and Civilization
Some form of a distinction between culture and civilization had been advocated by various fringe 
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groups in German society for almost the whole nineteenth century, but these were not widely spread 
and certainly not a majority opinion. As Breuer has argued, the groups that were most strongly 
advocating a distinction between  Zivilisation/Kultur  at the end of the nineteenth century,  like the 
circle surrounding the writer and poet Stefan George, were certainly not at the intellectual centre of 
the German Empire.4 Breuer does not seem to suggest that such a distinction was unknown to other 
sections of German society; it was just not as widely spread as many have previously assumed.  
Although  Breuer's  article  is  predominantly  concerned  with  those  who  actually  advocated  a 
distinction, his assertion is borne out by contributions of those who were not part of the circles he 
has  studied.  Other  writers  around  the  same  time  were  not  advocating  a  distinction  between 
Kultur/Zivilisation. They were merely interested in the actual use of both words, like the Jesuit 
Nostitz-Rieneck whose work has recently received more attention.5 Just a year after the publication 
of Toennies's Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft,  Nostitz-Rieneck addressed similar issues in his Das 
Problem der Cultur.6 In many ways, the Jesuit intellectual noted the same problems in German 
society that Toennies sought to put his finger on. He even interpreted what he saw as an increasing 
use of  Kultur  as a symptom of dramatic changes. He disagreed, however, that these could be, or 
were framed as an opposition between Zivilisation/Kultur:
Manche  meinen,  Cultur  und  Civilisation  ständen  in  einem  ähnlichen  Gegensatze  wie 
wirthschaftlicher Wohlstand und geistige Bildung. So berechtigt diese Auffassung scheinen 
mag,  so  kann  sie  für  uns  schon  darum  nicht  die  leitende  sein,  weil  der  gegenwärtige 
Sprachgebrauch von so enger Verwendung des Wortes Cultur sich sehr weit entfernt, und 
vielmehr dahin zielt dem Worte Cultur wie die weiteste Anwendung so auch die weiteste 
Bedeutung zu geben. Ja was man früher fast ausschliesslich Civilisation nannte, Bildung des 
Geistes, Feinheit der Sitten, das heisst heute fast vorzugsweise Cultur.7
4 Stefan Breuer, “Späte Barbaren. Kultur und Zivilisation im kaiserlichen Deutschland,” in Politik-Verfassung-
Gesellschaft: Traditionslinien und Entwicklungsperspektiven. Otwing Massing zum 60. Geburtstag (Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995), 35–50.
5 See the various contributions in Rüdiger Vom Bruch, Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, and Gangolf Hübinger, eds., 
Kultur und Kulturwissenschaften um 1900: Krise der Moderne und Glaube an die Wissenschaft (Stuttgart: Franz 
Steiner Verlag, 1989); Andrea Seier, “‘Überall Cultur und kein Ende’. Zur diskursiven Konstitution von Kultur 
um 1900,” in Der Gesellschaftskörper. Zur Neuordnung von Kultur und Geschlecht um 1900, ed. Andrea Seier, 
Hannelore Bublitz, and Christine Hanke (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag, 2000), 112–78.
6 Robert v. Nostitz-Rieneck, Das Problem der Cultur (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 
1888); Seier, “‘Überall Cultur und kein Ende’. Zur diskursiven Konstitution von Kultur um 1900.”
7 Nostitz-Rieneck, Das Problem der Cultur, 5. 'Some think that culture and civilization stand in a similar 
opposition to each other as economic welfare and intellectual culture. As right as this idea may seem, we cannot 
interpret culture in such a way as the current use of language is very far from such a specific use of this word. 
Indeed, the current trend is to give the word culture, both the widest application as well as meaning. What we 
used to, almost exclusively, call civilization: intellectual culture, refinement of manners, that is today 
predominantly known as culture.'
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Nostitz-Rieneck was right in that the 'gegenwärtige Sprachgebrauch' of the 1890s did not include a 
frequent  distinction  between  Kultur/Zivilisation,  a  phenomenon  that  would  only  touch  larger 
sections of German society in the early twentieth century.
Throughout  the  1890s,  next  to  nothing  was  written  about  the  allegedly  pervasive  distinction 
between  Zivilisation/Kultur until  Stewart  Houston  Chamberlain  took  this  distinction  up  in  his 
bestseller Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts,  a book that deeply impacted German 
ideas of Zivilisation.8 To claim that Chamberlain's book was widely successful would be a severe 
underestimation. Finished in 1898, it went through several editions before 1910, and by 1914 had 
sold 60.000 copies.9 The impact of Chamberlain's book cannot be measured merely in copies sold. 
Chamberlain's close connection to the emperor Wilhelm II, who was smitten with his work and kept 
in correspondence until the end of his life, enabled Chamberlain a cultural impact far beyond the 
likes of Toennies. As the German-born British Nietzsche scholar Oscar Levy remembered in 1914: 
'Mr Chamberlain's book […] has become the bible of modern Germany. It was freely distributed, as 
bibles usually are, all over the fatherland by no less a personage than the German emperor himself, 
who had a copy of this book sent to every school.'10 Although by no means primarily concerned 
with the difference between  Kultur/Zivilisation,  Chamberlain advocated such a distinction as he 
contrasted the true Kultur of a small and homogenous society with what he called Zivilisation, the 
dubious effects of modernity on national communities:
Was ausserhalb dieses mikrokosmischen Kulturlebens steht, ist lediglich 'Civilisation', das 
heisst, ein beständig höher potenziertes, zunehmend emsigeres, bequemeres und unfreieres 
Ameisenstaatendasein, gewiss reich an Segen und insofern wünschenswert, eine Gabe der 
Zeiten jedoch, bei welcher es häufig  überaus fraglich bleibt,  ob das Menschengeschlecht 
nicht mehr dafür bezahlt als erhält. Civilisation ist an und für sich nichts, denn es bezeichnet 
nur ein Relatives.11
8 Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, vol. 1, 2 vols. (Munich: 
Verlagsanstalt F. Bruckmann A.G., 1899).
9 William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2011), 107.
10 Peter Hoeres, Krieg der Philosophen: die deutsche und britische Philosophie im Ersten Weltkrieg (Paderborn: 
Verlag Ferdinand Schoehning, 2004), 198.
11 Chamberlain, Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, 1:62. 'What lies outside of this microcosmic 
cultural life is merely 'civilization', which means an ever increasing, ever more industrious, ever more 
comfortable, and ever less free state of ants. It is certainly rich in blessings and therefore desirable, but it is a gift 
of the times which raises the question, whether the human race is not paying more than it gains. Civilization is in 
itself nothing, because it only refers to something relative.'
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While the immediate influence of books is practically impossible to prove, and other factors, as I  
will  show  in  the  next  chapter,  certainly  enabled  the  spread  of  such  a  distinction,  the  direct 
contemporary  references  to  Chamberlain's  work  speak  for  themselves.  Although  some actively 
ignored the distinctions Chamberlain was drawing between Kultur/Zivilisation, others specifically 
focused  on  it,  and  Chamberlain  became  seen  as  their  main  representative.12 While  it  was 
unsurprising that the Bayreuther Blätter described Chamberlain's distinction in more detail, leading 
German newspapers like the Grenzboten also reviewed Chamberlain's work and specifically lauded 
him for taking a firm stance on what was a 'schwankender Sprachgebrauch': 
 
Für sehr verdienstlich müssen wir es erklären, daß Chamberlain den Unterschied zwischen 
Zivilisation und Kultur scharf  hervorhebt,  und doppelt  freut  es uns,  daß er auch in  dem 
bekanntlich schwankenden Sprachgebrauch mit  uns übereinstimmt;  wie wir  nennt  er  das 
Niedere, das Technische Zivilisation, das Höhere Kultur.13
While the Grenzboten insisted on the changing usage around 1900, throughout the early twentieth 
century this  distinction was often attributed to Chamberlain himself.  Hans Weicker,  part  of the 
German  colonial  administration  in  China,  claimed  in  1908  that  the  distinction  between 
Kultur/Zivilisation  was  the  most  important  contribution  of  Chamberlain's  book:  'Was  H.  St. 
Chamberlains viel gelesene “Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts” so wertvoll macht, ist eben 
dies, dass darin Zivilisation und Kultur jedes für sich gewürdigt wird, und dass sie immer als zwei 
ganz  verschiedene Dinge scharf  auseinandergehalten  werden.'14 Heinrich  Driesman in  his  book 
emblematically entitled  Wege zur Kultur,  similarly argued:  'Zu jüngst hat es H. St. Chamberlain 
unternommen,  durch  scharfe  Unterscheidung  von  Kultur  und  Zivilisation  die  allseitig  richtige 
Erfassung des Begriffes zu gewinnen.'15 Such instances do not suggest that a distinction between 
Kultur/Zivilisation  did not exist before, or that Chamberlain himself had invented the dichotomy. 
12 Arthur Drews, Die Grundlagen der geistigen und materiellen Kultur der Gegenwart (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 
1899), 1.
13 W. Golther, “Die Germanen,” Bayreuther Blätter 23 (1900): 336–40; “Entwicklung und Fortschritt, Zivilisation 
und Kultur,” Die Grenzboten: Zeitschrift für Literatur, Politik und Kunst, 1900, sec. Volkswirthschaft, 
Rechtspflege, Schule und Kirche, 242. 'We find it admirable that Chamberlain sharply emphasizes the distinction 
between culture and civilization. We are even more happy that, given today's fluctuating parlance, he agrees with 
us, calling the low and technical aspects of life, civilization, and the higher: culture.'
14 Hans Weicker, Kiautscho. Das deutsche Schutzgebiet in Ostasien (Berlin: Verlagsbuchhandlung Alfred Schall, 
1908), 174. 'What makes H. St. Chamberlain's widely read "Foundations of the Nineteenth Century so valuable, 
is precisely that civilization and culture are treated separately, and are kept separately as two entirely different 
things.'
15 Heinrich Driesmans, Wege zur Kultur: Grundlinien zur Verinnerlichung und Vertiefung des deutschen 
Kulturlebens (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1910), 7. 'Recently Stewart Houston Chamberlain has attempted to reach the 
correct definition of culture and civilization through a complete separation of the two.'
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They show, instead,  that  amongst  wider  circles  of  the German population,  this  distinction  was 
mainly attributed to a book only published in 1899.
Nonetheless, such a distinction only continued to spread slowly in the early twentieth century and 
many  of  those  who  started  to  advocate  radical  civilizational  dichotomies  acknowledged  the 
influence of Chamberlain on their work. In 1904, the young doctoral student Alexander Koch, who 
was writing his thesis with the neo-idealist Rudolph Eucken, was still unsure about the spread of 
civilizational dichtomies:
Das Wort “Kultur” wird oft gleichbedeutend mit Zivilisation gebraucht, oft aber auch im 
scharfen Gegensatze dazu. Da man für ein und dieselbe Sache nicht zwei Ausdrücke nötig 
hat,  so  wäre  es  wünschenswert,  wenn  sich  eine  unterschiedliche  Nutzung  beider  im 
Sprachgebrauch fixieren wollte.  Aber leider ist  für eine solche Fixierung wenig Aussicht 
vorhanden, da gerade diejenigen, welche zwischen Kultur und Zivilisation scharf scheiden, 
sich untereinander zum Teil in diametralem Widerspruch befinden.16
Koch was probably correct that Chamberlain's distinction, even by 1904, had not spread to include 
all  of those concerned with the topic.  Around the same time, however, many of those who did 
advocate  a  distinction  admitted  their  indebtedness  to  Chamberlain.  The  historian  and  traveller 
Albrecht  Wirth,  whose  studies  strongly  focused  on  a  distinction  between  Kultur/Zivilisation 
mentioned  Chamberlain's  influence  on  him  several  times.17 Two  years  later,  Moeller  van  den 
Bruck's  Die Zeitgenossen,  famously analysed in Stern's  study  The Politics of  Cultural Despair,  
dedicated two sections to both Chamberlain and the distinction between Kultur/Zivilisation.18 The 
same year,  the  disturbing best-seller  Der Kaiser  und die  Zukunft  des  deutschen Volkes,  by the 
cultural critic and Nietzsche enthusiast Georg Fuchs, lauded Chamberlain and employed a clear 
distinction between Kultur and Zivilisation as he had advocated:
Die  'moderne  Zivilisation'  vernichtet  die  Volkstümer.  […]  Nur  wo  der  unbezähmbare 
16 Alexander Koch, “Philosophische Erörterungen über die Stellung der Geschichtswissenschaften” (PhD diss., 
Gesamtuniversitaet Jena, 1904), 9.'The word "culture" is often used synonymously with civilization, but equally 
often in sharp contrast. Since one does not require two words for one and the same thing, it would be desirable if 
a differential use would become fixed in common parlance. Yet, unfortunately, there is very little hope for such 
an undertaking, since it is precisely those who differentiate culture and civilization most sharply, who differ most 
amongst themselves about their definitions.'
17 Albrecht Wirth, Volkstum Und Weltmacht in Der Geschichte (Munich: Bruckmann, 1904).
18 Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Die Zeitgenossen: Die Geister - Die Menschen (Minden i.W.: J.C.C. Bruns, 
1906), 6–19, 99–102.
174
Machtwille einer Rasse sich weigert, wo er sich zum Meister aufwirft über jenes Ungeheuer, 
das in dem Gelehrten-Rotwelsch mit dem Fachausdrucke 'Zivilisation' belegt wird und es 
durch die Vergewaltigungen seiner Umarmungen zwingt, in den Rhythmen, in den Formen 
sich zu bewegen, welche dem Blute dieser Herrenrasse und diesem allein eigen sind: nur da 
bleibt Volksthum, nur da bleibt Kultur.19
By the  end  of  the  first  decade  of  the  new  century,  Germans  and  international  commentators 
recognized a clearly German distinction between Kultur and Zivilisation. The left wing and social 
reformer Gertrud Bäumer expressed her criticism of modernity writing that in Germany: 'It could 
probably be summed up with this formula: the difficulties of our modern culture lie in the fact that 
today  Kultur  and  Zivilisation  have fallen into a kind of hostile anti-thesis.'20 The same year, the 
Swedish  sociologist  and  politician  Steffen,  while  admitting  that  some  were  advocating  similar 
distinctions  in  other  countries,  presented  the  phenomenon  of  a  distinction  between 
Kultur/Zivilisation as a predominantly German one.21 Another two years later, Ernst D. Richard, 
ironically  named  'Lecturer  in  German  Civilization'  at  Columbia  University,  explained  to  his 
audience, with the certainty of a scientist: 
The Germans make a clear distinction between civilization and culture. Under the former 
term they include the external relations of men to each other and to nature as expressed in 
the organization of society and material progress. Culture, on the other hand, refers to the 
development of the inner, the higher forces of men, as expressed in philosophy, science, art 
and religion.22
Today, as I have shown in the first chapter, this distinction has become seen as an almost perennial  
one. In the early twentieth century, however, many could still remember when it was not as clear 
cut.  As  the  sociologist  and  later  Nazi-supporter  Max  Hildebert  Böhm put  it  in  1916:  'Erst  in 
allerjüngster  Zeit  ringt  sich  im allgemeinen  Bewusstsein  eine  Scheidung  zwischen  Kultur  und 
19 Georg Fuchs, Der Kaiser und die Zukunft des deutschen Volkes, 3rd ed. (Munich: Georg Mueller, 1906), 63. 
'Modern civilization' destroys the culture of peoples. ( ... ) Only where the indomitable will to power of a race 
refuses to abide, where it turns itself into the master of this monster, which in common academic parlance is 
referred to by the technical expression civilization, and where it seeks to force it, through its embrace, into the 
natural movement of the blood of this 'Herrenrasse', only there the culture of this people, and culture in general, 
will prevail.'
20 Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity, 135.
21 Gustaf Fredrik Steffen, Lebensbedingungen moderner Kultur. Sozialphilosophische, soziologische und 
sozialpolitische Studien (Jena: G. Fischer, 1909), 58–60.




Saving Civilization from War
In the early 1890s, when Germans, like all other Europeans, were gripped by a large debate about 
the  threatening  rise  of  militarism,  the  distinctions  Böhm  was  talking  about were  practically 
unknown.  Organizations dedicated to the spreading of peace had existed for a long time. Their 
growth had intensified after the 1848 Revolutions, but it was the decade of the 1890s that saw their  
wide and global proliferation.24 1889 became the annus mirabilis of international efforts for peace, 
as the foundation of the International Parliamentary Union coincided with the first Universal Peace 
Congress in  Paris  and the publication of Bertha v.  Suttner's  pacifist  world-wide best-seller  Die 
Waffen nieder.25 In the book, the later Nobel Peace Price winner recounted the life of the fictional 
Martha, whose existence is marred by the destruction and terror of the wars of nineteenth century 
nationalism, to which she (directly or indirectly) loses two husbands, her sisters, and a brother. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the personal tragedies that dominate her life, Martha, a pacifist and 
feminist heroine, continues to support classic liberal doctrine of the abolition of war. It was Buckle 
– whose work enjoyed a period of renaissance in the 1890s after his quick fall from grace – she 
recounts, that first introduced her to the classically liberal position on war.26 Buckle, Martha told her 
readers:
führt den Nachweis, dass das Ansehen des Kriegerstandes im umgekehrten Verhältnis zur 
Kulturhöhe eine Volkes steht. […] Er betont, dass im Fortschritt der Gesellschaft, mehr noch 
als der Krieg selber, die Liebe zum Krieg im Schwinden begriffen sei. Das war mir aus der 
Seele gesprochen.27
Throughout  the  book,  the  heroine's  liberal  perspective  is  confronted  with  the  ideas  of  military 
necessity as  well  as with a  general  inability to see a  larger  civilizational  argument.  As Martha 
remembers one of several conversations: 'ich teilte ihm die von Buckle aufgestellten Betrachtungen 
23 Max Hildebert Böhm, Der Sinn der humanistischen Bildung (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer, 
1916), 5.'Only in very recent times, a distinction between culture and civilization starts to prevail.' 
24 David Cortright, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
38–40; Sandi E. Cooper, “Pacifism in France, 1889-1914: International Peace as a Human Right,” French 
Historical Studies 17, no. 2 (October 1, 1991): 359–86.
25 Bertha von Suttner, Die Waffen nieder!, vol. 1, 2 vols. (Dresden: E. Pierson, 1899). 'Lay down your arms!'
26 John Mackinnon Robertson, Buckle and His Critics. A Study in Sociology (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 
1895); George Stocking, Victorian Anthropology (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 110–143.
27 Suttner, Die Waffen nieder!, 1:71–72. 'proves that there is a negative correlation between the general level of 
culture in a country and the appreciation of men-of-war. He asserts that with the progress of society not just war 
itself but also the love of war diminishes. I found myself in total agreement.'
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über den mit steigender Civilisation abnehmenden Kriegsgeist mit – diese Reden passten nicht für 
die Ohren des Generals Althaus.'28
Suttner's  fictionalized  struggle  of  a  pacifist  against  the  military establishment  was  enormously 
successful, primarily because it was based on European reality.  Indeed, the later decades of the 
nineteenth century were dominated by a struggle between what Best has termed a 'pro war' and an 
'anti-war' party.29 Already in 1890, the famous legal scholar at the university of Heidelberg, Jellinek, 
had noted in a lecture entitled 'Die Zukunft des Krieges': 
Über  den Krieg selbst  ist  nämlich,  seitdem die modernen Humanitätsideen zu herrschen 
begannen, ein heftiger literarischer Krieg entbrannt. Ob der Krieg ein Übel oder ein Gut für 
die Menschheit sei, ist von Staatsmännern, Feldherren, Politikern und Gelehrten untersucht 
worden. Begeisterte Friedensapostel stehen nicht minder begeisterten Anhängern des Krieges 
gegenüber.30
The war party gathered behind the statements of military men like Moltke, who since the 1840s had 
argued for the positive effects of war on human societies and civilization. Moltke's pronouncements 
had long been known, but they were epitomized in a published and oft-quoted letter he had written 
to Bluntschli, and in which he argued: 
Der ewige Friede ist ein Traum, und nicht einmal ein schöner, und der Krieg ist ein Glied in 
Gottes Weltordnung. In ihm entfalten sich die edelsten Tugenden des Menschen, Mut und 
Entsagung, Pflichttreue und Opferwilligkeit  mit  Einsetzung des Lebens.  Ohne den Krieg 
würde die Welt im Materialismus versumpfen.31
Moltke's  ideas  were  supported  by many in  the  military,  like  the  soldier  and writer  Albert  von 
Boguslawski who in his Der Krieg in seiner wahren Bedeutung für Staat und Volk had questioned 
28 I told him about Buckle's reflections on the diminishing war spirit with increasing civilization - these words did 
not please the ears of General Althaus.
29 Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare. The Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts (London: 
Methuen & Co., 1983).
30 Georg Jellinek, Die Zukunft des Krieges: Vortrag, gehalten in der Gehestiftung zu Dresden am 15. März 1890 
(Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1916), 5. 'A fierce literary war has broken out about war itself. The question 
of whether war is good or bad for humanity has been investigated by statesmen, generals, politicians and 
scholars. Enthusiastic apostles of peace are facing no less enthusiastic supporters of war.'
31 Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Denkwürdiges aus meinem Leben, vol. 3 Heidelberg (Nördlingen: Verlag der C.H. 
Beck’schen Buchhandlung, 1884), 471. 'Eternal peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful one. War is a link in 
God's world order and in it the noblest virtues of man, courage and self-denial, self-sacrifice and devotion to 
duty in life-threatening conditions, develop. Without war, the world would stagnate in materialism.'
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ideas about a pacifist future, and lauded the positive influence of conflict and war.32 While Moltke 
and Boguslawski saw war as a positive influence on human civilization, other writers opposed the 
idea that culture and civilization were something that could slowly prevail over the necessity of 
conflict.  The Austrian writer Binder-Krieglstein asked the readers of his 1895 publication if the 
demands made by authors like Bluntschli and Suttner could ever become part military thinking: 'Ist 
die Cultur und Civilisation der Massstab mit dem man Heere misst? Es scheint wohl nicht. Einzig 
die Brauchbarkeit für den Krieg kann dieser Massstab sein.'33 
Those opposing war, meanwhile, were getting their arguments from works in which the future of 
civilization  was  imagined  through  a  complete  absence  of  war  (like  the  works  of  Jan  Bloch), 
although their reasoning sometimes differed substantially.34 Some followed Buckle's and Suttner's 
ideas that the rise in civilization would convince ever larger sections of the public of the negative 
influence  of  war,  and  that  the  peoples  of  Europe  themselves  would  take  charge  against  the 
governments  sceptical  of  peaceful  solutions.  The  professor  of  international  law,  Komarowskii, 
explained to his German readers: 
Je mehr unsere Zivilisation fortschreitet,  in einem umso schreienderen Widerspruch stellt 
sich zu ihr der Krieg. [...]  Es ist möglich,  dass die Regierungen bei ihrer Scheu vor der 
Annahme der besprochenen Reformen beharren werden, doch wird die allgemeine Meinung 
im Stande sein sie zu bekehren, sofern sie nur einmüthig und energisch handelt.35
More radical elements of society also imagined the future of civilization as warless, but differed on 
how such a future was to be achieved. The marxist intellectual Georg Zepler, like many on the left, 
chastised the continuous existence of war in his  Die Sünden unserer Civilisation. In contrast to 
Komaroswkii, he imagined that these sins were only to be absolved through a larger revolution, 
32 A. von Boguslawski, Der Krieg in seiner wahren Bedeutung für Staat und Volk (Berlin: E.S. MIttler und Sohn, 
1892).
33 Carl Binder von Krieglstein, Friedens- und Kriegsmoral der Heere am Ausgange des XIX Jahrhunderts: eine 
Streitschrift (Vienna: Wihelm Braumüller, 1895), 18. 'Are culture and civilization the scale with which one 
measures armies? It does not seem so. Only the usefulness in times of war can be that scale.'
34 For Bloch's life and work see T.H.E. Travers, “Technology, Tactics, and Morale: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War, 
and British Military Theory, 1900-1914,” Journal of Modern History 51, no. 2 (1979): 264–86; Grant Dawson, 
“Preventing `a Great Moral Evil’: Jean de Bloch’s The Future of War as Anti-Revolutionary Pacifism,” Journal 
of Contemporary History 37, no. 1 (2002): 5–19; Ela Bauer, “Jan Gottlieb Bloch: Polish Cosmopolitism versus 
Jewish Universalism,” European Review of History: Revue Européenne D’histoire 17, no. 3 (2010): 415–29.
35 Leonid Aleksi︠e︡evich Kamarovskii, Über Die Friedensbestrebungen Der Völker. Die Abrüstungsfrage. Über 
Einige Internationale Kongresse Im Jahre 1889 (Berlin: Puttkammer & Mühlbrecht, 1890), 14.  'The more our 
civilization advances, the more it stands in clear opposition to war. (...) It is possible that the governments will 
remain hesistant in their adoption of the discussed reforms, but the general public will be able to convert them, 
provided that they act unanimously and vigorously.'
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with which war would become once and for all a thing of the past.36 While Zepler imagined a future 
revolution, which was to change the way the world worked, the Polish economist Jan Bloch argued 
that already the current capitalist political system had made war impossible. As he explained in his 
Europe-wide best-seller The Future of War. Is War Now Impossible?, the economic intricacies of the 
modern world, the continuous developments in military technology, and increased armaments had 
made war so ruinous to the economy at large that nobody should dare to engage in it.37
The debate on the benefits and pitfalls of war was an international one, although perhaps most 
heated in the German-speaking countries. In a world-wide and decade-long debate anthropological, 
social, and economic arguments for and against war clashed. And most of these considered positive 
and negative effects with a view to civilization as a whole.38 In Germany, this debate had reached 
the centre of the political discussion. Apart from Moltke, who had internationally become known 
for  his  pro-war  stance,  Germany's  most  rabid  war  campaigner  was  the  nationalist  historian 
Treitschke.  Treitschke  held  the  nation  to  be  the  essence  of  international  politics,  and  military 
engagements between them as essential for their well-being, as he argued in several best-selling 
publications.  He  had  famously  advocated  the  need  for  war  before  German  unification,  but 
continued his rhetoric even after it had been achieved. He believed in the necessity of war, and 
denounced the hope to rid the world of conflicts between nations as 'nicht nur sinnlos, sondern tief 
unsittlich.'39 It  was war that rescued nations from the fate  of 'Selbstsucht'  and that inspired the 
'Opfermut' of individuals. War was a 'Kernfrage der Staatswissenschaft'.40 Amongst his historian 
colleagues,  this  was  not  a  majority  opinion.  The  old  Theodor  Mommsen  confessed  he  found 
Treitschke's nationalism odious, an attitude of mind he described as 'Ausdruck sittlicher Verrohung 
die unsere Civilisation in Frage stellt.'41 Even in the Reichstag, some of Treitschke's successors saw 
36 Georg Zepler, Die Sünden unserer Civilisation (Berlin: Hugo Steinitz, 1893). 'The sins of our civilization'. 
37 I.S. Bloch, The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic and Political Relations. Is War Now Impossible? (New 
York: Doubleday & McClure Co., 1899).
38 S. B. Luce, “The Benefits of War,” The North American Review 153, no. 421 (1891): 672–83; S. C. Bushnell, 
“The ‘Invigorating Influence of War,’” The Advocate of Peace 58, no. 2 (1896): 38–39; W. P. Trent, “War and 
Civilization,” The Sewanee Review 8, no. 4 (1900): 385–98; W.D. Le Sueur, “War and Civilization,” Popular 
Science Monthly 48 (1896): 749–70; John M. Robertson, “The Moral Problems of War,” International Journal of  
Ethics 11, no. 3 (April 1, 1901): 273–90; D. G. Ritchie, “The Moral Problems of War-In Reply to Mr. J. M. 
Robertson,” International Journal of Ethics 11, no. 4 (July 1, 1901): 493–514; Alexander McKenzie, “If 
Civilization Advances, War Will Cease.,” The Advocate of Peace 66, no. 5 (1904): 86–87; Sebald Rudolf 
Steinmetz, Der Krieg Als Sociologisches Problem (Amsterdam: W. Versluys, 1889); J. Novikov, Der Krieg und 
seine angeblichen Wohltaten (Leipzig: August Schupp, 1896).
39 Heinrich von Treitschke, “Das constitutionelle Königthum in Deutschland,” in Historische und politische 
Aufsätze., vol. 2 (Leipzig: G. Hirzel, 1870), 768. 'not just pointless, but deeply immoral'
40 Ibid. 'self-indulgence'. 'the central question of political science'.
41 Quoted in Stefan Rebenich, Theodor Mommsen und Adolf Harnack: Wissenschaft und Politik im Berlin des 
ausgehenden 19. Jahrhunderts : mit einem Anhang, Edition und Kommentierung des Briefwechsels (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 71, 358.
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it  similarly.  Ernst  Harmening,  MP  for  the  Freisinnige,  heavily  criticizing  Treitschke's  ideas, 
advocated  opposing ideas  in  his  Das Recht  der  Völker  auf  Frieden in  which  he  presented  the 
'Ausbreitung der Civilisation' as a 'Gegengewicht' to the 'Übel des Krieges'.42
Amongst the peace movement, Treitschke's and Moltke's ideas were not only seen as questioning 
civilization, as Mommsen had argued, but directly opposing it. As Wilhelm Carl Becker, who would 
later become famous for his book  Der Nietzschekultus,  explained in his clearly entitled pacifist 
pamphlet  “Patriotismus”  contra  Civilisation!  Treitschke  was  'der  Apostel  des  rabiatesten, 
engherzigsten  Pseudopatriotismus'.43 Patriotism,  the  way  that  the  general  and  the  nationalist 
historian  understood it,  was  the  true 'Hemmschuh der  Civilisation',  and to  claim that  men like 
Moltke  were  great  thinkers  was  a  'lächerliche  Übertreibung'.44 The  passion  and desperation  of 
Becker's  arguments  for  his  understanding of  civilization was most  palpable in  his  ad hominem 
attacks. Moltke's 'sehr eng begrenzter geistiger Horizont', combined with Treitschke's 'dummdreister 
Arroganz' were the forebears of a complete destruction of civilization, because their arguments were 
pushing humanity away from the ideas and developments of universal peace and progress.45 
Despite his anger at particular war enthusiasts and their justifications for the continuation of war, 
Becker realized that these were merely the philosophical figure-heads of a much larger European 
development that he and many others referred to as militarism. No consensus existed as to what 
militarism actually meant. It was most commonly used to describe the increasing importance of 
military forces in Europe, specifically since the 1870s and the dangers involved with this increase in 
armaments.46 While the arguments Treitschke and Moltke were making for war could be seen as 
philosophically and morally sustaining the increase in European armaments, it is important not to 
draw any generalization, as there were in fact two different debates. Arguments about the necessity 
of  war  were,  for  the  most  part,  anthropological  debates  about  human  beings  (or  nations)  and 
differing conceptions of civilization. The debates about militarism referred to a very specific time 
period and development in European history. They were equally related to ideas of civilization. The 
42 Ernst Harmening, Das Recht der Völker auf Frieden (Breslau: Verlag von Leopold Freund, 1891), 37.
43 Wilhelm Carl Becker, Der Nietzschekultus: ein Kapitel aus der Geschichte der Verirrungen des menschlichen 
Geistes (Leipzig: Lipinski, 1908); Wilhelm Carl Becker, Patriotismus contra Civilisation!: der Völkerfriede: 
Betrachtungen über die gegenwärtigen internationalen politischen Zustände der Kulturstaaten und Ideen 
hinsichtlich der zukünftigen Gestaltung derselben (Zurich: Verlags-Magazin, 1893), 242. 'the apostle of the most 
violent and selfish pseudopatriotism'.
44 Becker, Patriotismus contra Civilisation!, 110. 'a stumbling block to further civilization'; 'ridiculous 
exaggeration'.
45 Ibid., 110, 242. 'closely confined mental horizon'; 'stupid and brazen arrogance'
46 Nicholas Stargardt, The German Idea of Militarism: Radical and Socialist Critics 1866-1914 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 21–26.
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famous  naturalist  Alfred  Russell  Wallace  clearly  demonstrated  the  difference  in  his  1898  The 
Wonderful  Century,  of  which  a  whole  chapter  was  dedicated  to 'Militarism  the  curse  of 
civilization'.47 Wallace, whose politics were often unorthodox, was sure of the unique status of the 
nineteenth century, and in contrast to those who hailed the eternal need of human nature for war, he  
understood the time that followed the wars of nationalism as different from previous ones:
The evils of these wars did not cease with the awful loss of life and destruction of property, 
which were their immediate results, since they formed the excuse for that inordinate increase 
of armaments and of the war-spirit under which Europe now groans. This increase, and the 
cost of weapons and equipments, have been intensified by the application to war purposes of 
those mechanical inventions and scientific discoveries which, properly used, should bring 
peace and plenty to all, but which, seized upon by the spirit of militarism, directly tend to 
enmity among nations and to the misery of the people.48
All of these were not auspicious signs for civilization in general, as Wallace assured his readers:
 
It will be held by the historians of the future to show that we of the nineteenth century were 
socially and morally unfit to possess and use the enormous powers for good and evil which 
the rapid advance of scientific discovery has given us; that our boasted civilization was in 
many respects a mere surface veneer.49
It was not only idiosyncratic thinkers like Wallace or socialists and radicals who claimed that the 
arms race and the spirit of militarism were taking a huge toll on Europe in general.50 From the prime 
Minister to the backbenchers, the House of Commons in the 1890s was full of people who argued 
against 'the spirit of militarism', most of them on civilizational grounds. As Gladstone himself put it 
in a debate concerned, amongst other things, with the reduction of the military budget: 'I cannot 
question that intention, neither can I question the fact that militarism itself is a tremendous scourge, 
a tremendous curse to civilisation.'51 Gladstone was in agreement with most of his liberal party 




50 Geoffrey Best, “Peace Conferences and the Century Of Total War: The 1899 Hague Conference and What Came 
After,” International Affairs 75, no. 3 (1999): 620.
51 HC Deb 16 June 1893 vol. 13 col.1269
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colleagues who, throughout the decade, would harbour a  'general feeling of intolerance of these 
naval and military armaments which is spreading through the whole civilised world.'52 He was even 
supported by members on the other side of the House, like George Smyth Baden-Powell, the older 
brother of the more famous Robert, and himself a conservative MP. The duty of England and of the 
House of Commons was, he explained, the 'saving of modern civilisation from the fate that wars 
had brought upon previous civilisations', something that the 'spirit of militarism' threatened to do 
once again.53
This almost unanimous opposition to militarism raised the question of who was to blame for this 
'scourge of civilization'. The culprits were to be found amongst the military, some dared to suggest 
with Suttner. As the radical Irish MP John Dillon told the House at a later stage of a discussion that 
stretched through several years: 'We are travelling at a rate of accelerated rapidity every year along 
that path of militarism which adds fresh fuel to the patriotic fervour of those military gentlemen to 
whom we listen sometimes with interest and sometimes with great weariness.'54 Both sentiments 
were justified. Many 'military gentleman' understood the problematic of increasing armaments and 
the peril of another war, yet often refused to draw pacifist conclusions. Despite the enormous cost 
of armaments, a guide to the Royal Navy concluded in 1896: 'the fact of our being unprepared and 
weak would constitute the greatest danger to the peace of the world'.55 Eerily prescient, the much-
maligned Moltke had similarly weighed in on the subject of European armaments in a speech at the 
Reichstag in 1890: 
Meine  Herren,  wenn  der  Krieg,  der  jetzt  schon  mehr  als  zehn  Jahre  lang  wie  ein 
Damoklesschwert  über  unseren  Häuptern  schwebt,  -  wenn  dieser  Krieg  zum  Ausbruch 
kommt, so ist seine Dauer und sein Ende nicht abzusehen. Es sind die grössten Maechte 
Europas, welche, gerüstet wie nie zuvor, gegeneinander in den Kampf treten […] Meine 
Herren, es kann ein siebenjähriger, es kann ein dreissigjähriger Krieg werden – und wehe 
dem, der Europa in Brand steckt, der zuerst die Lunte in das Pulverfass schleudert!56
52 HC Deb 13 April 1899 vol. 69. col.1031.
53 HC Deb 16 June 1893 vol. 13. col.1269. 
54 HC Deb 20 October 1899 vol. 77. col. 441.
55 Frederick T. M. Gibbs, The Illustrated Guide to the Royal Navy and Foreign Navies; Also Mercantile Marine 
Steamers Available as Armed Cruisers and Transports, Etc. (London: Waterlow Bros. & Layton, 1896), vii.
56 Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags VIII. Legislaturperiode. I.Session. Von der 
Eröffnungssitzung am 6.Mai 1890 bis zur 32. Sitzung am 2.Juli 1890, 3 (Berlin: Druck und Verlag der 
Norddeutschen Buchdruckerei und Verlagsanstalt, 1890), 76. 'Gentlemen, when the war that has been hovering 
over our heads like the sword of Damocles for almost ten years, when this war breaks out, its duration and its 
end are unfathomable. The greatest powers of Europe, which more heavily armed than ever will join this fight. 
Gentlemen, it can be a seven-years war, it can be a thirty-years war - and woe to him who puts Europe on fire, 
the first to light the powder-keg.'
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While men like Wallace, and even Gladstone, argued that civilization could only be saved through a 
stop to the general militarization of society,  Moltke was convinced of the opposite.  Despite his 
weariness of a potential war,  he argued that 'die Fortdauer der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung und der 
Zivilisation' depended on Germany's preparedness for war.57 Again, it is important not to confuse 
the argument Moltke was making in 1890 with the argument in his famous and oft-quoted letter to 
Bluntschli. In 1890, he was not arguing for the anthropological worthiness of war. He stated simply 
that  the  race  of  European  armaments  and  the  spirit  of  militarism did  not  allow for  unilateral 
disarmament.  This  was  not  an  anthropological  argument,  it  was  game  theory.  Both  arguments 
related to civilization, but whereas Moltke's previous utterances emphasized the human need for 
war as a sustenance to civilization, in 1890, he was arguing that an end of armaments would lead to 
war, and thereby to the end of civilization. The fin-de-siècle had produced a myriad of arguments 
for and against war and armaments, all of which were formulated with recourse to the same word, 
but certainly not the same concept of civilization.
Far Eastern Crises and the Rhetoric of Civilization 
The  international  debate  on  militarism  and  the  ideas  of  the  decline  of  civilization,  did  not 
monopolize the political use of civilization in its entirety. The justification of particular wars (as 
opposed to war as a general phenomenon) through civilizational language was still popular. Wars in 
the name of civilization had for a long time been a privilege of European countries. Now, in the 
1890s non-European powers started to adopt similar language. Japan in particular had undergone a 
process of 'learning the competence and skill to be a “civilized” state', as Shogo Suzuki has called 
it.58 An integral part of that process was the adoption of civilization as a justificatory tool. The start 
of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894, a power-struggle over the Korean peninsula, was marked by 
concerted  rhetorical  efforts  on  the  Japanese  side  to  prove  that  their  wars  too,  were  wars  for 
civilization. The Japanese elites understood well that a war in the late nineteenth century could not 
be an aggressive and egoistic action. It had to be phrased in the international language of the day: 
the duty of civilization.  It  was therefore no surprise that the justification for Japan's aggressive 
action sounded very much like previous European pronouncements. As the Japanese representative 
in London M.Y. Uchida told the Times shortly after the start of the hostilities: 'The height of Japan's 
satisfaction would be to see her neighbour China consolidated, freed from corruption, prosperous, 
57 Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags VIII. Legislaturperiode. I.Session. Von der 
Eröffnungssitzung am 6.Mai 1890 bis zur 32. Sitzung am 2.Juli 1890, 76. 'The continuous existence of our 
societal order and civilization'
58 Shogo Suzuki, Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s  Encounter with European International Society 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 89–113.
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and open to commerce and civilization'.59
The Japanese  rhetoric  of  civilization  did not  stop throughout  the  war,  or  even afterwards.  The 
message that Japan was bringing modernity and civilization to China was consistently emphasized 
in a large public relations effort geared towards showing Japan's modern civilization at war with 
reaction. After the war, most officials repeated the official message, as the former foreign minister 
who remembered in his memoirs: 'it was obvious that one day a conflict would appear and its cause 
would be the collision between the new Western civilization and the old Asian civilization'.60 Japan 
represented  modern  and western  civilization  –  some journalists  even describing  it  as  the  most 
western country of the Occident – whereas China was depicted as backward, reactionary and badly 
administered. A piece of propaganda entitled Heroic Japan explained the Japanese war aims to the 
British public: it was 'a planting of the standard of civilization on the shores of conservatism and 
irreconcilable  maladministration.'61 The  Japanese  machinery  of  international  diplomacy  was 
impressive in its own right, still, it is difficult not to see the resemblance between Japanese rhetoric  
and previous liberal arguments relating to the international sphere, especially with regard to Turkey. 
The argument for war in the name of civilization, wherever it was used, functioned in the same way. 
The country claiming to fight for civilization was not fighting for itself, but for progress, peace and 
against  maladministration.  In  this  case,  there  was  arguably  more  at  stake.  Whereas  western 
interventions could always easily be justified with recourse to civilization, and because the civilized 
nature of the attacker was never in doubt, Japan clearly used the language of civilization not only to 
justify the war itself, but also its own civilized state.   
Japanese elites sought to distinguish their country from its enemies through the fighting itself, and 
in doing so,  they were implicitly backed by European powers.  As I  have explored in previous 
chapters, the idea of the civilized nation was often connected to the principles of civilized warfare 
(see chapter 4 and 5). Arguments for this connection had existed since the mid-nineteenth century,  
but  it  was  Russia's  war  against  the  Ottoman Empire  in  1877/1878 that  saw the  two explicitly 
connected for purposes of international propaganda. During the Sino-Japanese war, many pages 
were taken out of Russia's book to present Japan as a leading nation in the art of civilized war, 
tactics that would later even be used against the Russians themselves.62 The Japanese government 
59 “The War in the East,” The Times, November 9, 1894, 34417 edition, sec. News.
60 Quoted in Yamauchi, “Civilisation and International Law,” 11.
61 F. Warrington Eastlake and Yamada Yoshiaki, Heroic Japan: A History of the War Between China & Japan 
(London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company, 1897), 409.
62 Yamauchi, “Civilisation and International Law”; Rotem Kowner, “Becoming an Honorary Civilized Nation: 
Remaking Japan’s Military Image during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905,” Historian 64, no. 1 (2001): 19–
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had announced before the start of hostilities that it  would stick to the modern rules of civilized 
warfare, and Japanese generals similarly emphasized throughout the conflict that 'notre armée […] 
combat suivant les lois de la civilisation'63. As Howland has argued, this Japanese manoeuvre was 
driven by a  concerted  international  effort,  as  Japanese  and British  lawyers  worked together  to 
establish Japan's civilized status regarding the rules of war.64 In editorials preceding the onset of 
hostilities, the Japanese point of view was touted by eminent British scholars like T. E. Holland and 
John Westlake. After the war, several books Japan's international lawyers published in support of 
their country's adherence to the rules of war had their prefaces written by the same men. 65 It was 
through their proven adherence to European rules of law, British and Japanese lawyers argued in 
unison, that Japan's status as a civilized power could be confirmed and China's doubted. As T. E. 
Holland put it in his Studies in International Law:
Our review of the course of recent events would seem to lead to the following conclusions. 
Japan, apart from the lamentable outbursts of savagery at Port Arthur, has conformed to the 
laws of war, both in treatment of the enemy as well as in her relations to neutrals, in a 
manner worthy to the most civilized nations of Western Europe. China, on the other hand, 
has given no indication of her acceptance of the usages of civilized warfare.66
It is unclear to what extent this Anglo-Japanese cooperation should be seen as linked to the start of a 
process of abandoning the unequal treaties, or indeed as an indication of the later alliance in 1902. 
There were similar efforts by French lawyers and, despite the dubious optics, there was probably no 
larger master plan.67 Britain had indeed signed a new 'Treaty of Commerce and Navigation' a month 
before war was declared.  Yet,  as the  Times that had also printed most  positive material  on the 
Japanese argued,  a majority in Britain was sceptical about the potential end of extraterritoriality, 
and the government did not pursue a larger orchestrated line.68 In France, the prominent lawyer Paul 
Fauchille had taken it upon himself to write the equivalent introduction in Nagao Ariga's La guerre  
38.
63 'Our army fights according to the laws of civilization.' Oyama quoted in Nagao Ariga, La guerre sino-japonaise 
au point de vue international. (Paris: A. Pedone, 1896), 42.
64 Douglas Howland, “Japan’s Civilized War: International Law as Diplomacy in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-
1895),” Journal of the History of International Law 9, no. 2 (2007): 179–201.
65 John Westlake, “The Sinking of the Kowshing,” The Times, August 3, 1894, 34333 edition, sec. Letters to the 
Editor; Howland, “Japan’s Civilized War,” 193–194.
66 Thomas Erskine Holland, Studies in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898), 128–129.
67 Howland, “Japan’s Civilized War,” 184.
68 “The Announcement That a New Treaty Had Been...,” The Times, September 18, 1894, 34372 edition, sec. 
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sino-japonaise  au  point  de  vue  international,  exclusively  published  in  French.  As his  English 
colleagues, Fauchille emphasized the civilized nature of Japan's armed forces. More importantly, he 
expressed admiration for the work of Ariga himself. He explained: 'la 'civilisation' du conflit Sino-
Japonais a été son oeuvre. Plusieurs des règlements que publièrent les génèraux furent,  en effet, 
préparés par lui.'69 Fauchille drew similar conclusions to Holland and Westlake. Because Japan's 
military was not dominated by rules of military necessity but by legal scholars who knew the rules 
of war, Japan's civilized status should no longer be doubted by Europeans. Given these French 
pronouncements,  the  support  of  English  lawyers  seems  less  extraordinary  and  certainly  less 
politically motivated. They prove that the legal sympathies for Japan's claims to civilization were 
international and not exclusively British.
The Japanese civilizational propaganda was largely successful all over Europe, and whether legal or 
otherwise, the arguments advanced gained traction amongst the European public and coincided with 
rabid Sinophobia. Throughout the nineteenth century, European estimations of China had not been 
the highest. With its 'newly civilized' neighbour Japan as comparison, the Chinese reputation in 
Europe suffered even more.70 As Wippich has discovered,  scores  of  congratulatory letters  from 
normal German citizens, more than from any other country, reached the Japanese ministry of war in 
the  months  after  the  conflict,  most  of  them  uttering  admiration  for  the  efficient  and  modern 
Japanese  war  machine.71 Japan's  apparently  united  and  national  front  impressed  many  in  the 
recently unified Germany.  The national  nature  of  Japan's  struggle  in  particular,  opposed to  the 
purported chaos of the declining Qing dynasty, was seen as a sign of advanced civilization. The 
national character and the unified nature of the Japanese people was emphasized in Alfred Müller's 
Der Krieg zwischen China und Japan, 1894/1895:
das  Parlament  erklärte,  dass  es  sich  dem  Wunsche  und  Willen  ihres  Herrschers,  die 
barbarische Hartnäckigkeit Chinas zu brechen und Japan die Stellung einer Grossmacht zu 
verschaffen, voll und ganz anschliesse, und es mit ihm China als den Feind der Civilisation 
betrachte.  Nichts  von  alledem  in  China!  Ein  Bild  trauriger  Zustände  und  trostloser 
69 Paul Fauchille, “Preface,” in La guerre sino-japonaise au point de vue international., by Nagao Ariga (Paris: A. 
Pedone, 1896), IX. 'The 'civilization' of the Sino-Japanese conflict was his work. Many of the regulations the 
generals published were effectively prepared by him'.
70 Ernst Rose, “China as a Symbol of Reaction in Germany, 1830-1880,” Comparative Literature 3, no. 1 (1951): 
57–76.
71 Iikura Akira, “The Yellow-Peril and Its Influence on Japanese-German Relations,” in Japanese-German 
Relations, 1895-1945: War, Diplomacy and Public Opinion, ed. Christian W. Spang and Rolf-Harald Wippich 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2006), 80–97.
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Verwirrungen.72
The vilification of China was by no means a purely German phenomenon. The  Times journalist 
Chirol  asserted  the  war  did  not  only  show  Japan's  'reality  of  a  new  civilisation'  but  also  the 
'immeasurable  rottenness  hitherto  half  concealed  under  the  venerable  cloak  of  an  ancient 
civilisation' like China's.73 Some British liberals, like the journalist and later MP for Wolverhampton 
Henry Norman, went so far in their sinophobia as to argue that the Japanese army had been too soft  
with China. Japan's quest for civilized warfare had been misunderstood, he argued, instead Japan 
should have flouted international norms and would have thereby  'taught China more civilisation 
than she has learnt in the last 1000 years.'74 
Despite the enormous public support shown for Japan in Germany and other European countries, 
some had become sceptical of Japanese claims, and a certain fear of Japan had started to proliferate 
in the higher echelons of power. Even friends of Japan voiced their concern that 'the military spirit  
of the people has intensified rather than diminished by contact with the civilisation of the West'.75 
The argument against Japan came in various forms. There were more restrained East-Asia experts, 
like the long-term Prussian diplomat in China Max von Brandt, who argued that Japan's path to 
power was dubious and had nothing to do with Japanese claims to civilize: 
Es gibt andere Mittel und Wege, Reiche der Civilisation zu erschliessen und zuzuführen, als 
gezogene Geschütze und Gewehre, und die Welt hat kein Interesse daran, in Ostasien einen 
Staat entstehen zu sehen, der, wie Frankreich in Europa, durch seine ungezähmte und lange 
ungestrafte  Eitelkeit,  Ruhm  und,-  Ländergier,  seinen  Nachbarn  eine  Geissel  und  allen 
Staaten ein Gegenstand fortwährender Besorgnis wird.76     
72 von Müller, Der Krieg zwischen China und Japan, 1894/1895. Auf Grund authentischer Quellen, 2nd ed., vol. 1. 
Das Jahr 1894 (Berlin: Verlag der Liebel’schen Buchhandlung, 1895), 30. 'The Japanese parliament stated that it 
wholeheartedly supported the desire and will of its ruler to break the barbarous obstinacy of China and his plan 
for Japan to gain the status of a great power. They therefore, like him, looked upon China as the enemy of 
civilization. None of this in China, where there was a hopeless state of affairs and endless confusion.'
73 Valentine Chirol, The Far Eastern Question (London: MacMillan and Co., 1896), 138.
74 Henry Norman, The Peoples and Politics of the Far East: Travels and Studies in the British, French, Spanish 
and Portuguese Colonies, Siberia, China, Japan, Korea, Siam and Malaya (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1895), 379.
75 J. Morris, Advance Japan: A Nation Thoroughly in Earnest. (London: W.H. Allen and Co., 1895), 323.
76 Max von Brandt, “Der chinesisch-japanische Conflict,” in Ostasiatische Fragen. China. Japan. Corea. Altes und 
Neues. (Berlin: Verlag von Gebrüder Paetel, 1897), 268. 'There are other ways to open countries to civilization 
than canons and rifles, and the world has no interest to see a state rise to prominence in East Asia, which, like 
France in Europe, with its untamed and long unpunished vanity, greed for glory and possessions, will be a 
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It is safe to assume that Brandt was no friend of Japanese foreign policy. In other works, he uttered 
the  suspicion  that  the  Japanese  had  only  superficially  adopted  western  civilization,  could  not 
understand it, and probably even despised it.77 Others had even more alarming visions. The historian 
Christian Spielmann saw the recent events in East Asia, as the title of his book helpfully explained, 
as  Der  neue  Mongolensturm.78 'Das  ganze  Abendland  ist  in  eine  förmliche  Japanschwärmerei 
hineingeraten', argued Spielmann, claiming he was a lone voice in the wilderness.79 Unlike what the 
majority of his compatriots argued, Japan was not to be trusted, and its nationalism and militarism, 
that so many in Europe admired, were the beginning of a wave of Asian aggression against Europe.  
The only positive Spielmann could draw from his over-dramatized description of the Sino-Japanese 
war, was that it would bring Europe closer together. As he put it in the concluding paragraphs of his 
incendiary  pamphlet:  'La  France  marche  toujours  à  la  tête  de  la  civilisation  –  angesichts  des 
drohenden  asiatischen  Sturms  wird  unser  Nachbarvolk  im  Westen  dessen  eingedenk  werden.' 
France, Spielmann argued, would have to put its anti-German resentments behind it, then both its 
peoples would, arm in arm,  face the coming century together.'80 In a fight between Europe and 
Japan, Asian claims of civilization would evaporate and the legitimate ruling order of the globe 
would be re-instated.
Spielmann was admittedly a crackpot, yet similar ideas were held by people with real power in 
Germany, most importantly the Kaiser himself. In contrast to Spielmann, it was not France that the 
Kaiser sought to ally with in the name of civilization, but Russia. Since 1892, Russia had been in an 
alliance with France, a situation the always careful Bismarck had done his utmost to avoid.81 The 
Kaiser too was not enthused, and he saw the new situation that developed in the Far East as a 
possible pivot point to re-arrange the European balance of power. Many in Russia's military had 
long held designs to some of the territories that Japan had just conquered from China, and used their 
alliance with France to push for an international intervention against the undisputed victor of the 
Sino-Japanese War. Wilhelm II, who himself was eager to expand his influence in China, joined 
what would later become known as the Triple intervention against Japan, that had to relinquish 
control of the Liaodong Peninsula. 
77 M. von Brandt, Die Zukunft Ostasiens. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und zum Verständnis der ostasiatischen 
Frage (Stuttgart: Verlag von Strecker und Moser, 1895), 16.
78 Christian Spielmann, Der neue Mongolensturm.Caveant Europae populi. Stimme eines Predigers in der Wüste 
über die Vorgänge in Ostasien (Braunschweig: C.A. Schwetschke und Sohn, 1895).
79 Ibid., 4.
80 Ibid., 79–80.
81 For the whole network of alliances see William Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 23–92.
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While  Russia's  strategy  was  based  on  obvious  interests  and  France's  on  an  official  alliance, 
Germany's part in the intervention has always been more mysterious and was specifically surprising 
to the Japanese public.82 Apart from the territorial gains that Germany was to have from such an 
intervention, the Kaiser's (English) correspondence with his cousin, Tsar Nicholas II, reveals a more 
civilizational motive. As he wrote to the Tsar not long after the successful intervention:
I thank you sincerely for the excellent way in which you initiated the combined action of 
Europe for the sake of its interests against Japan. […] It shows to evidence how necessary it 
is that we hold together, and also that there is existant (sic), a base of common interests upon 
which all European nations may work in joint action for the welfare of all as is shown by the 
adherence of France to us two. […] I shall certainly do all in my power to keep Europe quiet 
and also to guard the rear of Russia, so that nobody shall hamper your action towards the Far 
East! For that is clearly the great task in the future of Russia to cultivate the Asian continent 
and to defend Europe from the inroads of the Great Yellow Race.83
While France's contribution was soon forgotten by the Kaiser – he even implored his cousin to 
terminate his alliance with France, because it would lead to a European war, instead (!) of a war 
against Asia – he certainly hoped for a continuing collaboration between Russia and Germany.84 In a 
letter three years after the intervention, Wilhelm was still talking about Russia's mission to 'promote 
civilisation' in Asia, and added: 
Will you kindly accept a drawing I have sketched for you, showing the Symbolising (sic) 
figures of Russia and Germany as sentinels at the Yellow Sea for the proclaiming of the 
gospel of Truth (sic) and Light (sic) in the East. I drew the sketch in the Xmas week under  
the blaze of the lights of the Xmas trees.85
It was not the first symbolic sketch the Kaiser had drawn, and he was not very secretive about his 
feelings towards Asia and his enthusiasm for Russia either. Right after the Sino-Japanese War, in the 
summer of 1895, Wilhelm II had ordered his former drawing teacher Knackfuss to finish a sketch 
he himself designed, showing what he would refer to as the 'Gelbe Gefahr' or as it would become 
82 Akira, “The Yellow-Peril and Its Influence on Japanese-German Relations,” 81.
83 Walter Goetz, ed., Briefe Wilhelms II. an den Zaren, 1894-1914 (Berlin: Verlag Ullstein & Co., 1920), 290–291. 
emphasis in the original.
84 Goetz, Briefe Wilhelms II, 296.
85 Ibid., 306.
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known in English as 'the yellow peril'.86 It  showed the archangel  Michael  and, as the historian 
Gollwitzer later sarcastically put it, a group of 'im Walkürenstil kostümierter Frauengestalten' in 
front of a distant thunderstorm in which the silhouette of a menacing Buddha had started to appear.87 
The angel called on Europe, allegorically represented in this group, 'wahrt eure heiligsten Güter'.88 
Wilhelm had the sketch sent to be distributed on all German ships going to Asia, as well as to 
several heads of state, and even to former politicians like Bismarck who admitted that he did not 
quite see the point.89 The Kaiser reserved the biggest propaganda effort for the country he perceived 
to be his greatest ally: Russia. He told the members of the foreign office that it was essential to 
protect Russia as 'Hort the Zivilisation' against Asian advances.90 In his letters, he continued to egg 
his  cousin  on  to  further  intervention,  arguing that  combined German-Russian  efforts  would  be 
respected by the 'yellow ones', and referring to the Tsar as 'morally speaking the master of Pekin'.91 
In the late 1890s, two arguments from civilization could be seen as applying to Japan and Asia more 
broadly. The Japanese elites themselves were trying to show that Japan was now a member of a 
civilized international community and a benefactor to civilization. This perspective was supported 
by  British  and  French  international  lawyers,  and  can  be  seen  as  an  important  factor  in  the 
international rapprochement between Britain and Japan. On the other hand, Wilhelm II and others 
were arguing against all support for Asian countries on the basis that they were a danger to what the 
adherents of this argument called European civilization. Notions of civilization were key in both 
arguments, although the debates on warfare and civilization clearly referred to different concepts. 
Whereas  Wilhelm  argued  for  the  importance  and  uniqueness  of  European  civilization,  the 
proponents of Japan's politics were arguing that it was civilization itself that could, and had been, 
adopted by other countries; and that to support Japan meant to support civilization. 
The Hague Conference of 1899
The Tsar had different civilizational ideas altogether and following decades of Russian rhetoric he 
86 Richard Austen Thompson, The Yellow Peril, 1890-1924 (New York: Arno Press, 1978); Gregory Blue, 
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Racist Discourse,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 13, no. 4 (2000): 683–747; Wolfgang 
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Cultural Negotiations - Sichtweise Des Anderen, ed. Cedric Brown and Therese Fischer-Seidl (Tübingen: A. 
Francke, 1998), 35–49.
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announced his plans of a large conference to solve the problems of war and civilization, once and 
for all. On 24 August 1898, Count Mouravieff, the Russian foreign minister handed a note to all 
international deputies at St. Petersburg: 
The maintenance of general  peace,  and a possible reduction of the excessive armaments 
which weigh upon all  nations, present themselves in the existing condition of the whole 
world, as the ideal towards which the endeavors of all Governments should be directed. The 
humanitarian and magnanimous ideas of His Majesty the Emperor, my August Master, have 
been won over to this view. […] In the course of the last twenty years the longings for a 
general  appeasement  have become especially pronounced in the consciences  of civilized 
nations. […] Filled with this idea, His Majesty has been pleased to order me to propose to all 
the Governments whose representatives are accredited to the Imperial Court, the meeting of 
a conference which would have to occupy itself with this grave problem.92
Two explanations were immediately offered for the Tsar's behaviour in calling what would later 
become known as the First Hague Conference.93 The more cynical one suggested that the Emperor 
had run out of money to support his army and thereby hid behind the explanations of the peace 
movement. The more idealist hypothesis held that Nicholas II had truly been converted by reading 
Jan Bloch's book.94 Evidence exists for both, and they do not seem to be mutually exclusive either. 
It is nonetheless certain that the support of the Tsar for the civilizational language of the peace 
movement and the opponents of militarism was a major boost for their message.
The German public at large, however, and specifically the left questioned the intentions of the Tsar.  
Social  democratic  opinion  was  divided,  but  the  most  important  German  socialists  remained 
violently opposed to any Russian idea of peace. All socialists agreed on the general opposition to 
92 “Peace Conference at the Hague 1899: Rescript of the Russian Emperor, August 24 (12, Old Style), 1898,” 
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war  and  militarism and the  threat  that  both  of  them posed  to  civilization.  As  Liebknecht  had 
explained in the early 1890s, the next potential war would be a horrific spectacle, a conflict 'wie ihn 
die  Weltgeschichte  niemals  gesehen,  im Vergleich  zu  welchem der  letzte  deutsch=französische 
Krieg ein Kinderspiel war und der unsere Zivilisation um ein Jahrhundert zurückwerfen muss.'95 
With an actual proposal for a peace conference on the table, however, major disagreements between 
socialist opinion leaders started to show. Moritz Adler, the editor of the Volkswille, showed himself 
impressed and merely amused about this surprising turn of events:
die Ehre die Rita des Märchens zu sein, gegenüber der schändlichen Blösse einer entarteten 
Civilisation – die Ehre überliessen neidlos Monarchien, Republiken, sich “radikal” nennende 
Parteien voranschreitende Rassen und Nationen einem klar und gross denkenden Jünglinge 
“der Autokratie und dem inferioren Slawenthum”!96
The russophobe leader of the SDP, Bebel, on the other hand, felt nothing but contempt for Russian 
plans. The social democrats were sceptical about the new peace ideas of the emperor, he told the 
Reichstag:  'wir  haben  uns  gesagt,  wenn  der  russische  Kaiser  ein  so  grossen  Bedürfniss  nach 
Humanität besitzt, wie sie seine Friedenskundgebung enthält, dann hat er reichlich Gelegenheit, sie 
im eigenen Lande, nach verschiedenen Richtungen zu betätigen.'97
 
In non-socialist German newspapers and journals, it was less personal hostility towards the Russian 
Tsar, that dominated the thinking of old left-wing politicians like Bebel, but concerns about the 
feasibility of his plans. Even the more balanced Deutsche Rundschau, despite arguing that the idea 
of the conference was an indubitable 'Culturfortschritt', told its readers: 'Wer könnte sich [...] die 
Schwierigkeiten verhehlen, die der Verwirklichung eines so verlockenden Ideals entgegenstehen.'98 
95 Verhandlungen und Beschlüsse des Internationalen Arbeiter-Kongresses zu Brüssel (16.-22. August 1891) 
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Russia itself was in a constant expectation of war with England, China's role in the future was 
uncertain, the US would not agree; in other words: the project was almost certainly doomed to fail. 
For the readers still  convinced that the Tsar's plans could be realized, the  Deutsche Rundschau 
added a hatchet job by the General-lieutenant, and war-party supporter Albert von Boguslawski.99 
All in all, as the later German delegate to the Hague Conference Philipp Zorn remembered: 'Kein 
einziges  der  grösseren  deutschen  Pressorgane,  auch  nicht  “Frankfurter  Zeitung”  oder  “Berliner 
Tageblatt”,  trat  mit  Entschiedenheit  für  die  russischen  Vorschläge  ein.'100 Nonetheless,  German 
officials immediately accepted the invitation and there were, at least,  no officially hostile tones 
towards it.   
In Britain, the Tsar's proposals found slightly more widespread acceptance, even though many were 
equally sceptical. Again, much of the rhetoric was formulated with recourse to civilization. At the 
first  meeting  of  Parliament  after  the  Russian  proposal,  the  liberal  politician  and  future  Prime 
Minister Campbell-Bannerman told the house: 
there is one event, it seems to me, which stands out from among all the incidents of the past 
year,  [...]  and which I am glad to speak of in the first instance because it  represents an 
influence  happily  brought  to  bear  in  favour  of  goodwill  and civilisation  throughout  the 
world. I allude, of course, to the Rescript which was issued by the Emperor of Russia.101
The Prime Minister, although very polite about the Russian proposals, shared the doubts of many in 
Germany: 
No one can doubt the purity and grandeur of the motives which have animated the Emperor 
in  making this  invitation,  and everyone must  heartily wish that  his  anticipations will  be 
realised;  but  further  than  that  I  do  not  think  it  is  safe  to  go.  The  constant  increase  in 
armaments which is taking place on all sides at the very time when we are speaking of and 
prophesying peace is not encouraging to the ideal dreams in which perhaps the Tsar has 
indulged, and they warn us to prepare for a possible issue less gratifying than that on which 
he has most naturally and most laudably allowed his mind to dwell.102
99 A. von Boguslawski, “Der Abrüstungsvorschlag des Zaren,” Deutsche Rundschau LXXXXVII (1898): 261–69; 
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As the first meeting of the conference drew closer, more and more problems and concerns started to 
appear on the horizon, most of them incidentally related to previous political conflicts that had been 
justified in the name of civilization. There was the old issue of Poland for whose independence in 
the name of civilization European liberals had been arguing for decades, and that now were adduced 
as further reason to distrust the Tsar.103 A parallel debate had developed concerning the Russian 
treatment of Finland. Whereas Russian politicians, like the governor of the province of Archangel 
Engelhardt, explained to the English public that the population of Finland were happily 'assuming 
the customs and civilisation of Russia', western European writers saw the same events as attempts 
of forced russification.104 It was clear, the supporters of Finland argued in international publications, 
that 'the general interest of civilisation which is to be invested with new forms of public right at the 
Hague' would be a new settlement of the Finnish question.105 The problems of civilization were by 
no means restricted to Russia. For obvious reasons, the Ottoman Empire could not accept Bulgarian 
participation in the conference, control over which it had lost in after a large campaign by European 
leaders arguing that the Porte was not civilized enough to control Christian areas. Yet, the largest  
dispute developed between Germany and Italy on one side, and Russia and the Netherlands on the 
other and concerned the invitation of the Vatican to the Conference.106 While Russian and Dutch 
officials  wanted  the  Vatican  to  participate  in  what  was  after  all  a  peace  conference,  the  post-
Kulturkampf German foreign office and its Italian pendant, still not reconciled with the Vatican over 
issues  that  involved  the  questions  of  modern  civilization  (see  chapter  4),  refused.  After  much 
haggling, the Vatican remained uninvited and the conference went ahead. These open questions, all 
of which were in some way related to European debates about civilization, clearly showed that the 
European public sphere was far from any unanimity on the issue.
Germany would soon be in the news about the rapidly approaching actual conference and again, it 
was  an  issue  that  had  previously  been  discussed  in  civilizational  terms:  the  anthropological 
questions of war. On the eve of the conference, the German foreign ministry had not only decided  
not to prepare their delegates for the conference, but to make Professor Stengel from the University 
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Verlag von Emil Felber, 1899); L. von Bar, Der Burenkrieg, die Russifizierung Finnlands, die Haager 
Friedenskonferenz (Hannover: Helwing’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1900).
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of Munich the head of  their  delegation to  the Hague.107 Stengel  was a  controversial  candidate, 
mainly because he had just published a pro-war pamphlet, in which he had argued that war was for 
'Kulturentwicklung' and 'Verbreitung der Civilisation' 'geradezu unentbehrlich'.108 As he explained: 
Für  die  Poesie,  Malerei,  die  Bildhauer,-  und  Baukunst  wären  manche  ihrer  schönsten 
Leistungen gar nicht möglich gewesen, sie alle würden vielmehr auf einen engeren Kreis 
beschränkt, einseitig geworden und ohne Krieg in ihrer vollen Entwicklung zurückgeblieben 
sein.109  
In the end, Stengel, the first German delegate at the Peace Conference, declared: 'sind doch alle 
Friedensbestrebungen  zwecklos,  um  nicht  zu  sagen  kindisch'.110 The  supporters  of  the  peace 
movement naturally protested against Stengel's commission and the Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft 
announced 'sein Befremden und tiefes Bedauern' at the decision to send someone who was clearly 
persuaded of the positive influence of war.111 Even amongst Stengel's new colleagues, support was 
limited. As Zorn, the other legal expert of the German delegation put it: 'Ob es zweckmässig war, 
den  Vertreter  dieser  Gedanken  als  deutschen  Delegierten  nach  dem  Haag  zu  senden,  kann 
dahingestellt bleiben.'112 The scandal surrounding Stengel only confirmed the opinions of those who 
firmly believed the foreign office to  be persuaded by Moltkean ideas  of  war  and of not being 
interested in the ideas of civilization the Tsar had recently started to subscribe to, and  Germany 
quickly became seen as the main obstacle of peace and civilization in Europe.113 
At the conference, the question of international arbitration caused the greatest problems. The duty to 
resort to a court of international arbitration before the commencement of hostilities would, as its 
proponents  put  it:  'produce  fruits  in  the  stability of  peace  and the  honour and development  of 
modern  civilisation.'114 The  German  foreign  office  violently  opposed  any  sort  of  international 
obligation. The Kaiser himself finally budged and agreed to the new principles negotiated, as Zorn 
remembered nearly twenty years later: 'Es ist heute von der grössten Wichtigkeit, festzustellen, dass 
107 Zorn, Deutschland Und Die Beiden Haager Friedenskonferenzen, 16.
108 Karl Michael Joseph Leopold von Stengel, Der ewige Friede, 2nd ed. (Munich: C. Haushalter, 1899), 12. 
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dies  grosse  Friedenswerk  aus  der  höchstpersönlichen  Entscheidung  des  Kaisers  hervorging,  im 
Gegensatze zu der Haltung, die das auswärtige Amt in schroffster Weise zu der Sache eingenommen 
hatte.'115 The Kaiser did agree to the final version, but made his real opinion abundantly clear in the 
marginalia of a letter by Bülow reminding him of his obligation to his cousin the Tsar. Nicholas II, 
was, as he noted, a 'knabenhafter Träumer' and although he had supported his ideas at the beginning, 
the results of the Conference could not be trusted:
Ich habe in Wiesbaden versprochen, dem Zaren zu einer befriedigenden Lösung mein Hülfe 
(sic) angedeihen zu lassen! Damit er sich nicht vor Europa blamire (sic), stimme im dem 
Unsinn zu. Aber ich werde in meiner Praxis auch fuer später mich nur auf Gott und mein 
scharfes Schwert verlassen und berufen! Und sch...auf die ganzen Beschlüsse!116
The Kaiser's personal opinion was unknown to most who could only see a relatively successful end 
to a conference, and a positive influence on civilization. The result was all the more surprising as 
the conference had accumulated, as the president of Columbia University and himself an attendant 
at the Hague put it:  'Powers content to preserve and guard their  own individuality in the small  
domains that are theirs; Powers also that are aggressive factors in the world's life and powers that 
find  the  forces  of  modern  civilization  in  conflict  with  all  that  has  been  characteristic  of  their  
national history.'117 Nonetheless, they had reached an agreement that even Germany had consented 
to. 'The principal outcomes of the Conference', W. Evans Darby, the undoubtedly hopeful secretary 
of the London Peace Society, explained: 'make it possibly one of the greatest of human agents that 
have ever existed for the advancement of civilisation.'118 'The value of the Conference', he added, 'is 
not confined to its splendid achievements. It will exercise a great moral influence as a witness to the 
solidarity of civilisation.'119
The solidarity of civilization, however, was, as I have argued, not as clear a concept as Darby would 
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have hoped.  Indeed,  as  the  century drew to  a  close,  very different  political  ideas  could  all  be 
associated  with  civilization.  There  were  those  who argued that  war  was  the  main  protector  of 
civilization,  who  were  in  their  turn  opposed  by intellectuals  and  politicians  who  emphatically 
argued for the reduction of war through a rise of civilization. At the same time as these debates were 
going on,  the  rhetoric  of  civilization  continued  as  a  means  of  justification  in  the  international 
sphere, as Japan went to war against China, in the name of civilization. Japan's association with 
civilization  was  opposed  in  Europe  by  those  who  associated  the  concept  purely  with  the  old 
continent, like the Kaiser, who appealed to the solidarity of civilization against Japan. By the end of 
the nineteenth century, a confusing, complex, and often incoherent debate on civilization dominated 
the international sphere, but it is important to stress that it was not a debate that separated Germany 
from the rest of Europe, but merely different ideas of civilization from each other. As I will argue in 
the next chapter, this alienation of different ideas of civilization would continue through the turn of 
the twentieth century, when more and more people started to question not the various definition of 
civilization, but civilization itself.
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Chapter 7. Undermining Civilization at the Turn of the Century
Introduction
The hopes of those who had seen the Hague Conference as a triumph of civilization over war were 
soon  dashed.  The  year  1899  saw  two  major  international  conflicts  justified  in  the  name  of 
civilization: the international expedition to suppress the Boxer rebellion in China, and the British 
war against the Boers in South Africa. The use of civilizational vocabulary to justify a war was 
certainly  nothing  new.  Previously,  however,  such  rhetoric  had  only  been  criticized  by  clearly 
defined sections of the European public, like the Catholic Church or socialist parties. This time, and 
in both cases,  civilizational propaganda was greeted with a chorus of disapproval. In Germany, 
British  justifications  for  the  war  against  the  Boers  were  described as  treacherous  lies,  and the 
concept of civilization as a mere cover-up for imperialism. Similar voices could be heard in Britain 
where many,  inside and outside of Parliament,  found harsh words for the government's  actions 
which they chastised as a colonial and capitalist war against Whites, and which, as the leader of the 
opposition put it, had 'greatly the character of a civil war'.1 While civilizational propaganda against 
the Boers was criticized for racial reasons, the brutal suppression of the Boxer rebellion was seen by 
many as a crime against a civilization much older than their own. Although China had not enjoyed 
the best of reputations throughout the nineteenth century, the atrocities that were committed in the 
name  of  civilization  proved  too  much  for  many  western  commentators,  and  a  coalition  of 
missionaries,  socialists,  and  conservatives  protested  against  the  treatment  of  the  Chinese. 
Remarkably,  and much earlier  than most  have previously suggested,  some of them ventured to 
describe this conflict not as a war for civilization, but as a war between civilizations; the root of  
which, they suggested, lay in a misunderstanding of Chinese culture.
Throughout both conflicts, I argue, the classic civilizational rhetoric that had dominated the second 
half of the nineteenth century was severely damaged. The insistence of many on the left that the 
long history of China showed that there existed not one but several civilizations, weakened potential 
claims  about  the  singular,  as  it  become  impossible  to  insist  on  just  one  type  of  civilizational 
progress. As I will show, those who nonetheless claimed the singularity of civilization as a reason 
for war were quickly criticized as using the word insincerely as a 'masked word' for an imperial and 
capitalist war. While this anti-imperial criticism had its roots in increasing cultural relativism, the 
English use of civilization in the Boer war was similarly criticized as imperial in German circles, 
but for entirely different reasons. There, conservatives and liberals alike alleged that the war against 
1 HC Deb 17 October 1899 vol. 77 col. 74.
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the Boers and its civilizational rhetoric betrayed England's changed character as a capitalist power 
willing to trample over small and independent communities. The Boers became an early example of 
the slowly growing distinction between Kultur/Zivilisation, as they defended their land and property 
against the evil influences of international capitalism and British imperialism; tropes that would 
later reappear in Germany's First World War propaganda. Germany itself equally became the target 
of  civilizational  attacks,  as  the  Kaiser,  amongst  pronouncements  that  Germans  were protecting 
civilization in China, called on his troops to ignore the rules of war when facing the Chinese. This 
speech,  the  famous  Hunnenrede,  would  later  serve as  the  basis  of  anti-German propaganda,  to 
denounce the empire's anti-civilizational tendencies.
New Wars for Civilization
Late-nineteenth century British imperial politics in South Africa were dominated by a conflict with 
two  small  republics  of  Dutch  settlers.  The  Boers,  whose  name  adequately  described  their 
profession, were predominantly farmers, who had been driven north by the expansion of British 
colonialism on the Cape and had founded two states in a what was to European standards rather 
uninhabitable terrain. They had always had a difficult relationship with British influence in South 
Africa, and had previously clashed in what would later become called the First Boer War. 2 In the 
1880s, the rough terrain the Boers inhabited became known for its richness in diamonds and gold, 
sparking a rush for both materials in larger companies as well as individuals who descended upon 
the two Boer states, and were known to them as uitlanders. Throughout the 1890s, Britain, as well 
as other states, sought to extend their influence in the Boer areas, with governments arguing that the 
uitlanders from their state should receive rights akin to citizenship, and private individuals trying to 
topple the Boer government with military means. Most of these interventions proved disastrous 
failures. The Boer republics managed to protect their independence and to resist the ever increasing 
wave of imperial pressure. In the process, they developed a reputation of being enemies of progress 
and civilization. 
Throughout  the  late  nineteenth  century,  as  many  have  previously  argued,  the  Boers  became 
increasingly associated with civilizational backwardness, amongst the British establishment and in 
Europe  more  broadly.3 In  1891,  Randolph  Churchill,  father  of  the  more  famous  Winston,  and 
2 John Laband, The Transvaal Rebellion: The First Boer War, 1880-1881 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).
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Public Discourse and the Boer War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 75–76; Vincent 
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himself at one point chancellor of the exchequer, described the Boer's life in a series of letters to the 
Daily Graphic  as 'the most ignoble existence ever experienced by a race with any pretensions to 
civilization';  a  sentiment  many  in  Britain  undoubtedly  shared.4 This  style  of  rhetoric  was  not 
unknown to the Boers: their leadership had in previous conflicts with the British insisted on setting 
the record straight. As a petition to Her Majesty's government in 1881 explained:
The  distance  at  which  we  live  from  the  centre  of  political  civilisation,  and  the  little 
knowledge people have of our history, make it very easy to represent our almost hopeless 
struggle  for  liberty  and  independence  as  an  insignificant  affair,  or  even  worse,  as  an 
inexcusable rebellion of discontented and stupid Boers against an enlightened and humane 
government.5  
As war between Britain and the Boer republics became more likely, British utterances about the 
uncivilized nature of the Boers increased.6 In 1899, shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, the 
adventure writer Rider Haggard introduced the Boers in his best-selling book The Last Boer War  
with expressions previously associated with a more colonial context: 'None of the refinements of 
civilisation enter into the life of an ordinary Transvaal Boer. […] His home is but too frequently 
squalid and filthy to an extraordinary degree. […] He himself has no education, and does not care  
that his  children should receive any.'7 Arthur Conan Doyle,  who later travelled to South Africa 
during the war, expressed similar thoughts, suggesting that even the most sophisticated Boers were 
'enervated by prosperity and civilisation'.8 Knox-Little, a clergy-man attached to British regiments 
in South Africa and whose books went through several editions,  criticized the Boers in similar 
language: 'Viewed from the standpoint of civilisation and progress', he argued, the Boer regime was 
'one  of  the  most  corrupt  and  injurious  of  all  earthly  governments.'9 Even  amongst  those  who 
theoretically supported the Boer cause, questions about the level of civilization in South Africa were 
raised. W. T. Stead, who would later call the war against the Boers a 'crime against civilisation', and 
whose pre-war pamphlet  Shall I slay my Brother Boer?  quite clearly put him on one end of the 
political spectrum, nonetheless noted: 'The residents in West Ham outnumber the white residents in 
4 M. van Wyk Smith, “The Boers and the Anglo-Boer War (1899 -1902) in the Twentieth-Century Moral 
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the Transvaal, and probably in civilisation, in homogeneity, and in many of the best qualities of 
citizenship deserve to rank higher than either Boers or Uitlanders in the scale of humanity.'10
The Boers had chosen to live a life far from civilization and modernity,  most claimed, actively 
turning away from the fate of other western nations. They were not backward by accident, but by 
choice. As Mr. Newdigate, MP for Nuneaton, explained to Parliament on the eve of the war: 'It has 
been said that it is very hard to interfere with the Transvaal Boers, who went into the wilderness to 
escape from civilisation and lead a pastoral life.'11 While those who opposed the Boer cause used 
this  as  an  implicit  argument  against  their  potential  opponents,  Boer  supporters  regarded  their 
situation as similarly, if not equally, bleak. The jurist and historian Frederic Harrison, himself a  
vocal opponent of a potential war in South Africa, argued that the Boers were 'a curious archaic 
survival' and that it could not be supposed that their society could continue to exist 'in permanent 
isolation of European civilisation'.12 Where Harrison and the pro-war supporters parted ways, was 
the question of whether the British Empire should intervene in this pre-modern drama on behalf of 
civilization; yet that there was a distinction in civilization few denied. The reason why 'the cause of 
the uitlanders is the cause of civilisation', as the writer Appleton Lewis explained to his readers, was 
that the opposition between the British and the Boers represented a clash between two different 
levels of civilization and time.13 The rabidly pro-war writer and journalist Sydney Brooks similarly 
alleged that  the  only progress  in  civilization  the Boers  had made was to  add 'the  vices  of  the 
nineteenth  century to  the  ignorance  of  the  seventeenth'.14 This  rhetoric  of  a  clash between the 
seventeenth and the nineteenth century continued throughout the next year, as in the case of the 
international  lawyer  Hugh  H.  Bellot,  who  similarly  dissected  the  issue  in  an  article  in  the 
Westminster Review  entitled: 'The Problem of South Africa'. The real trouble, Bellot argued, was 
that in the Boer case 'the industrial civilisation of the nineteenth century came into collision with the 
agricultural civilisation of the seventeenth century.'15
The  portrayal  of  China  in  European  sources  around  the  same  time  shared  many  of  the  basic 
assumptions associated with the Boers. Since the early nineteenth century, China had become used 
10 William T. Stead, The Candidates of Cain. A Catechism for the Constituencies (London: Stop-the-war 
Committee, 1900); W. T. Stead, Shall I Slay My Brother Boer?: An Appeal to the Conscience of Britain (London: 
“Review of reviews” Office, 1899), 8.
11 HC Deb 28 July 1899 vol.75 col. 757
12 Frederic Harrison, The Transvaal Crisis (London: Reform Press, 1899), 1, 4.
13 Lewis. Appleton, Britain and the Boers. Who Is Responsible for the War in South Africa (London: Simpkin, 
Marshall, Hamilton, Kent and co., 1899), 47.
14 Sydney Brooks, “England and the Transvaal,” The North American Review 169, no. 512 (1899): 70.
15 Hugh H. Bellot, “The Problem of South Africa,” The Westminster Review 154, no. 1 (1900): 4.
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as a shorthand for backwardness and despotism, with European liberals warning against states that 
they perceived to be the 'China of Europe.'16 Liberal economists and thinkers like John Stuart Mill 
assumed  that  the  Chinese  economy,  although  previously  strong,  had  stagnated  and  that  China 
seemingly could not progress beyond a certain point.17 If the case of the Boers was presented as a 
clash between the seventeenth and the nineteenth century, the situation in China was even bleaker. 
As W. T. Stead's son, Alfred, explained in his  China and Her Mysteries,  in the Middle Kingdom 
'advancement  ceased,  and  civilisation  remains  to-day  where  it  was  two-thousand  years  ago, 
absolutely uninfluenced by the discoveries and changes of the outer world.'18 Although China was 
not  directly  comparable  to  the  Boer  republics,  the  perceived  insistence  on  tradition  and  the 
superiority  of  Chinese  ways,  many Europeans  argued,  showed  a  similar  disregard  for  modern 
civilization. 'The only civilisation the Chinese appreciate', the British inspector general in China, 
Hart, argued, 'is their own: what we call progress, the majority know little about and care less for'.19 
Where the Boers were hopeless in general, the Chinese elite was arguably split into two groups. 
Some favoured western ideas of progress, Japan-style reforms of state and economy. Others, not 
unlike the Boers, wanted to protect tradition, and most important amongst them was the empress 
Dowager  Cixi.  In  Germany,  the  evangelical  missionary  Voskamp  spoke  of  a  fight  between 
'zerstörender' and 'aufbauender Mächte', and in the North American Review, the Irish journalist and 
Sanskrit scholar Charles Johnston later espoused a similar interpretation: 
The conservatives, under the lead of this remarkable woman, aspire to keep China as far as 
possible a forbidden land, a second Tibet, governed on traditional and theocratic lines. The 
radicals, on the other hand, desire to see China follow the lead of Japan, and put on the 
whole armor of civilization, as we understand it in Europe and America.20
While such discussions had dominated essays  and books about China for at  least  a decade,  an 
uprising against the western powers in the summer of 1899 turned these theoretical considerations 
into  real  political  concerns.  Following  a  drought  in  Shandong  province  and  attempts  by  the 
16 Ernst Rose, “China as a Symbol of Reaction in Germany, 1830-1880,” Comparative Literature 3, no. 1 (1951): 
57–76.
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government to reform the Chinese administration along western lines, a revolutionary movement 
developed that sought to rid China of western influence.21 At first the Qing officials were hesitant to 
show their support for the young men westerners would soon refer to as Boxers. As the force of the 
movement  and  tensions  between  the  Western  powers  and  China  grew,  the  courtly  elites 
sympathising with the anti-imperialists prevailed and Empress Dowager Cixi declared war on the 
western powers. Official Chinese troops laid siege to the legations quarters in Beijing, but failed to 
capture them over several weeks. Meanwhile an eight-power alliance organized partly at the behest 
of the Kaiser, whose envoy to China, von Ketteler, had been killed by the Boxers, attacked China. It  
relieved the legations quarters and suppressed the rebellion in a campaign that was later notoriously 
known for its mass-executions, atrocities against civilians, and almost systematic breaking of the 
rules of war, and which was nonetheless described as a 'war for civilization'.22
While most interpreted the hostilities as a clash between rebels and the conservative elite of China 
on one side, and reformers and the western powers on the other, some ventured to suggest that this 
was not merely a fight between old and new, but also between the east and the west. Keeping with 
old rhetoric, the Prussian military strategist Scheibert would later write about the war as a struggle 
between 'alter und neuer Kultur'.23 As the Boxers, like the Boers, represented backwardness and 
opposition to progress and civilization, such a fight could only have one outcome, as the writer 
Alexis  Sidney Krausse explained to  his  readers:  'Civilisation,  by dint  of  its  superior  force and 
resources, must triumph, and revolting barbarism is destined to lie at the mercy of the nations it has 
flouted.'24 This was undoubtedly the most popular interpretation,  as the Russian East-Asia expert 
Markoff, explained to the audience of the Daily News: 
There is commencing a life-and-death struggle between Chinese and Western civilisation. 
We are very doubtful as to which will eventually prove victorious. […] In the solution of the 
Chinese  problem,  Japan  cannot  play  an  important  part.  One  yellow  race  by  itself  is 
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formidable enough; two in conjunction would be fatal to European civilisation.25
Three months into the Boxer rebellion and with civilizational debates about it raging in Europe, the 
Boers  attacked  the  British  Empire  on  11  October  1899.  Although  provocations  and  posturing 
stemmed from both sides, in the British parliament, most were sure about where to place the blame.  
The attack of the Boers was, as a conservative member in Parliament put it, an 'uncivilised and 
barbarous act,  such as is scarcely known in the history of civilised nations.'26 Britain had done 
nothing wrong, as the Irish Unionist MP Colonel Saunderson explained: 'All other civilised parts of 
the world declare through their Press that our action with regard to the Transvaal is founded on the 
highest principles of justice'.27 This whole episode was not merely a debate about the justification of 
the  actual  war  declaration.  It  questioned civilization  more  broadly.  Britain  was  on  the  side  of 
civilization, as the triple-barrelled conservative MP Alexander Fuller-Acland-Hood explained to the 
House, because: 'The whole of the civilization and wealth of the country is due to us; the most 
thriving, the most contented population are to be found under British rule; the least cultivated, the 
most oppressed under Boer rule.'28 As his liberal Unionist colleague Mersey-Thompson added, a 
war could easily have been avoided, had the Boers known how to live under civilized government.29 
Now, most of them added, with British victory merely a question of time, civilized government and 
civilization itself would start to reign in the backward Boer republics.
Critics of Civilizational Warfare
Not all in Britain harboured negative feelings towards the Boers, with some holding them in higher 
esteem than their British opponents, and many arguing that a war against Whites in South Africa did 
not reflect well on the British Empire and its ideas of civilization. The Boers were compared with 
the Poles,  suffering under  Russian rule,  and, as van Wyk Smith has explored,  more republican 
perceptions existed in Britain about the Boers, with iconoclastic thinkers like Froude arguing that 
the  Boers  were  the  true  and  admirable  descendants  of  the  Roman  Republic.30 Examples  from 
antiquity were prominent, with some arguing that the Boers should be seen in similar terms as the 
inhabitants of Tacitus Germania, as holding up a mirror to a corrupted empire.31 Yet, the Boers were 
25 J. W. Robertson Scott, The People of China. Their Country, History, Life, Ideas, and Relations with the 
Foreigner (London: Methuen & Co., 1900), 168–169.
26 HC Deb 25 October 1899 vol. 77 col. 639
27  HC Deb 28 July 1899 vol.75 col. 728.
28  HC Deb 17 October 1899 vol. 77 col. 65
29  HC Deb 17 October 1899 vol. 77 cc60-160  
30 A Diplomat, “A Vindication of the Boers. A Rejoinder to Mr. Sydney Brooks,” North American Review 169, no. 
514 (1899): 362–74; van Wyk Smith, “The Boers and the Anglo-Boer War (1899 -1902) in the Twentieth-
Century Moral Imaginary,” 430.
31 Donal Lowry, “‘The Play of Forces World-Wide in Their Scope and Revolutionary in Their Operation [J.A. 
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not simply a symbol of the unspoilt polity the British had lost. Some like the liberal politician Bryce 
argued that  because  of  these  characteristics,  they were  the  last  hope for  civilization  in  Africa.  
Whereas Britain was corrupted and morally bankrupt, acting in the name of capitalist interests: 'he 
alone  [the  Boer],  in  this  quarter  of  the  globe,  can  save  civilization  from the  ultimate  gulf  of 
bankruptcy.'32 Even those liberals less interested in tales of morality and imperial decline found 
civilizational arguments odious, not because they were destroying Britain, but because they were 
breaking unspoken conventions of the international sphere. It was perfectly acceptable to them that 
an empire should have an imperial and civilizational mission, as long as it was directed to people of 
colour. The Boers were obviously a different case.33 Despite the fact that civilizational language had 
been used against whites previously, many liberals considered it a broken taboo of civilization. Sir 
Campbell Bannerman, leader of the liberals, opposed British intervention: 'Because a war between 
white men in South Africa, in addition to all the natural evils of a foreign war, has greatly the 
character of a civil war.'34 For much the same reason the MP and QC Edward George Clarke fell out 
with  his  party,  the  conservatives,  resigned  his  seat,  and  announced  that  he  considered  the 
declaration of war against the Boers 'a crime against civilisation'.35 
While the critique of the civilizational rhetoric of the Boer war was often based on racial references, 
the intervention in China was questioned by those who held China's history and culture in high 
esteem and questioned recent western influence on it. In contrast to previous wars with Chinese 
involvements,  even  those  critical  of  China  now  acknowledged  that  the  Boxer  uprising  was  'a 
patriotic  movement,  having  as  its  main  object,  the  achievement  of  a  policy  of  China  for  the 
Chinese', and was therefore, at least to a certain extent, comprehensible.36 Such an opinion was 
particularly  relevant  as  China  needed  to  be  respected,  as  the  MP Joseph  Walton  later  argued, 
because it 'had a civilisation of its own while European peoples were still in a barbarous condition'; 
a stance that was certainly not unique, as guides and history books to China of the period testify.37 
'The civilization of the Chinese, with all its anomalies and abuses, is entitled to the respect – and 
perhaps to the admiration – of all progressive communities' wrote the journalist Harold E. Gorst in 
Hobson]’: The South African War as an International Event,” South African Historical Journal 41, no. 1 (1999): 
89.
32 James Bryce, Briton and Boer; Both Sides of the South African Question (New York and London: Harper & 
brothers, 1900), 109.
33 Krebs, Gender, Race, and the Writing of Empire, 117.
34 HC Deb 17 October 1899 vol.77 col. 74.
35 HC Deb 19 October 1899 vol.77 col. 311. 
36 Alleyne Ireland, China and the Powers. Chapters in the History of Chinese Intercourse with Western Nations 
(Boston: Laurens Maynard, 1902), 20.
37 Joseph Walton 'Address in answer to her majesty's most gracious speech' H.C. Deb 4s. Col 276; Robert Coltman, 
Beleaguered in Peking. The Boxer’s War against the Foreigner (Philadelphia: F.A. Davis, 1901), 3; Robert Hart, 
“These from the Land of Sinim”. Essays on the Chinese Question (London: Chapman & Hall, 1901), 81–82, 141.
205
his  concise  guide,  simply  entitled  China.38 The  Chinese  were  misunderstood,  the  American 
Missionary Martin  explained in  his  best-selling book  The Lore of  Cathay:  'Never  have a  great 
people been more misunderstood. They are […] stigmatized as barbarians because we want the 
breath to understand a civilization different from our own.'39 George Lynch had a similar opinion, in 
his paradigmatically entitled  The War of Civilisations: 'But in China the difficulty is to hear the 
other side; so utterly removed from our scheme of civilisation, so immensely remote is it, so far 
from the seeing power of our Western eyes, so far from the hearing power of our Western ears.'40 
Many  directly  criticized  European  traders  and  soldiers  who  were  not  representing  western 
civilization well, and were an affront to the people of China, as 'the lives of a number of them in the  
Treaty ports are an outrage on all the best ideas of the natives and a libel on Western civilization.' 41 
Even the idea of modern civilization itself, touted by journalists who saw China  'at war with the 
world' and standing 'against allied civilisation' was not infrequently criticized.42 While the majority 
opinion was firmly sinophobic, many on the left and in the peace movement questioned European 
civilizational propaganda. The peace activist Jan Bloch claimed that Europe itself was to blame for 
the uprising and that the way the West had pushed China into the defensive made a rebellion not  
particularly  surprising.43 Arthur  H.  Smith,  the  famous  missionary  who  later  claimed  to  have 
invented the term 'Boxer', explained in his book China in Convulsion that what the west interpreted 
as civilization was to blame for Chinese misery. Although 'many of the innumerable sufferers from 
this steady advance of “civilization” into the interior of China' were unaware of the link between 
foreign trade and their problems, he argued, 'there are many others who know perfectly well that 
before foreign trade came in to disturb the ancient order of things, there was in ordinary years 
enough to eat and to wear, whereas now there is scarcity in every direction, with a prospect of 
worse to come.'44
The problems of the relationship between civilization, modern capitalism, and foreign trade also 
entered the debates about the Boer war, as the involvement and alleged responsibility of British 
financiers and most prominently those of Jewish descent, were heavily criticized. As the journalist 
38 Harold Edward Gorst, China. (London: Sands, 1899), 287.
39 William Alexander Parsons Martin, The Lore of Cathay (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1901), 8.
40 George Lynch, The War of the Civilisations: Being the Record of a “Foreign Devil’s” Experiences with the Allies  
in China (London: Longman’s, Green, & Co., 1901), ix–x.
41 Z. Charles Beals, China and the Boxers. A Short History of the Boxer Outbreak, with Two Chapters on the 
Sufferings of Missionaries and a Closing One on the Outlook (New York: M.E. Munson, 1901), 135.
42 J. Martin Miller, China. The Yellow Peril. At War with the World. A History of the Chinese Empire from the 
Dawn of Civilization to the Present Time (Chicago: Monarch Books, 1900), 9.
43 Johann von Bloch, “Zur gegenwärtigen Lage in China,” Die Friedens-Warte 2, no. 45 (1900): 177–80.
44 Arthur H. Smith, China in Convulsion (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1901), 91.
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and writer J.L. Hammond explained in his contribution to Liberalism and Empire, the men who had 
influenced Britain's provocative policy against the Boers in previous years were 'a motley group of 
marauding financiers, who measure civilization by their fortunes, and select their fatherland as other 
men select their banks.'45 This was undoubtedly 'a capitalist war', as James Keir Hardy, the later 
founder of the Labour Party, explained and British Patriotism was abused for personal gain.46 The 
Scottish socialist politician John Bruce Glasier even saw British civilization endangered as a whole, 
and the war driven by capitalist and jewish interests. 'All our civilisation seems to fall away' he 
noted in his diary,  'the daily mail  and the other great capitalist  and jewish papers have excited 
madness among them [the public].'47 As Hirshfield and Terwey have demonstrated, anti-Semitism 
was  a  driving  force  behind  pro-Boer  propaganda.48 As  in  previous  debates  (see  chapter  5), 
prejudices were based on assumptions of a non-British character of Jewish citizens, whose support 
for  Britain  was allegedly not  based  on feelings  of  nationality  but  pure self-interest.  While  the 
criticism of Disraeli's foreign policy in the 1870s had been based on accusations of his despotic and 
oriental character, the new British anti-Semitism was founded on a capitalist critique. Since the 
1880, left-wing British politicians had warned about the 'Jewish character' of British capitalism.49 
The  fact  that  the  British  Empire  was  now  ostensibly  defending  the  interests  of  the  so  called 
'Randlords'  – 'such true-born Britons as Beit,  Eckstein,  Rothchild,  Joel,  Adler,  Goldberg,  Israel, 
Isaac and Co.' - just served as further proof of their paranoid suspicions.50
The most prominent members of the English left, the Fabians, followed the government's line, but 
the discussions that preceded this decision led to severe splintering. The most famous members of 
the Fabian circle had expressed their  difficult relationship to the idea of civilization previously. 
George Bernard Shaw was convinced that the future of western civilization was bleak: 'That our 
own civilization is already in an advanced stage of rottenness may be taken as statistically proved'. 
His friend, the writer Havelock Ellis, merely mocked the idea of civilization in his The Nineteenth  
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Century:  An  Utopian  Retrospect: 'Civilisation?  You  surely  would  not  go  so  far  as  to  call  the 
nineteenth  century  civilised?'51 Nonetheless,  Shaw  and  other  leading  members  demanded  the 
Fabians officially support the government and expressed their curious position in their manifesto 
Fabianism  and  Empire.52 The  matter,  they  explained,  was  simple:  'The  state  which  obstructs 
international civilization will have to go, be it big or little'.53  Admittedly the long term plans of the 
Fabians differed enormously from Chamberlain's, but in the short-run they overlapped: 
the  fact  remains  that  a  Great  Power,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  must  govern  in  the 
interests of civilization as a whole; and it is not to those interests that such mighty forces as 
gold-fields, and the formidable armaments that can be built upon them, should be wielded 
irresponsibly  by  small  communities  of  frontiersmen.  Theoretically,  they  should  be 
internationalized, not British Imperialized; but until the Federation of the World becomes an 
accomplished fact, we must accept the most responsible Imperial federations available as a 
substitute for it.54
Similar  arguments  applied  to  China,  the  Fabians  claimed,  whose  reluctance  to  participate  in 
international  and  commercial  trade  the  Fabian  manifesto  condemned  as  untenable  'from  an 
international socialist point of view'.55 Some sections of the manifesto revealed the insecurities of 
the  Fabian  position  on  civilization,  as  its  authors,  like  so  many  others,  recognized  that  the 
application of civilizational  discourse with regard to  China was a tricky affair.  They could not 
simply condemn Chinese civilization as inferior, and elegantly side-stepped the issue: 
Without begging the question whether the Chinese civilization is a lower or higher one than 
ours, we have to face the fact that its effect is to prevent Europeans from trading in China, or 
from making railway, and postal, and telegraph routes across it for the convenience of the 
world in general.'56
While the manifesto admitted that the intervention was prone to be used 'for piratical conquests',  
there was no doubt that 'If the Chinese themselves cannot establish order, the Powers must establish 
51 Havelock Ellis, The Nineteenth Century. An Utopian Retrospect (London: Boston, Small, Maynard & Company, 
1901), 2–3.








As  Schneider  and  Thompson  have  shown,  debates  among  the  Fabians  about  the  relationship 
between imperialism and civilization  were hefty and led to  the alienation of  thinkers  like  J.A. 
Hobson and Ramsay MacDonald, who privately and in public, during and after the war, advocated 
more relativist ideas of civilization.58 Hobson wrote about the Boer conflict as a journalist, and his 
successful columns and ideas were already published during the war with such telling titles as The 
Psychology of Jingoism.59 It was in Imperialism: A study, that equally emerged from these writings, 
where he developed a clearer set of ideas specifically concerning questions of civilization. While 
Hobson's  war  writings  often  contained  more  outrage  and  anti-Semitism  than  clear  analysis, 
Imperialism  had a more analytical bent.  As he academically explained: 'Part II.  investigates the 
theory and practice of Imperialism regarded as a 'mission of civilisation', in its effect upon 'lower' or 
alien peoples, and its political and moral reactions upon the conduct and character of the Western 
nations engaged in it'.60 
Hobson's critique of the use of civilization was two-fold. Primarily he doubted what he called the 
'phraseology of sham-scientific history, and the talk of the “trend of civilization”' but secondly he 
questioned  whether  the  idea  of  civilization  had  not  been  hijacked  by  more  sinister  financial 
interests.61 The first part of his critique was straight-forward cultural relativism. Nobody was to 
know, Hobson argued, whether 'the slow going civilisation of the Transvaal Boer’ was better for the 
world than the one the 'British wished to foist upon it'. Therefore, any advocacy of a singular idea of 
civilization was mistaken and insincere. More importantly, one had to ask the question whether the 
constant talk of civilization did not conceal larger and more economic interests. As Hobson told his 
readers: 'To what extent Imperialism lives upon “masked words” it is difficult to realise until we 
turn to the language of diplomacy, the verbal armoury of Imperialism.' 'Effective autonomy' and 
'emissary of civilisation' were to him 'ready illustrations of a phraseology devised for purposes of 
concealment  and  encroachment'.62 In  other  words,  while  the  British  public  might  have  been 
convinced that it was sending soldiers into a battle for civilization, the real underlying reasons of 
the war were sinister capitalist and imperialist interests. 
57 Ibid., 46–47.
58 Fred D. Schneider, “Fabians and the Utilitarian Idea of Empire,” The Review of Politics 35, no. 4 (1973): 501–
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The later Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald advocated a similar interpretation of events, one he 
explored in more detail during the war in a lecture entitled 'The Propaganda of Civilization'. 63 What 
did it mean for a state to spread civilization, MacDonald asked his audience, and he argued that it 
very much depended on how one defined civilization: 
If it is a veneer imposed by law and military force, a routine of life prescribed by authority 
[…] the question is obviously a very easy one to answer. A free distribution of administrators 
who have passed examinations in English law and native languages, and of soldiers who 
have been taught the art and mysteries of Maxims, will civilize the world in a generation.64
This was not the right definition of civilization, MacDonald insisted, as all peoples of the world 
were connected to their past and to their surroundings in an intricate and complex way, and an 
outsider could neither understand, nor criticize these various forms of civilization. This chain of 
thought led Macdonald to a striking conclusion:
the distinction so often made between civilization and barbarism is mistaken in so far as it 
assumes that  barbarism is  a  state  of  unmade or  chaotic  nature,  a  state  unilluminated by 
reason, a state of brutishness characterized by an absence of wise adaptation of institutions to 
a  desirable  end.  The lowest  form of  institution  is  a  growth from conditions  and shows 
rational  adaptations  of  man  to  circumstances  and  society  to  tribal  history.  The  lowest 
barbarian has his civilization.65
This  instance  of  cultural  relativism was  a  heavy  blow  to  anyone  who  held  western  ideas  of 
civilization  to  be  universal.  MacDonald,  however,  was  determined  to  slay  the  monster  of 
civilizational  imperialism once  and for  all.  Going one  step  further,  he  announced that  western 
imperialism was not merely unjust because all societies had a right to their environment and their 
history,  they were also,  in some ways,  superior:  'It  is not only that there are different kinds of 
civilization, but that every civilization has some political, social and ethical excellence which in that 
respect may place it superior to the propagandist's civilization itself.'66 






While Hobson and MacDonald criticized the philosophical ideas that sustained British imperialism, 
others  in  the  British  Empire  used  the  Boer  war  to  implicitly  criticize  their  own,  subordinate 
position. War support tended to be strong in Canada and Australia, but Irish republicans and liberals  
heavily criticized  the  war,  sometimes  drawing  connections  between  the  Irish  situation  and  the 
conflict in South Africa.67 Politicians like the Irish republican and MP Michael Davitt who later 
railed against the Boer war in a book entitled  The Boer War for Freedom, saw the prejudices of 
backwardness towards the Irish paralleled in the Boer case, with prominent papers and journalists 
driving England into an unjust war.68 There were respectable British publications, he argued, 'which 
have poured out columns of falsehoods for months against the Boers and the Dutch race, and which 
have led, or rather misled, the public into this, the meanest war this country has ever waged against 
a civilised race.'69 Doogan, the MP for East Tyrone, similarly questioned conservative and liberal 
unionist propaganda: 'It is said that the object of the war was for civilisation, that it was for revenge, 
that it was the result of conspiracy, and that it was thrust upon us by the Boers. Now, who can 
believe that countries of the size of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State wished war with this 
great Empire?'70 
As one of the Irish MPs put it, with the attack on the Boers, Britain showed 'marked contempt for 
the opinion of the civilised world', an accusation that would be ever more frequently heard over the 
next months,  in Britain and abroad.71 The word civilization, when applied in England to the Boers, 
sounded hollow and insincere, Francis Charmes, a French writer whose views were aired in British 
publications, argued:
She speaks continually of civilization; but outside of her own boundaries nobody admits that 
the cause of civilization is interested in the Transvaal war. The high-sounding words with 
which  she  disguises  her  conduct  may  deceive  herself,  but  abroad  they  produce  a  very 
different effect. It would have been more sincere if she had invoked only her great material 
interests and the right of the stronger in this affair.72
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Charmes  was  right.  Commentators  from all  over  the  world  started  to  criticize  Britain's  use  of 
civilization  and questioned British  imagery of  the  uncivilized  Boer,  even in  the  generally  pro-
British US.73 While the US Secretary of State Hay opined that 'the fight of England is the fight for 
civilization and progress and our interests are bound up in her success', the majority US population, 
and especially German-Americans, were squarely on the side of the Boers.74 In previous years some 
had alleged that it  was obvious that the British wanted to 'treat  the Boers to the same kind of 
civilization' they had inflicted on the Matabele, 'the civilization of the Maxim gun'.75 Now that war 
was firmly under way, important figures like the former Secretary of State John Sherman officially 
signed petitions against the war, and prominent German-American journalists like Henry F. Urban 
expressed their disgust with the political use of civilization, arguing that wars '“im Interesse der 
Civilisation  und  Humanität”,  wie  die  Expansionisten  den  heuchlerischen  Engländern  gelehrig 
nachbeten' needed to stop.76 The member of the House of Representatives Shafroth called the whole 
event a 'crime against civilization' and journalists like Howard Clemens Hillegas, who had been sent 
to report on the Boers, provided the US public with aggressively pro-Boer accounts.77 In his Ohm 
Paul's People, he described the British as brutal usurpers who had already obstructed Boer progress 
as 'no civilized race on Earth has been handicapped', and were now driving them from their land.78
The most  brutal  backlash to  British arguments happened on the continent,  where,  hoping for a 
potential Russo-Franco-German Alliance against the British, even high-ranking politicians did not 
shy away from criticizing Britain.79 There were more or less absurd ways of questioning British 
propaganda. The famous italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso argued that it was wrong to see the 
Boers as civilizationally backward, because this was just a short-term phenomenon. 'It is not the 
irremediable barbarism of the negro or of the bedouin' that dominated South Africa, but that of the 
'Florentines around 1100'. In other words, the Boers would eventually start to be a civilized, Britain 
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on the other hand would decline.80 While Britain had been 'the greatest example of civilization and 
liberty'  on  its  own island,  it  could  not  be  said  that  it  had  'given  those  boons  to  others';  their  
imperialism was 'Roman in its enormous egoism and arbitrary exercise of power.'81 In France, many 
were hoping for a Russia-led alliance against Britain, and again, the concept of civilization played 
into their interpretation of the new international situation.82 In a German publication concerned with 
the Hague Conference, the French delegate, advocate of international arbitration and later Nobel 
Peace Price winner D'Estournelles de Constant, could be found frankly admitting why the cause of 
civilization used against the Boers was unjustified:
Wie werden derlei ferne Expeditionen gewöhnlich ins Werk gesetzt? In der Regel stellen die 
Grossmächte einen Grund oder einen Vorwand dazu voran: den der Civilisation; es handelt 
sich darum die Rothäute, die Neger, die Gelben zu civilisieren. Allein hier könnte man nichts 
ähnliches  behaupten.  Es  standen sich da zwei  Völker  gegenüber:  die  Engländer  und die 
Boers, die Boers, die weit davon entfernt, Wilde zu sein, so viel Anspruch auf die Sympathie 
der civilisierten Welt haben. Sie sind nicht allein ein civilisiertes, sondern ein Civilisation 
verbreitendes Volk; sie standen in den ersten Reihen der Pioniere der Kultur.83
 
German Troubles with Civilization
It was unsurprising that such views were aired in Germany which 'is perhaps the country in which 
the  unscrupulous  policy  of  England  has  been  condemned  most  vehemently',  Francis  Charmes 
claimed.84 The sympathy of Germans for the Boers was largely based on a perception of their close 
ethnic relationship. The fact that the President of the Transvaal, Kruger, had referred to Germany as 
the motherland of the Boers, who, in turn, would often be called Niederdeutsche in German books 
and pamphlets,  made the appearance of several committees and funds for the Boer cause a truly 
national one.85 After all, the Boers were, as the titled of a popular pamphlet would have it,  Der 
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83 Die Ergebnisse der internationalen Friedenskonferenz im Haag, eröffnet am 18. Mai 1899 (Bern: Buchdruckerei 
Büchler und Co., 1901), 3–4. 'How do these expeditions normally come about? In general, the great powers 
advance a reason or an excuse: civilization. It becomes their task to civilize the Redskins, the Negro, or the 
yellow ones. But here, none of this true. Two peoples were opposing each other, the British and the Boers, who, 
far from being savages can claim all the sympathy of the civilized world. They are not only a civilized, but a 
civilizing people. They are in the front ranks and pioneers of culture.'
84 Francis Charmes, “Will the Powers Intervene in the War,” in Briton and Boer, ed. James Bryce (London and 
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1900), 187.
85 Harald Rosenbach, Das Deutsche Reich, Großbritannien und der Transvaal: (1896 - 1902). Anfänge deutsch-
britischer Entfremdung (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993).
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deutsche  Bruderstamm in  Südafrika,  and  as  the  Germans  in  Europe,  the  main  cultivators  and 
civilizers of a whole continent.86 Their often-critiqued backwardness and distance from civilization 
had made them the primary civilizers  of  Africa,  as Julius Fessler,  lecturer  at  the University of 
Munich, tried to explain to the readers of his best-selling reportage. The British had only come to 
South Africa for gold and diamonds, in other words, for profit. The Boers were the 'eigentlichen und 
wirklichen ersten Pioniere der weissen Rasse und ihrer Zivilisation in Südafrika'.87 The fact that the 
British  were  claiming land that  nobody had wanted  before  was  a  recurring  chorus  in  German 
descriptions of the war. The British acted parasitically and only wanted the lands, as some put it:  
'nachdem die Boeren sie der Zivilisation geöffnet hatten.'88 It would not be an exaggeration to say 
that a real  Bureneuphorie broke out in Germany.89 Suddenly, everything about the Boers became 
interesting. Several books were published about their history,  poems were written for them and 
legions of pamphlets described the 'Freiheitskampf der Buren' in detail.90 Although other voices 
existed, it is safe to say a vast majority of Germans supported the Boers.91 
Acting on behalf of these organizations, authors like the colonial administrator Wilhelm Vallentin 
could explore their hatred of British civilizational propaganda and their conviction that the cause of 
civilization was a mere tool of geopolitical interests.92 As Vallentin explained:  'Auf Anregung der 
Burenfreunde habe ich es unternommen, im vorliegenden Büchlein Englands ruchloses Vorgehen in 
Süd-Afrika einer kurzgefassten Betrachtung zu unterziehen und Grossbritanniens Lüge: 'Im Namen 
der Zivilisation und Humanität' etwas näher zu beleuchten.'93 He was joined in such an enterprise by 
writers  like  Jenny Schwarz,  who,  most  likely  for  reasons  of  gender,  had  to  publish  her  Vivat  
86 Hermann Elss, Die Buren, Der Deutsche Bruderstamm in Südafrika, 2nd ed. (Bielefeld: Druck und Verlag von 
Ernst Siedhoff, 1899).
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(Berlin: Verlag von Hermann Walter, 1900), 81.
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Druck und Verlag von Philipp Reclam, 1902).
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Transvaal. Eine Erzählung für die reifere Jugend und das Volk as J. Schwarz, but espoused similar 
ideas. As she explained to the  'reifere Jugend',  'jene sind nichts besseres als Strassenräuber und 
Meuchelmörder, wenn sie auch ihre Schurkenthaten mit dem gleissenden Mantel der Zivilisation 
verhüllen.'94 While  not  everyone  described  British  civilizational  ideology in  such  brutal  terms, 
contempt for the word civilization, used in this context, was very visible and widely shared. The 
previously  liberal  and  now  conservative  political  commentator  Fechenbach-Laudenbach,  who 
published his musings under the dubious pseudonym Fürchtegott Peinlich, was outraged by the 
British use of civilization, a sentiment he expressed by an excessive use of exclamation marks: 
'England sei dies der Civilisation (!!!) […] schuldig.'95 Such an opinion was not onlypopular on the 
fringes of the German establishment, but also shared by conservative  Neue Preussische Zeitung, 
whose  readers  were  told  that  the  aim  of  British  policy  was  not  'die  Zivilisation,  sondern  die 
Bereicherung enger Interessenkreise.'96
In certain sections of the anglophobe German public, this was not merely a debate about the misuse 
of the word civilization. The war had become part of a larger stand-off between the British Empire 
and the rest of the world. As the Dutch journalist  Elout,  whose works were translated to great 
acclaim into German, announced: this was a new 'Kulturkampf'.97 Vallentin and other conservatives 
agreed, calling for a larger coalition against the British:
Denn die Buren kämpfen nun nicht mehr für sich allein, für ihr Transvaal, für ihr Afrika, 
nein:  so  wie  die  Verhältnisse  sich  gestaltet  haben,  stehen die  Buren in  der  Bresche;  sie 
kämpfen  gegen  eine  allgemeine  Gefahr,  gegen  ein  raubgieriges,  unersättliches,  aber 
angefaultes Weltreich den Kampf für die gesammte gesittete Kulturwelt.98
Despite the fact that writers like Vallentin or Elout insisted on the merely superficial character of 
British civilizational propaganda, some of their writing was actually driven by a deep suspicion 
towards the idea of civilization itself. The Boers could only be the heroes of the 'Kulturwelt', or be 
94 J. Schwarz, Vivat Transvaal! Eine Erzählung Für Die Reifere Jugend Und Das Volk (Strassburg: Strassburger 
Druckerei und Verlaganstalt, 1899), 10.
95 Friedrich Karl Fechenbach-Laudenbach, Gedanken und Erinnerungen an den Krieg Englands gegen die 
Burenstaaten in den Jahren 1899/1900 von Fürchtegott Peinlich [pseud.]. (Berlin: F. Luckhardt, 1900), 147.
96 Bender, Der Burenkrieg und die deutschsprachige Presse, 52:55.
97 C. K. Elout, Der Kulturkampf in Süd-Afrika :ein Versuch zur Prüfung der Krüger’schen Kulturpolitik. (Leipzig: 
Verlag von Rudolph Uhlig, 1901).
98 Vallentin, Hunnen in Süd-Afrika! Betrachtungen über englische Politik und Kriegsführung, 6. 'Because the Boers 
are now no longer fighting for themselves, for their Transvaal, for their Africa. As the situation is today, the 
Boers stand in the breach. They fight against a common danger, against a greedy predator, an insatiable, but 
rotten empire, for the entire cultured world.'
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fighting a 'Kulturkampf', because they were opposed to modern civilization and modernity as such. 
The original German Kulturkampf had been fought against the allegedly backward principles of the 
Catholic Church and for progress and modernity. This time, the sides had switched. As Elout put it 
in a revealing passage: 
Es fehlte den Buren zwar mancher Vorzug, aber auch mancher Nachteil unserer modernen 
Zivilisation. Sie hatten keine Wissenschaft – aber sie kannten auch den Zweifel nicht. Sie 
hatten keine Music – aber auch keine “music halls”; keine Maschinen und Fabriken – aber 
auch weder  Pauperismus  und Prostitution;  keine  Banken und Börsen  –  aber  auch keine 
Schwindler und Spekulanten. Sie besassen weder Kunst noch Literatur – aber auch weder 
Pornographie noch ungesunde Sensationsromane.99
The Boers thereby became a paradigmatic example of what Chamberlain and others referred to as 
an opposition between  Kultur  and  Zivilisation.  The struggle of the Boers, to which Chamberlain 
dedicated a poem of questionable quality, was a fight of a people defending their Kultur against a 
superficial and uprooted conception of civilization. 
Germany's liberals, traditionally Anglophile, started to turn away from the Empire. Some of them 
argued that imperialism had destroyed the upright character of Britain. The  Münchener neueste 
Nachrichten  reminded its readers that the opponents of Britain had always been the opponents of 
civilization: 'Wer sich gegen englische Herrschaft und Ausbeutung zur Wehr setzt ist noch stets als 
Feind der […] Zivilisation in die Acht erklärt worden.'100 Yet, more reflective liberal journals like 
the Grenzboten lamented a substantial change in the previously liberal character of Britain and its 
perceptions  of  civilization.  The colonies,  they argued in surprising parallel  to  British critics  of 
empire,  had exacerbated an already materialistic culture and were destroying England from the 
inside.  The English propaganda on civilization differed from German perspectives,  because the 
character of England itself had changed. As the Russian expert Ernst von der Brueggen put it: 
So  wurde  und  wird  der  kaufmännisch  harte  Volkscharakter  des  Engländers  durch  die 
Kolonien  in  einer  Richtung  ausgebildet,  die  ihn  von  den  Prinzipien  einer  humanen 
Zivilisation  entfernen.  Und  es  liegt  viel  Ironie  darin,  wenn  Fürst  Bismarck  gerade  die 
Engländer  beschuldigt  'die  Redensarten  von  Humanität  und  Zivilisation'  bei  uns  zu 
99 Elout, Der Kulturkampf in Süd-Afrika, 21–22.
100 Bender, Der Burenkrieg und die deutschsprachige Presse, 52:62.
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importieren. Es sind das bei uns zum Glück nicht bloße Redensarten, aber in England freilich 
gehören diese Begriffe zu dem etwas veräußerlichten Moralkultus, mit dem die Engländer 
vor  andern  und  auch  vor  sich  selbst  gern  die  Wirklichkeit  verhüllen.  Und  wo es  nicht 
Heuchelei bei ihnen ist, da liegt es an der englischen Auffassung von Zivilisation, die weit 
materieller ist als bei den Völkern des Kontinents.101
While von der Brueggen explored the ironic situation of English ideas of civilization, the real irony 
of its early twentieth century use was lost on him. As during the high-time of the Yellow Peril  
around the Sino-Japanese war, Wilhelm explained that the war in the East was uniting all of Europe. 
This was the time for Europeans 'ihre heiligsten Güter zu wahren' and in the fight all the differences 
between  them,  the  Kaiser  argued,  should  be  forgotten.  On 2  July 1900,  he  reminded the  first 
expedition corps to China: 'Ihr habt gute Kameradschaft zu halten mit allen Truppen, mit denen ihr 
dort zusammen kommt. Russen, Engländer, Franzosen, wer es auch sei, sie fechten alle für eine 
Sache, für die Zivilisation.'102 For the idea of civilization, national European differences had to be 
put aside, the same way that previous agreements to keep the peace were now irrelevant. He had a 
similar message for officers he spoke to before their departure at the end of August, and he had even 
chosen to forget his hatred for the Japanese: 'Im Verkehr mit Offizieren anderer Nationen fallen 
selbstverständlich alle politischen Gefühle weg. Ob Engländer oder Russe, Franzose oder Japaner, 
wir kämpfen alle gegen denselben Feind, zur Aufrechterhaltung der Zivilisation.'103
The Kaiser's speeches, however, would soon achieve the opposite effect. Wilhelm II, talking himself 
into a frenzy at Bremerhaven, denigrated the Chinese and, implicitly, his own pronouncements of 
civilization. The Kaiser announced that when the troops should meet the  'verschlagene'  Chinese, 
they were to remember:
Pardon wird nicht gegeben! Gefangene werden nicht gemacht! [...] Wie vor tausend Jahren 
die  Hunnen  unter  ihrem König  Etzel  sich  einen  Namen  gemacht,  der  sie  noch  jetzt  in 
Überlieferung und Märchen gewaltig erscheinen läßt, so möge der Name Deutscher in China 
101 Ernst v.d. Brueggen, “Wohin gehen wir?,” Die Grenzboten: Zeitschrift für Literatur, Politik und Kunst, 1900, 
59/2 edition, sec. Politik, Kolonialwesen, Heer und Marine, Geschichte, 220. 'The hard, national, business 
character of the Englishman is transformed by the colonies and slowly removes him from the principles of 
human civilization. There is a lot of irony, when Prince Bismarck accuses the British of importing phrases of 
humanity and civilization. With us, they are fortunately not mere phrases, but in England they form part of the 
purely exterior morality with which the British conceal reality for themselves and others. And if it is not 
hypocrisy with them, it is their conception of civilization, which is much more materialist than ours.'
102 Wilhelm II., Die Reden Kaiser Wilhelms II. in den Jahren 1896-1900, ed. Johs. Penzler (Leipzig: Druck und 
Verlag von Phillip Reclam jun., 1904), 206.
103 Ibid., 223.
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auf  1000  Jahre  durch  euch  in  einer  Weise  bestätigt  werden,  daß  es  niemals  wieder  ein 
Chinese wagt, einen Deutschen scheel anzusehen!104
An  embarrassed  political  and  diplomatic  German  establishment  made  immediate  attempts  to 
suppress,  at  least  the  most  violent  parts,  of  what  would  soon  be  known  as  the  infamous 
Hunnenrede.105 The German foreign minister Bülow showed himself concerned and attempted to 
change  the  official  version  of  the  speech  several  times,  yet  to  no  avail.106 As  he  undoubtedly 
anticipated, the Kaiser's speech soon turned out to be a massive strain on the eight-power alliance. 
The  Hunnenrede,  widely reported in Germany and abroad, was not only a direct violation of the 
freshly signed Hague Convention, but a new reminder of German scepticism towards the rules of 
war in general.107 Germany was quickly singled out amongst the powers, and Wilhelm's speech 
became a trope of Anti-German war propaganda for at least fifty years. 
Almost  immediately after  the hostilities in  China started,  horrible  tales  of  mass-executions  and 
atrocities committed by Western soldiers reached Europe. Many were quick to blame the Kaiser for 
the  uncivilized  behaviour  in  the  name  of  civilization.  During  the  following  weeks,  several 
newspapers printed letters by German soldiers describing the cruelties that to the public would 
become  known  as  Hunnenbriefe.108 It  quickly  became  obvious  that  German  soldiers  were 
committing massacres and had specifically been told that the Chinese were not part of international 
law or had excluded themselves through previous behaviour.109 Anonymous letters horrified the 
public,  and the nonchalance with which journalists  like Rudolf Zabel,  the correspondent of the 
Vossische Zeitung and the Ostasiatische Lloyd, described the German expeditions, came as a shock 
both to Germans and other Europeans as well.  While the Russians plundered and the Japanese 
104 Bernd Sösemann, “Die sog. Hunnenrede Wilhelms II. Textkritische und interpretatorische Bemerkungen zur 
Ansprache des Kaisers vom 27. Juli 1900 in Bremerhaven,” Historische Zeitschrift 222, no. 2 (1976): 342–58. 
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'zivilisiert tun', Zabel argued, the Germans were the exemplary representation of civilization.110 If 
the culprits could not be found in a 'Strafexpedition', Zabel explained, the elders are executed in 
their  stead  and  'die  männliche  Bevölkerung  des  Ortes  wird,  wenn  möglich,  gezwungen  der 
Exekution beizuwohnen'.111 
Although similar behaviour was soon reported in other troops as well, Germany was quickly singled 
out as the worst offender. Its national characteristics and the Kaiser's rhetoric that were found to be 
to blame. As the writer Alexis Sidney Krausse explained: 'Germany has indulged in her national 
characteristic of bullying to such a degree as to cause the celestials to regard her with a  hatred even 
greater than that with which they view Russia […] Germany's whole relations have been tinged by 
an  attitude  of  brutality.'112 The  British  writer  and  journalist  George  Lynch,  whose  surprisingly 
relativist  The  War  of  Civilizations  was  published  shortly  after  the  hostilities,  argued  that  the 
brutality of the Boxers had rhetorically and practically only been matched by the Germans:
The cry of Sha Sha (kill, kill), which the Boxer mob shouted outside the Legations, has been 
answered from Europe by the German Emperor's speeches for 'Vengeance, vengeance,' and 
in paying a visit to the house of the prefect of the German section, the effect of the speeches 
was everywhere apparent.113
The behaviour of German troops has often and explicitly been portrayed as a clear antecedent of 
things to come. While the German military and its practices are certainly to blame, the German 
chain of command was not altogether homogeneous. In the work of Kuss and Hull, a clear line runs 
between the announcements of the Kaiser and the behaviour of German soldiers and later speeches 
by Hitler and atrocities of the Wehrmacht.114 While these parallels undoubtedly exist, one should be 
careful not to conflate the two events. During the Boxer uprising, several people, among them the 
foreign minister himself, were actively engaged in damage control. Bülow, who had already tried to 
suppress the crasser parts of the Kaiser's speeches, was doing his best to make German policy seem 
more acceptable abroad. In several notes, he blamed the behaviour of German soldiers on individual 
110 Rudolf Zabel, Deutschland in China (Dusseldorf: August Bagel, 1902), 290.
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acts and was very clear on where he stood with regards to various reports of executions and their  
relationship to civilization. He explained the official position in a note to the German allies on the  
18. September 1900: 'Massenexekutionen widerstreben dem civilisierten Gewissen'.115
The Aftermath of the Wars for Civilization
The rhetoric of the Kaiser during the war and the behaviour of German soldiers made the attempts 
of the Kaiser and Bülow to sell the events in Asia during the summer to the German parliament as 
being done in the name of civilization, rather difficult. The Kaiser announced in the Thronrede, that 
opened parliamentary debate in Germany:
Die  Ereignisse  im  fernen  Osten  haben  unter  allen  gesitteten  Völkern  tiefe  Erregung 
hervorgerufen. Fanatischer Hass und finsterer Aberglaube, angestachelt von gewissenlosen 
Ratgebern  des  Pekinger  Hofes,  hatten  missleitete  Massen  des  chinesischen  Volkes  zu 
Greueltaten getrieben gegen die friedlich unter ihnen weilenden Vorposten abendländischer 
Zivilisation und christlicher Kultur.116
This  was  a  perspective  supported  by  Bülow,  who,  advanced  to  being  the  chancellor  over  the 
summer,  argued that Germany was a part  of a larger European civilization that was at stake in  
China. Rhetorically asking the Reichstag what German aims were in China, he answered himself: 
'Wir wollen dass die europäische Kulturbewegung und die europäische Zivilisation in China nicht 
gehemmt wird, und das Deutschland innerhalb dieser Bewegung den ihm zukommenden Einfluss 
ausübt.'117
Almost immediately, these positions were ridiculed both by the social democrats and by members 
of the House one could have expected to be more courteous towards the government. Lieber, from 
the  Centre  party,  expressed:  'Bedauern  […]  über  beklagenswerte  Erscheinungen  die  einen sehr 
nachdrücklichen  Ausdruck  geben:  das  sind  die  Nachrichten  über  Grausamkeiten  in  der 
Kriegsführung,  über  Massenmorde  durch  untergeordnete  Organe  und  ohne  ordentliches 
Verfahren.'118 Rickert,  a  member  of  the  Freisinnigen, argued  that  Germany's  attempt  to  push 
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Weltpolitik to another level had been nothing but an embarrassment, with horrendous costs.119 The 
Kaiser received the worst beating from Bebel, who, in several speeches, some of them four hours 
long, read the letters of German soldiers aloud and denounced the crimes against civilization.120 The 
Kaiser, Bebel claimed, was personally responsible for the brutalities and his speeches had driven 
German soldiers to the excesses that were now widely reported in the international press.121 The 
hatred for the Chinese, the emperor was known for, and the pretences of Weltpolitik made for a bad 
combination,  Bebel  argued,  and expressed  enormous  apprehension about  the  future  of  German 
foreign policy.
Similar horror was expressed by various politicians and writers in Britain, who also discussed the 
far-Asian events after the summer. Many of them not only argued that crimes against civilization 
had been committed, but that the whole event would hold back civilization in the future. Already in 
August,  when only rudimentary reports  of  atrocities  had  reached Europe,  the  conservative  MP 
Ashmead-Bartlett expected the worst: 
The tales of what took place at Tientsin are bad enough; but Peking, with its million of 
inhabitants exposed to the licence of five or six different armies, might easily offer scenes of 
horror that would be a disgrace to our so-called civilisation, and would consolidate Chinese 
resistance to Western progress and Christianity as nothing else could do.122
Mr. Broderick, the MP for Guildford, agreed with the statement, and he suspected even worse. The 
Chinese would be  outraged,  and the whole globe would suffer  from the  excesses  of  European 
troops. As he explained: 'no one can tell whether the result of what has occurred may not put back 
the clock of civilisation for forty or fifty years'.123 Outside of parliament, the writer George Lynch 
was afraid his eyewitness accounts would be too horrible for the British public: 'There are things 
that I must not write, and that may not be printed in England, which would seem to show that this 
Western civilisation of ours is merely a veneer over savagery.'124 He was certain that that same 
civilization, 'mistaking speed for progress, is propelling us, like a heard of Gadarene swine over an 
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abyss of God knows what.'125
In  German  papers  and  books,  questions  were  immediately  raised  about  the  hypocrisy  that 
characterized the German use of civilization at the turn of the century. Civilization, many explained, 
was merely a word of propaganda for Europeans. As the social democratic sympathizer and writer  
Seifarth put it: 'Leider gibt es auch unter den Deutschen so bedauernswerthe Köpfe, die denken: Ein 
Chinese tötet einen Europäer – das ist ein Verbrechen! – Die Europäer töten die Chinesen – das ist 
ein Werk der Civilisation!'126 Some publications went so far as to try and attempt German rhymes 
with Civilisation, finding only the unfortunate Mongolensohn. The message was nonetheless very 
clear:
Doch will der gelbe Mongolensohn
seine Unabhängigkeit wahren
Dann kläfft die Civilisation: 
Tod über die Barbaren!127
Unsurprisingly,  none  of  these  pronouncement  managed  to  change  the  official  story of  western 
intervention. The Boxer protocols, that marked the end of this unfortunate episode of European 
imperialism,  clearly  stated  where  the  blame  was  to  be  found.  As  a  joint  note  written  by  the 
representatives of the eight powers, Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands specifically stated that: 
During the months of May, June, July, and August of the present year serious disturbances 
broke out in the northern provinces of China and crimes unprecedented in human history – 
crimes against the law of nations, against the laws of humanity, and against civilization – 
were committed under particularly odious circumstances.128
Needless to say, these crimes had been Chinese crimes and not western ones, but, as I have shown, 
large sections of the western public had become deeply suspicious of such civilizational claims.
125 Lynch, The War of the Civilisations, 317.
126 F. Seifarth, China: Schilderung von Land and Leuten, Kultur, Religion, (Missionswesen), Sitten und Geschichte, 
Mit kurzer Berücksichtigung der jüngsten Ereignisse und Deutschlands Handelsinteressen (Berlin und Leipzig: 
Verlag von Freidrich Luckhardt, 1900), 15.
127 “Zopf ab” Die chinesische Affaire im Lichte der europäischen Karikatur (Berlin: Verlag von Dr. Eysler und Co., 
1900), 34.
128 “Joint Note Signed by the Diplomatic Representatives at Peking of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Spain, 
The United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, and Russia, Embodying Conditions for 
Reestablishment of Normal Relations with China,” The American Journal of International Law 4, no. 4 (1910): 
300.
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With the Boxer rebellion and the Boer war, I argue, the classic period of European civilizational  
rhetoric came to an end. This does not mean that civilization stopped to be employed as a tool of 
politics, indeed it would feature widely in the First World War, but that the original confidence in 
the singular of civilization, and in a liberal and European idea of progress had ended. With the 
insistence on the existence of several civilizations, and the heavy criticism that was levelled at 
civilization as a word of imperialism, its previously positive connotations had suffered dramatically. 
The new enemies of civilizational vocabulary were no more the Catholic Church or conservative 
Europeans,  but  instead the  new representatives  of  a  politics  of  progress,  left-wing liberals  and 
socialists.  In  this  new  debate,  civilization  stood  for  the  politics  of  old,  for  capitalism,  and 
imperialism,  and  had  become  the  language  of  those  in  power  and  not  those  opposing  it,  and 




The  Boer  war  was  not  forgotten  in  Germany,  where  the  next  civilizational  confrontation  with 
Britain,  the  First  World  War,  was  quickly  described  as  merely  another  episode  of  British 
civilizational propaganda against small and independent nations. Ernst Reventlow explained in his 
Der Vampir des Festlandes that 'in Grossbritannien'  one had already in 1899 spoken about the 
'Notwendigkeit, dass die britische Kultur und Zivilisation  über die burische Rückständigkeit und 
Unkultur siege.1 'Die erbarmungslose Zermalmungstaktik der Engländer im Burenkriege ist noch im 
frischen Andenken', Friedrich Meinecke added, but Germany was suffering even worse from this 
'Barbarei, die unter der Decke einer  äusserlichen Zivilisation brütet.'2 The real disappointment for 
German liberals, just  as during the Boer war,  was that British writers denigrated Germany and 
presented Britain as the 'Verteidiger des Rechts,  der Zivilisation,  der Bildung und der Freiheit', 
apparently proving that these had merely become propaganda slogans.3
The First World War, to them, presented another instance British imperialism, that Germans had not 
recognized  early  enough.  The  theologian  Fritz  Wilcke  was  devastated:  'Zu  spät  erkennt  das 
einfache, kindliche Denken, dass der glatte Verkündiger von Humanität und Zivilisation ein falscher 
Freund war, dem nicht das Wohl des Landes, sondern nur sein eigener klingender Vorteil am Herzen 
lag.'4 In Kurt Engelbrecht's plea for Germany to understand the lessons of the past,  Deutschland 
lerne!, the tale of the Boers became a warning example of what could happen to Germany.5 England 
was leading the war 'als einen business war, als einen Geschäftskrieg  […] ebenso frivol wie es einst 
Cecil Rhodes tat, gegen die Buren'. In the  Kulturkrieg  of 1914, German officials presented their 
country  as  a  bulwark  of  anti-imperialism,  which  in  the  curious  propaganda  that  preceded  and 
accompanied the conflict was amalgamated into a larger spectre of western dangers, ranging from 
capitalism  to  western  ideas  of  democracy.  As  Thomas  Mann  famously  explained  in  his 
Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen: 'Der Unterschied von Geist und Politik enthaelt den von Kultur 
1 E. Reventlow, Der Vampir des Festlandes. Eine Darstellung der englischen Politik nach ihren Triebkräften, 
Mitteln und Wirkungen, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Ernst Friedrich Mittler und Sohn, 1915), 112. 'The necessity that British 
culture and civilization win over Boer backwardness and unculturedness.'
2 Friedrich Meinecke, Die deutsche Erhebung von 1914: Vorträge und Aufsätze, 2.-5. ed. (Stuttgart: J.G.Cotta’sche 
Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1914), 69. 'We still remember the merciless “squash tactics” of the English in the 
Boer war, but Germany is suffering even more from this barbarism under the cover of a superficial civilization.'
3 P.D. Fischer, Der internationale Nachrichtenverkehr und der Krieg (Leipzig: S.Hirzel, 1915), 30. 'The defender 
of right, civilization, culture, and civilization'.
4 Fritz Wilke, Ist der Krieg sittlich berechtigt? (Leizpig: Dieterich’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1915), 93. 'The 
simple and child-like mind realizes too late that the smooth preacher of humanity and civilization was the wrong 
friend, who was not concerned with the best for the country, but only with his personal gain.'
5 Kurt Engelbrecht, Deutschland lerne! Ein Ruf an das deutsche Gewissen. (Berlin: Concordia Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, 1915), 65. 'England was leading the war as a business war (…) as frivolous as Cecil Rhodes did against 
the Boers.'
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und  Zivilisation,  von  Seele  und  Gesellschaft,  von  Freiheit  und  Stimmrecht,  von  Kunst  und 
Literatur;  und  Deutschthum  das  ist  Kultur,  Seele,  Freiheit,  Kunst  und  nicht  Zivilisation, 
Gesellschaft, Stimmrecht und Literatur.'6
While German intellectuals, as I have explored in the first chapter, were grappling with the political  
meaning of  civilization  during and after  the  First  World  War,  the concept  was also questioned 
amongst British thinkers. The veneer of civilization still covered the sacred trust that now ruled over 
a  large  mandate  system,  but  in  the  inter-war  period,  the  seeds  of  civilizational  doubt  that 
MacDonald, Hobson, and others had sown, started to sprout. It was the Bloomsbury members, Clive 
Bell and Leonard Woolf, who wrote most specifically about the word and meaning of civilization, 
whose political  implications they heavily criticized.  While  Bell  expressed an interest  in  British 
First World War propaganda, which he chastised, Woolf had turned to an analysis of the League of 
Nations and to the study of imperialism more broadly.7 In Imperialism and Civilization, he analysed 
the history of the phenomenon through several centuries and argued that while the sacred trust of 
civilization was arguably to be seen as progress, it could not be said to have much to do with any 
real idea of civilization.8 Under the cover of the League of Nations and the concept of civilization, 
imperial interests were still being pushed, as they had been for decades.
Civilization was not just the target of philosophers and social theorists like Woolf, but in the books 
of his more famous wife, Virginia, in the works of D.H. Lawrence and James Joyce the matter of 
civilization was frequently discussed.9 As Shaffer has demonstrated in his brilliant  The Blinding 
Torch: Modern British Fiction and the Discourse of Civilization,  modernist  writers in the early 
twentieth century were obsessed with civilization, and its complicated and mixed blessings.10 While 
civilization had epitomized an incontestable idea of progress for many liberal writers during the 
nineteenth century, it was now seen, Shaffer argues, as a blinding torch, illuminating and concealing 
at the same time. Most famously, these issues were addressed in Freud's best-selling Civilization 
and  its  Discontents,  concerned,  above  all,  with  the  intellectual  strains  and  difficulties  humans 
suffered living in civilization. Shortly after the publication of this book, so deeply influenced by the 
6 Thomas Mann, Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1919), xxxiii. 'The difference between 
spirit and politics contains the difference between culture and civilization, of soul and society, of freedom and 
the right to vote, of art and literature; and germaness is culture, soul, freedom, art, and not civilization, society, 
the right to vote and literature.'
7 Clive Bell, Civilization. An Essay (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1928).
8 Leonard Woolf, Imperialism and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1928).
9 Christine Froula, Virginia Woolf and the Bloomsbury Avant-Garde: War, Civilization, Modernity (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005).
10 Brian W. Shaffer, The Blinding Torch: Modern British Fiction and the Discourse of Civilization (Univ of 
Massachusetts Press, 1993).
225
horrors of the Great War, Freud had to emigrate to Britain where he died three weeks into Europe's  
next catastrophe. The Second World War, whose impact Freud saw no more,  once and for all ended 
European pretensions to a higher or perhaps any civilization.
The end of the Eurocentric world-system also ended the career of civilization as an international 
concept, and it would soon be replaced by another word: culture. It should not be surprising that the 
UN, founded to replace the failed League of Nations should instead of a sacred trust of civilization 
have  an  organization  dedicated  to  the  world's  education,  science  and  culture:  the  UNESCO. 
Inevitably, as had happened with civilization before, the sudden prominence of culture as a word of 
politics drew an academic crowd. In England two men on opposite sides of the political spectrum 
prominently turned to its examination. While T.S. Eliot commenced his Notes towards a Definition  
of Culture with a quotation from the newly founded UNESCO, the Marxist intellectual Raymond 
Williams started his Keywords with the observation that immediately after the war, he found himself 
preoccupied by a single word: 'culture,  which it seemed I was hearing very much more often: not 
only, obviously, by comparison to the talk in an artillery regiment, or of my own family but by 
direct comparison within the university over just those few years.'11 Williams was right as over the 
next  years  and  decades,  culture,  partly  driven  by  the  rise  of  the  teachings  of  American 
anthropologists like Kluckhohn and Kroeber, started to be the most dominant concept in western 
social sciences, and arguably remains until today.12
For most social and political scientists after the Second World War, culture was the main concept 
with which to analyse anthropological and social phenomena, and civilization was a ghost of a long-
forgotten  past.  They were  shocked,  as  I  have  described  in  the  first  chapter,  when  civilization 
returned to the international sphere, first in the writings of Huntington and then as a cry of politics. 
The critique that the concept of civilization was quickly the target of was one shaped by the reading  
of Hobson and those who had criticized it in the early twentieth century. It is difficult not to think of 
Hobson's 'masked words' of imperialism, for example, when reading Brett Bowden's description of 
the purposes of civilization in selling the imperial mission, throughout history:
While this suggests that the [...] primary motivation for venturing into the affairs of empire 
were economic benefit,  this  does not  necessarily mean that  the “mission of civilization” 
11 T.S. Eliot, Notes Towards a Definition of Culture (London: Faber & Faber., 1948), 13; Raymond Williams, 
Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 12.
12 A.L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1952).
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aspect  is  unimportant  in  justifying  and  “selling”  such  adventurism  to  domestic 
constituencies, to the colonized, and even in the minds of policy makers themselves.13
There  was,  however,  a  crucial  difference  between  Hobson  and  those  who  examined  the  term 
civilization in the early twenty-first century. While Hobson had believed in an idea of civilization 
and had merely argued that the word had been abused for political interests, contemporary writers 
saw the imperial aspect of civilization as its main defining feature. For those writing not only after 
Hobson, but also after Freud, and two world wars, the concept of civilization had lost most positive 
characteristics and was merely reminiscent of older and more horrible times.
Yet in the early 2000s, it looked to some as if the past, and its dreadful association with civilization, 
had returned.  A wave of what  critics would soon refer  to  as  neoliberalism had swept  over the 
western world since the 1980s, and with the end of the Soviet Union it seemed as if this new form 
of liberalism would start to rule the world once more. Undoubtedly, there were many similarities 
between the international politics of the late nineteenth and the early twenty-first century. As Porter 
has provocatively argued in the re-edition of Critics of Empire, it sometimes suffices to replace the 
word gold with oil and the critique of the Boer war and modern US engagements start to look very 
similar.14 With the rhetoric of civilization added, the farce could be seen as following the tragedy. 
How different were Huntington's pronouncements about the 'bloody borders' of civilizations from 
the writings of those who had held the Boxer rebellion to be a war between civilizations, and were  
George W. Bush's ideas of civilization not a mere reincarnation of Joseph Chamberlain's? Carefully 
ignoring the many differences that separate the late nineteenth century from our time, those who 
started to be concerned with civilization interpreted what they saw as an eerie repetition of previous 
centuries.
Given these similarities and the recurrence of civilization as a word of politics, it was an easy step 
to interpret it as one of the main culprits of the new international situation. Following a whole swath 
of literature dedicated to western orientalism and the rhetoric of empire, civilization became seen as 
the fixture of an ever similar international sphere, dominated by western imperialism. There were 
several problems with these assertions. Firstly, cause and effect can be said to have been confused, 
as civilization, in some descriptions, served both as a cover-up as well as the cause of imperial 
13 Brett Bowden, The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2009), 155.
14 Bernard Porter, “Preface,” in Critics of Empire: British Radicals and the Imperial Challenge (London: 
I.B.Tauris, 2007).
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expansion. In other words, it was simultaneously the driving force behind an imperial ideology and 
a 'masked word' to protect its true intentions. Secondly, assuming the similarity of civilization over 
several centuries, its critics asserted a unified character. European imperialism stretched through 
centuries, and equally must have the inevitably connected concept of civilization. From those who 
lived long before the term civilization was invented, like Francisco de Vitoria, to those who first  
used it in an entirely different context, like the philosophers of the Enlightenment, all started to be 
complicit  in  the  larger  drama  of  civilization.  Civilization  was  de-contextualized,  taken  out  of 
previous  debates,  and  left  to  stand  for  itself  as  an  ever-imperial  term,  which  dominated  the 
international sphere for centuries.
As I have shown, this is a gross oversimplification of the long and complex history of the use of the 
word civilization in  international  relations.  The concept  of civilization,  as I  have argued in the 
second chapter, did not rise to prominence as an imperial term. Instead, it was the liberals of early 
nineteenth century Europe, who, associating progress, nationalism, and civilization first advocated 
it as a concept of international politics. They were for the most part not interested in imperialism, 
but precisely the opposite, as they argued for a national and civilized state to follow the dynastic 
empires of Europe. The original, liberal meaning of civilization was an anti-imperial one, used to 
overthrow oppression, not to justify it. Through the propaganda of Europe's liberals, civilization 
became  the  watchword  of  revolution,  and  before  and  throughout  1848  it  was  a  term  widely 
associated with those who demanded the overthrow of the old order. In the Crimean War, as I have 
shown in chapter three, a coalition of western powers went to war against Russia and it was soon 
clear that it would be the first war for civilization. As a coalition of France and Britain, or as many 
conservatives  saw  it,  a  coalition  of  the  friends  of  the  revolution,  opposed  Russia,  the  word 
civilization entered the discussions of international relations for good. In the British, as well as in 
the  Prussian  parliament,  the  war  was  debated  with  civilizational  vocabulary,  which  remained 
associated with those who wanted Europe to move towards a more nationalist future.
In a series of wars of nationalism that shook Europe from 1859 to 1871, the language of civilization 
formed part of the arsenal of those who wanted to see the downfall Austria and the foundation of 
Germany  and  Italy.  Nationalists  and  liberals  were  not  just  opposed  by  Austria  and  other 
conservative powers, but also by the Catholic Church, which opposed the national unification of 
Italy and all  ideas  of  modern  civilization  and nationalism.  The  deep  religious  conflicts  within 
Europe  are  often  forgotten  when  we  talk  about  the  three  C's  of  commerce,  Christianity,  and 
Civilization  that  allegedly  dominated  the  nineteenth  century  in  unison.  Christianity  was  not  a 
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unifying  element  in  the  discussions  of  the  mid-nineteenth  century,  as  Protestantism  became 
associated with modern civilization, and Catholicism with the old order, the Jesuits, and Catholic 
civilization. It is again important to stress that these conflicts were not imperial. In the wars of the 
1860s, whose propaganda relied on civilizational language, Europeans opposed each other, and the 
different ideas of civilization were what these wars were partially about.
What emerged from and with them was the idea of a liberal and civilized state, that formed the 
opposite of a dynastic and illiberal one and not, as one might think, of a savage or barbarian state.  
Indeed, it is important to see the civilized state as an inner-European and liberal construction, not as  
an imperial and chauvinist  tool of international relations. The original,  liberal  ideas of progress 
associated with the civilized state, which was meant to stick to the rules of civilized warfare and to 
guarantee liberal government, were not yet infused with the spirit of conquest and domination late 
nineteenth  century liberalism is  generally  associated  with.  And even  when these  tendencies  of 
associating  civilization  with  racist  and  imperial  fantasies  started  to  show,  they  were  never 
exclusively geared towards the rest of the world, but equally applied to Europe. As I have argued in 
the chapter concerned with the 1870s, debates about race and civilization dominated not just the 
Russo-Turkish war and the propaganda that preceded it, but also British domestic debates, where 
the relationship between Britain's first Jewish prime minister and an English idea of civilization was 
discussed. On top of that, inner-European debates about civilization, so prominent in the 1860s had 
far from gone away. As Germany embarked on a civilizational struggle against the Catholic Church, 
and Gladstone chastised the pope as an enemy of modern civilization, it must have been obvious to 
most Europeans that they were not living in a time of civilizational unanimity.
Such  unanimity  is  nonetheless  often  associated  with  the  European  imperial  project  and  the 
civilizing mission, which, as I have argued, also has its roots in the 1870s. Yet, as I have shown in 
chapter six, we should not let official civilizational rhetoric about the European civilizing mission 
fool us into believing that it represented a general European trend in the appreciation of civilization.  
In contrast to previous interpretations of the 1880s, I have shown that a new scepticism towards 
older  positivist  liberal  conceptions  of  civilization  started  to  grow  in  Europe,  making  the 
civilizational landscape of the 1880s a highly contested one. While the philosophy and the ideas of 
liberal civilization were criticized by intellectuals and thinkers on the left, the international mission 
for civilization was highly disputed for different reasons. Claims by the Portuguese government to 
civilize Africa, were quickly ridiculed by British liberals and the ensuing dispute over who was to 
bring  which  type  of  civilization  directly  led  to  the  Conference  of  Berlin  in  1885.  While  an 
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international dispute over civilization was the original reason for a conference that has become 
synonymous with a one-sided European idea of civilization, such an interpretation of civilization 
was  actively  disputed  behind  closed  doors.  As  I  have  shown  through  a  close  reading  of  the 
Conference  protocols,  the  representatives  of  various  European  states  and  the  Ottoman  Empire 
disagreed over the exact formulation of the articles containing civilization, and the final result, I 
argue, owes its confusing character to an attempt at compromise.
The 1890s, as I have argued in chapter seven, continued to be dominated by civilizational language, 
which split Europe into a pro-war and anti-war party. The perceived rise of militarism led to large 
discussions  about  the future of  Europe and the world,  in  which the word civilization played a 
crucial role on both sides of the argument. It did however not, as I have shown, separate Germany 
from the rest  of  Europe,  as  has  so often  been argued,  but  merely the different  conceptions  of 
civilization  from  each  other.  While  the  German  emperor  heavily  opposed  Japanese  claims  to 
civilization,  the British government  moved ever  closer  to an alliance with Japan.  The different 
perceptions of the East, as a 'Yellow Peril' or as another addition to the future of civilization was 
what separated much of German and British discourse, although arguments in both countries relied 
heavily on civilizational tropes. These debates continued throughout the 1890s, as I have shown in 
the last chapter, and finally led to the downfall of classic civilizational rhetoric in the singular. As 
the western powers intervened in China to suppress the boxer rebellion, many in Europe started to 
speak not of a war for civilization but as a war between civilizations. While this rhetoric started out 
as pro-war propaganda, it was quickly adopted by those who saw Britain and other western powers 
engaged in a capitalist  war that sought to undermine different traditions of civilization.  Similar 
tropes could be found in the contemporaneous Boer war, in which, what Hobson called 'the slow-
going civilization of the Boer' was often described as equal or even superior to the singular idea of 
liberal, international civilization propagated in Europe.
As I have sought to argue, many of those interpreting the use of the concept of civilization today are 
doing so through a lens shaped by these late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century debates 
and we need to be careful not to apply the analysis of the past to our time. The word civilization, I  
have argued, does not have a fixed place in the history of the international sphere. Indeed, its rise 
and fall throughout the second half of the nineteenth century describes a dramatic curve, in which it  
rose to prominence on the back of liberal politics and declined as the optimistic beliefs in progress 
turned sour. Yet, civilization should also not be reduced to a liberal concept, as it was employed for 
many different, unexpected, and often contradictory political purposes and, should its use remain 
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popular over the next decades, it will do so again. While there are therefore few lessons from the 
past, especially from such a chameleon-like word of politics as civilization, what we can do is not to 
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